WI: Kaiserliche Marine adapts Jeune Ecole

Given commerce raiders cannot match captial ships in a stand up fight Britain will just leave its battle and cruiser squadrons based all around the world to guard naval chokepoints and thick shipping routes and blockade coaling stations and bases both in Gewrman and around the world. Given that German commerce raiding ships are unable to conduct a stand up fight against captial ships they will do what damage they can then then either be bought to battle and be destroyed or be interned in neutral countries. Closer to home British ability to defeat any German ship in home water in stand up battle will bring the naval war to the German coast, leaving the Germans thinking how stupid they were for not building a battlefleet.

Battle cruisers were about 25% more expensive than battleship by ton, if memory serves. Historically, the HSF built 7.5 BC's (Blucher, VDT, 2xMoltke, 3 Derrflinger, Seydlitz) and 17 dreadnoughts of 4 different classes, for 24.5 capital ships. Assuming the 17 dreadnoughts turn into 8 dreadnoughts and the rest as BC's, that's 7.5+(9/1.25=7.2) = 14.7 battlecruisers. If an average German BC was 22,000, that's about 325,000 tons of capital ships. They need to double their range, so call it 30,000 tons each instead of 22,000 tons, or 11 BC's in the fleet capable of, say, 10,000 nm cruising.

The RN needs 12 dreadnoughts to counter their 8 German counterparts. For the 11 BC's, they'll need 16 in the British Isles, 16 in the Americas, leaving the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans undefended. 32 British BC's = 40 dreadnoughts. Total requirement is equivalent to 52 dreadnoughts. Total British builds by 1914 were 10 BC's and 25 dreadnoughts, (including purchases and theft of foreign dreadnoughts building in Britain), for a total of 35. The RN has only 2/3rd's of the required forces.
 

Deleted member 94680

Battle cruisers were about 25% more expensive than battleship by ton, if memory serves. Historically, the HSF built 7.5 BC's (Blucher, VDT, 2xMoltke, 3 Derrflinger, Seydlitz) and 17 dreadnoughts of 4 different classes, for 24.5 capital ships. Assuming the 17 dreadnoughts turn into 8 dreadnoughts and the rest as BC's, that's 7.5+(9/1.25=7.2) = 14.7 battlecruisers. If an average German BC was 22,000, that's about 325,000 tons of capital ships. They need to double their range, so call it 30,000 tons each instead of 22,000 tons, or 11 BC's in the fleet capable of, say, 10,000 nm cruising.

The RN needs 12 dreadnoughts to counter their 8 German counterparts. For the 11 BC's, they'll need 16 in the British Isles, 16 in the Americas, leaving the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans undefended. 32 British BC's = 40 dreadnoughts. Total requirement is equivalent to 52 dreadnoughts. Total British builds by 1914 were 10 BC's and 25 dreadnoughts, (including purchases and theft of foreign dreadnoughts building in Britain), for a total of 35. The RN has only 2/3rd's of the required forces.

You forgot the Mediterranean. They'll need 16 BCs in the Home, NAWI, and Mediterranean stations if all 11 German BCs are in one place. Surely they won't put all of their battlecruisers together? The whole point would be to raid all over the place, therefore splitting their 11 up? That means the RN doesn't need as many BCs in one place. Also, being the defender, the RN could use a mixture of Dreadnoughts, pre-Dreadnougt and battlecruisers to fend off the German raiders. The onus in on the Germans to avoid the defences, not necessarily on the British to chase them down and catch them. British battlecruisers could be used to herd German BCs towards the RN heavies for destruction.
 
Battle cruisers were about 25% more expensive than battleship by ton, if memory serves. Historically, the HSF built 7.5 BC's (Blucher, VDT, 2xMoltke, 3 Derrflinger, Seydlitz) and 17 dreadnoughts of 4 different classes, for 24.5 capital ships. Assuming the 17 dreadnoughts turn into 8 dreadnoughts and the rest as BC's, that's 7.5+(9/1.25=7.2) = 14.7 battlecruisers. If an average German BC was 22,000, that's about 325,000 tons of capital ships. They need to double their range, so call it 30,000 tons each instead of 22,000 tons, or 11 BC's in the fleet capable of, say, 10,000 nm cruising.

The RN needs 12 dreadnoughts to counter their 8 German counterparts. For the 11 BC's, they'll need 16 in the British Isles, 16 in the Americas, leaving the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans undefended. 32 British BC's = 40 dreadnoughts. Total requirement is equivalent to 52 dreadnoughts. Total British builds by 1914 were 10 BC's and 25 dreadnoughts, (including purchases and theft of foreign dreadnoughts building in Britain), for a total of 35. The RN has only 2/3rd's of the required forces.

Why does Britian suddenly need 4 x the number of Battle Cruisers?

They are not tied to their ports - they would move about and counter the know German Movements

Also where are these German BCs operating from?

Britain has bases around the world capable of handling far flung squadrons - Germany? Not so much.

Also what about other nations ships?

The Japanese alone have 4 of the Kongos which ship for ship are the equal or better of any of the Battlecruisers of the period and if the Japanese see Britain and Germany conducting a BC race - they would join in with possibly some of the Battleships of that time built as BCs instead.

Lastly - "theft of foreign dreadnoughts building in Britain" - there was nothing illegal about the seizing of Erin and Agincourt (which i assume you are alluding to) - the contracts of the day for any warship being built in the UK had a stipulation that in time of war the ship could be turned over to the Royal Navy.
 
This sort of move by the Germans probably prompts the US to build its own BCs as well. War Plan Black was developed out of concerns of German aggression in the Caribbean so the US was not totally immune to fears of a German threat. German battlecruisers on the high seas around the world to include in the western hemisphere probably generate some sort of an American response.
 
What if instead of trying to match the RN ship by ship, the Imperial German Navy decided to adapt the Jeune Ecole doctrine (with some modifications, probably) and develop strategies to counter the naval advantage of the British?
I've not read all the replies, so forgive me if this repeats what others have already written.

If the Germans build fewer battleships and uses the money saved to build more cruisers most of the extra commerce raiding forces will be based in Germany when war breaks out and will be trapped in the North Sea because the Royal Navy's distant blockade will prevent them getting through the GIUK Gap and Strait of Dover. I.e. they won't get past the Northern Patrol or the Dover Patrol.

The few cruisers that Germany did have overseas IOTL did sink (IIRC) over 100,000 GRT of merchant shipping before they were hunted down and destroyed by the Royal Navies. More cruisers overseas would have sunk more ships before they were in turn caught and sunk. That would be embarrassing for the Royal Navy, however, I doubt that it would be enough to do significant damage to Britain's overseas trade.

The Germans would also have to develop a sophisticated fleet train of colliers and repair ships to make up for the lack of overseas bases. The few overseas bases the Germans did have would have to have their defences strengthened so they could hold out longer because they would been higher up the British to do list in the event of a war with Germany.

And a smaller High Seas Fleet means the Royal Navy can deploy a smaller force in the North Sea to counter it. That means more ships can be deployed on the far seas to counter the larger German cruiser fleet.

The Germans really need a battle fleet capable of breaking the blockade, which in turn allows the cruisers (and their colliers) to break out into the North Atlantic.

The only way for this to work is for the Germans to realise the potential of the submarine earlier so they can develop a U-boat powered by diesel engines with enough endurance to operate in the Western Approaches in time to have about 80 in service in August 1914. This would be possible financially if the Germans were building fewer battleships. However, it might not be possible to develop the technology required early enough.

IIRC the German Navy of OTL didn't commission its first submarine until 1906 only commissioned another 3 by the end of 1909, but by August 1914 increased the total to 25-30 of which about two thirds were sea going boats with diesel engines. The projected total set by the 1912 amendment of the Navy Law was 80 boats by 1920. With a smaller battle fleet it would be possible to bring that forward 5-6 years with the first U-boat completing in 1901 for a force of 80 by the end of 1914 (set by the 1906 amendment of the Navy Law). However, a smaller proportion of the boats will be long range diesel powered submarines unless the development of the diesel engine can be accelerated.
 
Zheng He This sort of move by the Germans probably prompts the US to build its own BCs as well. War Plan Black was developed out of concerns of German aggression in the Caribbean so the US was not totally immune to fears of a German threat. German battlecruisers on the high seas around the world to include in the western hemisphere probably generate some sort of an American response.

Definitely, but for Germany a large American fleet program is a good thing - the stronger the US is at sea, the better.
 
I've not read all the replies, so forgive me if this repeats what others have already written.

If the Germans build fewer battleships and uses the money saved to build more cruisers most of the extra commerce raiding forces will be based in Germany when war breaks out and will be trapped in the North Sea because the Royal Navy's distant blockade will prevent them getting through the GIUK Gap and Strait of Dover. I.e. they won't get past the Northern Patrol or the Dover Patrol.

The Channel defenses might be too hot to tackle, but for the Norwegian Sea I don't see how blockade line AMC's can do anything against BC's except be quickly sunk.
 
If the Germans build fewer battleships and uses the money saved to build more cruisers most of the extra commerce raiding forces will be based in Germany when war breaks out and will be trapped in the North Sea because the Royal Navy's distant blockade will prevent them getting through the GIUK Gap and Strait of Dover. I.e. they won't get past the Northern Patrol or the Dover Patrol.

This is a hurdle never addressed by those who advocate for a weaker German navy. IOTL the KM had the ability to assault its jailer and make him keep a close watch, a weaker KM will free up the RN to do other stuff and certainly not keep a respectful distance.
 
The Channel defenses might be too hot to tackle, but for the Norwegian Sea I don't see how blockade line AMC's can do anything against BC's except be quickly sunk.
Because there would still be a substantial Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow supporting the Northern Patrol.

IOTL the Grand Fleet in World War One and the Home Fleet in World War II enforced a distant blockade that (usually) prevented the German Navy from sending anything bigger than an auxiliary cruiser through the GIUK gap. In World War One that allowed the RN to replace the old cruisers that initially made up the Northern Patrol with AMCs, because the job of the patrol was to stop merchant ships trying to run the blockade and they shouldn't have to deal with a warship more powerful than an auxiliary cruiser.

However, a weaker German battlefleet allows the British to build fewer battleships and more cruisers. Therefore the AMCs that formed the Northern Patrol IOTL will be replaced by light cruisers. Which will be better able than the AMCs to outrun a German BC and then shadow it while the British BCs based at Scapa Flow home in using the position reports it provided.
 
Furthermore spending less money building battleships means the money could have been spent on accelerating the development of naval aviation. The WWI Ark Royal might have been completed earlier or we might even have got the ship Beardmore proposed before World War One.

Or it might be even more radical. If less money needs to be spent on the Royal Navy then more money is available to spend on the British Army.
 
Because there would still be a substantial Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow supporting the Northern Patrol.

That's not going to stop any break in or breakout by warships unless the GF is pre-warned and already in position at sea. By the time the GF gets to the scene (assuming the AMC managed to get off a received distress signal against jamming), the German squadron is long gone.

IOTL the Grand Fleet in World War One and the Home Fleet in World War II enforced a distant blockade that (usually) prevented the German Navy from sending anything bigger than an auxiliary cruiser through the GIUK gap.

In WW2 the British could not stop German warships from going through the GIUK gap, and that was with radar and air patrols on top. In WW1 the GIUK gap was even more permeable to German warships, they just never did that, being content to stay in the North Sea and be contained.

In World War One that allowed the RN to replace the old cruisers that initially made up the Northern Patrol with AMCs, because the job of the patrol was to stop merchant ships trying to run the blockade and they shouldn't have to deal with a warship more powerful than an auxiliary cruiser.

The armored cruisers were replaced because they poorly suited for the role (old, unreliable). They held no combat advantage against German warships, (a CL could outrun them, a BC or submarine could sink them, and the Germans had few armored cruisers in home waters).

Which will be better able than the AMCs to outrun a German BC and then shadow it while the British BCs based at Scapa Flow home in using the position reports it provided.

CL's are much better than AMC's for blockade, but in 1914/1915 they were using AMC's and armored cruisers, which German BC's could have easily dealt with. Note that this does not entail an Atlantic breakout - Hipper could have gone to the blockade line and assaulted it, then moved north into the far reaches of the Norwegian Sea for a couple days or weeks, then returned to Germany after the GF had returned to port.
 

Deleted member 9338

While I can see the Admirality always wanting more, are the need for 11BC in the Atlnatic and another 11 in the Mediterrean nessaracy. They have pre Dreadnoughts for convoy work and the will deter a Battlecruiser, unless the Germans form them into a squadron which will limit there usefulness in comerece raiding.
 
Note that this does not entail an Atlantic breakout - Hipper could have gone to the blockade line and assaulted it, then moved north into the far reaches of the Norwegian Sea for a couple days or weeks, then returned to Germany after the GF had returned to port.
Except they can't, because the German capital ships weren't capable of sustaining themselves at sea for more than a couple of days. The handful of times they did it, it required heroic efforts akin to the Russian Baltic Fleet sailing to Vladivostok in 1905... we know how that ended up.
 
German capital ships had a range roughly half that of their RN equivalents, based upon bunkerage - whether they could usefully use that would be down to procedure.
 
The assertion that German battleships has particularly short range doesn't ring true to me. The Nassau had 2700t of coal and 160t of oil, the Dreadnought had 2900t coal and 1120t of oil. The oil was used to increase the burn rate of the coal rather than as a fuel itself, and the Nassau used reciprocating engines but efficient small tube boilers whereas the Dreadnought used efficient turbine but large tube boilers. So I'll need some serious marine engineering talk to convince me that German equivalent to the Dreadnought was particularly short on range in comparison.
 
After a fast look into Wiki it seems to me that the range of the German Dreads is at least comparable to the British ones. The one outliner is the Iron Duke class. But all in all the are around 5 to 7 thousand seamiles.

That is not to say, that the British ships may heve been more suited for longer stays at distant stations. Just that they had comparable range.
And the suitebility may also be influenced by the availability of stations of suiteble importance and mentality to station major units far from home.
 
It's not a matter of range, but of accomodation, reliability and self-maintenance capability. The Germans didn't have those - accomodation was cramped, stores capacity limited, and they relied on shore facilities for a lot of support. When MOLTKE went to New York, provisions were stacked in the passageways, and that with a reduced peacetime complement. I suspect that the coal capacity is based on providing full power for an extended period rather than on long cruising range - they could make long trips, but as an administrative move rather than a combat deployment.

That's not to say that the Germans were incapable of designing ships for long voyages. Their armoured cruisers were designed for Pacific service, with all the things the capital ships lacked to allow them to stay at sea for a long time. But their capital ships were heavily optimised for fighting in the North and Baltic Seas, and that's why their statistics look so much better than British capital ships. Tellingly, the REVENGE class partially (though not entirely) adopted the German design philosophy and would have added significant value in a late-war fleet action at relatively modest cost.
 
Do you have any document that shows the HSF could not pull two weeks from harbour? Because that would be what is needed in the Baltic and North Sea Imo.

And again, the decision for the slimer accomodation and co. would be a design choice because of the probable theaters of war. The Germans simply had the luxury to be able to optimise for one theater of operations whereas the British had a world spanning Empire that they needed to defend.
And that the Germans had the facilities at home should be no suprise at all.
 
The Germans simply had the luxury to be able to optimise for one theater of operations whereas the British had a world spanning Empire that they needed to defend.
And that the Germans had the facilities at home should be no suprise at all.
Indeed - all design is compromise, and that was a set of compromises that suited German strategic realities. When the British were faced with a similar strategic problem, they adopted a similar solution in the REVENGEs.
 
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