WI July-crisis made August-1914 - looking for advice

On Britain, it might be relevant to note some of Grey's statements to Cambon.

On 29July, Grey said "France is being drawn into a quarrel which is not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance [with Russia], her honor and interest obliged her to engage." But, he pointed out, Britain was "free of engagements", and "Our idea has always been to avoid being drawn into war over a Balkan question."

On 1Aug, after Cambon apparently mentioned Britain's support of France during the Agadir Crisis, Grey again pointed out that "in this case, France is being drawn into a quarrel which is not hers."

If Germany doesn't DOW France, but France enters the war anyway, Grey's objection against Britain being obligated to support France gains even more credibility, as it is now quite clear that France is not having war forced upon her.

So, yeah, no German DOW against France, + no German invasion of Belgium, probably = no British entry and no British blockade.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... about - possible - british behavior ...
Unfortunatly I don't have a copy of P.Kennedy "The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism" as well as no accsess to. Also haven't found a decent review and or discussion of it on the web yet.

In the Wiki-arcticle on Causes of World War I it is stated :
"The German invasion of Belgium was not important because the British decision had already been made and the British were more concerned with the fate of France."
with the book named above, pages 457-462, as reference.

Can anybody tell me more about this "already made decision" ?
By whom ?
When ?

I am well aware of the rational and the history ("Entente cordial" etc.) behind such a decision/choice, but I would like to know if and when and by whom this decision was made during the July-crisis before german troops crossed the belgian border.
 
In The Sleepwalkers, Clark recounts Grey's 1Aug conversation with Cambon, in which Grey told Cambon that the Cabinet was still opposed to war, having decided that British interests did not require intervention.

During the next 24 hours there was frantic lobbying for intervention.

At the first Cabinet meeting of 2Aug, Grey was authorized to tell the French that the RN would take action to protect France if the HSF sortied into the North Sea to attack French coasts or shipping.
In the second meeting, in the evening of 2Aug, between 6:30pm and 8pm, the Cabinet agreed that a "substantial violation" of Belgian territory would "compel us to take action".

It is this meeting that Walter Runciman later said was "the Cabinet which decided that war with Germany was inevitable."

Grey said that Britain had a "moral obligation" to support France "in her agony". The specific issues under consideration, though, were British commitment to protect France's northern coast, and "substantial" German violation of Belgian territory. The decision was cemented by Grey's threat to resign if intervention were denied, which would probably bring down the Liberal government and likely put the Conservatives (who happened to oppose intervention) in control.

Still, though, Britain only DOW'd Germany on 4Aug, when Germany DOW'd France and Britain's own ultimatum to Germany expired.






ITTL, though, the Germans have already made reassurances of respecting Belgium's neutrality (at noon on 2Aug, hours before the OTL second Cabinet meeting), and have been meeting with the British ambassador since about noon that same day, to iron out potential misunderstandings -- I would assume that the issue of the HSF's behavior would be addressed, and (given Germany's newly-reinforced hope that Britain might remain neutral) probably resolved to Britain's satisfaction.

These things will undercut Grey's position badly, as Germany is now clearly not threatening France. If France enters the war, it can now only be because she allowed herself to be "dragged into a quarrel which is not hers" (Grey's own words to Cambon).

It is one thing for the Interventionist faction to rally support for a moral obligation of helping a threatened France and an assaulted Belgium; quite a different matter to convince the reluctant Cabinet members to go to war to help the French in their own folly!

In these new circumstances, even Grey's threat to resign would only look like a petulant gesture in support of a stupid, needless action, and will thus not be made.

I figure the Liberals realize that they are now unlikely to get a war consensus, and will only be harmed politically if they insist on trying.

ITTL, there is no German ultimatum to Belgium, no second ultimatum to France, no German DOW on France, no German violation of Belgium, no need for the OTL British ultimatum to Germany. None of the historical triggers (or, alternatively, "necessary justifications") are present: Britain doesn't go to war. At least initially.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
It is this meeting that Walter Runciman later said was "the Cabinet which decided that war with Germany was inevitable."
Ohhhh, than this is a statement made afterwards ... looking backwards from OTL events.
interesting

... the Conservatives (who happened to oppose intervention) ...
Somewhere in this thread was stated, that Bonar Law offered Asquith conservative participation in the gouverment in interventionists side, should he - somehow - "loose" :p some of his ministers.

However, from what (few) I known about british home politics at this time, the conservatives were more concerned about Ireland and "Suffragettes" question. ...



ITTL, though, the Germans have already made reassurances of respecting Belgium's neutrality (at noon on 2Aug, hours before the OTL second Cabinet meeting), and have been meeting with the British ambassador since about noon that same day, to iron out potential misunderstandings -- I would assume that the issue of the HSF's behavior would be addressed, and (given Germany's newly-reinforced hope that Britain might remain neutral) probably resolved to Britain's satisfaction.

These things will undercut Grey's position badly, as Germany is now clearly not threatening France. If France enters the war, it can now only be because she allowed herself to be "dragged into a quarrel which is not hers" (Grey's own words to Cambon).

It is one thing for the Interventionist faction to rally support for a moral obligation of helping a threatened France and an assaulted Belgium; quite a different matter to convince the reluctant Cabinet members to go to war to help the French in their own folly!

In these new circumstances, even Grey's threat to resign would only look like a petulant gesture in support of a stupid, needless action, and will thus not be made.

I figure the Liberals realize that they are now unlikely to get a war consensus, and will only be harmed politically if they insist on trying.

ITTL, there is no German ultimatum to Belgium, no second ultimatum to France, no German DOW on France, no German violation of Belgium, no need for the OTL British ultimatum to Germany. None of the historical triggers (or, alternatively, "necessary justifications") are present: Britain doesn't go to war. At least initially.
Nice summary of possible events. :)

I would like to add, that the HSF during this events would, with some of its "bigger" units additionally to what was already there, more likely to be on its way through th Kiel-channel to the baltic sea, causing even lesser concern for the RN.

However, this would leave France in need of a really good other reason/casus belli to go on war against Germany. At least the politicians, even though not the militairs didn't believe to have a chance without proper british support ... beside some coast watch :p duties for tghe mighty RN.6
 
If Britain stays out, it will be interesting to see what efforts the French might make towards strangling German trade.

I suppose they have enough cruisers to attrit German-flagged shipping. But they will not have the strength necessary to run somewhat roughshod over neutral shipping, as the British did OTL (forcing neutrals to gather in the Downs for inspection, for instance; a method which I believe the British had previously resisted when they were the neutrals). Nor will the French be able to define virtually everything as contraband, contrary to prior custom, as the British did; especially when we must suppose that much of the material is either being carried in British bottoms, or is being shipped for British merchants.

On the other hand, we can expect Germany to grow restive under British restrictions on German warships passing through the North Sea. After all, "the French can sweep up our trade, but we are not permitted to retaliate?!?"

Between French efforts at strangling German trade, and the rather understandable German desire to retaliate, there will be some interesting moments for Britain. Depending upon the exact events, Britain might enter the war against Germany (purely in a naval and colonial role, probably; sweep up some nice German colonies at no risk, eh wot?), or pursue some punitive actions against France.

These are my thoughts; anyone want to comment? My understanding of the issues involved is far from comprehensive...
 
I can't imagine a neutral Britain would object to German trade and the occasional cruiser rounding the top of Scotland to the open Atlantic.

There is no British blockade squadron off New York so all the Germans liners and merchants in American harbors are free to move home.

No way the French have are going to try stop American merchants forwarding goods going around north of Scotland. It would be hard for them to set up a cruiser patrol with their other commitments or risk antagonizing the Americans.

The Germans better get on the stick and start buying and shipping in all the strategic supplies they might need for a long war before the British think about coming in. In this TL there is no Antwerp captured nitrates and their own iron production in Lorraine is at risk of disruption.

I expect in this TL where everyone isn't DOWing everyone and crossing borders right away peace might break out if everybody has time to think about what might be gained and lost in a war (especially a war in the TL which everyone would know from the get go might last years). The Germans can get out of this anytime they wan't by having Britain host a conference over Serbia. I expect they will ask within a couple of weeks.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
EMERGENCY CALL : POD is falling apart, 1

The foundation of my POD has just fallen apart.

It was :

Barbara Tuchmanns narrative of the nightly calling of Moltke to the Kaiser on 1.August, who, after receiving a telegram from Lichnowsky, german ambassador to London, shows Moltke this and gives him the 'free hand' for the western plan (Schlieffen-Plan through Belgium).

Now that I've been through most of the collection of documents compiled by Karl Kautsky in 1919 (to be found here) I've found the following 4 telegrams of Lichnowski of 1.August 1914:

1st Lichnowski telegram (no. 205): sent from London at 12.14 MEZ, reception at foreign office noted at 16:23,
notion „deciphering seen by the Kaiser“, sent to general staff, War ministry admirality staff and „Reichsmarineamt“ at 20:10
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]It tells, that Lichnowsky is called for a talk with Grey by Sir W. Tyrell, who also seems to hint, that if Germany doesn't attack France, England will also stay neutral and would guarantee passivity of France.[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]It also tells of a phone call by Gray at this moment asking Lichnowsky, if he could declare, that in case France stays neutral in a german-russian war, Germany would not attack France. Lichnowski answered in affirmative.[/FONT]

2nd Lichnowski telegram (no. 209): sent from London at 15:10 MEZ, reception at foreign office noted at 18:04,
notion „deciphering seen by the Kaiser“, sent to general staff, War ministry admirality staff and „Reichsmarineamt“ at 20:00, sidenotes by the Kaiser, one depicting the time „20:30 N.M (afternoon)“
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]It tells of another talk with Tyrell, saying Grey wants to make proposals for the neutrality of England, even for the case, that „we (germany) would have war with Russia as well as France“. The meeting with Gray will be at 15:30 (16:30 MEZ).[/FONT]

3rd Lichnowski telegram (no 212) sent from London 17:47 (18:47 MEZ), reception at foreign office noted at 22:02,
seen by the Kaiser at 16:30 of 2.August and sent back at 17:30 as stated with its numerous sidenotes of the Kaiser,

[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Containing a declaration of the cabinet, read by Gray, complaining of the non-positive answer of Germany – contrary to France – regarding Belgiums neutrality. That theme to be stressed all over the talk. On the counterquestion, if he could give a certain declaration about Britains neutrality, gray had answered that's not possible to him. Gray also had asked if France and Germany couldn't just stand im arms at their borders without attacking each other, what Lichnowski declared possible, if Britain guarantees its neutrality, on which Gray said he would enquire about.[/FONT]

4th Lichnowski telegram (no 214), sent from London 20:26 (21:26 MEZ), reception at foreign office noted at 23:10
(no notion of passing it on ! Esp. not if seen by the Kaiser ! as the others)

[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Telegram 205 be cancelled by telegram 212. Since there is even no positive proposal present, telegram 204 (by Bethamnn-Hollweg) is exhausted. No further steps done.
[/FONT][FONT=Verdana, sans-serif](Bethamnn-Hollweg sents a telegram (no. 204), answering the telegram 209 above,, sent to main telegraph office at 19:15,
[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]stating that Germany accepts the english proposal, if England gurantees with all of its military the unconditioned neutrality of France in the german-russian conflict until its end. When this ends will be decided by Germany.)[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]
[/FONT]
edit :
Emergency call suspended
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
EMERGENCY CALL : POD is falling apart, 2

The result of this wall of text :
There couldn't have been the stated nightly meeting of Moltke and the Kaiser, based on a nightly telegram depressing the Kaisers mood and giging Moltke the 'free hand' of operation.

The 'long' Lichnowski telegram bringing down Wilhelm II hopes (no 212) sent earlier was seen by the Kaiser THE NEXT DAY ! AFTERNOON !

The 'short' Lichnowski telegram (no 214) seems to have been more kinda 'administrative notion' for the foreing office' use only. No notion of passing it on to anybody, as with the others.


What is the notion of Barbara Tuchmann mentioned above then based upon ??
Only on Moltkes own „Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente“ (Memoires, Letters, Documents), published by his wife after the war ? Which might have been a wee bit biased ?

If so, then Moltke and the general staff had just ignored and not followed Wilhem II orders. A clear cause of insubordination and later on Moltke made up a story to cover that fact.

Does anybody knows of another source for the 'nightly meeting' of Moltke and the Kaiser beside Moltkes own words and their reiterating by others (as i.e. Barbara Tuchmann) ?

edit :
Emergency call suspended

 
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NoMommsen

Donor
[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Btw.:
Wilhelm II order about the crossing into Luxembourg : it was followed to some degree.

[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]There is also a telegram of the german envoy in Luxembourg, von Buch, of the 2.August, sent 12:10,
reception at foreign office noted at 15:57, passed on to general staff, War ministry admirality staff and „Reichsmarineamt“
[/FONT] [FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]Reproducing a message of the State Minister Paul von Eyschen :[/FONT]
„[FONT=Verdana, sans-serif]At this eving at 19:00 (1.August) 5 officers with some soldfiers of the 69th Regiment of Trier arrived in cars in Ulflingen, occupying the Train station anf Telegraph and destroyed the last as well as 150 meters of rails to Belgium. Later there came other cars recalling the first arrived and declared there's some mistake.“[/FONT]
 

NoMommsen

Donor
... hmmm, begins to become a monologue ...

*bump*bump*bump*

Really no comments on the above stated ?
... to detailed the questions ?
... too far from what's rendered as common knowledge , that no one dares :p to say something ?



But ... found another discrepancy, that puzzles me :
From what I've heard and read so far about the mobilization procedures of the german army, as laid down on 1.April each year and distributed to the corps commands, the plans and orders for mobilization demanded that active army corps should be ready with deployment on the 5. and 6. day of mobilization, the reserve corps on 6. and 7. day, followed by Landsturm and Landwehr on the 12. day

In OTL this would/should call for i.e. the 1st Army, that troops far away as the
3rd division from Stettin,
4th division from Bromberg and Gneesen (deeep within Posen province)
5th division from Frankfurt/Oder
are in position on 6.-7.August

or the 4th Army for troops like
11Th division from Schweidnitz
12th division from Nei?e and Gleiwitz
both deep down Silesia are in position also around 6.-7.August on the Luxembourg border region

just to name the most ... remote troops from their place in western deployment plans/order of battle positions of OTL.

Full, let's call it 'battle readiness' should be achived around, let's be in favor of german organization abilities, 10.-12. day of mobilization. That would have been around the 11.August.

I under stand, that with declaration of "Imminent Danger Of War" troops of lokal army corps marked for "border duties" had to be raedy within 6 hours. However, in OTL 1st, 2nd and 3rd army started their full invasion of Belgium on the 4.August, that's 2 days ahead of ... schedule only for the active troops.


Can anybody explain this to me ?
... or were the germans 'just' soo good in their deployment organization to outrun their own schedules ?
 

Tyr Anazasi

Banned
Well, I don't know. I just speculate.

Once you could be right and it was simple an outrun of the own schedule.

Twice: As there was a crisis some preparations could have been made in secrecy to speed it up.

Thrice: The mobilisation was ordered in secrecy before and when the official orders came they were several days in force already.

For the last point there is no proof and very likely only a thought.
 
However, in OTL 1st, 2nd and 3rd army started their full invasion of Belgium on the 4.August, that's 2 days ahead of ... schedule only for the active troops.
Can anybody explain this to me ?
... or were the germans 'just' soo good in their deployment organization to outrun their own schedules ?

The coup de main on Liège was conducted by 2nd Army troops on peacetime footing. Selected brigades were transported to the border and invaded Belgium ahead of all other forces, which were following the 'normal' mobilisation and deployment schedule.
Neither 1st nor 3rd Army units took part in the coup de main.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
The coup de main on Liège was conducted by 2nd Army troops on peacetime footing. Selected brigades were transported to the border and invaded Belgium ahead of all other forces, which were following the 'normal' mobilisation and deployment schedule.
Neither 1st nor 3rd Army units took part in the coup de main.
2nd army consisted of
1st and 2nd Guards inf. divisions from Berlin and Potsdam,
13th and 14th diviisons from Münster, Düsseldorf and Wesel
19th and 20th divisions from Oldenburg and Hannover
and their respective recerve units (as is stated here)
... units not really 'near' the border to belgium. But with kinda 'quick reaction/ready to go' active units ... well within possibility for the VII. corps (13th and 14th div.), but wiki says it was the X. corps's (19th and 20th div.) task ...
That would mean an attack just out of approaching ...
 
That would mean an attack just out of approaching ...

I've the battalion history of 10th Jäger Bn (Goslar) at hand:

02 Aug, 19:00 mustering for marching out, the bn is not fully mobilised, strength: 550 rifles in four coys, MG coy and cyclist coy on war footing.
02 Aug, 20:45 train leaves Goslar station.

03 Aug, 06:45 detraining at Malmedy (by then still a German town), billets in town.

04 Aug, 08:00 mustering for advance into Belgium. Bn is informed that they now belong to 38th InfBrig.
04 Aug, 11:00 vanguard crosses Belgian border.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@rast

WOW, that's fast ! ... as said : seems way faster, then what I've read about the mobilization plan. ;)

That would/could support a thesis, that german mobilization, as it was conducted OTL, was considerably faster than what was thought it could be in late 1913, when the plans were drawn up, maybe to improvements achieved between until August ...
or, that the 'plans' we can look upon today are ... deceptions ?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Found a possible explanation for the discrepancy about the Lichnowsky telegrams.

It wasn't the Lichnowsky telegram, that let Willy call upon Moltke late night, it was a telegram by George V., that arrived late night at the palace' own telegraph bureau answering a telegram sent earlier by Willy himself.

Georgies telegram called for a misunderstanding on the side of Lichnowsky.



But have found another 'question' to pester you with ;) :
In the OP, well #2 post, I stated, that Moltke gets fired by Willy and Falkenheyn is made his succesor.
But ... afaik, the perhaps most important reason for Falkenheyn to become Moltke successor OTL was :
NOT BEING HINDENBURG/LUDENDORFF

With a wee bit more of time on the 2nd August in the OP, one, a couple of hours maybe, would/could someone else been choosen ?
? Schmidt von Knobelsdorf ?
As being Superoir Quartermaster I (Oberquartiermeister)one of Moltkes deputies and responsible for mobilization and deployment.
? Hermann von Kuhl ?
As Superoir Quartermaster IV and one of Moltkes deputies responsible for dealing with Russia and the Balkans ... and the german Fortresses in east and west
? Colmar von der Goltz ?
As seen with Hindenburg Willy had no problems in reactivating OLD men and in earlier times Willy was quite in favor of him. And he was rendered an expert on defense as well as eastern conditions.
? Hans von Plessen ?
Generaladjutant and one of Willys 'closest'
? other proposals ?
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
*bump*Bump*bump
... another time.

As I'm just rewriting/writing anew/reinventing my POD and its nearer consequences I would really, eally like to hear your opinions on a possible successor to Moltke in this very early stage on things (1. and/or 2.August), before any serious actions of war happen.
(... and before forum shutdown ;) )
 
It seems that as early as August 10th, Falkenhayn was approached about replacing Moltke. - So, the idea must have been around already before. The Kaiser was very much in favour of Falkenhayn, which the leading officers of the military cabinet (Lyncker and Marschall) knew.
Von der Goltz was considered a too strong character to harmonise with the Kaiser, the same should apply for Schmidt von Knobelsdorf. Plessen was considered too old.
Kuhl and (Georg) von Waldersee might be options, but not strong ones. Hermann von Stein would be another one.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
HiHoo :) I haven't given up working on this, though I have been ... quite quiet here for some times (real Life sucks :openedeyewink: )

As said in 2 posts above I am remaking my PoD, but I am again running into the devils details.
However I still center around the 'Lichnowsky-telegram' offering british as well as french neutrality to germany.

OTL :
Bethmann-Hollweg came late to the afternoon meeting with the Kaiser. Too late to keep Willy from signing the mobilisation order and even after Moltke and Falkenhayn had already left with the mobilisation order.

This is how I could reconstruct things :
  • Early afternoon Bethmann-Hollweg was at the Federal-Council session in the Reichstag. Tirpitz talked to him after the session had ended.
  • Tirpitz returned to the 'Marine-Amt' to get called for the meeting from there
  • Meeting at the palace starts before 17:00, because
  • 17:00 Willy signs the order of mobilisation
  • Tirpitz arrives a wee bit late due to traffic problems, Moltke and Falkenhayn are still there
  • von Jagow arrives only announcing a „very important Despatch from England“. Some short talks, Moltke and Falkenhayn leave, distributing the mobilisation order almost immediatly
  • only then Bethmann-Hollweg shows up
  • after that, "10 minutes after Moltke and Falkenhayn have left" the famous/infamous Lichnowsky-telegram 'arrives' at the meeting
  • and so on ....
This is mainly based on :
- Tirpitz : Memoirs ['Erinnerungen']
- Holger Afflerbach : Falkenhayn : politisches Denken und Handeln (what is accessable through google books)

My Question :
Why were Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow late ?

They knew it was THE important meeting, scheduled right about the time the ultimatum to Russia ends with the only consequence of mobilisation to be signed and announced. The meeting starting the feared Great War.

Anyone have some ideas ? ... or even references of Bethmann-Hollwegs whereabouts at the afternoon before the meeting ?

(further 'detail' questions in the pipe, but atm ... RL calls )
 
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