WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

Three different ways you can take this, but I wonder about the outcome of each long term.

1. The Japanese take Midway, but at a high cost to themselves with most of their ships and planes being destroyed and a relatively low cost to the Allies

2. The Japanese force pushes the Allied navies out, with slightly more losses for the Allies than the Japanese.

3. A total Japanese Victory, with minimal casualties for them and almost the entire Allied force involved in the fight being destroyed.

Does any of these change the strategic situation at all? Is #3 even possible? What changes does this make to the Allied war effort?
I have strong doubts as to the Japanese being able to take Midway even if the naval battle had gone their way, American defenders were numerous, motivated, and extremely well-armed, Japanese would have had an extremely difficult time getting troops thru the reef under very heavy automatic weapon and cannon fire
 
How much damage could be done to a 2.4 sq mi atol If the IJN used let's say Yamato, two other battleships, 3 heavy and 4 light cruisers? The CV used just for fleet to fleet action.
 
Last edited:
How much damage could be done to a 2.4 sq mi atol If the IJN used let's say Yamato, two other battleships, 3 heavy and 4 light cruisers?

I guess you could add in the four Kongo class BC/BB conversions. They were all present too.

That depends on how good their target information is, what the portion of HE to AP is in their ammo mix. How appropriate their techniques are.

ie: At Betio Island the USN closed in to get better accuracy. The unanticipated effect was increasing the number of ricochets and failed fuzes. That is cannon projectiles that strike at a angle of 15 degrees or less have a high portion of "skipped" rounds and fuse failures. Since this does not seem to be a important consideration in ship vs ship gunnery the IJN may not have anticipated it either in this case. The USN had a fairly accurate idea of the location of the cannon and large bunkers on Betio from photographs and air observers. The accounts I've read don't mention any large or medium caliber cannon knocked out. Accounts of the 14 Japanese survivors indicate a few casualties, but the log and sandbag or concrete bunkers protected them from all but a rare direct hit during the four hour naval bombardment. The Betio Island attack was in daylight. As with all such 'dense' bombardments the smoke and dust obscured the target area. I don't remember weather haze being mentioned as a problem. The two USN BB used had some dead time in their program to allow the dust/smoke to clear so they could see the island and not kill fish in the lagoon.

One indicator of damage might be the IJN bombardments of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. There a spotting team of naval gunnery officers was set on Mount Austen & had several weeks to use survey techniques to locate the aim points within a few meters, and refine the survey between bombardments. They also provided a accurate reference point in the form of a signal lamp on Mt Austen. This gave the ships gunnery officers a accurate navigation reference to fire from.

Undifferentiated blanket 'barrages' are generally a waste of ammunition in terms of target neutralization. Particularly where the ammunition and fuzes are not optimal. They scare the s..t out of anyone under fire, but the numbers killed and weapons destroyed are seldom enough to justify the ammo. I have some of the effects tables from US, British, and Soviet artillery. Not really enough to give a good take on this specific case. It might take me a couple days of research to pin down the appropriate data/calculations. I can say that ordinary artillery in mass attacks on entrenchments and concrete bunkers, for extended periods of 4+ hours is estimated at negligible effect by Red Army, US, or British artillery of the 20th Century. How that predicts larger weight ammunition from naval cannon is ambigious.

From memory there were still two dozen PBY Catalinia aircraft and a squadron of B17s still operational. Close to all the torpedo and dive bombers based on Midway had been destroyed. I'd expect all those to be lost one way or another.
 
How much damage could be done to a 2.4 sq mi atol If the IJN used let's say Yamato, two other battleships, 3 heavy and 4 light cruisers? The CV used just for fleet to fleet action.

To be honest, the Japanese Fleet probably embarked very little in the way of HE, since after all, this was to be the long awaited Decisive Battle. You don't win that by shooting HE at the enemy battleships. So with that in mind... I'm going to say you'll probably kill a few unlucky marines, scare the shit out of the rest of them, damage anything not dug in, and put the island out of commission for a few days to weeks. In return, you've pretty much tied yourself to the Island for a few hours and any sub captain worth his salt would love to get a salvo in at Yamato... and who knows? Maybe, just maybe, his torpedos will work...
 
Do the ships have to stay still when shooting at land targets? I believe they sail faster then a sub. And why wouldn't they carry HE rounds, they did carry a lot on the CVs to bomb Midway instead of focusing on the enemy fleet. I mean you want to destroy the US CVs but you expend your precious aircrews on useless ground targets. They had about 10 BB involved in the Midway operation, they could use 3 of them to bomb the island. Yes you might loose some BBs, maybe even Yamato, but if you achieve your goal, that is the US carriers, I believe is worth it. Because if you lose the war you lose everything.
 
Do the ships have to stay still when shooting at land targets? I believe they sail faster then a sub. And why wouldn't they carry HE rounds, they did carry a lot on the CVs to bomb Midway instead of focusing on the enemy fleet. I mean you want to destroy the US CVs but you expend your precious aircrews on useless ground targets. They had about 10 BB involved in the Midway operation, they could use 3 of them to bomb the island. Yes you might loose some BBs, maybe even Yamato, but if you achieve your goal, that is the US carriers, I believe is worth it. Because if you lose the war you lose everything.

Well it’s entirely too late for That.
 
Do the ships have to stay still when shooting at land targets? I believe they sail faster then a sub.

No, warships can obtain good gunnery solutions at 20 or 30 knots. But moving at speed is only partial protection. Japanese submarines got hits on US carriers three time and BB S Carolina. You just have to start with a good position.

And why wouldn't they carry HE rounds,[

AP rounds sink armored warships faster than HE, a lot faster. The common mixes common on large IJN warships had a very low portion of HE. Doctrinally the Japanese did not expect to use many warships for bombarding land targets. Warships were to fight warships. Their experience with amphib ops on Chinas coast did not change this. Typically one or two light cruisers and a few destroyers or support ships provided fire support for landings. Nothing illogical in this. The USN did not allocate many large ships for shire bombardment it is prewar doctrine, and changed only gradually. Only two BB were allocated to preparation fires for the Betio island attack. Previously in 1943 fire support for US Pacific theatrelandings was relatively light, not on the scale used later there or in Europe.

they did carry a lot on the CVs to bomb Midway instead of focusing on the enemy fleet. I mean you want to destroy the US CVs but you expend your precious aircrews on useless ground targets.

There was a need to destroy the US air wing on Midway. With that it represented a extra carrier. They were right, had the aircrews based on Midway been better trained and experienced the destruction of the Japanese carriers would have started sooner on 4 June.

They had about 10 BB involved in the Midway operation,

Three actually, seven if you count the four up armored Kongo class. tho as battleships the latter failed in combat.

they could use 3 of them to bomb the island. Yes you might loose some BBs, maybe even Yamato, but if you achieve your goal, that is the US carriers, I believe is worth it. Because if you lose the war you lose everything.

The Japanese were after the entire US battle fleet. They thought we'd have our remaining battleships present and wanted to sink more of those too.
 
When bombarding shore targets, ships are relatively stationary, they get better accuracy that way. Especially if you have troops landing, in ship to ship combat short rounds kill fish, with amphibious landings...
 
Do the ships have to stay still when shooting at land targets?

Have to? No. Will they? Yes.

And why wouldn't they carry HE rounds, they did carry a lot on the CVs to bomb Midway instead of focusing on the enemy fleet.

Because every HE round you carry is one less round that can be used in ship to ship combat. And more to the point, because they didn't. Japan didn't bombard land positions with battleships, and this was not going to change at Midway.

I mean you want to destroy the US CVs but you expend your precious aircrews on useless ground targets. They had about 10 BB involved in the Midway operation, they could use 3 of them to bomb the island. Yes you might loose some BBs, maybe even Yamato, but if you achieve your goal, that is the US carriers, I believe is worth it. Because if you lose the war you lose everything.

The US carriers were NOT the goal. The American battleships were. The Japanese did not deem the carriers to be more important targets than battleships, that's WHY they sent the carriers in at Midway while holding their own battleships back.
 
...
The US carriers were NOT the goal. The American battleships were. The Japanese did not deem the carriers to be more important targets than battleships, that's WHY they sent the carriers in at Midway while holding their own battleships back.

This had been US and British Doctrine as well until 1942. The carriers, like submarines and cursers were to scout for the enemy, and pick off what they could to weaken the enemy fleet for the BIG BATTLE. This is why the Japanese & British or Italian cruisers still carried torpedoes in 1942, and the USN carried them right up into 1940. Torpedos gave the cruisers a weapon that could disable a battleship with a bit of luck. Submarines were the same. All three navies built big long ranged fleet subs in the 1930s, and in 1942 fanned them out ahead of the fleet to try to pick off a battleship in a ambush. The carriers were the third leg in this. Once the enemy fleet was spotted the carrier would launch a strike or series of strikes with torpedo planes, and the new fangled dive bombers, to weaken the enemy fleet.

In 1942 the IJN doctrine was fairly successful, the submarines put US carrier out of action three times, a BB as well. Their cruisers savaged the Allied fleets with their torpedoes multiple times.

In 1942 the USN was forced to abandon doctrine. King and Nimitz intended to stick to War Plan ORANGE for the Pacific war. Or in the modern iteration something like Kimmels WPP-46 The existing BB were to few for a decisive surface battle & the new classes of the S Dakotas, ect... were not ready. Some not even launched. So Nimitz sought a quick ambush in the hope of picking off a few enemy capitol ships with his flotilla of a dozen fleet submarines, and the US carrier group/Midway. With the massive air reinforcement of Midway the US effectively deployed four carrier air wings to ambush the Japanese.

While the US submarines largely failed and the US cruisers did not have a role, the carrier wings lucked out. The US got way more than a favorable hit and run, instead gutting the Japanese carrier fleet. In hindsight its easy to see the carrier was supposing the battleship in importance 1940-1941. But, in the spring of 1942 this was not so clear. Four of the critical carrier battles of WWII occurred in seven months from May through October 1942. It was only as that ended that some of the admirals involved realized the decisive naval battle had occurred in a way they had not really anticipated when it started.
 
The US carriers were NOT the goal. The American battleships were. The Japanese did not deem the carriers to be more important targets than battleships, that's WHY they sent the carriers in at Midway while holding their own battleships back.

This. The Kido Butai was a SCOUTING AND SKIRMISHING FORCE, not the Main Thrust in the Decisive Battle. The Japanese could lose every single carrier, and every single plane and pilot and still consider it a victory as long as their battleline inflicted minorly more damage on the American battleline.
 
No problem, no harm no foul. Thank goodness one of us was not making a joke. Those carry so poorly in the cyber world they lead to months long flame wars.
 
to clarify a detail about ships maneuvering during shore bombardment. USN and British doctrine 1943-45 was to run at moderate speed in a 'racetrack' pattern. The more regular the track the easier on the gunnery officer & his minions in the plotting room. A regular track pattern also simplifies collision avoidance if the invasion fleet concentration creates a crowded roadstead.

When bombarding shore targets, ships are relatively stationary, they get better accuracy that way. Especially if you have troops landing, in ship to ship combat short rounds kill fish, with amphibious landings...

This last assumes the ships are firing over the landing force. In a perfect world you offset the bombardment 90 degrees to the right or left. That creates some safety benefits, but complicates things if a spotting team in the landing force attempts to signal adjustments to the ships. At Betio Island the best location for the battleships was the deep water to the east of the island. that kept them clear of the Tarawa Atolls reefs and shoals. It also placed them opposite the ships carrying the landing force, which were milling about the entries to Betios lagoon to the west. The logbooks and after action reports of the amphib and supporting ships were littered with remarks about 14" projectiles tumbling end over end and splashing down around the ships 6,000 to 12,000 yards west of Betio. These were the skipped or ricocheted rounds off Betio, due to the BB firing from too close to the island. None hit anything important, so i guess the 'Big Sky Little Bullet' doctrine we applied at times in my military career is validated.
 
So we have two possible levels of victory:

1) Early on the 4th the Japanese with a different/better/luckier search sight the American carriers and get off a strike with his reserve planes before his midway strike returns.
Much depends on timing of what strikes hit before what takes off, but the Japanese know what they need to do better all day and get strikes off quickly, at the end of the day 3 american carriers are sunk, 1 heavy damaged, 1 Japanese carrier sunk, 1 heavy damaged. Japanese invasion of Midway fails. Japanese linger around the island through the 6th, bombarding the place of an on, hoping for a surrender that never happens.

b) Dick best picks up a very lucky Japanese anti-aircraft shot, and Akagi survives the 10:22 am attack and is still operational and able to launch air craft. At the end of the day of attritional combat both sides have 1 operational carrier, Air losses are high and both sides have minimal strike capability left. The Japanese are still committed to their invasion, which fails miserably, and by late afternoon are leaving the area. (The Japanese protect their remaining carrier on the 5th pulling her west a bit, bring up Zuiho, American naval assets have retired to the east and await opportunity to assist the island).

However compared to OTL: The Japanese are at least up one carrier and the Americans are down 1, Guadalcanal doesn't happen, both side are content to reinforce their islands until the Essex class carriers are ready. With lower 42-43 attrition I can see the Japanese launching a big carrier effort then to defend the Gilberts which fails miserably.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
The Japanese error was expecting to fight the same sort of war as happened in 1894 and 1904-5. Those WERE classic colonial empire wars, over bit and pieces of territory that were simply pawns on a chess board, useful but not vital. What Japan failed to realize is that WW I, especially WW I on the Western Front, utterly changed the other Great Powers vision of what war really was. The Japanese were not unique in this, the Italians under Mussolini also thought the same 19th Century rules would continue to apply.

Both countries thought they were getting into a dogfight with other dogs, dogs can kill each other in fights, but it isn't the point most of the time. The point is usually about territory or mating or some specific bit of food, both sides generally walk away, one more scuffed up than the other, but they both walk away. What they actually got into was a Pride Dominance fight between lions, kill or die is the only rule in those, which is why smaller males avoid fighting bigger ones.

The Japanese actually believed that they could do the same thing that had been done after the Panay Incident, although on a larger scale. There was actually at least discussion, if not an actual finalized plan in place, to offer a large indemnity to the U.S. and UK after the successful of the acquisition of the "Southern Resource Area" and what was expected to be a fiat accompli as far as the war went. The discussion included granting the Philippines "independence" within the Co-Prosperity Sphere as a part of the smoothing of America's feathers.

The idea was actually remarkably similar to the way that the Seven Year's War ended in the Western Hemisphere, or even the end of the U.S./Mexico War, where money changed hands for territory, a real estate deal with gunfire.

Problem was it was no longer 1760 or 1849, and The Great Game had ended.

This description once again highlights all the flaws in Japanese thinking and assumptions.

However, I think there was a major U.S. deterrence failure too, not much remarked because it is generally seen as inevitable. The US failed to act, enough, like Japan might go to war on this theory, until it was too late and it could not respond fast enough to seal the "weakness in the death star" before Japan gave attacking a try.

The U.S. knowingly planned in most interwar versions of Orange on losing the Philippines and taking two years to mount a counterattack. But having a fleet and forward based strength to deny the Japanese even the desperate hope of winning was easily within American economic capability. It probably would not have even required Cold War defense spending levels to achieve the ability stop the Japanese cold in the Philippines and Hawaii and demonstrate the US had power to spare to punish any attacker.

If you deny Japan the slim hope it had, it just won't attack attack all.

The U.S. did not do this because of lame excuses like "it's expensive" and "we're going to give the Philippines independence in 10 years anyway," "seriously arming the Philippines might harm the nice little society we've been trying to uplift" and "they probably won't dare." - That logic would never have flown in Cold War America or after. What if the adversary thinks he's got a shot at winning? Or thinks you won't fight? And, even if the expectation was that by the mid-1940s the U.S. would have been out of the Philippines and maintained no commitments to it at all (which I am not sure would have actually happened absent the Pacific War and with an aggressive looking Japan around), well, the Japanese had a vote in the matter and might feel like they had to fight over the western Pacific in less than ten years.

Because of these reasons the U.S. satisfied itself with plans and forces that involved a short-term write-off of its most forward positions, and a requirement for a two year build up and counterattack to gain supremacy in the western Pacific. So in most of the interwar era, the chances of a war with Japan was considered "not enough" to suffer any fiscal inconvenience.

What this reasoning left out was the risk that Japan, especially with its successful experiences against powers of greater total potential, would misread the the U.S. not being ready to "come as you are" into war at the very beginning as a sign that the U.S. really might not bother to do the hassle of reversing a land-grab at all. After all, they could tell themselves, "if the U.S. is too lazy to be ready to 'fight tonight' and win, when will it ever work up the will to fight to win.".

In the event, that's what the Japanese told themselves, not entirely believing it, but still enough to "jump from the temple of Kiyomizu" and take the chance. Because of that the U.S. ended up spending far more on vengeance than what successful defense or deterrence would have cost, and lost over 50,000 people, around what was lost in the Korean War and the Vietnam War each. It also failed in one of the most important parts of its mission in the Philippines, to colonize so that nobody else would. The U.S. could not even protect its captive nation, and, unlike the British, who collected captive nations like pokemon cards, it is not like the U.S. had so many to take care of.

Basically U.S. preparations and naval plans were paced too slowly for the threat that emerged, and that the U.S., leading with an economic jab at Japan, drew upon itself.

The pace did pick up very, very late in the pre-war, but that build-up, while ultimately formidable and irresistible, left the burglar an unbarred window. In the last months before the war, the Americans finally realized that the prospect of war with Japan was truly an even chance, and then a more than even chance. But the American stuff would not be ready. By the time the U.S. imposed the embargo really the geopolitical situation had turned so bad that the U.S. had no options that were not high risk.
 
Last edited:
Top