WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

Has it been mentioned beforehand of the Coral Reef that surrounds both Midway Is??

Would the reef have gotten those small motor boats of the IJN carrying IJN Marines and Army troopers stuck at least a hundred feet/yards(?) from the beachhead and hung up for awhile to be targeted by the US Garrison??

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The distance from the reef to the islands is 4 to 6 miles on the long side, and the reef is exposed at low tide. Base commander Col. Shannon placed special emphasis on booby trapping the coral barrier so that Japanese landing forces attempting to cross it would be blown sky high.
 
Has it been mentioned beforehand of the Coral Reef that surrounds both Midway Is??

Yes its has been mentioned, tho the photos you posted are a excellent illustration. The descriptions I've read of the Japanese plan was to attack from the South or left side of the photos. The practice in previous landings was for the large transports to anchor 2-6 km out & offload to the landing craft. The smaller assault transports would close in to disembark into the landing craft, as they had some light guns to support the landing. It was not unknown for these light transports to beach on the shoals or reef to disembark their passengers. The reef at its narrowest point is on the south or left side of the near island, Eastern Island. Its just a hair under 300 meters there. At Sand Island the further or western island, the narrowest point its between 400 & 500 meters from reef to dry sand. For comparison the open dry beaches @ Normandy were between 200 & 400 meters from water line to first available cover. At Betio Island the edge of the reef to the seawall varied from 600 to 800 meters on Red Beach. In that case the first assault waves crossed in 105 LVT, each armored against small arms fire and each carrying three medium and heavy MG. That is 300+ MG providing assault fire as the LVT closed into the seawall.

Lt Col Ichiks reinforced Army battalion was to attack Eastern Island, the SNLF battalion Sand Island.
 
Yes its has been mentioned, tho the photos you posted are a excellent illustration. The descriptions I've read of the Japanese plan was to attack from the South or left side of the photos. The practice in previous landings was for the large transports to anchor 2-6 km out & offload to the landing craft. The smaller assault transports would close in to disembark into the landing craft, as they had some light guns to support the landing. It was not unknown for these light transports to beach on the shoals or reef to disembark their passengers. The reef at its narrowest point is on the south or left side of the near island, Eastern Island. Its just a hair under 300 meters there. At Sand Island the further or western island, the narrowest point its between 400 & 500 meters from reef to dry sand. For comparison the open dry beaches @ Normandy were between 200 & 400 meters from water line to first available cover. At Betio Island the edge of the reef to the seawall varied from 600 to 800 meters on Red Beach. In that case the first assault waves crossed in 105 LVT, each armored against small arms fire and each carrying three medium and heavy MG. That is 300+ MG providing assault fire as the LVT closed into the seawall.

Lt Col Ichiks reinforced Army battalion was to attack Eastern Island, the SNLF battalion Sand Island.

If I recall correctly, the Japanese planned to send their landing craft through the gap in the reef at the northwest part of the Atoll in order to minimize the danger of scraping or falling victim to traps set up by the Americans. The gap itself is approximately three miles wide and between 2 and 5 miles from the principal islands, depending on location.

978-90-481-2639-2_11_Part_Fig1-114_HTML.jpg
 
If I recall correctly, the Japanese planned to send their landing craft through the gap in the reef at the northwest part of the Atoll in order to minimize the danger of scraping or falling victim to traps set up by the Americans. The gap itself is approximately three miles wide and between 2 and 5 miles from the principal islands, depending on location.

A plan that would line the boats nicely into the predicted fire killing zone. Those gap are just obvious and well within range of the guns larger than 3 inches. Airburst shells would be lethal against the occupants.
 
If I recall correctly, the Japanese planned to send their landing craft through the gap in the reef at the northwest part of the Atoll in order to minimize the danger of scraping or falling victim to traps set up by the Americans. The gap itself is approximately three miles wide and between 2 and 5 miles from the principal islands, depending on location.

978-90-481-2639-2_11_Part_Fig1-114_HTML.jpg

There's not really a channel between the NE reef gaps and the lagoon. More alternating coral heads, potholes, and occasional sand shoals. The boats would be zig zaging around shallows for several kilometers.
 
A plan that would line the boats nicely into the predicted fire killing zone. Those gap are just obvious and well within range of the guns larger than 3 inches. Airburst shells would be lethal against the occupants.

The three inch gun was a dual purpose AA & surface gun. Accurate enough the crews could compete at getting direct hits on the boats. Be interesting to find the gunnery tables for those cannon.
 
To change the subject, how severe would aircrew losses be with a Japanese victory? OTL 25+ pilots were lost attacking the island 4 June.would aircrew losses reach 25 pct in sinking the carriers and bombing the island?
 
The three inch gun was a dual purpose AA & surface gun. Accurate enough the crews could compete at getting direct hits on the boats. Be interesting to find the gunnery tables for those cannon.

And when the assault crafts approach the islands, other weapons join in this symphony of lethality. Now, an assault with sufficient air support and naval gun support can do it and the IJN certainly had the ships to do so, but the rebuilding of the airfields take time and render the purpose of assaulting these island moot.
 
To change the subject, how severe would aircrew losses be with a Japanese victory? OTL 25+ pilots were lost attacking the island 4 June.would aircrew losses reach 25 pct in sinking the carriers and bombing the island?

I’d assume the carrier air wings would basically be a spent force by the end of the day.
 
And when the assault crafts approach the islands, other weapons join in this symphony of lethality. Now, an assault with sufficient air support and naval gun support can do it and the IJN certainly had the ships to do so, but the rebuilding of the airfields take time and render the purpose of assaulting these island moot.

Would the Japanese think of using the ships for bombardments before the entire first wave is wiped out though? As I recall, NGS was distinctly against their doctrine. Plus I doubt the ships not assigned for bombardment have much in the way of HE.
 
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SsgtC

Banned
Would the Japanese think of using the ships for bombardments before the entire first wave is wiped out though? As I recall, NGS was distinctly against their doctrine. Plus I doubt the ships not assigned for bombardment have much in the way of HE.
The Japanese weren't opposed to using NGS. They just never developed it to the same level that the USN/USMC did. They also delegated the task to destroyers and cruisers while the US used battleships.
 

Geon

Donor
Here's a kind of nutty idea. The general consensus here is that any invasion of Midway itself would be a total disaster. But, remember the primary focus of the battle wasn't to capture Midway as it was to sink the USN carrier force. What if the Japanese pulled a D-Day like deception. That is sending transports with the attack force but without many troops on board-just enough to convince aerial reconnaissance that one of the objectives was to take the island itself. That still brings the carriers into contact-which is the primary plan-but there is no actual invasion.

Also, what would the Japanese gain if they had taken Midway however unlikely that seems. They couldn't have supplied any garrison there and has been pointed out in another thread it would be a very poor forward base to launch any attacks on Pearl Harbor. And as I pointed out earlier the Japanese would be stretched to their logistical limit. The U.S. would not.
 

SsgtC

Banned
Here's a kind of nutty idea. The general consensus here is that any invasion of Midway itself would be a total disaster. But, remember the primary focus of the battle wasn't to capture Midway as it was to sink the USN carrier force. What if the Japanese pulled a D-Day like deception. That is sending transports with the attack force but without many troops on board-just enough to convince aerial reconnaissance that one of the objectives was to take the island itself. That still brings the carriers into contact-which is the primary plan-but there is no actual invasion.

Also, what would the Japanese gain if they had taken Midway however unlikely that seems. They couldn't have supplied any garrison there and has been pointed out in another thread it would be a very poor forward base to launch any attacks on Pearl Harbor. And as I pointed out earlier the Japanese would be stretched to their logistical limit. The U.S. would not.
The IJN didn't have the transport capacity to spare to use ships as decoys. If they're sending transports, they fully intend to use them to capture the atoll.

The point of capturing Midway was to prevent another Doolittle Raid. It cannot be understated just how badly shaken the Japanese were by that handful of bombs dropped on the Home Islands.
 
To change the subject, how severe would aircrew losses be with a Japanese victory? OTL 25+ pilots were lost attacking the island 4 June.would aircrew losses reach 25 pct in sinking the carriers and bombing the island?

I'd assume, based on the results of the other carrier battles of 1942, that Japanese aircraft losses would have been comparable to those of the Americans (excluding planes lost on the 'sunken' US carriers or the Midway Island garrison). The Japanese claim on their wiki that they lost 110 aircrew historically, so if correct the alternate figures would probably be lower. The number of airframes lost, in my estimation, would probably have been in the 100 to 120 range, or at least 40% of Nagumo's striking force.
 
One point about naval gunfire support. If you are going to be doing NGS you want to be using HE shells, not the SAP/AP you use against other ships (1). This means you need to put those shells aboard the ships before you leave base, and for every HE shell used against ground targets subtract one SAP/AP from your magazine. Since HE shells are of limited value against larger warships, you have reduced your ability to slug it out with enemy heavies - something most captains won't like especially the Japanese who were not in to NGS. It is also a good thing to have decent recon of your objective first. Sure some things will be visible by your spotters or spotting aircraft (as long as they are not shot down), and batteries may reveal themselves, but without pre-designated targets the effort is reduced. You can see where this leads in terms of NGS for any Midway landing.

(1) AP shells have a much smaller explosive charge than HE, and will dig themselves in to the ground before they explode so their effect is mostly wasted. If you have reinforced concrete or similar bunkers, then AP shells can be used to good effect, but in general HE is preferred.
 
One point about naval gunfire support. If you are going to be doing NGS you want to be using HE shells, not the SAP/AP you use against other ships (1). This means you need to put those shells aboard the ships before you leave base, and for every HE shell used against ground targets subtract one SAP/AP from your magazine. Since HE shells are of limited value against larger warships, you have reduced your ability to slug it out with enemy heavies - something most captains won't like especially the Japanese who were not in to NGS. It is also a good thing to have decent recon of your objective first. Sure some things will be visible by your spotters or spotting aircraft (as long as they are not shot down), and batteries may reveal themselves, but without pre-designated targets the effort is reduced. You can see where this leads in terms of NGS for any Midway landing.

(1) AP shells have a much smaller explosive charge than HE, and will dig themselves in to the ground before they explode so their effect is mostly wasted. If you have reinforced concrete or similar bunkers, then AP shells can be used to good effect, but in general HE is preferred.

The Japanese Bombardment Force had this problem at Guadalcanal. On 14 October Kongo and Haruna actually used up their stocks of fragmentation and incendiary projectiles and had to resort to AP. Even though those two battleships fired nearly 1,000 main battery rounds between them - not to mention the expenditure by cruiser Isuzu and the screening destroyers - they failed to wipe out Henderson field.
 
Would the Japanese think of using the ships for bombardments before the entire first wave is wiped out though?.

The Japanese weren't opposed to using NGS. They just never developed it to the same level that the USN/USMC did. They also delegated the task to destroyers and cruisers while the US used battleships.

Two cruisers of Cu Division 4. We're to do 45-60 minutes of preparation fires. Some destroyers and landing ships were to do fire support for the assault battlaions. Betio Island got four hours from a pair of 14" gunned Battle Ships. The damage to the log and sandbag revetments did not knock out the majority of the Japanese cannon.

For the assualt on Betio a pair of destroyers did good work. But the Marines had learned the hard way the previous year the radio communications needed to be very robust. I've been told the Japanese provided one radio team for each of the two assualt groups. If so I'm skeptical radio comm with the destroyers would survive trying to pack two radio sets across 300+ meters of reef under MG & rifle fire.
 
Here's a kind of nutty idea. The general consensus here is that any invasion of Midway itself would be a total disaster. But, remember the primary focus of the battle wasn't to capture Midway as it was to sink the USN carrier force. What if the Japanese pulled a D-Day like deception. That is sending transports with the attack force but without many troops on board-just enough to convince aerial reconnaissance that one of the objectives was to take the island itself. That still brings the carriers into contact-which is the primary plan-but there is no actual invasion.

Also, what would the Japanese gain if they had taken Midway however unlikely that seems. They couldn't have supplied any garrison there and has been pointed out in another thread it would be a very poor forward base to launch any attacks on Pearl Harbor. And as I pointed out earlier the Japanese would be stretched to their logistical limit. The U.S. would not.

It's not clear how such a bluff would actually work given the IJN's assumptions in planning the operation: chiefly, that the attack would be a strategic surprise to the Americans, whose carriers were believed to be mostly still in the South Pacific (Halsey had even deliberately feinted toward Nauru to give flesh to this impression for IJN intelligence). It would take upwards of a week for the American carriers to reach Midway. Would Nagumo and Kondo just keep running their transports back and forth to gun range for a week while waiting for Halsey to show up?
 
It's not clear how such a bluff would actually work given the IJN's assumptions in planning the operation: chiefly, that the attack would be a strategic surprise to the Americans, whose carriers were believed to be mostly still in the South Pacific (Halsey had even deliberately feinted toward Nauru to give flesh to this impression for IJN intelligence). It would take upwards of a week for the American carriers to reach Midway. Would Nagumo and Kondo just keep running their transports back and forth to gun range for a week while waiting for Halsey to show up?

If the Japanese are just chilling off Midway for a week... well even the early war Mk. XIV gets lucky once in a while. And you'd pretty much see every sub in Pearl raising anchor and making flank speed with THAT rich a prize.
 
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