WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
It would have been far worse than that. According to Walter Lord, by 4 June 1942 the defending garrison on Eastern and Sand Islands amounted to three Marine Defense Battalions plus two Rifle Companies from another and a handful of Army and Navy personnel. These totalled about 3,500 men and were equipped with the following:

4 x 7 inch (178 mm) coastal gun
6 x 5"/38 DP
24 x 76.2 mm (3") DP
8 x 37 mm AA
18 x 20 mm AA
42 x 12.7 mm MG
30 x 7.62 mm MG
5 x M3 Stuart
1,500 x mines, booby traps, and other IEDs spread throughout the beaches, the lagoon, and the barrier reef, not to mention the handful of PT boats that the defenders still possessed.

The Midway Defense Unit, while roughly equal to a regiment in numbers, had the firepower of an entire division. The Japanese, without the benefits of American-style big gun fire support, LVTs, and the like, would have had to overcome the booby-trapped barrier reef (which is exposed at low tide), travel four to six miles over the heavily mined lagoon under the guns of the defending Americans before even hitting the beach, and then grind their way through a series of bunkers, trenches, and barbed-wire entanglements against a determined enemy on 'death ground' that they only outnumber 1.5 to 1 and with nowhere near their level of heavy equipment. In short, Col. Ichiki and his men (5,000 personnel) would have been utterly murdered a few months early; nothing less than a division-sized unit would have been adequate to seize the atoll.
Oh, I agree.

I was pointing out that, even without the breaking of JN-25, the forces deployed to Midway would have made any back of the envelope, "we'll just walk right in" assault on the atoll effectively impossible.
 
Oh, I agree.

I was pointing out that, even without the breaking of JN-25, the forces deployed to Midway would have made any back of the envelope, "we'll just walk right in" assault on the atoll effectively impossible.

Ah, I see that now after having read further back. Even if they had somehow taken Midway it would have been worthless on its own unless the rest of the war also went miraculously well for Japan, and might well have ended up cut off and used for target practice like Wake.
 
If the Japanese had proceeded with the landings would the American submarines have taken a toll of the landing forces before they even got ashore? I know there was a fairly heavy deployment of subs around Midway but don't know the details or if any were S-boats which I believe had less problems with torpedoes. And even assuming a successful landing the attrition of supply ships by American submarines would have drained the forces even more.
 
If the Japanese had proceeded with the landings would the American submarines have taken a toll of the landing forces before they even got ashore? I know there was a fairly heavy deployment of subs around Midway but don't know the details or if any were S-boats which I believe had less problems with torpedoes. And even assuming a successful landing the attrition of supply ships by American submarines would have drained the forces even more.

The American's have no need to have their subs attempt to take pot shots at landing ships. The Japanese are going to be wading through chest high water for quite the distance into the teeth of MURDEROUS MG fire, at least 72 machine guns, plus whatever the ground crews strip out of crashed or damaged aircraft that make it all the way back to Midway.
 
If the Japanese had proceeded with the landings would the American submarines have taken a toll of the landing forces before they even got ashore? I know there was a fairly heavy deployment of subs around Midway but don't know the details or if any were S-boats which I believe had less problems with torpedoes. And even assuming a successful landing the attrition of supply ships by American submarines would have drained the forces even more.

No S boats near, they were all fleet subs. The Nautilus got a shot at the carrier group on the morning of the 4th, unfortunately the torpedos failed to hit or detonate. The Commander got a medal for trying. Another sub encountered a cruiser group covering the invasion fleet. The commander dithered, afraid they might be US cruisers, tho none were to be deployed in the area. He failed to attack when he had a shot and lost contact. After the battle he was relieved of command and transferred to a support task.

The American's have no need to have their subs attempt to take pot shots at landing ships. The Japanese are going to be wading through chest high water for quite the distance into the teeth of MURDEROUS MG fire, at least 72 machine guns, plus whatever the ground crews strip out of crashed or damaged aircraft that make it all the way back to Midway.

If any make it past the thirty-four 3", 5", & 7" cannon. At Wake six 3" & six 5" cannon were able to run off a force of two cruisers and six destroyers.in the first attempt to land. The second attempt brought along a larger fire support force, including two aircraft carriers delivering multiple air strikes. With all that the defenders inflicted a minimum of 92 dead and 190 wounded on the ships, then killed another 120, and wounded 130 in the landing force. In return the defense suffered a quarter that number casualties, roughly 50 killed & 50 wounded.

... In short, Col. Ichiki and his men (5,000 personnel) would have been utterly murdered ...

Ichiki had a reinforced Army battalion of under 1,200 men. They were to land on one island while the assault element of a SNLF battalion of similar size attacked the other island. The balance of the landing force were airfield/ground personnel, construction laborers, HQ/supply/communications sections & other REMF types. When the 2400 man assault force got into trouble the other 2,000+ support troops could have broken out their rifles and waded onto the reef to help. Wonder how that would have worked out?

The following year on Betio island it took the better part of eight Marine rifle battalions, reinforced with a tank battalion, land based artillery, two battleships and destroyers for fire support, and 100+ armored amphibious personnel carriers for crossing the reef. Midway was similarly armed as Betio, had nearly as many defenders, and better built fortifications. Its difficult to see how a far lighter armed force a third the size of the assault at Betio is going to accomplish much at Midway.
 
If any make it past the thirty-four 3", 5", & 7" cannon. At Wake six 3" & six 5" cannon were able to run off a force of two cruisers and six destroyers.in the first attempt to land. The second attempt brought along a larger fire support force, including two aircraft carriers delivering multiple air strikes. With all that the defenders inflicted a minimum of 92 dead and 190 wounded on the ships, then killed another 120, and wounded 130 in the landing force. In return the defense suffered a quarter that number casualties, roughly 50 killed & 50 wounded.



Ichiki had a reinforced Army battalion of under 1,200 men. They were to land on one island while the assault element of a SNLF battalion of similar size attacked the other island. The balance of the landing force were airfield/ground personnel, construction laborers, HQ/supply/communications sections & other REMF types. When the 2400 man assault force got into trouble the other 2,000+ support troops could have broken out their rifles and waded onto the reef to help. Wonder how that would have worked out?

The following year on Betio island it took the better part of eight Marine rifle battalions, reinforced with a tank battalion, land based artillery, two battleships and destroyers for fire support, and 100+ armored amphibious personnel carriers for crossing the reef. Midway was similarly armed as Betio, had nearly as many defenders, and better built fortifications. Its difficult to see how a far lighter armed force a third the size of the assault at Betio is going to accomplish much at Midway.

Depends on if you count “dying gloriously for the Emperor” as an accomplishment.
 
Even assuming an overwhelming naval victory, how long will the covering force be able to stay at Midway? I doubt there were any tankers planned to stay with the gunfire ships. Unless the Japanese win right away, and they won't, the US can reinforce Midway pretty freely whereas for the Japanese landing force it will be a long time before they see any help.
 
Ichiki had a reinforced Army battalion of under 1,200 men. They were to land on one island while the assault element of a SNLF battalion of similar size attacked the other island. The balance of the landing force were airfield/ground personnel, construction laborers, HQ/supply/communications sections & other REMF types. When the 2400 man assault force got into trouble the other 2,000+ support troops could have broken out their rifles and waded onto the reef to help. Wonder how that would have worked out?

The following year on Betio island it took the better part of eight Marine rifle battalions, reinforced with a tank battalion, land based artillery, two battleships and destroyers for fire support, and 100+ armored amphibious personnel carriers for crossing the reef. Midway was similarly armed as Betio, had nearly as many defenders, and better built fortifications. Its difficult to see how a far lighter armed force a third the size of the assault at Betio is going to accomplish much at Midway.

Thanks for the specifics, I thought the combat echelon alone was 5,000 and that Ichiki was in overall command; in that case it would have been an even greater disaster.

Even assuming an overwhelming naval victory, how long will the covering force be able to stay at Midway? I doubt there were any tankers planned to stay with the gunfire ships. Unless the Japanese win right away, and they won't, the US can reinforce Midway pretty freely whereas for the Japanese landing force it will be a long time before they see any help.

The Japanese might just decide it's not worth it. Presumably after having effectively neutralized the US carrier force - at least for the time being - they would shift their attention south again to Port Moresby, and from there to the F-S objectives. These would be much worthier goals for the expenditure of manpower and fuel than a second attempt against Midway atoll.
 
It would have been far worse than that. According to Walter Lord, by 4 June 1942 the defending garrison on Eastern and Sand Islands amounted to three Marine Defense Battalions plus two Rifle Companies from another and a handful of Army and Navy personnel. These totalled about 3,500 men and were equipped with the following:

4 x 7 inch (178 mm) coastal gun
6 x 5"/38 DP
24 x 76.2 mm (3") DP
8 x 37 mm AA
18 x 20 mm AA
42 x 12.7 mm MG
30 x 7.62 mm MG
5 x M3 Stuart
1,500 x mines, booby traps, and other IEDs spread throughout the beaches, the lagoon, and the barrier reef, not to mention the handful of PT boats that the defenders still possessed.

The Midway Defense Unit, while roughly equal to a regiment in numbers, had the firepower of an entire division. The Japanese, without the benefits of American-style big gun fire support, LVTs, and the like, would have had to overcome the booby-trapped barrier reef (which is exposed at low tide), travel four to six miles over the heavily mined lagoon under the guns of the defending Americans before even hitting the beach, and then grind their way through a series of bunkers, trenches, and barbed-wire entanglements against a determined enemy on 'death ground' that they only outnumber 1.5 to 1 and with nowhere near their level of heavy equipment. In short, Col. Ichiki and his men (5,000 personnel) would have been utterly murdered a few months early; nothing less than a division-sized unit would have been adequate to seize the atoll.

Believe the 5 inchers were old 5"/51 from landed BB secondaries...
 
Believe the 5 inchers were old 5"/51 from landed BB secondaries...

That was my mistake, they were.

Midway+Mem+Day++2013.jpg


Although these had been moved, the Midway gun positions were in general dug out of the ground and surrounded with heaps of sand or coconut log revetments, which weren't as effective as concrete bunkers. When the Japanese first bombarded the atoll on the same day as Pearl Harbor the destroyers Ushio and Sazanami were able to silence a gun battery before withdrawing.
 
The following year on Betio island it took the better part of eight Marine rifle battalions, reinforced with a tank battalion, land based artillery, two battleships and destroyers for fire support, and 100+ armored amphibious personnel carriers for crossing the reef.

Don't forget also: 3 escort carriers for CAS, including 36 Avengers and 48 Wildcats. Which is not counting the 11 fast carriers GALVANIC brought along in case the Combined Fleet decided to show up at the party. Whereas the Japanese never had any dedicated CAS capability for amphibious ops, any more than they did LVT's or LTS's.
 
The American's have no need to have their subs attempt to take pot shots at landing ships. The Japanese are going to be wading through chest high water for quite the distance into the teeth of MURDEROUS MG fire, at least 72 machine guns, plus whatever the ground crews strip out of crashed or damaged aircraft that make it all the way back to Midway.
I wasn't talking about beaching craft. I was thinking about APA and AKA type ships. Much more efficent to put 500 or 1000 troops bobbing in the water with no equipment than to shoot them one by one as they land!
 
Don't forget also: 3 escort carriers for CAS, including 36 Avengers and 48 Wildcats. Which is not counting the 11 fast carriers GALVANIC brought along in case the Combined Fleet decided to show up at the party. Whereas the Japanese never had any dedicated CAS capability for amphibious ops, any more than they did LVT's or LTS's.

Unfortunately the air crew designated for the CAS were Navy, with little more than the previous thirty days to train for CAS. They made a sincere effort, but had problems with orientation and target identification. The air spotters on the ground repeatedly waived off the air attacks as they were dropping bombs on the US ground force as well as the Japanese. The Marine air wings with the extended training and year of combat experience at CAS in the S Pac were not yet embarked aboard carriers.
 
I wasn't talking about beaching craft. I was thinking about APA and AKA type ships. Much more efficent to put 500 or 1000 troops bobbing in the water with no equipment than to shoot them one by one as they land!

The Japanese had built something similar to a LSD in the 1930s, a landing craft carrier with a flooding well deck. However they built exactly one. It took a torpedo at the battle of Sendai Strait and was laid up under repair in June 1942. They also had some destroyers covered to landing craft transports. the smaller sized Daihatsu boats were stacked on the deck between launch davits. Below deck they could squeeze in a company of infantry.
 
Unfortunately the air crew designated for the CAS were Navy, with little more than the previous thirty days to train for CAS. They made a sincere effort, but had problems with orientation and target identification. The air spotters on the ground repeatedly waived off the air attacks as they were dropping bombs on the US ground force as well as the Japanese. The Marine air wings with the extended training and year of combat experience at CAS in the S Pac were not yet embarked aboard carriers.

Sure, it wasn't remotely as effective as it would be later in the war - lots and lots of teething pains.

It was a distinctly secondary element in the U.S. victory. Still, it showed an attempt at a capability the IJN never even tried; they had to waste their precious fast carrier groups on it. At Midway, just that first (largely ineffective) attack on the atoll left 25 Kido Butai aircraft hors d'combat, and another 29 damaged. Those were assets they really needed for the decisive battle Yamamoto was wanting to provoke with the USN fast carriers in the first place.

Perhaps having 4th Carrier Division on hand to take care of that rather than stalking the Aleutians could have been a good start. Not that it mattered much without having an adequate ground element, of course....
 
Last edited:
Sure, it wasn't remotely as effective as it would be later in the war - lots and lots of teething pains. ....

The Marine air wing still on the beach had a year plus of recent experience at CAS in the Solomon's and after. For a variety of reasons a couple squadrons of their bombers we're not scheduled to embark on carriers in 1943.

The artillery support at Betio came from a adjacent coral sand spit. From there it was firing towards the landing force instead of overhead and away. In the prebattle work up the FOs trained to reverse their adjustment commands to the cannon crews.
 
Has it been mentioned beforehand of the Coral Reef that surrounds both Midway Is??

Would the reef have gotten those small motor boats of the IJN carrying IJN Marines and Army troopers stuck at least a hundred feet/yards(?) from the beachhead and hung up for awhile to be targeted by the US Garrison??

thediplomat_2016-01-07_21-01-51-386x411.jpg
 
Last edited:
Top