WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

Geon

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The only thing that would prevent a mission to shoot down Admiral Yamamoto's plane on a morale building tour would be that the Admiral's flight would be out of range of an interception or that there was no message intercepted and decoded in time.

Remember the morale building tour would not be needed. Guadalcanal is delayed perhaps indefinitely because of the Midway disaster. Further IJN morale would be at its peak with a successful Battle of Midway and a successful (possibly) invasion of Port Moresby.
 

nbcman

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Remember the morale building tour would not be needed. Guadalcanal is delayed perhaps indefinitely because of the Midway disaster. Further IJN morale would be at its peak with a successful Battle of Midway and a successful (possibly) invasion of Port Moresby.
Eventually the Japanese would be rolled back which means the conditions for his fateful trip would occur. The Yamamoto flight could be because some other contested area fell to the Allies at some time later in 1943, not necessarily Guadalcanal in early 1943.
 
I agree with you that if Yamamoto is smart he will fortify the key islands.

Also I agree that Yamamoto was looking to keep up the offensive. Yamamoto was intelligent as well as a gambler. He would not have ignored fortifying the islands at the cost of offensive operations. The FS Operation was postponed then cancelled because of the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. But it is possible that if Midway was the disaster we are hypothesizing here that Yamamoto might actually see seizing New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa as the perfect way to try and cut off American troops and supplies reaching Australia.

He might actually succeed too. I think it would be pushing Japanese supply lines to their absolute limit but if Yamamoto moved fast enough-i.e. within the six month window bought by the Midway battle he might, I emphasize might be able to pull it off.

However conversely, would the USN risk its two or at this point three carriers to try and stop him? I think so. I think you might have your decisive battle in the vicinity around the targets of Operation FS.

1. The IJN could take, perhaps, Espiritu Santu. But beyond that? Even Efate had a sizable garrison that included an entire Marine Defense Battalion by late May. And as I noted above, by spring New Caledonia had over 22,000 regular troops, featuring almost the entire Americal Division (arguably the best trained US Army infantry division in the world at that time), with another 13,000 added by end of summer. It was superbly defensible due to terrain and nearly continuous coral reefs. It would have been a multi-division operation (requiring several weeks to months to secure) for the Japanese, almost on the scale of the Philippines - only this time on virtually the other side of the world, rather than just 300km from Formosa. Fiji would have been almost as bad. Remember: The Japanese in OTL couldn't even evict a single under-equipped Marine Division from Guadalcanal, even with multiple windows of isolation from U.S. naval protection!

I submit that anything beyond Espiritu Santu is simply beyond Japanese capabilities, and they would have quickly discovered this the hard way had they tried. They did not have the shipping, the available troops, the logistics, or the air support - not at that point in time. IJN intelligence simply had no idea how heavily defended these major islands were by the spring of 1942, let alone by the end of summer. If they had, Operation FS would have been deep-sixed.

You can read a lot more about U.S. efforts to build up these islands in 1942 here.

Port Moresby really is, I think, the one credible option for them.

2. Saratoga and Wasp - which is all Nimitz would have in July, assuming he loses all three carriers at Midway - is not a match for the full Kido Butai, assuming Yamamoto waits until early August when Shokaku and Zuikaku were available. But they would have nearly half the air complement of the KB, enough to play a spoiler role on the flank in cooperation with land-based air assets in the New Hebrides and Queensland, perhaps waiting until Nagumo's air groups had been chewed down establishing air supremacy over New Cal. (It's probably safe to assume Ranger could not reach the South Pacific until September.) If FS is delayed until then, however, Halsey starts to have a fairly formidable force.

3. As others have noted earlier in the thread, Nimitz was hand-picked by FDR, leaping over dozens of more senior admirals. It's really hard to see him sacking Nimitz losing a battle against a superior Japanese force, especially after he'd played for a draw at Coral Sea. Fletcher and Spruance, on the other hand, might see the end of their useful employment, if they survive the battle (which would be a pity, as both were fine commanders).
 
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Remember the morale building tour would not be needed. Guadalcanal is delayed perhaps indefinitely because of the Midway disaster. Further IJN morale would be at its peak with a successful Battle of Midway and a successful (possibly) invasion of Port Moresby.

Operation VENGEANCE did require a number of factors to come together to pull off, so it's not unreasonable to think that even with MAGIC reading the IJN's mail, that the odds of an operation like it happening are difficult to replicate in this different timeline.

I'm not sure how it really helps the Japanese, save perhaps in morale (for a while). It's not clear to me that Koga, his inevitable replacement, is really a worse strategist or administrator. Yamamoto's conduct of the Solomons Campaign is quite suspect, even more than his planning for Midway. And Yamamoto can't magically conjure up new fleet carriers or air groups.
 

Geon

Donor
Athelstane

I agree with your assessment above regarding the FS Operation.

One thing regarding Yamamoto. Unlike Koga he still has most if not all of his carriers intact so that makes him formidable until the end of 43 when he will be facing increasingly unfavorable odds deck for deck.

No one has yet answered my question regarding the possibility of terror bombings of northern Australian cities from Port Moresby by the way. Was there a Japanese bomber that could accomplish this assuming they took New Guinea?

If so, I could see a decisive battle coming with a USN/Australian task force sometime in late 43/early 44 trying to retake Port Moresby and New Guinea. This might well be the one that decides the naval balance in the Pacific.
 
If Yamamoto survives, the Japanese may do better for a while. They are going to lose the battle of material production. They are going to lose the battle of aircrew training/replacement. They are going to lose in getting raw materials, especially petroleum, to the Home Islands for use. Yamamoto cannot fix these things. He can't change IJN on ASW and submarine use, at least enough to make a difference, and it is not clear he would. Terror bombing of Northern Australian cities from Port Moresby - good luck with that, it will never be anywhere near as bad as the Blitz which did not cause the British to surrender or overly panic, and simply getting aviation gasoline and all the other bits needed to sustain this to Port Moresby is going to stretch Japanese logistics so as to interfere with other operations.
 

CalBear

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Yamamoto is one of those historical figures who reputation is greatly aided by the simple fact that he died before his vast limitations became apparent to one and all. He had a combination of really unusual traits that greatly impacted his strategic thinking; he was a gambler AND he simply adored overly complex plans (the Midway scenario being his masterwork). He was, admittedly, trying to get thing wrapped up before the U.S. got its collective headspace and timing back, but not only did he split what was already a diminished force (with the mission kill of CarDiv 5 and the loss of Shoho at Coral Sea the IJN lost 114 strike aircraft & 36 fighters from the Kido Butai and 30 aircraft from any amphibious covering group) but planned an amphibious landing against a known to be heavily fortified atoll with two reinforced regiments that had never worked together, took no time to rehearse the assault, and even if successful would be effectively impossible to keep in a state of supply. Had Midway WORKED the battle of attrition that destroyed the IJN would have taken place off Midway since the Japanese would have, as they demonstrated time and again, fought for it to the last sailor and soldier, regardless of losses.

Since Yamamoto was killed before the vast disaster that his strategic "planning" had set into motion, he is seen as a myth, not the terribly flawed officer he actually was.
 
but planned an amphibious landing against a known to be heavily fortified atoll with two reinforced regiments that had never worked together, took no time to rehearse the assault, and even if successful would be effectively impossible to keep in a state of supply.
I don't remember the source right off hand, but didn't they also plan only an extremely light bombardment, and lack shells designed for land bombardment?
 

CalBear

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I don't remember the source right off hand, but didn't they also plan only an extremely light bombardment, and lack shells designed for land bombardment?
One CruDiv for a few hour. It is noted in any number of histories, but likely you ran across it in the exceptional Shattered Sword.
 
Since Yamamoto was killed before the vast disaster that his strategic "planning" had set into motion, he is seen as a myth, not the terribly flawed officer he actually was.

He lived long enough to feed most of IJN naval air talent into Nimitz's Solomons Meatgrinder, though. All Chester had to do was turn the handle.
 
That said, Yamamoto was one of Japan's finest naval officers - though what that says about the IJN's admirals is, well...

His real gift - the source of his mystique - wasn't so much strategic or tactical brilliance as it was his ability inspire the officers under him, and get the most out of them. His death in Operation VENGEANCE *was* therefore a great blow to the Japanese Navy - just not for the reasons some might think. It was a hard hit to Japanese morale, as the IJN had no one with anything quite like his gift to inspire, or reputation. Strategically, it's hard to say that Toyoda or Koga were appreciably worse than Yamamoto; and in any event by the time Koga took over, the IJN was a sword that had lost most of its edge (not that it would have mattered against the tsunami of American naval might that was just starting to arrive in the South Pacific).
 
P.S.

but planned an amphibious landing against a known to be heavily fortified atoll

Just to be clear, Yamamoto's intelligence on the Midway garrison was, as I recall, pretty thin. They were working from an assumption of a garrison the size of that which was there at the outbreak of the war. And against *that*, Kondo *might* have had a significant chance.

I think one can give Yamamoto some allowance for not realizing the Americans had largely broken his codes, pushing Nimitz to beef up the garrison (especially its air element) throughout May in anticipation of the attack. The problem was, Nimitz had been reinforcing the atoll even before that, and Yamamoto ought to have assumed as much. With the fall of Wake, it was the westernmost base left to the United States by the spring of 1942, and as such, vulnerable to attack. Wake had shown what a reasonably alert Marine garrison could do against an amphibious assault. Even without knowing his mail was being read, he ought to have brought a much more robust force, or simply used it as a pure bluff.
 
Given how poorly Japan did with Wake, attacking Midway would have been a disaster. Basically the Japanese, other than Wake, did not have any really resisted amphibious assaults. Essentially all of their landings were against minimal resistance, minimal beach defenses and defending air support. Even at Wake, which came close to being a loss for the Japanese, they rarely faced any naval forces against the landing forces - not never but rarely and weak at best. In many cases Japanese landings were almost administrative.
 

Geon

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Assuming Yamamoto survived as a result of the hypothetical Midway disaster then, I am expecting we would see another more elaborate battle plan prepared for the IJN for another attempt at a decisive blow at the USN sometime in the future. The question is where and when this would occur.
 
Please remember:

(a) This is the low point of Allied morale. Midway alone likely does nothing but irritate the US and look bad in the press (rumblings of peace might emerge but it really needs one or two *serious* defeats to get traction). It might reorder American power in the Atlantic as mentioned with a few more convoys not getting through and life in Europe being a bit more miserable for a brief time.

(b) Soviet morale was also not in good shape - they have Moscow but no Stalingrad as yet. If Paulus moves south and takes Baku with its rich oil supplies here before heading for Astrakhan or Stalingrad...

(c) Panic ensues on the West Coast and *definitely* in Hawaii. Not sure what happens to the Nissei and Issei on the island but it is not good.
 

CalBear

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Given how poorly Japan did with Wake, attacking Midway would have been a disaster. Basically the Japanese, other than Wake, did not have any really resisted amphibious assaults. Essentially all of their landings were against minimal resistance, minimal beach defenses and defending air support. Even at Wake, which came close to being a loss for the Japanese, they rarely faced any naval forces against the landing forces - not never but rarely and weak at best. In many cases Japanese landings were almost administrative.
Actually Wake is one of the very few actual fully repulsed amphibious assaults in WW II. The Japanese never really got the hang of kicking in the door.

The Japanese withdrew following the loss of two warships during the December 11th assault; the came back on December 23 with Soryo, Hiryu, and four times as many troops as the first attempt (which was fortunate on their part since the second attack landing force took ~650 casualties (320 KIA and 330 WIA), or about 1/3 more casualties than the entire landing force sent on December 11, which consisted of 450 SNLF personnel) while attacking a partial Marine Defense Battalion.

Even without the warning supplied by the code breakers Midway was going to be a right bitch to assault. The 6th Marine Defense Battalion was based there on December 7th, and after Wake fell the reinforcements meant for Wake were diverted to Midway, meaning it had the 4th Defense Battalion in addition to the 6th or about 1,800 men specifically trained to fortify and hold island bases.
 
Assuming Yamamoto survived as a result of the hypothetical Midway disaster then, I am expecting we would see another more elaborate battle plan prepared for the IJN for another attempt at a decisive blow at the USN sometime in the future. The question is where and when this would occur.
Doing nothing after winning would be the best way to exploit a victory. They'll need time to adopt the lessons from Midway and train new air wings to make up the losses.

But given historical evidence, it's probably going to be something Alaska related instead.
 
Even without the warning supplied by the code breakers Midway was going to be a right bitch to assault. The 6th Marine Defense Battalion was based there on December 7th, and after Wake fell the reinforcements meant for Wake were diverted to Midway, meaning it had the 4th Defense Battalion in addition to the 6th or about 1,800 men specifically trained to fortify and hold island bases.

It would have been far worse than that. According to Walter Lord, by 4 June 1942 the defending garrison on Eastern and Sand Islands amounted to three Marine Defense Battalions plus two Rifle Companies from another and a handful of Army and Navy personnel. These totalled about 3,500 men and were equipped with the following:

4 x 7 inch (178 mm) coastal gun
6 x 5"/38 DP
24 x 76.2 mm (3") DP
8 x 37 mm AA
18 x 20 mm AA
42 x 12.7 mm MG
30 x 7.62 mm MG
5 x M3 Stuart
1,500 x mines, booby traps, and other IEDs spread throughout the beaches, the lagoon, and the barrier reef, not to mention the handful of PT boats that the defenders still possessed.

The Midway Defense Unit, while roughly equal to a regiment in numbers, had the firepower of an entire division. The Japanese, without the benefits of American-style big gun fire support, LVTs, and the like, would have had to overcome the booby-trapped barrier reef (which is exposed at low tide), travel four to six miles over the heavily mined lagoon under the guns of the defending Americans before even hitting the beach, and then grind their way through a series of bunkers, trenches, and barbed-wire entanglements against a determined enemy on 'death ground' that they only outnumber 1.5 to 1 and with nowhere near their level of heavy equipment. In short, Col. Ichiki and his men (5,000 personnel) would have been utterly murdered a few months early; nothing less than a division-sized unit would have been adequate to seize the atoll.
 
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