WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

Japan stuck to their doctrine of placing cargo ships at the bottom of priority for submarine attacks. Only one torpedo was allowed per cargo ship, and only if there were no warships present. Their doctrine was the submarines attacked capitol ships first and always as part of their Decisive Battle doctrine. They never deviated significantly from that. Japans sortie rate for submarines was nowhere near what was needed anyway for a cargo interdiction campaign. The numbers they could sustain on patrol were far below what the Germans did, even on a off day.

You'd think that an island empire could have learned something from the British experience.
 
You'd think that an island empire could have learned something from the British experience.

To be fair, the WWI British experience is of relatively low relevance, as most of the SEA Allied bases close to Japanese shipping routes were occupied and Japan was fighting with most of its pre war trading partnets anyway. The South Seas was not penetrated and interdicted by Allied subs effectively until late 1942.
 
Folks took the opposite view from the British experience. The conventional view from the Great War was that a submarine blockade failed, the Germans did not succeed. Calculation suggested a much larger submarine fleet than deployed was needed. Admiral Doneitz estimated a fleet three times what he had in 1939 was needed. Japan did not have the ability or wealth to build any thing like that. Another lesson Japan took from 1916-17 was the extended time it would take to execute a guerre de course with submarines. Japan did not posses the resources for a extended war & a campaign against cargo shipping would not contribute to the the five or six months victory needed.

The capitol ship first doctrine did produce some results. Four times in 1942 submarines took out a US carrier. The Lexington was sunk outright, the salvageable Yorktown was finished, the Saratoga sent to dry dock twice accumulating five months out of combat repairing torpedo damage. Since the US possessed only seven fleet carriers in 1942 this had some significance. If the Japanese subs were off stalking cargo ships three US carriers would have remained operational.

US submarine doctrine through 1941 was at two levels. 1. Coastal or area defense by smaller subs like the S class. 2. Scouting for the US fleet and attrition of the enemy warships by a flotilla of larger long range fleet submarines. This latter was very similar to Japanese doctrine for their subs. It was not until 1942 the USN made practical changes to support the doctrine of guerre de course or cargo interdiction with submarines.
 
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The capitol ship first doctrine did produce some results. Four times in 1942 submarines took out a US carrier. The Lexington was sunk outright, the salvageable Yorktown was finished, the Saratoga sent to dry dock twice accumulating five months out of combat repairing torpedo damage.

Five times, including Wasp. Btw one thing I can't understand is, in January 1942 when Inaba, commanding I-6, fired at Saratoga, why did he launch only three torpedoes? IIRC the range was 4,000 meters so to get a hit Inaba must've been a great torpedo marksman. But if a fleet carrier isn't worth a full spread of six what the heck is? (AFAIK I-6 hadn't fired previously on that patrol, so it didn't have shortage of "fish.") He probably could've gotten another hit, which might've proved decisive.

Since the US possessed only seven fleet carriers in 1942 this had some significance. If the Japanese subs were off stalking cargo ships three US carriers would have remained operational

It is true that IJN subs such as the New Junsun B, were too big to be well suited for stalking merchantmen. Still, 1942 was the worst year for allied shipping losses. What if the IJN subs were used for hunting merchant ships? The authors of The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II said Japan would've fared better had its subs been sent to the US west coast for the first 13 months of the war (although IMO results would've been best had the subs been concentrated in the Indian Ocean, the best hunting grounds for IJN subs in the OTL). If losses from IJN subs had been greatly increased in '42, adding to an already debilitating toll from U-boats and italian subs, how might that have affected the allied war effort?
 
... What if the IJN subs were used for hunting merchant ships? The authors of The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II said Japan would've fared better had its subs been sent to the US west coast for the first 13 months of the war (although IMO results would've been best had the subs been concentrated in the Indian Ocean, the best hunting grounds for IJN subs in the OTL). If losses from IJN subs had been greatly increased in '42, adding to an already debilitating toll from U-boats and italian subs, how might that have affected the allied war effort?

I've thought about trying to estimate the number and duration of patrols the Japanese could have sustained off the west coast. They used Rabaul to sustain their subs operating in the Solomons & coral Sea in 1942, which cut transit time very low. Patrols around Oahu were more difficult with the nearest base being Truk in the Marinans. Have never made time to do the research, and had some of the data unreturned after loaning it out.
 
Folks took the opposite view from the British experience. The conventional view from the Great War was that a submarine blockade failed, the Germans did not succeed. Calculation suggested a much larger submarine fleet than deployed was needed. Admiral Doneitz estimated a fleet three times what he had in 1939 was needed. Japan did not have the ability or wealth to build any thing like that. Another lesson Japan took from 1916-17 was the extended time it would take to execute a guerre de course with submarines. Japan did not posses the resources for a extended war & a campaign against cargo shipping would not contribute to the the five or six months victory needed.

The capitol ship first doctrine did produce some results. Four times in 1942 submarines took out a US carrier. The Lexington was sunk outright, the salvageable Yorktown was finished, the Saratoga sent to dry dock twice accumulating five months out of combat repairing torpedo damage. Since the US possessed only seven fleet carriers in 1942 this had some significance. If the Japanese subs were off stalking cargo ships three US carriers would have remained operational.

US submarine doctrine through 1941 was at two levels. 1. Coastal or area defense by smaller subs like the S class. 2. Scouting for the US fleet and attrition of the enemy warships by a flotilla of larger long range fleet submarines. This latter was very similar to Japanese doctrine for their subs. It was not until 1942 the USN made practical changes to support the doctrine of guerre de course or cargo interdiction with submarines.


Hum...perhaps @Athelstane was commenting on the (in)famously poor Japanese ASW?
 
Perhaps. I was focused on the Japanese reasons for not using their subs vs cargo shipping, & missed any change in subject there.

One can see how their doctrines led to neglect of ASW. 1. The war won't last long enough to stand up a effective anti cargo ship campaign. 2. Thats not US doctrine anyway. Their subs are tied to fleet ops just like ours.
 
Perhaps. I was focused on the Japanese reasons for not using their subs vs cargo shipping, & missed any change in subject there.

One can see how their doctrines led to neglect of ASW. 1. The war won't last long enough to stand up a effective anti cargo ship campaign. 2. Thats not US doctrine anyway. Their subs are tied to fleet ops just like ours.

Given that Continental US are self-sufficient in most of the key supplies anyway, a cargo interdiction doctrine against US shipping would not be of much effect. It may delay build up in Australia and Western Pacific, but otherwise not very useful to IJN.
 

elkarlo

Banned
There would’ve been a coup tbh
I am to find it odd that it went this way. It's like the Roman Empire had a general problem and the Japanese had a mid level officer problem.
Makes sense in a modern way, mid management rules corporate Japan. No reforms happen as mid management simply ignores or pretends to obey reforms, and they never truly happen though
 
I am to find it odd that it went this way. It's like the Roman Empire had a general problem and the Japanese had a mid level officer problem.
Makes sense in a modern way, mid management rules corporate Japan. No reforms happen as mid management simply ignores or pretends to obey reforms, and they never truly happen though

I've heard comments about that in the local Japanese own Subaru facility. The Japanese senior managers who are sincere about improvements hire non Japanese for midlevel management. Those who are not argue for importing another Japanese manager or two.
 
Given that Continental US are self-sufficient in most of the key supplies anyway, a cargo interdiction doctrine against US shipping would not be of much effect. It may delay build up in Australia and Western Pacific, but otherwise not very useful to IJN.


What about allied shipping in general? I don't think more sub patrols off the west coast would've been a good idea, as those which occurred in the OTL tended to have poor results. The most renumerative (and safest) hunting grounds were in the Indian Ocean. Higher losses there could've delayed operations even in the Pacific. By late '42 the allies "were digging deep for tonnage" and the war against Japan had a lower priority than the ETO.
Unlike the Japanese, the allies took the threat of shipping loses very seriously.
 
While there were some successes for the Japanese submarine force, given the size and capabilities it was really wasted. A lot of time was spent humping stores/troops to various islands when the risk to merchant shipping was high or merchant ships not available. US merchant losses in the Pacific were relatively small and needs for escorts for merchant convoys small compared to the Atlantic and Caribbean. In the Pacific EVERYTHING had to be shipped from the US west coast to the operating forces, there was no Britain which could at least provide some things if need be and also act as an advance storage site - not to disparage Australia, but they were limited in production, and also for the Central Pacific drive far away. Had a significant proportion of the Japanese submarine fleet been used against merchant traffic it would have had more effect than the way it was used generally. Every ship sunk, every cargo lost would have been needed to be replaced, meaning something somewhere else was shorted. More escorts and a better convoy system would be needed, and with a higher submarine threat even more escorts for troop convoys. Wart winning for Japan, nope, but better.
 

Geon

Donor
Regarding Port Moresby....

It seems clear that if Midway is a major Japanese victory Yamamoto will try once more to take Port Moresby. As noted earlier time is of the essence. He needs to move before major reinforcements arrive in Port Moresby by September. I think it quite possible Yamamoto could take the Port by then given his naval advantage. I suspect the USN might try to harass him but they would be cautious as the IJN even with the addition of Wasp still has a deck for deck advantage in carriers on the USN.

Now, what does Yamamoto do? I agree with all of those on this page. Any attempt at invasion of Australia would be a disaster on par with any attempt at Sealion. The smart thing for Yamamoto and the IJN to do would be to sit tight. But Yamamoto was a gambler. And he knows he has bought Japan maybe 6 more months. What does he and the IJN do with it?

One thing I would suggest is possible is using Port Moresby as a base to launch air attacks on northern Australian ports. These attacks would serve to terrorize the people in Australia. The Japanese know they don't have the manpower to invade Australia, but attacking northern Australian ports might lead the public to think otherwise. As a result the government might be forced by an increasingly anxious public to recall some of its troops from North Africa.

  • I will readily admit here I am not as well read as I could be. Did the Japanese have a strategic bomber/tactical bomber that had the range to reach northern Australia from Port Moresby?
Yamamoto would also be looking for ways to further cripple/demoralize the U.S. Realistically what could he try? Remember he was a gambler at heart. And as noted in an earlier post here Midway's success as well as Pearl Harbor's would have accentuated that gambler's streak. So what does he try next with regard to the U.S.?

Let's dismiss some of the more ASB possibilities here.

  1. No second Pearl Harbor. The USN isn't stupid and any such attempt would be doomed to disaster.
  2. No attacking the Panama Canal - The logistics problems would make the first Pearl Harbor attack pale in comparison.
  3. No raids on West Coast with carriers - (see #2 above).
So, again what does Yamamoto do with the extra six month of grace he has gained?
 
To be fair, the WWI British experience is of relatively low relevance, as most of the SEA Allied bases close to Japanese shipping routes were occupied and Japan was fighting with most of its pre war trading partnets anyway. The South Seas was not penetrated and interdicted by Allied subs effectively until late 1942.

Well, the strategic situation was different, but the economic situation was not so dissimilar: Japan was, like Britain (but UNLIKE the United States!), heavily dependent on seaborne trade for foodstuffs and raw materials to keep its economy (and war machine) operating. The fact that it had managed to occupy the trading partner polities in question (Malaya, DEI, French Indochina, Korea, etc.) should not, I think, obscure this fact.

We've had numerous discussions here, of course, on the wisdom (or lack thereof) of Japanese ASW doctrine. It was not a high priority for them, before the war, or during, on the premise that Japan's limited resources had to be used in more urgent capabilities, and that ASW would only matter in a long, total war against peer naval powers, which was the sort of war Japan wasn't equipped to fight anyway. Some of it was the bushido mindset, some of it was total dedication to Mahanian "decisive battle" doctrine...however you cut it, they deliberately made ASW and shipping protection a low priority.

The problem, of course, was that by going to war with the U.S. and Britain, they were entering into exactly the kind of war where it *would* matter.
 
If I am not mistaken, a land offensive in China akin to Ichi-Go was planned in 1942 before being cancelled due to the Solomon Islands campaign and the reverses suffered at Midway. If Midway was a Japanese victory instead, would such a hypothetical land offensive be able to take place, and knock out the Republic of China as a serious opponent or at least a unified political entity? Ichi-Go overran much farmland and if the territory gained can be held, there might have been a famine that would force the RoC to come to terms or simply disintegrate. While the Japanese might not be able to push against the Allies much further at sea, perhaps on land they can find more success.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Three different ways you can take this, but I wonder about the outcome of each long term.

1. The Japanese take Midway, but at a high cost to themselves with most of their ships and planes being destroyed and a relatively low cost to the Allies

2. The Japanese force pushes the Allied navies out, with slightly more losses for the Allies than the Japanese.

3. A total Japanese Victory, with minimal casualties for them and almost the entire Allied force involved in the fight being destroyed.

Does any of these change the strategic situation at all? Is #3 even possible? What changes does this make to the Allied war effort?
# 3 is an impossibility under historic circumstances. It is unlikely, although not impossible, that the Japanese could have wiped out the American carrier force, but actually TAKING the Island? Even if they managed it it would have made Tarawa look like an Administrative Landing. The Japanese had not practices a landing in advance, despite the fact that they had two SEPARATE commands (a SNLF detachment and a reinforced under the command of Col. Kiyonao Ichiki (of Guadalcanal infamy) totaling only 2,500 men to invade two separate islets (one of which had a heavy platoon of light tanks that the Japanese didn't even know existed) defended by 3,500 troops, mostly Marines (including a Raider battalion) in prepared defensive positions. There was NO floating reserve to provide support for the IJA/SNLF except construction laborers.

The Japanese plan called for a brief bombardment by a cruiser division (4 CA) followed by a landing at dawn. American defenses include four 7"/45 guns (secondary guns from the Mississippi class of pre-dred BB class) that had the capacity to punch straight through the belt of the Mogami and her sisters, along with five 5"/51 coastal defense guns.

The Americans invaded Tarawa (defended by ~2,600 troops and 2,000 construction laborers) with 18,000 Marines supported by 6 CV, 5 CVL, and 6 CVE (with many of the pilots Marines who have actual CAS training and the other Navy pilots have done considerable practice against land targets), 12 BB, 8 CA, 4 CL, 66 DD. The American landing force took 3,100 casualties (1,009 KIA) despite being directly supported by more battleships than the Japanese navy possessed, better than double the carrier aircraft carried by the Kido Butai at Midway, etc.

Zero chance the Japanese don't take massive casualties, even if the manage to win the land battle (IMO the chances of that are under 30%).
 
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It is unlikely, although not impossible, that the Japanese could have wiped out the American carrier force, but actually TAKING the Island? Even if they managed it it would have made Tarawa look like an Administrative Landing.

You've been making the Tarawa comparison for years, and it's really ideal for illustrating just how enormously difficult the Japanese task at Midway would have been. The IJN had far less capability, far more impoverished doctrine, far less experience at opposed landings, to have any real chance of tackling an atoll that was nearly as well defended as Tarawa would be a year later.

The Kido Butai at its peak was a lithe, impressive thing; but it was really much more analogous to light calvary than it was to infantry or even artillery. It was a raiding force, not a weapon for amphibious warfare, or indeed any sustained offensive. And the IJN had no notion of building up the kind of amphibious complement that the USN was already building up - the big gunline, the escort carrier flotillas for CAS, the specialized landing ships, the amphibious command and coordination capabilities, the logistics required for the length of time needed to secure such a heavily defended island, and so on that the USN got so damned good at over the final three years of the war.

How can Nagumo take Midway? I think the only way is if you butterfly away Nimitz's reinforcements of it over the previous six months. In short, make it a far less opposed landing in the first place. But that requires a much earlier (and harder to justify) POD - whereas simply winning the naval battle can be managed with individual decisions right up to and during the battle (McCluskey goes the wrong way, etc.).
 
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So, again what does Yamamoto do with the extra six month of grace he has gained?

If he's smart, he fortifies the heck out of key islands that the U.S. cannot easily bypass (one is astonished to see how late in the game the Japanese waited until beginning serious work fortifying the Marianas, for example), builds up a pool of trained naval pilots, and saves his fuel (save for training), waiting for a decisive battle when the U.S. offensive begins in earnest.

It's not much of a strategy, but then Japan has no really good cards to play. The Spring 1942 perimeter was pretty much the Japanese logistical outer limit. Major objectives (Moresby or maybe the northern New Hebrides aside) beyond it were all more or less beyond Japanese capabilities.

The problem is that this really wasn't how Yamamoto's mind worked; and he was a little too full of victory disease with his incredible run of successes. Winning at Midway will intensify that, and create pressure to keep up the offensives. I think if his carrier force is still intact, it will be hard for him to resist trying Operation FS, and frankly that was an even bigger recipe for disaster than Midway was.
 
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