destiple
Banned
delusions of grandeur are not exlcusive to "aryans" only btwEveryone knows the superior aryan race doesn’t care about logistics
I think narcissistic people of all "races" seem to share this
delusions of grandeur are not exlcusive to "aryans" only btwEveryone knows the superior aryan race doesn’t care about logistics
they thought about that ? I thought that was just in the novel 1901
You also see this in militaries trained by or patterned after Germany. Imperial Japan for example. Just substitute Mighty Samurai for Superior Arayns and the same sentence applies to bothYou joke, but its actually kinda interesting how thorough this failing resonates in the German military (at least Imperial and Nazi Germany, largely because it was the same people). They could do the tactics fine, but fell down when it came to the larger picture. If you read accounts of German generals during WWII it becomes apparent. Its also a big part of the "Hitler's screwups cost Germany the war" myth came from.
Kaiser Wilhelm had this damnfool idea
Six month to one year delay in US victory.
As strong as the US economy was, a significant Midway loss would force at least some redirection of resources to the Pacific. This means some reduction in LL to Russia, and somewhat less pressure of the Germans in the west - delaying getting them out of North Africa, Husky a little later, etc. With less LL goodies and less pressure on the Germans in the west, the Soviets are going to still win in the east, but it will take longer and probably be more expensive in manpower and materiel. Given the atomic bombs will be arriving at more or less the same time, and it will take the Soviets 3-4 months to reorient their forces to move against Japan, you might actually see fewer Soviet gains in Korea, Kuriles not more. Furthermore, the Soviets will have shown their hand at not living up to various agreements before the US has completely one and begun demobilizing...
First let's assume the Japanese win at Midway. By win we will assume a variant of scenario #3. Japan wins with minimal casualties at sea-very unlikely but for the moment let's assume the Americans royally bungle the trap they've set for the IJN. The Americans lose Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown. The Japanese do not lose a single carrier.
As has been discussed elsewhere, any invasion of Midway is a disaster. Picture a reverse Tarawa with the Americans able to hold off the Japanese and being able to be supplied by air from Hawaii. The Japanese are at the edge of their supply lines, the Americans are not. The invasion of Midway ends in a disaster for the invasion force. The Japanese withdraw satisfied that they have dealt America a major blow.
But have they?
To use a source commonly quoted regarding said battle namely Combined Fleet-http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm - we see that at the end of the battle the IJN has a 4 to 1 advantage in carriers and a 5 to 1 advantage in naval aircraft by the end of the battle.
Japan has won some breathing space. That advantage will last for one year. By late 1943 the USN will have a 2 to 1 advantage in carriers and almost a similar advantage in aircraft. That advantage will only get larger over the next two years.
So, what will Japan and the United States do?
Here are my thoughts.
Japan:
- Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.
- Japan begins building air bases on all the islands at the edge of its conquests to secure them. The goal is to make retaking any of these islands a difficult proposition and bleed the allies so that they will come to the negotiating table.
United States:
There is simply no getting around two factors here. The grim determination of the U.S. to win and the U.S. production ability as opposed to Japan.
- For the United States one thing has not changed. It will win the battle of production by the end of 1943 and will have a decided advantage over the IJN. But for the moment it does not have the carrier strength in the Pacific to launch a significant offensive or to thwart Japanese plans. I don't see American naval planners wanting to risk their sole remaining aircraft carrier in the Pacific - the Saratoga- on any major action until it gets reinforcements. So likely Japan takes Port Moresby and New Guinea.
- There is no Guadalcanal operation. At least not until summer/early fall of 1943. The U.S. and its allies are forced into a holding action. Then in mid to late 43 the U.S. and Australia launch a joint naval/air invasion of New Guinea to retake it and take pressure off of Australia.
- You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL. Why? Remember in this scenario Japan did not lose its four carriers at Midway. Not only does it still have them but it also has the skilled air crews that flew on them. This is going to make things more difficult for the Americans during this time. You don't have the Marianas Turkey Shoot, more likely it's the Marianas Blood Bath as both sides will lose carriers and planes. But as the combined fleet above indicates the Americans can afford to absorb these losses. The Japanese can't.
- Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody. The Japanese victory at Midway means more troops must be diverted to the Pacific which probably delays but does not stop operations in Europe. How much I leave to those more knowledgeable in this area.
- The U.S. will eventually have the atomic bomb in 1945. By then we will be close to taking Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Japan's victory may allow her to delay the inevitable by at most - and I am being charitable - 6 months. But by March 1946 at the latest Japan will surrender as she did in our timeline.
What about US subs? If, on the basis of a victory at Midway, the Japanese became more confident and ambitious about territorial expansion eastward/southeastward into the Pacific, and sent even larger forces to remote garrisons, wouldn't that provide more opportunities for US subs to cause greater losses than in the OTL? (I recall a Japanese author say that if more ambitious, far flung operations were implemented, the loss of shipping would've occurred "incalculably faster" than it actually did.) If that occured, wouldn't the whole Japanese war effort crumble even sooner than in the OTL?You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL.
- Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody.
The US could maintain their OTL timeline or possibly improve it (!) by solely advancing in the Central Pacific and ignore the South West Pacific. The Japanese aren't going to go much further south even if the US loses at Midway as was well said in post #30. Australia may feel threatened in 1942-1943 but they truly would not be since the Japanese couldn't invade Australia with any strength.
What about US subs? If, on the basis of a victory at Midway, the Japanese became more confident and ambitious about territorial expansion eastward/southeastward into the Pacific, and sent even larger forces to remote garrisons, wouldn't that provide more opportunities for US subs to cause greater losses than in the OTL? (I recall a Japanese author say that if more ambitious, far flung operations were implemented, the loss of shipping would've occurred "incalculably faster" than it actually did.) If that occured, wouldn't the whole Japanese war effort crumble even sooner than in the OTL?
Japan:
- Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.
The Japanese taking PNG doesn't imperil the supply lines to Australia at all, which go via the South Pacific.
All it does is get the Japanese a potential airbase that might assist in the damn fool idea of invading northern Australia, which - even if successful - will not imperil the supply lines to Australia either.
It's a long, long way from Cairns or Townsville to Melbourne.
...
And Japanese submarines would not be idle. They would also be sinking allied shipping bound for Australia which could effect future planning for a Central OR South-Western Pacific campaign.
The US could maintain their OTL timeline or possibly improve it (!) by solely advancing in the Central Pacific and ignore the South West Pacific.
As strong as the US economy was, a significant Midway loss would force at least some redirection of resources to the Pacific. This means some reduction in LL to Russia, and somewhat less pressure of the Germans in the west - delaying getting them out of North Africa, Husky a little later, etc. With less LL goodies and less pressure on the Germans in the west, the Soviets are going to still win in the east, but it will take longer and probably be more expensive in manpower and materiel. Given the atomic bombs will be arriving at more or less the same time, and it will take the Soviets 3-4 months to reorient their forces to move against Japan, you might actually see fewer Soviet gains in Korea, Kuriles not more. Furthermore, the Soviets will have shown their hand at not living up to various agreements before the US has completely one and begun demobilizing...
I agree that Port Moresby was probably the most viable offensive option for Yamamoto. Unlike Midway and the Operation FS objectives, it actually had some significant chance of success, and some modest strategic value for Japan's strategic perimeter.Japan:
- Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.
- Japan begins building air bases on all the islands at the edge of its conquests to secure them. The goal is to make retaking any of these islands a difficult proposition and bleed the allies so that they will come to the negotiating table.
There is simply no getting around two factors here. The grim determination of the U.S. to win and the U.S. production ability as opposed to Japan.
- For the United States one thing has not changed. It will win the battle of production by the end of 1943 and will have a decided advantage over the IJN. But for the moment it does not have the carrier strength in the Pacific to launch a significant offensive or to thwart Japanese plans. I don't see American naval planners wanting to risk their sole remaining aircraft carrier in the Pacific - the Saratoga- on any major action until it gets reinforcements. So likely Japan takes Port Moresby and New Guinea.
- There is no Guadalcanal operation. At least not until summer/early fall of 1943. The U.S. and its allies are forced into a holding action. Then in mid to late 43 the U.S. and Australia launch a joint naval/air invasion of New Guinea to retake it and take pressure off of Australia.
- You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL. Why? Remember in this scenario Japan did not lose its four carriers at Midway. Not only does it still have them but it also has the skilled air crews that flew on them. This is going to make things more difficult for the Americans during this time. You don't have the Marianas Turkey Shoot, more likely it's the Marianas Blood Bath as both sides will lose carriers and planes. But as the combined fleet above indicates the Americans can afford to absorb these losses. The Japanese can't.
- Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody. The Japanese victory at Midway means more troops must be diverted to the Pacific which probably delays but does not stop operations in Europe. How much I leave to those more knowledgeable in this area.
- The U.S. will eventually have the atomic bomb in 1945. By then we will be close to taking Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Japan's victory may allow her to delay the inevitable by at most - and I am being charitable - 6 months. But by March 1946 at the latest Japan will surrender as she did in our timeline.