WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

SsgtC

Banned
You joke, but its actually kinda interesting how thorough this failing resonates in the German military (at least Imperial and Nazi Germany, largely because it was the same people). They could do the tactics fine, but fell down when it came to the larger picture. If you read accounts of German generals during WWII it becomes apparent. Its also a big part of the "Hitler's screwups cost Germany the war" myth came from.
You also see this in militaries trained by or patterned after Germany. Imperial Japan for example. Just substitute Mighty Samurai for Superior Arayns and the same sentence applies to both
 

destiple

Banned
and they did look down upon the koreans and chinese as subhumans
but the british did the same in India in the 19th century
I think such kind of crude nationalism is common in all expanding imperialistic powers , for brits this was 18th and 19th century for germans and japs it was early 20th
 
Six month to one year delay in US victory.

Massive changes then. Off the top of my head: Unified Korea, possible KMT/USSR deal. 4 powers Tokyo occupation might be forced by the USSR. Many more dead POWs and civvies. The first serious strategic bombardment may be simultaneous atomic bombardments. USN might get to blockade out a surrender.

yours,
Sam R.
 
As strong as the US economy was, a significant Midway loss would force at least some redirection of resources to the Pacific. This means some reduction in LL to Russia, and somewhat less pressure of the Germans in the west - delaying getting them out of North Africa, Husky a little later, etc. With less LL goodies and less pressure on the Germans in the west, the Soviets are going to still win in the east, but it will take longer and probably be more expensive in manpower and materiel. Given the atomic bombs will be arriving at more or less the same time, and it will take the Soviets 3-4 months to reorient their forces to move against Japan, you might actually see fewer Soviet gains in Korea, Kuriles not more. Furthermore, the Soviets will have shown their hand at not living up to various agreements before the US has completely one and begun demobilizing...
 
As strong as the US economy was, a significant Midway loss would force at least some redirection of resources to the Pacific. This means some reduction in LL to Russia, and somewhat less pressure of the Germans in the west - delaying getting them out of North Africa, Husky a little later, etc. With less LL goodies and less pressure on the Germans in the west, the Soviets are going to still win in the east, but it will take longer and probably be more expensive in manpower and materiel. Given the atomic bombs will be arriving at more or less the same time, and it will take the Soviets 3-4 months to reorient their forces to move against Japan, you might actually see fewer Soviet gains in Korea, Kuriles not more. Furthermore, the Soviets will have shown their hand at not living up to various agreements before the US has completely one and begun demobilizing...

Pretty neat argument...never seen it before. As weird as it sounds, could have been almost a good thing, in light of subsequent developments. Why I like this site...makes you think! Has anyone explored what happens if you just simply slow down LL to the Sovs and redirect it?
 

Geon

Donor
First let's assume the Japanese win at Midway. By win we will assume a variant of scenario #3. Japan wins with minimal casualties at sea-very unlikely but for the moment let's assume the Americans royally bungle the trap they've set for the IJN. The Americans lose Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown. The Japanese do not lose a single carrier.

As has been discussed elsewhere, any invasion of Midway is a disaster. Picture a reverse Tarawa with the Americans able to hold off the Japanese and being able to be supplied by air from Hawaii. The Japanese are at the edge of their supply lines, the Americans are not. The invasion of Midway ends in a disaster for the invasion force. The Japanese withdraw satisfied that they have dealt America a major blow.

But have they?

To use a source commonly quoted regarding said battle namely Combined Fleet-http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm - we see that at the end of the battle the IJN has a 4 to 1 advantage in carriers and a 5 to 1 advantage in naval aircraft by the end of the battle.

Japan has won some breathing space. That advantage will last for one year. By late 1943 the USN will have a 2 to 1 advantage in carriers and almost a similar advantage in aircraft. That advantage will only get larger over the next two years.

So, what will Japan and the United States do?

Here are my thoughts.

Japan:

  1. Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.
  2. Japan begins building air bases on all the islands at the edge of its conquests to secure them. The goal is to make retaking any of these islands a difficult proposition and bleed the allies so that they will come to the negotiating table.

United States:

  1. For the United States one thing has not changed. It will win the battle of production by the end of 1943 and will have a decided advantage over the IJN. But for the moment it does not have the carrier strength in the Pacific to launch a significant offensive or to thwart Japanese plans. I don't see American naval planners wanting to risk their sole remaining aircraft carrier in the Pacific - the Saratoga- on any major action until it gets reinforcements. So likely Japan takes Port Moresby and New Guinea.
  2. There is no Guadalcanal operation. At least not until summer/early fall of 1943. The U.S. and its allies are forced into a holding action. Then in mid to late 43 the U.S. and Australia launch a joint naval/air invasion of New Guinea to retake it and take pressure off of Australia.
  3. You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL. Why? Remember in this scenario Japan did not lose its four carriers at Midway. Not only does it still have them but it also has the skilled air crews that flew on them. This is going to make things more difficult for the Americans during this time. You don't have the Marianas Turkey Shoot, more likely it's the Marianas Blood Bath as both sides will lose carriers and planes. But as the combined fleet above indicates the Americans can afford to absorb these losses. The Japanese can't.
  4. Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody. The Japanese victory at Midway means more troops must be diverted to the Pacific which probably delays but does not stop operations in Europe. How much I leave to those more knowledgeable in this area.
  5. The U.S. will eventually have the atomic bomb in 1945. By then we will be close to taking Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Japan's victory may allow her to delay the inevitable by at most - and I am being charitable - 6 months. But by March 1946 at the latest Japan will surrender as she did in our timeline.
There is simply no getting around two factors here. The grim determination of the U.S. to win and the U.S. production ability as opposed to Japan.
 

nbcman

Donor
First let's assume the Japanese win at Midway. By win we will assume a variant of scenario #3. Japan wins with minimal casualties at sea-very unlikely but for the moment let's assume the Americans royally bungle the trap they've set for the IJN. The Americans lose Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown. The Japanese do not lose a single carrier.

As has been discussed elsewhere, any invasion of Midway is a disaster. Picture a reverse Tarawa with the Americans able to hold off the Japanese and being able to be supplied by air from Hawaii. The Japanese are at the edge of their supply lines, the Americans are not. The invasion of Midway ends in a disaster for the invasion force. The Japanese withdraw satisfied that they have dealt America a major blow.

But have they?

To use a source commonly quoted regarding said battle namely Combined Fleet-http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm - we see that at the end of the battle the IJN has a 4 to 1 advantage in carriers and a 5 to 1 advantage in naval aircraft by the end of the battle.

Japan has won some breathing space. That advantage will last for one year. By late 1943 the USN will have a 2 to 1 advantage in carriers and almost a similar advantage in aircraft. That advantage will only get larger over the next two years.

So, what will Japan and the United States do?

Here are my thoughts.

Japan:

  1. Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.
  2. Japan begins building air bases on all the islands at the edge of its conquests to secure them. The goal is to make retaking any of these islands a difficult proposition and bleed the allies so that they will come to the negotiating table.

United States:

  1. For the United States one thing has not changed. It will win the battle of production by the end of 1943 and will have a decided advantage over the IJN. But for the moment it does not have the carrier strength in the Pacific to launch a significant offensive or to thwart Japanese plans. I don't see American naval planners wanting to risk their sole remaining aircraft carrier in the Pacific - the Saratoga- on any major action until it gets reinforcements. So likely Japan takes Port Moresby and New Guinea.
  2. There is no Guadalcanal operation. At least not until summer/early fall of 1943. The U.S. and its allies are forced into a holding action. Then in mid to late 43 the U.S. and Australia launch a joint naval/air invasion of New Guinea to retake it and take pressure off of Australia.
  3. You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL. Why? Remember in this scenario Japan did not lose its four carriers at Midway. Not only does it still have them but it also has the skilled air crews that flew on them. This is going to make things more difficult for the Americans during this time. You don't have the Marianas Turkey Shoot, more likely it's the Marianas Blood Bath as both sides will lose carriers and planes. But as the combined fleet above indicates the Americans can afford to absorb these losses. The Japanese can't.
  4. Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody. The Japanese victory at Midway means more troops must be diverted to the Pacific which probably delays but does not stop operations in Europe. How much I leave to those more knowledgeable in this area.
  5. The U.S. will eventually have the atomic bomb in 1945. By then we will be close to taking Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Japan's victory may allow her to delay the inevitable by at most - and I am being charitable - 6 months. But by March 1946 at the latest Japan will surrender as she did in our timeline.
There is simply no getting around two factors here. The grim determination of the U.S. to win and the U.S. production ability as opposed to Japan.

The US could maintain their OTL timeline or possibly improve it (!) by solely advancing in the Central Pacific and ignore the South West Pacific. The Japanese aren't going to go much further south even if the US loses at Midway as was well said in post #30. Australia may feel threatened in 1942-1943 but they truly would not be since the Japanese couldn't invade Australia with any strength.
 
You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL.
  1. Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody.
What about US subs? If, on the basis of a victory at Midway, the Japanese became more confident and ambitious about territorial expansion eastward/southeastward into the Pacific, and sent even larger forces to remote garrisons, wouldn't that provide more opportunities for US subs to cause greater losses than in the OTL? (I recall a Japanese author say that if more ambitious, far flung operations were implemented, the loss of shipping would've occurred "incalculably faster" than it actually did.) If that occured, wouldn't the whole Japanese war effort crumble even sooner than in the OTL?
 

Geon

Donor
The US could maintain their OTL timeline or possibly improve it (!) by solely advancing in the Central Pacific and ignore the South West Pacific. The Japanese aren't going to go much further south even if the US loses at Midway as was well said in post #30. Australia may feel threatened in 1942-1943 but they truly would not be since the Japanese couldn't invade Australia with any strength.

The Japanese may not be able to invade Australia but they can and will try to sink any shipping delivering troops and supplies there now that they control most of the central and south Pacific. As I indicate in the response to starman it will become a grim game of who sinks the most.

Further, a lot depends on how loud MacArthur howls about wanting to retake the Philippines. Remember, what you are suggesting is what Nimitz wanted to do in OTL. But MacArthur launched a charm offensive with FDR that convinced him to make this a two-pronged offensive. Here it's not both/and but either/or, given the assets that are available. It's likely, but not certain that MacArthur gets his chance to return to the Philippines. You probably still get a Sho Go operation but with the northern carrier "bait" having much more experienced seamen and airman on board. A Philippine campaign would last longer and be bloodier in this case.

It is possible Nimitz does get his way-in which case you will still have several bloody engagements ahead for both sides but without having to commit the massive amounts of men and material that were needed for the invasion of the Philippine Islands.

What about US subs? If, on the basis of a victory at Midway, the Japanese became more confident and ambitious about territorial expansion eastward/southeastward into the Pacific, and sent even larger forces to remote garrisons, wouldn't that provide more opportunities for US subs to cause greater losses than in the OTL? (I recall a Japanese author say that if more ambitious, far flung operations were implemented, the loss of shipping would've occurred "incalculably faster" than it actually did.) If that occured, wouldn't the whole Japanese war effort crumble even sooner than in the OTL?

U.S. subs could have caused greater losses but remember they were dealing with the Mark 14 torpedo problems through mid-1943. That would prove a disadvantage on the U.S. side.

And Japanese submarines would not be idle. They would also be sinking allied shipping bound for Australia which could effect future planning for a Central OR South-Western Pacific campaign.
 

Ian_W

Banned
Japan:

  1. Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.

The Japanese taking PNG doesn't imperil the supply lines to Australia at all, which go via the South Pacific.

All it does is get the Japanese a potential airbase that might assist in the damn fool idea of invading northern Australia, which - even if successful - will not imperil the supply lines to Australia either.

It's a long, long way from Cairns or Townsville to Melbourne.
 
The Japanese taking PNG doesn't imperil the supply lines to Australia at all, which go via the South Pacific.

All it does is get the Japanese a potential airbase that might assist in the damn fool idea of invading northern Australia, which - even if successful - will not imperil the supply lines to Australia either.

It's a long, long way from Cairns or Townsville to Melbourne.

... and even further to Wellington. People who think taking Port Morseby of Fiji 'cuts off' Australia, should take a hard look at the distances and compare to how operating in their OTL distances overtaxed the IJN and Japans cargo shipping.
 
...

And Japanese submarines would not be idle. They would also be sinking allied shipping bound for Australia which could effect future planning for a Central OR South-Western Pacific campaign.

Japan stuck to their doctrine of placing cargo ships at the bottom of priority for submarine attacks. Only one torpedo was allowed per cargo ship, and only if there were no warships present. Their doctrine was the submarines attacked capitol ships first and always as part of their Decisive Battle doctrine. They never deviated significantly from that. Japans sortie rate for submarines was nowhere near what was needed anyway for a cargo interdiction campaign. The numbers they could sustain on patrol were far below what the Germans did, even on a off day.
 
The US could maintain their OTL timeline or possibly improve it (!) by solely advancing in the Central Pacific and ignore the South West Pacific.

One of my faves. Forget MacArthurs proposals and get to the Central Pacific campaign. Might be able to start that a few months earlier, when the fortifications in the outer perimeter are less complete.
 
As strong as the US economy was, a significant Midway loss would force at least some redirection of resources to the Pacific. This means some reduction in LL to Russia, and somewhat less pressure of the Germans in the west - delaying getting them out of North Africa, Husky a little later, etc. With less LL goodies and less pressure on the Germans in the west, the Soviets are going to still win in the east, but it will take longer and probably be more expensive in manpower and materiel. Given the atomic bombs will be arriving at more or less the same time, and it will take the Soviets 3-4 months to reorient their forces to move against Japan, you might actually see fewer Soviet gains in Korea, Kuriles not more. Furthermore, the Soviets will have shown their hand at not living up to various agreements before the US has completely one and begun demobilizing...

I really can't see TORCH being cancelled. It was too politically important, above all to Roosevelt, who saw it through over considerable opposition by Marshall. He really needed some tangible American combat action in the ETO, and he wanted it before Election Day; and the troops, tanks and landing craft involved were not going to help Nimitz one whit in delivering hard knocks to Nagumo's ships. Fundamentally, FDR agreed with "Germany First;" he was not immune to domestic political pressure to beat back Japan, but he had enough of a mandate and support to see off even a naval defeat like the Midway we are talking about. Unless Yamamoto conquers Hawaii (an impossibility), that is not going to change.

But yes, there would be some other modest butterflies in Europe. TORCH would go on, but you might see Ranger reassigned to the Pacific, with a Brit carrier assigned to replace it. Sicily and Italy might be imperiled or modified in some way, but OVERLORD will still happen in the spring of '44.

The real need in the Pacific after a loss at Midway will be for fast carrier decks and planes for the Pacific as quickly as possible, and there's limits to what could be done with existing production capabilities to achieve that. There were only so many slipways which could accommodate a carrier, and too many were spoken for with other naval construction. As I said above, the one really feasible option would be to expand the conversion of Cleveland class cruisers to Independence class light carriers. Say you bump it up from the planned nine to 12 or 15. That at least is something you could have in the water by 1943.
 
Well said, Geon.

Only one or two small niggles:

Japan:
  1. Japan will probably try to take Port Moresby again. Doing so, imperils the supply lines to Australia for the allies. And this time the IJN doesn't have to worry about the USN interfering. New Guinea falls into Japanese hands.
  2. Japan begins building air bases on all the islands at the edge of its conquests to secure them. The goal is to make retaking any of these islands a difficult proposition and bleed the allies so that they will come to the negotiating table.
I agree that Port Moresby was probably the most viable offensive option for Yamamoto. Unlike Midway and the Operation FS objectives, it actually had some significant chance of success, and some modest strategic value for Japan's strategic perimeter.

The difficulty is that the longer Yamamoto waits to do it, the harder it gets - rapidly. And he has only so much available sealift and troops to do it - maybe a reinforced brigade.

Consider what the Allies had there in the summer of 1942:

The New Guinea Force present in Moresby under Gen. Blamey up through August amounted to roughly 3,000 Australian troops, along with some American units - a couple fighter groups, an antiaircraft battalion, several Engineer units to improve the two existing airstrips and build new ones, and some Ordnance troops, including, by July, an Ordnance aviation (air base) company, the 703d, an 11-man detachment of the 25th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company to service the antiaircraft guns, and detachments of two ammunition companies, the 59th and 55th. That might be manageable for 17th Army (which despite its impressive name amounted to no more than a division)...perhaps.

But on August 21, the Australians brought in two more brigades (part of the Australian 7th Division) to Moresby and Milne Bay. Perhaps with the thrust that actually came from Buna in OTL staged simultaneously with this new MO, it might have been doable, with a few breaks.

Air assets?

40th fighter (P-39's)
80th fighter (P-39's) arrived July 20
75th RAAF fighter (P-40's) arrives late July
76th RAAF (P-40's) first action in late July.

A renewed Operation MO in July has a chance. Delay it until September, and I think the Allies keep it.

  1. For the United States one thing has not changed. It will win the battle of production by the end of 1943 and will have a decided advantage over the IJN. But for the moment it does not have the carrier strength in the Pacific to launch a significant offensive or to thwart Japanese plans. I don't see American naval planners wanting to risk their sole remaining aircraft carrier in the Pacific - the Saratoga- on any major action until it gets reinforcements. So likely Japan takes Port Moresby and New Guinea.
  2. There is no Guadalcanal operation. At least not until summer/early fall of 1943. The U.S. and its allies are forced into a holding action. Then in mid to late 43 the U.S. and Australia launch a joint naval/air invasion of New Guinea to retake it and take pressure off of Australia.
  3. You now have an air/sea war of attrition starting in late 1943 in the Pacific. It will probably be more bloody then OTL. Why? Remember in this scenario Japan did not lose its four carriers at Midway. Not only does it still have them but it also has the skilled air crews that flew on them. This is going to make things more difficult for the Americans during this time. You don't have the Marianas Turkey Shoot, more likely it's the Marianas Blood Bath as both sides will lose carriers and planes. But as the combined fleet above indicates the Americans can afford to absorb these losses. The Japanese can't.
  4. Liberating New Guinea takes the remainder of 1943. From here the war takes a similar turn to our timeline with the Japanese being forced back bit by bit. But it is more bloody. The Japanese victory at Midway means more troops must be diverted to the Pacific which probably delays but does not stop operations in Europe. How much I leave to those more knowledgeable in this area.
  5. The U.S. will eventually have the atomic bomb in 1945. By then we will be close to taking Iwo Jima and Okinawa. Japan's victory may allow her to delay the inevitable by at most - and I am being charitable - 6 months. But by March 1946 at the latest Japan will surrender as she did in our timeline.
There is simply no getting around two factors here. The grim determination of the U.S. to win and the U.S. production ability as opposed to Japan.

Actually, Saratoga was not the only US fleet carrier in the Pacific at that point - the Wasp passed through the Panama Canal on June 10, and arrived at San Diego on June 19. It would be available along with Saratoga for ops in the South Pacific by July. That's not enough to beat the Kido Butai but it's enough to be a credible threat. (That's up to 186 aircraft between them, which is actually about half what the KB could deploy at that point even with all six carriers - worth noting that Shokaku and Zuikaku would not be available until August, and even so the IJN was struggling to come up with replacement air crews following Coral Sea). Nimitz would be more careful in employing it, but a thrust down into the New Hebrides would almost certainly justify an opportunistic deployment on Nagumo's flank if they had adequate intel.

One thing that's less clear in the timeline here - which we seem to agree on - is what operations look like in late 1942 and 1943 without the Solomons of OTL. If Yamamoto keeps his head and is contented with a Port Moresby thrust and rounding out the southern Solomons, there will be less risk to the fast carriers, and the real attrition risk will be various raids by the USN, via quick carrier raids and subs until Nimitz is ready to move in force. If he goes full-hog on Operation FS, I think he loses a lot of air crews and some decks, because he would be hitting targets far more formidable than Japanese intelligence realized, and we see in just the attacks on Midway Atoll that ground suppression attacks really chewed up IJN air assets rapidly. A Yamamoto who has won at Midway is likely to roll the dice again, though. It likely would have cost him dearly.

Otherwise, you probably see something close to a decisive carrier battle in the Gilberts or Marshalls in late 1943.
 
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