WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

He had Corsairs on Guam in 1941. Where there Corsairs in 1941?

In OTL? Still in acceptance trials. The first test flights had begun in May, 1940, and production did not start rolling off planes until June 1942. But @CalBear's POD was a decision by Roosevelt in summer 1940 to put procurement on a war footing, enabling at least a land-based version to hit production in 1941. I could quibble with the pace he proposes, or let him defend it, or propose shipping something else more readily available to Guam.
 
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How? The British had great difficulty just projecting power out to Singapore, given that Europe and the Med was absorbing the preponderance of their resources, so how are they then supposed to mount an offensive to secure the SLOCs then? Are you proposing that the US rebase the entire Pacific fleet to Singapore?

No, I'm not saying that the US rebases their fleet to Singapore. I'm saying that if the British were to hold Singapore getting supplies to Luzon would be easier than crossing the Central Pacific from Oahu. AFAIK, this scenario was not examined.

Your own source says that it was the bombers who were there to ward off carrier attack, which they obviously failed to do. For the fighters, it says they were there for training...When your own sources are contradicting you, it's probably best to stop digging.

The fact that bombers were on Oahu to repel carrier attack indicates that the fighters there would escort them and provide air cover. Your quote states that the fighters on Oahu were used for training during peacetime. This was SOP in all militaries - the IJN forces that attacked Hawaii used their Zeros, Kates, and Vals for training before doing so.

General Short had two Alert levels to choose from. In the lowest his fighters would be unready and lined up to prevent sabotage. In the higher level they'd be dispersed to revetments to guard against bomber attack, fuelled for immediate air combat, and with standing air patrols.

Spending 8-12 months blockading and bombarding the forces on those islands deprived them of much of their supplies, denied them any prospect of reinforcement, and reduced their strength, while allowing the US to marshal additional forces for the attacks, all of which probably reduced casualties. The USN on the offensive was moving just as fast as it should have been. As was always the case in the Pacific War, the passage of time saw US forces grow stronger while those of the Japanese grew weaker.

USN offensive after Marianas was too plodding, overdirected from Washington and too politically muddled between the Army and the Navy. In terms of Iwo Jima, this Wiki article details the large scale reinforcements and fortifications that occurred after the fall of Saipan, because the US did not invade in July 1944 as the Japanese had been expecting,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planning_for_the_Battle_of_Iwo_Jima

The garrison was about 10,000 in June 1944 with little fortification work done. The delay in attack allowed for the boosting of the garrison to 21,000, the landing of an artillery park of about 500 pieces, and massive levels of fortification produced from the frantic digging in the 8 month reprieve.

The exhaustion of air and ground power was indeed an issue, but the commitment of naval forces also badly sapped Japanese strength there.

IJN forces inflicted heavy losses as well, while by 1943 were becoming ineffective. So a case can be made that naval battles in 1942 were to the IJN's interests. Where I think the argument on sapping naval strength in the Solomons is true is when IJN forces were attrited by US land based airpower.

Their errors during and before the Guadalcanal campaign were probably just as serious, if not more so, then those afterwards.

I don't think losing 20,000 men on Guadalcanal was a more serious error than having 100,000 bypassed on Rabaul.

Guadalcanal cost the Japanese Merchant Marine 200,000 tons of shipping. That's not just 200,000 tons of shipping sunk, but 200,000 tons of shipping sunk in the ass end of the Pacific while it was doing nothing to bring back the resources that Japan needed, which would have been a much bigger contribution to the Japanese war effort then trying to shuttle troops and supplies to a doomed battle.

Right, but the Japanese had to learn that lesson first - both at Guadalcanal then again in the Bismarck Sea. Once burned, they were more careful to keep their shipping out of land based air range.

The main effect the South Pacific campaign had, from beginning to end, was that it allowed the US to be able to grind the Japanese forces down piece meal even before it had built up the strength for the main offensive into the western pacific. The entire concept of the perimeter was shown to be militarily bankrupt. Japan could not support the forces at the island perimeter, could not defend it, and proved unable to anticipate attacks on it or effectively respond to them. It was a strategic millstone.

The grinding of IJN and IJA airpower was because the Japanese decided to commit their airpower in full rather than play "fleet in being" with it, and build it up. In this sense the Allied campaign was perfectly played.
 
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While he has posted sources which have contradicted the claims he's making in the past, this is the first time I've seen where the contradiction is so... blatant.

The source states that the USAAF was planning to repel a two carrier assault. You are claiming that USAAF tactics for Oahu to repel this attack intended unescorted bomber attacks, and that while the bombers were fighting, the fighters would not even fly CAP over their bases? I've never heard of such a thing! (You took a comment in the source out of context - frontline combat units trained all the time).
 
In OTL? Still in acceptance trials. The first test flights had begun in May, 1940, and production did not start rolling off planes until June 1942. But @CalBear's POD was a decision by Roosevelt in summer 1940 to put procurement on a war footing, enabling at least a land-based version to hit production in 1941. I could quibble with the pace he proposes, or let him defend it, or propose shipping something else more readily available to Guam.

Probably something more readily available then - F2A's most likely. Judging from the reaction at Wake, had an increased air garrison on Guam successfully repelled air attacks, then Nagumo would have shown up about December 18th or so with 1st and 5th Carrier Divisions and hammered Guam with multiple massed air strikes, after which we can assume that Guam would not have airpower remaining and the invasion would proceed?
 
As nbcman pointed out, how are the Japanese supposed hit TF-58's fleet train without taking out TF-58 first? The Japanese have to approach from the west due to geography and the axis of advance; this dramatically limits their ability to try and swing around.

During the Battle of Leyte Gulf Ozawa's carriers approached Halsey from the northeast undetected. Presumably Halsey's tankers were east of Halsey at that point, and if so, at that point nothing was between Ozawa and Halsey's supply train. Ozawa was able to do this because the carriers were based in Japan, not in the NEI.

Furthermore, I just did some digging, and the US Navy wasn't stupid; the carrier forces used for the Tarawa landings refueled south of Guadalcanal. Any Japanese force trying to get at the fleet train would either have to hit it on the way from Hawaii to Tuvalu, or else face the full wrath of American airpower in the South Pacific.

We're talking 1944 campaign only, Marshalls to Leyte Gulf.
 

nbcman

Donor
Probably something more readily available then - F2A's most likely. Judging from the reaction at Wake, had an increased air garrison on Guam successfully repelled air attacks, then Nagumo would have shown up about December 18th or so with 1st and 5th Carrier Divisions and hammered Guam with multiple massed air strikes, after which we can assume that Guam would not have airpower remaining and the invasion would proceed?

You are missing other aspects of the Pacific War Redux TL where the KB airgroups were gutted attacking PH. But that TL has little to do with what is being discussed in this thread.
 
During the Battle of Leyte Gulf Ozawa's carriers approached Halsey from the northeast undetected. Presumably Halsey's tankers were east of Halsey at that point, and if so, at that point nothing was between Ozawa and Halsey's supply train. Ozawa was able to do this because the carriers were based in Japan, not in the NEI.



We're talking 1944 campaign only, Marshalls to Leyte Gulf.
Ozawa was also able to do this because Halsey was distracted with hitting Kurita's Center Force and fending off air strikes from Luzon. The former is unlikely to be a factor without the Japanese desperate enough to throw unsupported battleships into the fray; the latter was a decidedly unreliable thing to count on, as Philippine Sea demonstrated.

Also, I did further digging on the campaigns you listed, and again, I must emphasize that the US Navy were not idiots; the fleet train, near as I can tell (unlike at Tarawa, the US Navy wasn't kind enough to organize the fleet train into a proper task force) was either with the amphibious forces and thus under the cover of the CVEs, or met up with refueling carriers behind the front lines, usually near or at Eniwetok and Majuro, where they're covered by land-based air.
 
The fact that bombers were on Oahu to repel carrier attack indicates that the fighters there would escort them and provide air cover.

???? This was exactly OPPOSITE of doctrine and training at the time. "The bomber will always get through" was considered a truism before the experience of the war proved it wrong. In fact that's why MORE bombers were being sent to Hawaii on December 7th to increase this supposed ability to destroy the Japanese navy with high altitude bombing but the war proved otherwise. "Pursuit" aircraft were for point-defense only and as noted there weren't enough of them as it was assumed the Navy and Air Force would detect and destroy any Naval attack which was expected to include the main battle-line of the Japanese Navy. (Another reason no one expected an actual attack since supporting the battle-line that far out into the Pacific was deemed impractical by everyone INCLUDING the Japanese)

Your quote states that the fighters on Oahu were used for training during peacetime. This was SOP in all militarizes - the IJN forces that attacked Hawaii used their Zeros, Kates, and Vals for training before doing so.

Arguably it's STILL SOP but the context, (and it's plainly stated) is that the ones on Oahu were both assigned and used as PRIMARILY training aircraft which in fact (and this is still true) limits their usefulness for combat operations. Why? Because they are being used very heavily for training and therefore are both not operationally available, (they are set up with minimum loads of ammunition and fuel for 'training' missions rather than full loads for 'operational' missions) and they are being used constantly with limited maintenance and servicing which degrades their combat life and ability. (Again this is specifically stated as a major issue and WHY they were not available for defense or combat except in limited numbers which WERE assigned operations missions)

General Short had two Alert levels to choose from. In the lowest his fighters would be unready and lined up to prevent sabotage. In the higher level they'd be dispersed to revetments to guard against bomber attack, fuelled for immediate air combat, and with standing air patrols.

And the one he chose was consistent with operational planning and available intelligence. In other words neither he nor anyone else thought they were needed for defense against air attack. Specifically since no one considered Hawaii vulnerable to air attack.

Randy
 
You are missing other aspects of the Pacific War Redux TL where the KB airgroups were gutted attacking PH. But that TL has little to do with what is being discussed in this thread.

Wow, KB's air wings gutted attacking Pearl Harbor in a Alternate History timeline on this site? What are the odds of that? :^)

In real life Nagumo's carrier squadrons were not gutted at Pearl Harbor. All were still operational at 'Midway' strength levels. If Guam had a larger air wing and had resisted air attacks from Saipan, then Yamamoto would hit Guam with some carrier divisions and that would be that. So there is no argument that Guam can hold out, only the idea that the Guam can discomfort the Japanese more before falling.
 
Ozawa was also able to do this because Halsey was distracted with hitting Kurita's Center Force and fending off air strikes from Luzon. The former is unlikely to be a factor without the Japanese desperate enough to throw unsupported battleships into the fray; the latter was a decidedly unreliable thing to count on, as Philippine Sea demonstrated.

Your original question was how Ozawa gets a crack at American tankers if approaching from the west with TF-58 between Ozawa and the SLOC. So we have the answer. The IJN carriers need to be based in the Sea of Japan so that they can interdict anywhere along TF-58's SLOC as the US carriers move west to hit land bases such as Formosa, Saipan, or Luzon. Then, when TF-58 becomes engaged with land based air forces, their command is distracted, similar to what happened with Nagumo at Midway, and the SLOC are vulnerable if the tanker train can be detected.

Also, I did further digging on the campaigns you listed, and again, I must emphasize that the US Navy were not idiots; the fleet train, near as I can tell (unlike at Tarawa, the US Navy wasn't kind enough to organize the fleet train into a proper task force) was either with the amphibious forces and thus under the cover of the CVEs, or met up with refueling carriers behind the front lines, usually near or at Eniwetok and Majuro, where they're covered by land-based air.

When outlining an SLOC strategy it was to be assumed that if Ozawa were to attack the tanker train he might tangle with a CVE Taffy or land based air. But most CVE's had Wildcats and the land based airpower of an Eniwetok was nowhere near the fighter power of TF-58. So generally speaking, if Ozawa tangles with tankers and a CVE Taffy, he's going to do better than if he attacks TF-58 head on.
 
???? This was exactly OPPOSITE of doctrine and training at the time. "The bomber will always get through" was considered a truism before the experience of the war proved it wrong. In fact that's why MORE bombers were being sent to Hawaii on December 7th to increase this supposed ability to destroy the Japanese navy with high altitude bombing but the war proved otherwise. "Pursuit" aircraft were for point-defense only and as noted there weren't enough of them as it was assumed the Navy and Air Force would detect and destroy any Naval attack which was expected to include the main battle-line of the Japanese Navy. (Another reason no one expected an actual attack since supporting the battle-line that far out into the Pacific was deemed impractical by everyone INCLUDING the Japanese)

The USAAF had a doctrine that B-17's could attack unescorted, and given that these could hit to over 600 miles and the P-40 could escort not further than 150 or 200 miles, unescorted attacks would be expected for B-17's. But Oahu had 45 bombers of the B-18 and A-20 types, and I've never heard of that doctrine applying to them.

No one expected a carrier attack on Oahu in 1941? What's this on page 163-164 of the link I posted earlier? (underlined is mine),

To assist Mr. Stimson in convincing the President it was safe to shift American naval power to the Atlantic, General Marshall had the War Plans Division prepare an estimate, the draft of which read:

…The Hawaiian Islands are subject to (a) sabotage, (b) carrier raids, (c) an attack in force.

In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.

Carrier raids by the Japanese involve jeopardizing naval units that will not be lightly undertaken. To meet these carrier raids our bombardment, protected by pursuit aviation, the latter operating from advanced fields on the Islands of Hawaii and Kauai, can cover a radius from Oahu of approximately 400 miles and beyond suitable points for the establishment of hostile land-based aviation.....

General Marshall memo means by "our bombardment, protected by pursuit aviation" that Army bombers would attack IJN carriers with P-40 escort. Furthermore on page 167, the radar units were intended to allow Army fighters to intercept IJN carrier aircraft at a distance from Pearl Harbor,

The radars in operation on Oahu in late 1941 had a dependable range of from 75 to 125 miles seaward. An exercise in early November demonstrated their ability to detect a group of carrier planes before daylight 80 miles away, far enough out to alert Army pursuit planes in time for the latter to intercept incoming "enemy" bombers about 30 miles from Pearl Harbor

USAAF fighters were on Oahu in large numbers to protect against carrier attack and prevent the invasion of Hawaii.

Arguably it's STILL SOP but the context, (and it's plainly stated) is that the ones on Oahu were both assigned and used as PRIMARILY training aircraft which in fact (and this is still true) limits their usefulness for combat operations. Why? Because they are being used very heavily for training and therefore are both not operationally available, (they are set up with minimum loads of ammunition and fuel for 'training' missions rather than full loads for 'operational' missions) and they are being used constantly with limited maintenance and servicing which degrades their combat life and ability. (Again this is specifically stated as a major issue and WHY they were not available for defense or combat except in limited numbers which WERE assigned operations missions)

About 2/3rd's of the fighters on Oahu were operational on 6 December and would have been available for anti-carrier and CAP missions had Short decided to go with the appropriate alert level, as per Marshall's memo above.
 
Your original question was how Ozawa gets a crack at American tankers if approaching from the west with TF-58 between Ozawa and the SLOC. So we have the answer. The IJN carriers need to be based in the Sea of Japan so that they can interdict anywhere along TF-58's SLOC as the US carriers move west to hit land bases such as Formosa, Saipan, or Luzon. Then, when TF-58 becomes engaged with land based air forces, their command is distracted, similar to what happened with Nagumo at Midway, and the SLOC are vulnerable if the tanker train can be detected.



When outlining an SLOC strategy it was to be assumed that if Ozawa were to attack the tanker train he might tangle with a CVE Taffy or land based air. But most CVE's had Wildcats and the land based airpower of an Eniwetok was nowhere near the fighter power of TF-58. So generally speaking, if Ozawa tangles with tankers and a CVE Taffy, he's going to do better than if he attacks TF-58 head on.
That’s one hell of an if for the Japanese. It would require a lot of scouting with green aircrews, burning lots of fuel and giving the Americans every opportunity to find them and call back TF 58.

Further, there’s a problem with keeping the carriers in Japan: oil. The Japanese basically left their carriers in the Singapore/Lingga area for three months OTL, and I’d bet it’s for the same reasons they did it with their surface combatants during the aftermath of Philippine Sea: not enough oil is reaching Japan to keep them fueled up, so they need to stay near the wells. The only reason the Japanese brought their carriers back to Japan at this point was to train air groups, which explains what Ozawa’s decoys were doing there. That, and physical repairs. Which brings us back to the problem of having to slip past TF 58 from the West.

And, lastly, part of the reason Ozawa was able to respond to the Saipan invasion as fast as he did is because he was in Lingga, and thus very close to the action. Operating out of Japan, especially in the early stages of the Central Pacific campaign, makes it a very real possibility that by the time the Japanese get there the Americans are done raiding and are back near the fleet train.

A CVE Taffy? By Leyte, the fleet train straight-up included ten escort carriers, and the Taffies supporting the amphibious force are all within support distance of each other. That’s 26 escort carriers as of Leyte, which straight outnumbers Ozawa’s carrier force at Philippine Sea in aircraft; don’t Pooh-Pooh the Wildcat, they’re still going up against Zeroes and now they have better aircrews. At Saipan, that’d be twenty, still not something Ozawa wants to tangle with. As for before, when the Mobile Force just has to contend with relatively small land bases... well, see my comments above about positioning.
 
While he has posted sources which have contradicted the claims he's making in the past, this is the first time I've seen where the contradiction is so... blatant.

Ten years ago there was some effort at organized argument, critical thinking, and analysis. In recent years its been more of throwing things at the wall in the hope something sticks. The only effort I'm seeing is in selectivity of facts or factoids.

Its interesting to read the rebuttals. In that sense the bandwidth here is not entire wasted, since some references and good arguments are presented in the counter posts.
 
That’s one hell of an if for the Japanese. It would require a lot of scouting with green aircrews, burning lots of fuel and giving the Americans every opportunity to find them and call back TF 58.

So tackling the most powerful navy in the history of mankind armed with the best equipped and best trained aviators in the world required planning, luck and work? Wow, who'd have thought?

Further, there’s a problem with keeping the carriers in Japan: oil. The Japanese basically left their carriers in the Singapore/Lingga area for three months OTL, and I’d bet it’s for the same reasons they did it with their surface combatants during the aftermath of Philippine Sea: not enough oil is reaching Japan to keep them fueled up, so they need to stay near the wells. The only reason the Japanese brought their carriers back to Japan at this point was to train air groups, which explains what Ozawa’s decoys were doing there. That, and physical repairs. Which brings us back to the problem of having to slip past TF 58 from the West.

Yes, oil was a big problem. Since the IJN intended to smash head on into TF-58 the most efficient logistics solution was to put the carriers at the oil then sail straight at the enemy. But if the plan is SLOC raiding, then the logistics for the plan needed to be in Japan because the IJN cannot sail through the USN's formations travelling west to east.

And, lastly, part of the reason Ozawa was able to respond to the Saipan invasion as fast as he did is because he was in Lingga, and thus very close to the action. Operating out of Japan, especially in the early stages of the Central Pacific campaign, makes it a very real possibility that by the time the Japanese get there the Americans are done raiding and are back near the fleet train.

So, worst case is that the IJN gets into a battle with TF-58, and will lose, and will be out of the war as an offensive fighthing force - ie the historical outcome at Marianas.

CVE Taffy? By Leyte, the fleet train straight-up included ten escort carriers, and the Taffies supporting the amphibious force are all within support distance of each other. That’s 26 escort carriers as of Leyte, which straight outnumbers Ozawa’s carrier force at Philippine Sea in aircraft;

Kurita tangled with 3 Taffys off Samar, (which I assume were providing ground support to the landings). 18 CVE's were insufficient to repel a surface force without air cover at point blank range and had trouble mustering the type of coordinated combined strikes necessary to penetrate IJN CAP defenses (even in 1944). The CVE's were slow and vulnerable and could be sunk by one torpedo or a few bombs. Overall, much better prospects for the IJN to fight CVE's than fleet carriers.

don’t Pooh-Pooh the Wildcat, they’re still going up against Zeroes and now they have better aircrews. At Saipan, that’d be twenty, still not something Ozawa wants to tangle with. As for before, when the Mobile Force just has to contend with relatively small land bases... well, see my comments above about positioning.

No one is poo-pooing the Wildcat. But the Wildcat is obsolescent by 1944 and will have trouble intercepting Judys and Jills. Hellcats were much, much better fighters.
 
So tackling the most powerful navy in the history of mankind armed with the best equipped and best trained aviators in the world required planning, luck and work? Wow, who'd have thought?



Yes, oil was a big problem. Since the IJN intended to smash head on into TF-58 the most efficient logistics solution was to put the carriers at the oil then sail straight at the enemy. But if the plan is SLOC raiding, then the logistics for the plan needed to be in Japan because the IJN cannot sail through the USN's formations travelling west to east.



So, worst case is that the IJN gets into a battle with TF-58, and will lose, and will be out of the war as an offensive fighthing force - ie the historical outcome at Marianas.



Kurita tangled with 3 Taffys off Samar, (which I assume were providing ground support to the landings). 18 CVE's were insufficient to repel a surface force without air cover at point blank range and had trouble mustering the type of coordinated combined strikes necessary to penetrate IJN CAP defenses (even in 1944). The CVE's were slow and vulnerable and could be sunk by one torpedo or a few bombs. Overall, much better prospects for the IJN to fight CVE's than fleet carriers.



No one is poo-pooing the Wildcat. But the Wildcat is obsolescent by 1944 and will have trouble intercepting Judys and Jills. Hellcats were much, much better fighters.
Wow, sarcasm, that's original. See, I can do it too!

That plan assumes there's enough oil in or getting to Japan to not only top up the entire Mobile Force, but also provide some at-sea refueling. With American submarines ravaging Japan's own SLOCs, this is a very dangerous assumption. The onus is on you, I'm afraid, to prove that there's enough oil in Japan to do the job.

Samar brings circumstances that do not track with the Mobile Force hitting the supply train/amphibious forces. Two of the three Taffies were under attack and could not organize proper air strikes against the Center Force. Taffy 3, naturally, was under immediate surface attack. Taffy 1 spent all day beating of kamikaze attacks. Taffy 2 was left unmolested - and thus was able to properly organize a strike that took out both Chokai and Chikuma and was a major factor in getting Kurita to turn around and GTFO.

An attack from the Mobile Force means that the first circumstance I outlined, the surface attack, is irrelevant. The second, the air attacks, are quite frankly a win for the Americans because any strike aircraft going after the CVEs are strike aircraft not going after the tankers that are the main target. And further, the Mobile Force and Center Force present two very, very different problems for CVEs. Attacking a large surface force like Kurita's, full of heavily armored ships, is something CVEs are inherently less suited for than simply providing fighter cover. The former needs heavy bombs and torpedoes, both of which are in short supply on CVEs. The latter just needs them to get fighters up in the air.

And fundamentally, even with Wildcats, the math is not on Ozawa's side. His aircrews are all green as freshly-mown grass; he's outnumbered at Leyte and maybe at par at Saipan. It's a bad fight.

~o~
Honestly, I agree that the Japanese should've tried to go after American SLOCs rather than TF 58, that it would make for an easier target. The Japanese thought so, too, given that the Unryu class was supposed to do just that. I just think that a. it wouldn't work and would just get the Mobile Force smashed to pieces anyway and b. the logistics of doing it with the entire Mobile Force simply don't work for the reasons I've already outlined.

As well, odds are nice and all, but they're not the end-all be-all of decisionmaking. The magnitude of the event/outcome in question also matters. In risk management, a possibility may be less likely to happen, but the problems it would create can be greater, and thus needs more accounting for than a high-probability, low-magnitude event. Similar idea here: going after the SLOCs gives the Japanese better odds of success, but it's debatable whether those odds are enough to offset the greater impact taking out TF 58 would create.

Further, the Japanese are operating with quite a few Unknown Unknowns. They don't know they don't know how badly the Americans have been hamstrung in earlier battles by faulty torpedoes. They don't know they don't know that how much better American pilots are compared to their own now. And they especially don't know that they don't know how good American AAA and fighter interception has gotten. Add in Ozawa's plan to throw land-based aircraft into the fray, and the fact is that the Japanese don't know, and honestly can't know, just how badly the odds are skewed against them in a tangle with TF 58. Which is a severe impediment to them enacting this plan with the Mobile Force rather than just a couple Unryus.
 
That plan assumes there's enough oil in or getting to Japan to not only top up the entire Mobile Force, but also provide some at-sea refueling. With American submarines ravaging Japan's own SLOCs, this is a very dangerous assumption. The onus is on you, I'm afraid, to prove that there's enough oil in Japan to do the job.

It also assumes that the IJN a) has an accurate appreciation of the tremendous disparity in combat power between its naval air arm and that of the USN at this juncture, and b) that the IJN is willing and able to abandon its decisive battle doctrine that it has held to passionately for nearly a half century.

But Koga, Toyoda, and Ozawa and their staffs really did believe that the force they could deploy would, with planned backing from land-based air assets, be something close to a match for whatever Nimitz would be sending their way. But it wasn't. Not even close.
 
It also assumes that the IJN a) has an accurate appreciation of the tremendous disparity in combat power between its naval air arm and that of the USN at this juncture, and b) that the IJN is willing and able to abandon its decisive battle doctrine that it has held to passionately for nearly a half century.

The plan was that land based airpower could offset the known numerical and qualitive superiority of the US carriers and that Ozawa could deliver a shuttle attack to keep his carriers out of range while delivering the blow. Didn't work for a variety of reasons, the most important of which were that two hundred Hellcats could ruin anyone's day and land bases under the constant air attack aren't viable planning factors for shuttle operations.
 
That plan assumes there's enough oil in or getting to Japan to not only top up the entire Mobile Force, but also provide some at-sea refueling. With American submarines ravaging Japan's own SLOCs, this is a very dangerous assumption. The onus is on you, I'm afraid, to prove that there's enough oil in Japan to do the job.

The IJN did not have the logistics to employ the "entire" Mobile Fleet in this fashion. During Leyte Gulf the IJN split its surface and carrier forces in two groups, with the surface forces operating from the oil supply in the NEI, the carriers from Japan. At Leyte Gulf the IJN managed to provide two converted battleships, three cruisers and eight DD/DE's for Ozawa's carriers. That's probably in the ballpark for this hypothetical - the IJN carriers need the logistics to operate 9 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers and 8 DD/DE on the USN SLOC's in June 1944.


Samar brings circumstances that do not track with the Mobile Force hitting the supply train/amphibious forces. Two of the three Taffies were under attack and could not organize proper air strikes against the Center Force. Taffy 3, naturally, was under immediate surface attack. Taffy 1 spent all day beating of kamikaze attacks. Taffy 2 was left unmolested - and thus was able to properly organize a strike that took out both Chokai and Chikuma and was a major factor in getting Kurita to turn around and GTFO.

I doubt a Taffy fight would be likely to generate the same battle result as a TF-58 vs. IJN carrier fight. In the one the IJN could reasonably expect to inflict a sharp defeat on the USN. In the other, the IJN can reasonably expect to have its carrier forces neutralized.

Honestly, I agree that the Japanese should've tried to go after American SLOCs rather than TF 58, that it would make for an easier target. The Japanese thought so, too, given that the Unryu class was supposed to do just that. I just think that a. it wouldn't work and would just get the Mobile Force smashed to pieces anyway and b. the logistics of doing it with the entire Mobile Force simply don't work for the reasons I've already outlined.

I think the logistics were probably doable assuming an OOB of 9 carriers, 1 service carrier, 2 cruisers, 2 battleships, 6 destroyers.

...going after the SLOCs gives the Japanese better odds of success, but it's debatable whether those odds are enough to offset the greater impact taking out TF 58 would create.

Correct, but a navy that cannot seek the decisive battle due to overwhelming enemy strength must default to commerce warfare tactics or to fleet in being, and fleet in being was not viable in the circumstances.

Further, the Japanese are operating with quite a few Unknown Unknowns. They don't know they don't know how badly the Americans have been hamstrung in earlier battles by faulty torpedoes. They don't know they don't know that how much better American pilots are compared to their own now. And they especially don't know that they don't know how good American AAA and fighter interception has gotten. Add in Ozawa's plan to throw land-based aircraft into the fray, and the fact is that the Japanese don't know, and honestly can't know, just how badly the odds are skewed against them in a tangle with TF 58.

The actual Japanese or us in the discussion on theoretical hypotheticals? Because this discussion is us and we know all of these things and can make guesses at the best available IJN options circa 1944.
 
The plan was that land based airpower could offset the known numerical and qualitive superiority of the US carriers and that Ozawa could deliver a shuttle attack to keep his carriers out of range while delivering the blow. Didn't work for a variety of reasons, the most important of which were that two hundred Hellcats could ruin anyone's day and land bases under the constant air attack aren't viable planning factors for shuttle operations.

I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you, because it helps prove my point: The Japanese simply did not understand how much better the U.S. fast carrier forces had gotten - the planes, the pilots, the air group coordination, the carrier operations, the radar, the logistics, even the damage control . . . every single aspect of their operation. And because they did not, there was less reason to re-think their decisive battle strategy - say, to even consider something like hitting Nimitz's SLOC's instead.

Against the U.S. carrier forces of 1942, the strategy probably would have worked. By the summer of 1944, it was a different U.S. Navy.
 
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