WI: Japanese Victory at Midway

Six month to one year delay in US victory. New and far better ships and aircraft are coming and coming fast. Carrier and fast battleship construction gets sped up even more. The Navy probably works harder on getting the Corsair deck qualified. The Navy bites the bullet and transfers Ranger to the Pacific (they know she won't last long out there but they need the hulls).

The Japanese would retain the advantage in aircraft carriers until about early 1944, so this significantly delays any advance into the Pacific.
 
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Is that decks, or air wings. OTL they had a advantage in decks late 42, but had pretty much lost the air war.

Numerical advantage until the second half of '43.

This also is purely looking at the quantitative advantage in terms vessels without taking into account the differences in quality. All those Essex-classes are superior to almost everything the Japanese fields and American carrier aircraft even more so.

Indeed, but the simple fact of the matter is they won't have a lot of Essex class either until the second half of '43.


That is not what that link says. It says there would have been parity in September 1943, and a 2-1 US advantage by mid-1944.

The Japanese would retain the advantage in aircraft carriers until about early 1944, so this significantly delays any advance into the Pacific.
 
The Japanese would retain the advantage in aircraft carriers until about early 1944, so this significantly delays any advance into the Pacific.

I'm really not sure what you think you're proving just by posting that again. September 1943 is not early 1944, its not about early 1944. Its closer to the middle of 1943 than it is the end of that year. By early 1944 the US enjoys superiority according to the link, and it will be massive superiority in a few months. Even a statement of parity is a bit rosy for the Japanese since the actual breakdown above shows the US with seven CVs and seven CVLs versus Japan's six CVs and two CVLs. Not to mention the massive 300 plane advantage on the US side.
 

nbcman

Donor
Numerical advantage until the second half of '43.



Indeed, but the simple fact of the matter is they won't have a lot of Essex class either until the second half of '43.
Based on the IJN’s air crew replacement rates, they may have more decks in early 1943 but the decks will have partial air crews with greener and greener crews. The Allies forces will still attrit the IJ aircrews be it at Cactus or some other location in late 1942-3.
EDIT: especially when the better Allied airframes are being used at this time.
 
I'm really not sure what you think you're proving just by posting that again. September 1943 is not early 1944, its not about early 1944. Its closer to the middle of 1943 than it is the end of that year. By early 1944 the US enjoys superiority according to the link, and it will be massive superiority in a few months. Even a statement of parity is a bit rosy for the Japanese since the actual breakdown above shows the US with seven CVs and seven CVLs versus Japan's six CVs and two CVLs. Not to mention the massive 300 plane advantage on the US side.

There are 12 months in a year and September is the 9th month. About is a relative term denoting proximity.
 
Based on the IJN’s air crew replacement rates, they may have more decks in early 1943 but the decks will have partial air crews with greener and greener crews. The Allies forces will still attrit the IJ aircrews be it at Cactus or some other location in late 1942-3.

The question though for the Allies is with what? Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger are the only thing available and moving Ranger pushes back operations in the ETO. I'd also imagine that, after loosing all carriers at Midway, the U.S. is going to start playing defensively because the danger of loosing any of their remaining carriers is too great.
 
There are 12 months in a year and September is the 9th Month. About is a relative term denoting proximity.
Its four months away from 1944. That is not about there. December sure. But early 1944 implies that up until more or less January of 1944 the Japanese are in a superior position. This is important because of the post you were initially responding to, which was about the American offensives being pushed back six months to a year, which would have meant around July-August 1943, which is about September. By posting 1944 your post is implying an extra sixth months, where the initial post you were responding to has the time-table more or less exactly on.
 

nbcman

Donor
The question though for the Allies is with what? Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger are the only thing available and moving Ranger pushes back operations in the ETO. I'd also imagine that, after loosing all carriers at Midway, the U.S. is going to start playing defensively because the danger of loosing any of their remaining carriers is too great.
See Japanese Victory Disease. The IJN will keep advancing and the Allies have plentiful airbases and aircraft to fight them with in SWPAC.
 
See Japanese Victory Disease. The IJN will keep advancing and the Allies have plentiful airbases and aircraft to fight them with in SWPAC.

Where at, however? It took Allied carriers to do the Solomons and there is a valid question of whether Australia can even have consistent supply lines for 1942 with the aforementioned carriers swept from the Pacific.

Its four months away from 1944. That is not about there. December sure. But early 1944 implies that up until more or less January of 1944 the Japanese are in a superior position. This is important because of the post you were initially responding to, which was about the American offensives being pushed back six months to a year, which would have meant around July-August 1943, which is about September. By posting 1944 your post is implying an extra sixth months, where the initial post you were responding to has the time-table more or less exactly on.

9/12 = 75% of 1943

It's useless nitpicking to be honest, particular when July is "about" but January is not when the difference is a single month.
 

nbcman

Donor
Where at, however? It took Allied carriers to do the Solomons and there is a valid question of whether Australia can even have consistent supply lines for 1942 with the aforementioned carriers swept from the Pacific.



9/12 = 75% of 1943

It's useless nitpicking to be honest, particular when July is "about" but January is not when the difference is a single month.
The IJN would follow up with FS and try to advance through Espiritu Santo and Fiji. The US-Aus supply lines are too far away for the IJN to interdict even if the IJN was interested in sinking merchies as opposed to Allied warships.
 
The IJN would follow up with FS and try to advance through Espiritu Santo and Fiji. The US-Aus supply lines are too far away for the IJN to interdict even if the IJN was interested in sinking merchies as opposed to Allied warships.

What were the closest airbases and allied air power available to contest such? It's also not a matter of directly attacking merchants as it is the threat of doing so; the threat of German interception was enough to shut down the arctic route to the USSR concurrent to this.
 
The question though for the Allies is with what? Saratoga, Wasp and Ranger are the only thing available and moving Ranger pushes back operations in the ETO. I'd also imagine that, after loosing all carriers at Midway, the U.S. is going to start playing defensively because the danger of loosing any of their remaining carriers is too great.

You seem to be unaware the bulk of the attrition of the IJN aircrew in 1942 & 1943 occurred from US land based aircraft. Thats why he referred to "Cactus". If you don't know what that name means you need to drop out of this discussion and hit the books for a semester or two.

In any case the first new Essex class carriers were ready for operations July - October 1943. The USN kicked off its Central Pacific offensive, setting the wheels in motion August/September, and executing the landings in the Gilbert islands in early November. 1943. The Japanese can try for a big carrier battle then. The USN has well trained aircrew, heavily salted with veterans of the previous battles, equal or better aircraft in the air wings, radar & centralized air defense control refined from earlier combat experience, better damage control, more efficient ships. On the surface six new battleships were available plus eight of the old Standards, a robust and experienced cruiser and destroyer fleet, and a swarm of new submarines.
 

According to the site you yourself cited, the US would gain the advantage in CVs in the second half of 1943:

7/1/43-
12/31/43

USN:
Saratoga (88), Wasp (76), Essex (91), Bunker Hill (91), Yorktown (91), Lexington II (91), Intrepid (91), Independence (33), Princeton (33), Belleau Wood (33), Cowpens (33), Monterey (33), Langley (33), Cabot (33)
7 CV
7 CVL
850
smlplane.jpg


IJN:
Kaga (90), Akagi (91), Soryu (71), Hiryu (73), Zuikaku (84), Shokaku (84), Ryujo (38), Zuiho (30)
6 CV
2 CVL
561
smlplane.jpg
 
The U.S. did not do this because of lame excuses like "it's expensive" and "we're going to give the Philippines independence in 10 years anyway," "seriously arming the Philippines might harm the nice little society we've been trying to uplift" and "they probably won't dare." - That logic would never have flown in Cold War America or after.

I am struck again and again, in reading correspondence within the administration, of the general disbelief that the Japanese would actually attack the U.S. - a disbelief that the PURPLE intercepts only really broke down in the final weeks before Pearl Harbor - and even then, of course, a refusal to seriously countenance the idea that they would do so by hitting the Pacific Fleet in Pearl. The one clear exception to this seems to have been Joseph Grew, who struggled to make FDR and his senior officials of the same mind. But he knew the Japanese leadership intimately; they did not.

Otherwise, one really struggles to explain the slowness to fortify and garrison the Philippines or Guam even through sheer ennui or entropy, because quite clearly the U.S. could have done so effectively with a quite modest effort. And we have seen a few very well researched timelines here at AHC (by Calbear, Galveston Bay, etc.) which have done a good job of showing what was possible with even very small and modest points of departure.
 
You seem to be unaware the bulk of the attrition of the IJN aircrew in 1942 & 1943 occurred from US land based aircraft. Thats why he referred to "Cactus". If you don't know what that name means you need to drop out of this discussion and hit the books for a semester or two.

In any case the first new Essex class carriers were ready for operations July - October 1943. The USN kicked off its Central Pacific offensive, setting the wheels in motion August/September, and executing the landings in the Gilbert islands in early November. 1943. The Japanese can try for a big carrier battle then. The USN has well trained aircrew, heavily salted with veterans of the previous battles, equal or better aircraft in the air wings, radar & centralized air defense control refined from earlier combat experience, better damage control, more efficient ships. On the surface six new battleships were available plus eight of the old Standards, a robust and experienced cruiser and destroyer fleet, and a swarm of new submarines.

To be more precise, the IJN failed to recover from loss of experienced aircrews and the exchange rate became so skewed that the IJN operated CVs to act as decoys for BBs later in the war as the IJN CV lost the capacity to launch meaningful strikes due to pilot shortages.
 
What were the closest airbases and allied air power available to contest such? It's also not a matter of directly attacking merchants as it is the threat of doing so; the threat of German interception was enough to shut down the arctic route to the USSR concurrent to this.

Espiritu Santo, Efate, Samoa, New Caledonia, and Fiji.

Air complements in these places were not overwhelming yet in the summer of 1942, but the garrisons were strong enough, and Japanese logistics and amphibious capability inadequate enough, that any effort by the IJN to execute Operation FS would pretty much have ensured an extremely bloody nose for Yamamoto. Japan simply did not have the ability to take these places, even if this was not entirely clear to either side at the time.
 
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