WI: Japanese target Pearl harbors fuel storage tanks, USN submarines and administration buidlings?

Don't underestimate them. According to my great-grandfather's diary, those things were an absolute pain in the ass to shoot down. They could survive quite a few 8mm Mauser rounds fired from ZB 26s or whatever MG his troops had. The real question is how many flak guns and AAMGs US forces can man by the time the 3rd wave shows up.
As of January 1941: "There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti-air craft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. " That was judged inadequate as of the report I'm quoting, so by the end of the year I'm pretty sure those numbers are much higher...to which can be added the guns and manpower of every ship in the harbor. 50 caliber AA and dedicated 3" AA batteries are much better at shooting down planes than 8mm machine guns. As mentioned, even with only the time between the first and second wave, they got enough crewed to shoot down 17% of the dive bombers of the second wave, so they can't be written off as ineffective, either.
 
Don't underestimate them.
According to my great-grandfather's diary, those things were an absolute pain in the ass to shoot down.
They could survive quite a few 8mm Mauser rounds fired from ZB 26s or whatever MG his troops had.

The real question is how many flak guns and AAMGs US forces can man by the time the 3rd wave shows up.
First wave lost nine planes, second wave lost twenty. Returning pilots from the second wave reported heavy flak and fighters in the air. Third wave will face a tougher defense than the second wave.
 
First wave lost nine planes, second wave lost twenty. Returning pilots from the second wave reported heavy flak and fighters in the air. Third wave will face a tougher defense than the second wave.
Didn't the first wave of IJN planes specifically target airfields to destroy US aircraft and prevent the survivors form getting airborne.
 
Didn't the first wave of IJN planes specifically target airfields to destroy US aircraft and prevent the survivors form getting airborne.
Yes, and they were relatively effective. They destroyed 188 and damaged 159, which is impressive, except that's out of 390. That leaves 43 combat-effective planes. That's not enough to repel the attack, which means their surpression efforts worked, but it's enough to be disruptive and dangerous. And of course, Enterprise is in the area, hunting with her own scouts and strike planes...
 
Didn't the first wave of IJN planes specifically target airfields to destroy US aircraft and prevent the survivors form getting airborne.
Yes and yet some still got in the air (about a dozen or so) and not all of them were destroyed and some were only lightly damaged and fairly easily fixed. A third wave would have encountered a much better prepared defense than either of the first two waves would have faced.
 
What if besides targeting the larger capital ships at Pearl, the Japanese pilots are also instructed to hit the fuel storage, USN submarines and key USN administration buildings? How setback would the US war effort be?
Net effect 30 days to recover the oil and redistribute the administration or less trouble than battleship row wrecked.
I wonder if any of the major USN warships that were sunk or badly damaged in our time line would be either undamaged or perhaps only lightly damaged as a result ?
Good question. Most of the Japanese strike was counter-air, not anti-ship. If it is infrastructure instead of anti-ship, then Genda would be beheaded for screwing up the planning.

About Japanese aircraft and flammability.
Don't underestimate them.
According to my great-grandfather's diary, those things were an absolute pain in the ass to shoot down.
They could survive quite a few 8mm Mauser rounds fired from ZB 26s or whatever MG his troops had.

The real question is how many flak guns and AAMGs US forces can man by the time the 3rd wave shows up.
1. Did your GGF have phosphor tipped incendiary rounds?
2. About 200+ AAA guns in PACFLT and 170 more ashore .5 in (50 cal) or larger. The IJNAS were APPALLED at the barrage when the second wave came in. Almost 40% of all strikers were hit by AAA. 20% of the fleet total IN THAT STRIKE, even the returns to base were written off as mission lost or unrepairable and thrown over the side. That is 26 shot down by AAA, 3 downed by fighters and another 35+ written off over the two attacks or 26.5% of Nagumo's air strength which is a lot for a surprise attack for aircraft committed. Imagine the carnage if the idiots at Oahu's US Army air defense had paid attention to the radar warning? Even 70 fighters up and at them would have seen the first wave slaughtered. Probably have Nagumo brown stain himself and Kido Butai running for home.
 
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Another thing to keep in mind on the whole third strike thing is that the Japanese were ultra Mahanian in their outlook and they believed you defeated an opposing navy by sinking ships, not by blowing up logistics targets. I know we can take this too far but at least according to some sources, the Japanese target priorities for December 7th were as follows:
  • land-based airpower
  • aircraft carriers
  • battleships
  • cruisers
  • other warships
  • merchant shipping
  • port facilities
  • land installations
Okay land based airpower and battleships have been taken care of and the carriers are not there. However, the cruisers, other warships, and any merchant shipping in port have not been touched. Fuel tanks (those are land installations) are at the bottom of the list and there are still several targets they need to get through before they get to those. I realize Fuchida claims he told Nagumo they should attack the tank farm next. Frankly, I think Fuchida was lying through his f--king teeth. He's trying to play the whole, "If Nagumo had just listened to me game," and I'm not buying his BS.

 
Probably have Nagumo brown stain himself and Kido Butai running for home.

Thanks for that, I laughed so damn hard I now have to clean soda off of my monitor.
 
And besides Japan's ultra-Mahanian tendencies hitting administrative buildings or submarines or drydocks does nothing to further the strategic goal of the Pearl Harbor raid: give the Japanese the time to conquer the Southern Resource Area, at which point their light forces would be once again free to conduct the Decisive Battle. Taking out the oil farm would do the trick, but I'm not sure the Japanese actually knew that, and even if they did they couldn't discount the US charging across the Pacific from the West Coast, as indeed American strategic planning had called for for a very long time.
 
This is a much tougher target than is generally realized and it's frankly turning into the Pacific's version of Sea Mammal:
And here is where I normally bring up the existance of the Red Hill Underground storage tanks under construction with three shifts for the past year prior the attack with almost 4000 workers
 
And besides Japan's ultra-Mahanian tendencies hitting administrative buildings or submarines or drydocks does nothing to further the strategic goal of the Pearl Harbor raid: give the Japanese the time to conquer the Southern Resource Area, at which point their light forces would be once again free to conduct the Decisive Battle. Taking out the oil farm would do the trick, but I'm not sure the Japanese actually knew that, and even if they did they couldn't discount the US charging across the Pacific from the West Coast, as indeed American strategic planning had called for for a very long time.
Mind you the USN had ended such plans several years before 1941 since they realized they didn't have the fleet train or sufficient numerical superiority to pull it off
 
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Mind you the USN had ended such plans several years before 1941 since they realized they didn't have the fleet train or sufficient numerical superiority to pull it off
Quite. And I think the Japanese had at least some idea of that. Understandably, though, a good number of Japanese officers weren't comfortable betting on that.
 

DougM

Donor
A few questions and comments. In no particular order.
Do we actually have proof of what the a Japanese priority was or is this just based on what happened?
If we have proof what kind? Written or verbal?
We have had in this thread (and many many many others) suggestions that the IJN should hit targets in addition to the targets the did hit. So have suggestions that basically the IJN should have somehow known and understood the following.
Know they need more tankers and support ships decades in advance
Know that aircraft carriers are more important the any other ships. Decades before said carriers had proven that. Thus they know..l
That battle ships are not that useful
Thus they knowthey will never usevattle ships for much and..,,
They know to build non combat ships at the cost of a battle fleet
This also implies that they know enough to target the tank farm
Targeting the tank farm means they did most of the above and stick around for at least 1 if not two more waves. Of course the crews are getting a bit tired so how many more times can the crews go out in reality?
Of course these extra waves also means that they are brave enough or know enough about the location of the UzS carriers to be willing to. Stick around.
Problem with this is that they had to think the carriers were the most dangerous (see above for why). So they HAVE to be scared of getting hit by them. So the only way they can stay around for another wave is if they know the location of the US carriers. But if they know where the carriers are then why did the Peril Harbor when they were gone? Do you knowingly attack and miss the ships you consider the most dangerous “. So this is the catch 22. If they know the location they woould attack if the don’t know the location they wouldn’t stay around and if they don’t think carriers are the most dangerous ships then they would insist on building battleships as well. And thus don’t have the ships needed to stay around long enough to truly take out the suport .

It is reasonably obvious that at least a part of the IJN thought (as pretty much the whole world did on Dec 6th) that battleships we’re still the main warship and the carriers were only useful for raids like PH. The reason I say this is because they spent a LOT on battleships upto the start of the war. And during the war they tried to use the carriers to let the battleships get into range. If they thought the battleships were not important then they would have done something else.

So basicly this thread wants to give Japan perfect foresite for something like 15-20 YEARS.
Why is it that everyone keeps trying to wank Japan at the beginning of the war? Why not wank the US or GB? Instead of trying to extend the war how about trying to shorten it?
And as I have said before it is EXTREMELY hard to wank Japan 1940-42 as that time already went so well for Japan that it is almost impossible to get them to do better short of ASB.
 
A few questions and comments. In no particular order.
Do we actually have proof of what the a Japanese priority was or is this just based on what happened?
If we have proof what kind? Written or verbal?
We have had in this thread (and many many many others) suggestions that the IJN should hit targets in addition to the targets the did hit. So have suggestions that basically the IJN should have somehow known and understood the following.
Know they need more tankers and support ships decades in advance
Know that aircraft carriers are more important the any other ships. Decades before said carriers had proven that. Thus they know..l
That battle ships are not that useful
Thus they knowthey will never usevattle ships for much and..,,
They know to build non combat ships at the cost of a battle fleet
This also implies that they know enough to target the tank farm
Targeting the tank farm means they did most of the above and stick around for at least 1 if not two more waves. Of course the crews are getting a bit tired so how many more times can the crews go out in reality?
Of course these extra waves also means that they are brave enough or know enough about the location of the UzS carriers to be willing to. Stick around.
Problem with this is that they had to think the carriers were the most dangerous (see above for why). So they HAVE to be scared of getting hit by them. So the only way they can stay around for another wave is if they know the location of the US carriers. But if they know where the carriers are then why did the Peril Harbor when they were gone? Do you knowingly attack and miss the ships you consider the most dangerous “. So this is the catch 22. If they know the location they woould attack if the don’t know the location they wouldn’t stay around and if they don’t think carriers are the most dangerous ships then they would insist on building battleships as well. And thus don’t have the ships needed to stay around long enough to truly take out the suport .

It is reasonably obvious that at least a part of the IJN thought (as pretty much the whole world did on Dec 6th) that battleships we’re still the main warship and the carriers were only useful for raids like PH. The reason I say this is because they spent a LOT on battleships upto the start of the war. And during the war they tried to use the carriers to let the battleships get into range. If they thought the battleships were not important then they would have done something else.

So basicly this thread wants to give Japan perfect foresite for something like 15-20 YEARS.
Why is it that everyone keeps trying to wank Japan at the beginning of the war? Why not wank the US or GB? Instead of trying to extend the war how about trying to shorten it?
And as I have said before it is EXTREMELY hard to wank Japan 1940-42 as that time already went so well for Japan that it is almost impossible to get them to do better short of ASB.
No disagreement here. I will say what I have said before - there is no easier TL to write than an Allies do Better in the First Six Months of the Pacific War TL because it is so easy to throw sand in Japan's gears and yes I realize I am writing one of those TLs. BTW, most of us are not trying to wank Japan. Usually when these threads come up, most of us are poking holes in it. I consider the Third Strike on Pearl Harbor bit to be the Pacific equivalent of Sea Mammal but it's so entrenched in so many general histories that it has become fact whether we like it or not.
 
Another thing to keep in mind on the whole third strike thing is that the Japanese were ultra Mahanian in their outlook and they believed you defeated an opposing navy by sinking ships, not by blowing up logistics targets. I know we can take this too far but at least according to some sources, the Japanese target priorities for December 7th were as follows:
  • land-based airpower
  • aircraft carriers
  • battleships
  • cruisers
  • other warships
  • merchant shipping
  • port facilities
  • land installations
Okay land based airpower and battleships have been taken care of and the carriers are not there. However, the cruisers, other warships, and any merchant shipping in port have not been touched. Fuel tanks (those are land installations) are at the bottom of the list and there are still several targets they need to get through before they get to those. I realize Fuchida claims he told Nagumo they should attack the tank farm next. Frankly, I think Fuchida was lying through his f--king teeth. He's trying to play the whole, "If Nagumo had just listened to me game," and I'm not buying his BS.

The Japanese historians were first to call foul on Fuchida, that self promoting book seller and con-man.

A few questions and comments. In no particular order.
Do we actually have proof of what the a Japanese priority was or is this just based on what happened?
If we have proof what kind? Written or verbal?
We have had in this thread (and many many many others) suggestions that the IJN should hit targets in addition to the targets the did hit. So have suggestions that basically the IJN should have somehow known and understood the following.
Know they need more tankers and support ships decades in advance
Know that aircraft carriers are more important the any other ships. Decades before said carriers had proven that. Thus they know..l
That battle ships are not that useful
Thus they knowthey will never usevattle ships for much and..,,
They know to build non combat ships at the cost of a battle fleet
This also implies that they know enough to target the tank farm
Targeting the tank farm means they did most of the above and stick around for at least 1 if not two more waves. Of course the crews are getting a bit tired so how many more times can the crews go out in reality?
Of course these extra waves also means that they are brave enough or know enough about the location of the UzS carriers to be willing to. Stick around.
Problem with this is that they had to think the carriers were the most dangerous (see above for why). So they HAVE to be scared of getting hit by them. So the only way they can stay around for another wave is if they know the location of the US carriers. But if they know where the carriers are then why did the Peril Harbor when they were gone? Do you knowingly attack and miss the ships you consider the most dangerous “. So this is the catch 22. If they know the location they woould attack if the don’t know the location they wouldn’t stay around and if they don’t think carriers are the most dangerous ships then they would insist on building battleships as well. And thus don’t have the ships needed to stay around long enough to truly take out the suport .

It is reasonably obvious that at least a part of the IJN thought (as pretty much the whole world did on Dec 6th) that battleships we’re still the main warship and the carriers were only useful for raids like PH. The reason I say this is because they spent a LOT on battleships upto the start of the war. And during the war they tried to use the carriers to let the battleships get into range. If they thought the battleships were not important then they would have done something else.

So basicly this thread wants to give Japan perfect foresite for something like 15-20 YEARS.
Why is it that everyone keeps trying to wank Japan at the beginning of the war? Why not wank the US or GB? Instead of trying to extend the war how about trying to shorten it?
And as I have said before it is EXTREMELY hard to wank Japan 1940-42 as that time already went so well for Japan that it is almost impossible to get them to do better short of ASB.
What Zheng He said on the subject I cannot improve. I will say this as a reason it seems the Pacific War takes so long. I war-gamed out possible moves to PoD a certain timeline and I keep coming up with the same situation that the Central Pacific is wide open and just waiting to be plucked clean in early 1943, but there are not the means available to hand to invade and appropriate all those nifty vulnerable islands that are so poorly defended, because the Japanese have sent most of their stuff to SE Asia and/or the SWPOA. The Americans are still building the fleets, air forces and marine divisions they need to carry on the campaign.

I think I might have worked out a way around it; but it is a high risk option and goes against the politics of the day. There was this Aleutians campaign that burned up a couple of army divisions and an entire air force to no purpose. The force is there and it is misused about the time it is needed to exploit Japanese weakness. Why not use it somewhere practical? Like Wake Island? There is a little problem of sealift and the Combined Fleet parked at Truk, but I am working on that item, too. It is a submarine war thread after all.
 
Also don’t forget that the IJN has to deal with its biggest enemy both foreign and domestic both before and after December 7th, the Imperial Japanese Army. The biggest battles both thought were important were, at times, fought between each other.
 
It is reasonably obvious that at least a part of the IJN thought (as pretty much the whole world did on Dec 6th) that battleships we’re still the main warship and the carriers were only useful for raids like PH.
They thought at minimum until Midway, by which point it was far, far too late.
 
They thought at minimum until Midway, by which point it was far, far too late.
6 aircraft carrier engagements. 19 surface battles between ships (cruiser-destroyer surface action groups) involving guns and torpedoes. Dozens of torpedo boat brawls. There were even two major fleet actions decided by battleship guns and destroyer torpedoes in those 19 surface battles. And at least 50 convoy battles between US subs and the Grand Escort Fleet and other elements of the IJN in which 192 Japanese warships were sunk. 2x as many as the rest of the USN sank in those naval air and surface battles.

The Pacific War at sea was not the aircraft carrier war of the popular histories. It was combined arms with a lot of naval artillery involved in the fleet on fleet actions and most of the ship killing done by the Silent Service.
 
Why is it that everyone keeps trying to wank Japan at the beginning of the war? Why not wank the US or GB? Instead of trying to extend the war how about trying to shorten it?
I don't know the answer, but it's probably the same reason people want to wank nazi-Germany.
 
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