WI Japanese had launched a 3rd strike in Pearl Harbour?

CalBear

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The Japanese operational plan was specific on the issue of a third strike. It was only to be done if additional effort was required to destroy fleet units (specifically it calls for bombers to carry torpedoes). I posted the link to the OP in another one of these threads.

The Japanese, literally, never even considered striking the fuel tanks or other similar targets. The Japanese were looking to win a lightning war. They had little in the way of illusion of the end result of a long war, but they never expected to have to fight one. The plan was to knock the U.S. fleet out, grab the Southern Resource Areas, and establish a defensive perimeter that would be too costly for the U.S. to consider fighting through.

Since there wasn't going to be a long war, there was no reason to plan for one. They had knocked the fleet out, it would be months before the Americans would have any ships to use any fuel, so attacking it was pointless. It is only in hindsight that the need to attack the fuel tanks becomes apparent (which, BTW, wasn't as easy as some of the fans of the idea seem to think). Some of the Japanese junior officers who survived the war claim that they pushed for such a strike at the time, but that may well be an effort to rewrite history, and it was specifically against the written operational orders that Nagumo was following. IJN officers didn't violate written orders.

The Japanese war plan depended on the United States being a bunch of candy asses. When that assumption was disproved the whole Japanese construct came apart.
 

Geon

Donor
A Third Strike and Halsey

I have a question - assuming Nagumo decides to launch a third strike and damages the infrastructure at Pearl Harbor (damage which can eventually be repaired and will probably not significantly change things). What about Halsey and the two carriers which are at sea at this point?

Here's my thought. Nagumo launches a third strike and someone at PH sends a message to Halsey and the carriers returning from Midway. They pulled back into Pearl that night in fact. First, could these two carriers have located and damaged the IJN force? I don't doubt that Halsey would have done it given half a chance. Secondly, how bad could they have hurt the Japanese assuming that the Japanese had to stay to recover all their planes?

Geon
 

CalBear

Moderator
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Monthly Donor
I have a question - assuming Nagumo decides to launch a third strike and damages the infrastructure at Pearl Harbor (damage which can eventually be repaired and will probably not significantly change things). What about Halsey and the two carriers which are at sea at this point?

Here's my thought. Nagumo launches a third strike and someone at PH sends a message to Halsey and the carriers returning from Midway. They pulled back into Pearl that night in fact. First, could these two carriers have located and damaged the IJN force? I don't doubt that Halsey would have done it given half a chance. Secondly, how bad could they have hurt the Japanese assuming that the Japanese had to stay to recover all their planes?

Geon

Enterprise was the only ship that close. Lexington was about two days out toward Midway with the intention of delivering some USMC Vindicator dive bombers to the island. Six to one is not good odds.
 
Enterprise was the only ship that close. Lexington was about two days out toward Midway with the intention of delivering some USMC Vindicator dive bombers to the island. Six to one is not good odds.

If Enterprise was that close could the japs had attacked her thus delivering one more moral blow to USA?
 
If Enterprise was that close could the japs had attacked her thus delivering one more moral blow to USA?
It would have been left to the battleships and support ships then. The Japanese doctrine of aerial ZERG RUSH would mean all their planes are rearming and refueling leaving only guns and torpedoes to fight the Enterprise.

Not a desirable situation for the Japanese all things considered.
 
Even if the Japanese had lost the element of surprise, they still had the advantage. They had already destroyed virtually all the base's combat capabilities, and at most they would have taken moderate losses. , but If the planned third wave had been sent in and was successful, the US would take longer to recover from such an attack, and thus give Japan more time to act before the US really gets in the game.

I'm not sure that the Japanese fleet would have run out of fuel. Remember, they had originally planned three waves, so my guess is they calculated how much fuel they would need to get home.

If I was the Japanese commander, I definetely would have ordered the third wave sent in.
That would only have changed the length of the war, not the oucome. Remember what Yamamoto said about prospects for victory before the attack on Pearl, "We will run wild for six months, then the AMericans will crush us."
 
The Japanese operational plan was specific on the issue of a third strike. It was only to be done if additional effort was required to destroy fleet units (specifically it calls for bombers to carry torpedoes). I posted the link to the OP in another one of these threads.

The Japanese, literally, never even considered striking the fuel tanks or other similar targets. The Japanese were looking to win a lightning war. They had little in the way of illusion of the end result of a long war, but they never expected to have to fight one. The plan was to knock the U.S. fleet out, grab the Southern Resource Areas, and establish a defensive perimeter that would be too costly for the U.S. to consider fighting through.

Since there wasn't going to be a long war, there was no reason to plan for one. They had knocked the fleet out, it would be months before the Americans would have any ships to use any fuel, so attacking it was pointless. It is only in hindsight that the need to attack the fuel tanks becomes apparent (which, BTW, wasn't as easy as some of the fans of the idea seem to think). Some of the Japanese junior officers who survived the war claim that they pushed for such a strike at the time, but that may well be an effort to rewrite history, and it was specifically against the written operational orders that Nagumo was following. IJN officers didn't violate written orders.

The Japanese war plan depended on the United States being a bunch of candy asses. When that assumption was disproved the whole Japanese construct came apart.

That it did, did it not, both axis powers were depending on dreadfully fallacious self deceptions regarding Americans and out willingness to do battle. They paid for it, oh nelly did they pay!

A third strike would have made it a war of no quarter i nthe Pactific.
 
A third strike might actually help the allies in the Pacific. Why? The Anti Air defenses would be on full alert, and fighters would be in the air, resulting in more damaged/destroyed planes. In addition, only the Royal Navy had perfected landing at night. As a result, many damaged planes would have to ditch, resulting in more pilot casualties. These losses would likely butterfly away the Hiyru and Soyru attacking Wake, giving it enough time to get the testily convoy there. In addition, less experienced Japanese pilots could result in the Yorktown or Lexington surviving Midway/Coral Sea. The extra carriers would help in Midway (Lexington) or the solomans(both of the above carriers).
 

Hyperion

Banned
The Japanese operational plan was specific on the issue of a third strike. It was only to be done if additional effort was required to destroy fleet units (specifically it calls for bombers to carry torpedoes). I posted the link to the OP in another one of these threads.

The Japanese, literally, never even considered striking the fuel tanks or other similar targets. The Japanese were looking to win a lightning war. They had little in the way of illusion of the end result of a long war, but they never expected to have to fight one. The plan was to knock the U.S. fleet out, grab the Southern Resource Areas, and establish a defensive perimeter that would be too costly for the U.S. to consider fighting through.

Since there wasn't going to be a long war, there was no reason to plan for one. They had knocked the fleet out, it would be months before the Americans would have any ships to use any fuel, so attacking it was pointless. It is only in hindsight that the need to attack the fuel tanks becomes apparent (which, BTW, wasn't as easy as some of the fans of the idea seem to think). Some of the Japanese junior officers who survived the war claim that they pushed for such a strike at the time, but that may well be an effort to rewrite history, and it was specifically against the written operational orders that Nagumo was following. IJN officers didn't violate written orders.

The Japanese war plan depended on the United States being a bunch of candy asses. When that assumption was disproved the whole Japanese construct came apart.

Two biggest PODs I can think of, 1930 or so, perhaps a year or two earlier, Japan builds two or three major fleet oilers more than OTL, or otherwise aquires ships to do the job above OTL.

Second POD, someone in either Nagumo or Yamamoto's staffs suggests that if/when a third wave is launched, at least part of the forces involved target fuel tanks and other major targets on land.

Doable with a couple of PODs more than a couple of years back.

In the end, I don't see it changing the overall outcome of the war. At some point the US will win, and depending on the timing, the British and Russians might get a bigger pound of flesh out of Japan themselves.

That being said, with a reasonable POD or two far enough back, I don't see it as impossible for the Japanese to do something that could throw the US back two or three months more compared to OTL.
 
A third strike might actually help the allies in the Pacific. Why? The Anti Air defenses would be on full alert, and fighters would be in the air, resulting in more damaged/destroyed planes. In addition, only the Royal Navy had perfected landing at night. As a result, many damaged planes would have to ditch, resulting in more pilot casualties. These losses would likely butterfly away the Hiyru and Soyru attacking Wake, giving it enough time to get the testily convoy there. In addition, less experienced Japanese pilots could result in the Yorktown or Lexington surviving Midway/Coral Sea. The extra carriers would help in Midway (Lexington) or the solomans(both of the above carriers).

Would Nagumo be willing to sacrifice planes and aircrews (Kamikaze attacks perhaps if bombers were running low on fuel?) in order to cause greater damage to USA thus rendering them incapable while Japan goes on a conquering spree in Pacific?
 
Would Nagumo be willing to sacrifice planes and aircrews (Kamikaze attacks perhaps if bombers were running low on fuel?) in order to cause greater damage to USA thus rendering them incapable while Japan goes on a conquering spree in Pacific?
Those planes and crew are vital to any conquering spree, so, no probably not.
 

sharlin

Banned
The IJN would not use its precious highly trained and skilled pilots in such a manner early on. Kamikaze's were a weapon of desparation.
 
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