WI: Japanese-Ethiopian alliance in the 20s and 30s?

On the subject of a navy I think the best might be a reflagged and officially crewed AMC or two?

A converted fast tanker would work well to hunt Italian trade and it could be officially flagged as Ethiopian with only a small handful of hidden IJN personnel (mostly out of sight in bridge and engine room) so the Ethiopian could make up the boarding and deck crews that would get looked at by ships they stopped to inspect.

This could be supported by a few more support ships as a couple of tankers and CAs just over the horizon ready to fall back to, that would prevent the Italian realistically hunting (requiring them to split up CLs to cover the area involved) for the AMC without risking destruction?

As officially an uninvolved neutral Japan could refuel and enter civilian ports at least until it was forced to defend the AMC....

The problem is where to find Italian trade without fighting somewhere that would be considered to risking and threatening to a major power? Ie not close off US/GB coasts, I would suggest that of South America might be best?
 

trurle

Banned
How would these Japanese-equipped Ethiopian forces fare against the Italians in any invasion?
Quite bad anyway i suspect. IOTL, few hundreds of foreigners from developed countries fought for Ethiopian cause, and most of Ethiopian war equipment was of foreign origin. Adding a Japanese teams and weapons to the mix will increase firepower of troops, but will also complicate already complicated supply chains, increasing chaos.
Realistically, with 100,000-200,000 Murata rifles, 100 Type 31 75 mm guns (IOTL, that batch was sold to Russia in 1916) and a couple of prototype Type 95 Ha-Go tanks, the Ethiopian forces will be able to kill additional ~6000 Italians (30 kills per gun and 0.02 kills per rifle)

P.S. To make a difference in outcome of war, Japanese would need to supply at least 400 pieces of artillery, but i have a doubts it would be possible - Japan did not have a large stocks of obsolete guns to begin with, and with active war in China all new production was assigned to Japanese needs only.
IOTL, Japanese industry has struggled to produce modern 75mm artillery since 1929 as Type 90 and Type 95, but the industrial capability was insufficient, and Type 38 (first mass-produced artillery piece of Japan) has continued to be used until 1945. Therefore, mainstay Type 38 75 mm guns were impossible to retire from the operational army units. Early POD in Japanese engineering would be necessary to free up some of Type 38 guns for foreign use.

Therefore, my opinion is what only hope for Ethiopians to remain an independent state is to avoid war with Italy at all - with Japanese-supplied force multiplier acting as deterrent.
 
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Quite bad anyway i suspect. IOTL, few hundreds of foreigners from developed countries fought for Ethiopian cause, and most of Ethiopian war equipment was of foreign origin. Adding a Japanese teams and weapons to the mix will increase firepower of troops, but will also complicate already complicated supply chains, increasing chaos.
Realistically, with 100,000-200,000 Murata rifles, 100 Type 31 75 mm guns (IOTL, that batch was sold to Russia in 1916) and a couple of prototype Type 95 Ha-Go tanks, the Ethiopian forces will be able to kill additional ~6000 Italians (30 kills per gun and 0.02 kills per rifle)

P.S. To make a difference in outcome of war, Japanese would need to supply at least 400 pieces of artillery, but i have a doubts it would be possible - Japan did not have a large stocks of obsolete guns to begin with, and with active war in China all new production was assigned to Japanese needs only.
IOTL, Japanese industry has struggled to produce modern 75mm artillery since 1929 as Type 90 and Type 95, but the industrial capability was insufficient, and Type 38 (first mass-produced artillery piece of Japan) has continued to be used until 1945. Therefore, mainstay Type 38 75 mm guns were impossible to retire from the operational army units. Early POD in Japanese engineering would be necessary to free up some of Type 38 guns for foreign use.

Therefore, my opinion is what only hope for Ethiopians to remain an independent state is to avoid war with Italy at all - with Japanese-supplied force multiplier acting as deterrent.
What about arms and advisors from the West?
 

trurle

Banned
What about arms and advisors from the West?
IOTL, Ethiopia had already arms and advisors from West during second Italo-Ethiopian war. About one hundred advisors in total. Overall, further advisors would be not very helpful - the primary weapon of epoch was field artillery, and without enough artillery and shells to even make the basic drills the Ethiopian army was doomed. As i said before, to have the capability to fight back, Ethiopian army should have about 600 artillery pieces instead of 200 IOTL. Furthermore, Ethiopians had exactly zero counter-battery pieces (or anything to fire beyond range of 10km), therefore Italian light artillery acted usually with impunity. Even a couple of batteries of guns with 10-20 km range would make a large difference in the pace of war, forcing Italians to be much more cautious.
 
IOTL, Ethiopia had already arms and advisors from West during second Italo-Ethiopian war. About one hundred advisors in total. Overall, further advisors would be not very helpful - the primary weapon of epoch was field artillery, and without enough artillery and shells to even make the basic drills the Ethiopian army was doomed. As i said before, to have the capability to fight back, Ethiopian army should have about 600 artillery pieces instead of 200 IOTL. Furthermore, Ethiopians had exactly zero counter-battery pieces (or anything to fire beyond range of 10km), therefore Italian light artillery acted usually with impunity. Even a couple of batteries of guns with 10-20 km range would make a large difference in the pace of war, forcing Italians to be much more cautious.
What else would be needed?
 

trurle

Banned
What else would be needed?
Ammunition stocks and machinery to re-chamber the rifles. As i understand, the most common in Ethiopia was 8mm Manlicher rifle, and its round was very similar to Japanese Murata rifle round. Standardisation of all rifle stocks to 8mm Rimmed Bottleck cartridges and allowing cross-chambering of similar cartridges will help to clear some of the worst supply failures of Ethiopian army. In average, you need to fire 1000 rounds from rifle to kill a single enemy. Therefore, if your army unit do not have 1000 rounds per infantryman (16 kg per soldier in case of 8mm cartiges) then you are guaranteed to lose, no matter how much infantrymen or rifles you have. Same for cannon ammunition. 20 shells per cannon per day of war (~30 thousands tons of ammunition for 600 cannons for year). Of course, that amount of ammunition was simply not affordable, with IOTL military expenditures i expect about 1 thousands tons of shells was actually available in Ethiopia, with ATL Japan may be adding 0.2-0.4 thousand tons cheaply, and 1 thousand tons for exponentially increasing costs. Therefore, early point of divergence to develop a domestic 75mm ammunition supply would be necessary. Of course, each kilogram of steel and chemical spent for shells is the kilogram of lacking tools end fertilizers.

OTL military production capability (calculated with standard GDP conversion 500(modern $)/(WWII-epoch kg)) of Ethiopia by 1935 was about 8 thousands tons per year, averaging to 5 thousand tons per year in 2 decades before war, with maximal sustainable effort 3%. This calculation results in 1935 military equipment stocks stocks of 3 thousand tons, close to OTL figures - and about 10% of needed to wage an effective war against Italian invaders.
Summary:
OTL military power:10% of power
ATL Japanese help (maxed): 7% of power
ATL double economic growth: 10% of power
remainder: 73% of power

Alternative is to turn Ethiopia into military dictatorship from 1916, with war effort approaching 30%. In this case the various Ethiopian groups may revolt and welcome Italians as liberators though.:openedeyewink:
 
Alternative is to turn Ethiopia into military dictatorship from 1916, with war effort approaching 30%. In this case the various Ethiopian groups may revolt and welcome Italians as liberators though.:openedeyewink:
Let's say Ethiopia becomes a de-facto military dictatorship led by Emperor Menelik II or Haile Selassie - how could this affect the Ethiopian military?
 

trurle

Banned
Let's say Ethiopia becomes a de-facto military dictatorship led by Emperor Menelik II or Haile Selassie - how could this affect the Ethiopian military?
Closest possible analogy would the Thailand after coup of 20 June 1933. In next 12 years, Thailand was harassed by great powers of epoch, but managed to remain independent (although its independence was on the brink of collapse at times), and nowadays is ~5 times higher GDP compared to Ethiopia, despite being about half the size of Ethiopia by size or population.
Thai military model:
1) Domestic rifle and rifle ammunition production
2) Buyout of heavy military equipment abroad, concentrating on artillery
3) License production of ground-attack aircraft (Thailand made a good choice with Avro 504), with engines only bought abroad
4) Navy purchases abroad, concentrating on mobile coastal defence and submarines
 
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Closest possible analogy would the Thailand after coup of 20 June 1933. In next 12 years, Thailand was harassed by great powers of epoch, but managed to remain independent (although its independence was on the brink of collapse at times), and nowadays is ~5 times higher GDP compared to Ethiopia, despite being about half the size of Ethiopia by size or population.
How successful was Thailand in industrializing and modernizing her military? How could any successes be replicated in Ethiopia?
 

trurle

Banned
How successful was Thailand in industrializing and modernizing her military? How could any successes be replicated in Ethiopia?
Quite moderately. The industrial capacity was built, but it was not profitable, increasing burden on still-agricultural country. Military force multiplier has become comparable to foreign countries, but the state still can support only small modern army. You should expect in Ethiopia similar results, at least in first decades. Most likely Ethiopia will need to adopt the same strategy as Thai - bending to most of threats, trying to preserve the core of most loyal population groups and granting less loyal subjects to colonial powers. I.e. Eritrea is likely impossible to hold even in best case scenario, but core Ethiopia may remain independent. Some additional provinces may be lost though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoare–Laval_Pact
 
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Quite moderately. The industrial capacity was built, but it was not profitable, increasing burden on still-agricultural country. Military force multiplier has become comparable to foreign countries, but the state still can support only small modern army. You should expect in Ethiopia similar results, at least in first decades. Most likely Ethiopia will need to adopt the same strategy as Thai - bending to most of threats, trying to preserve the core of most loyal population groups and granting less loyal subjects to colonial powers. I.e. Eritrea is likely impossible to hold even in best case scenario, but core Ethiopia may remain independent.
Seems plausible. In the event of war with Italy, could Ethiopia potentially focus on a similar strategy like China - wearing down the enemy while building up her strength?
 

trurle

Banned
Seems plausible. In the event of war with Italy, could Ethiopia potentially focus on a similar strategy like China - wearing down the enemy while building up her strength?
Likely no. The size of Ethiopia is too small for this strategy. It would be comparable to WWII China trying to wear down US instead of Japan.
 
Likely no. The size of Ethiopia is too small for this strategy. It would be comparable to WWII China trying to wear down US instead of Japan.
Perhaps that wasn’t the right way to word what I meant - I was asking if the Ethiopian Army could simply focus on maintaining her lines in Tigray and the Ogaden while building up her strength.
 

trurle

Banned
Perhaps that wasn’t the right way to word what I meant - I was asking if the Ethiopian Army could simply focus on maintaining her lines in Tigray and the Ogaden while building up her strength.
With decent counter-battery fire force, possible. Without counter-battery fire forces (as happened IOTL) defending the fixed position is just an additional gunnery practice for Italians.
 
With decent counter-battery fire force, possible. Without counter-battery fire forces (as happened IOTL) defending the fixed position is just an additional gunnery practice for Italians.
Could Japanese-style fortifications be effective in at least temporarily halting the Italian advance from Eritrea?
 

trurle

Banned
Could Japanese-style fortifications be effective in at least temporarily halting the Italian advance from Eritrea?
Would depend on location. Resilient and fast to build fortifications are reliant on huge amounts of timber. Ethiopia had entire regions where timber was deficient to absent, although in south-western part of Ethiopia effective field fortifications are possible. Regarding Tigray: seems marginally enough of timber. Agaden: hopeless terrain for field fortification.

By the way, if you refer to Japanese deep-tunnel fortifications of Iwo Jima or Okinawa, it cannot be replicated easily in Ethiopia - because that type of field fortifications only possible with soft limestone bedrock (Ethiopia seems have some marble, but it is too hard, and more suitable for forts built pre-war rather than field fortifications). I remember Italians utilized some of these stone cave forts when defending in later East African campaign of WWII though.

Also, to add to this - could Ethiopia utilize “magnetic warfare”?
??? The first time i hear this. What is "magnetic warfare"?
 
Seems plausible. In the event of war with Italy, could Ethiopia potentially focus on a similar strategy like China - wearing down the enemy while building up her strength?

Perhaps that wasn’t the right way to word what I meant - I was asking if the Ethiopian Army could simply focus on maintaining her lines in Tigray and the Ogaden while building up her strength.

How could Ethiopian Army build up her strength in view of insufficient domestic industrial production and blockade of foreign supply by the Italian Navy? The stock is small to begin with and constant fighting to hold line will prevent the building up of stock that can be used to train and establish new formations.

One thing to remember is that Japan spent 44 years to "pull off a Meiji" in the Meiji period and it was still one of the least powerful of the industrialised countries. To think the Ethiopians can do the same in less time and with a much worse starting conditions (i.e. low literacy population) is absurd.
 
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