WI: Japanese Attack Midway Month Earlier?

The Aleutians operation is ambigious. Its supposed to have been a diversion, designed to draw the USN out prematurely, then have them at sea & possiblly split between that group and a group remaining in Oahu. However there are claims the timing is off and reasons advanced for other Japanese motivations for that op. The core problem with it is it splits a portion off from the main fleet advancing on Midway. Yamamoto clearly wanted a DECISIVE BLOW, but then he authorizes a carrier & cruiser force, plus a amphib group and landing force to make a operation out of easy supporting range of his main fleet. Whatever the reasons it weakened the main fleet and complicated the overall operation.

Perhaps if the Midway op is run a month early Yamamto can postphone the Aleutians op a month or two.

Yeah but that is pretty much all of it. If he wants the DECISIVE BLOW, why the Aleutians? Why risk CARDIV 5 at Coral Sea? Why keep the big battleships 600 FREAKING MILES behind the carrier force? Why put the capable of fleet speeds light carrier Zuiho with the invasion force? Why have so many powerful and fast battleships/battlecruisers and heavy cruisers with the invasion force?

Let's face it, Yamamoto had a thing for complex operations with lots of moving parts.
 
HP Willmott said it best when he pointed out that the Japanese failed to recognize that when it came to the Kido Butai there were two types of operations"

1. Operations that required all six carriers.

2. Operations that required none of them.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yeah but that is pretty much all of it. If he wants the DECISIVE BLOW, why the Aleutians? Why risk CARDIV 5 at Coral Sea? Why keep the big battleships 600 FREAKING MILES behind the carrier force? Why put the capable of fleet speeds light carrier Zuiho with the invasion force? Why have so many powerful and fast battleships/battlecruisers and heavy cruisers with the invasion force?

Let's face it, Yamamoto had a thing for complex operations with lots of moving parts.

The IJN were not disciples of Mahan, certainly.

In some ways, one can see it as a legacy of the RN and especially the Grand Fleet's division between the battleship and battlecruiser forces, which made sense in terms of the need for heavy scouts in 1914-18 (and later in bad weather) but is pretty much taken to the ridiculous extreme by the IJN.

Obviously, they were trying to compensate for the expected numerical disadvantages, but still: KISS doesn't ever seem to have been a thing for the IJN.

Best,
 
Yeah but that is pretty much all of it. If he wants the DECISIVE BLOW, why the Aleutians? Why risk CARDIV 5 at Coral Sea? Why keep the big battleships 600 FREAKING MILES behind the carrier force? Why put the capable of fleet speeds light carrier Zuiho with the invasion force? Why have so many powerful and fast battleships/battlecruisers and heavy cruisers with the invasion force?
Craig Symonds, in his book The Battle of Midway summed it up best when he noted:
"All of these options were contemplated by a Japanese decision-making architecture that depended less on clear lines of hierarchy and authority than on subtle and constantly shifting political and personal relationships between power centers, relationships that were frequently jealous and competitive."

"If he wants the DECISIVE BLOW, why the Aleutians?" Yamamoto had to accept this operation as a price for getting the Midway op approved.

Why risk CARDIV 5 at Coral Sea? Because the Army wanted protection for their forces attacking Port Moresby.

Why keep the big battleships 600 FREAKING MILES behind the carrier force? The idea was to keep this force out of the range of American search planes; it would also be in a position to support whichever advance was attacked by the US fleet.

Why put the capable of fleet speeds light carrier Zuiho with the invasion force? Why have so many powerful and fast battleships/battlecruisers and heavy cruisers with the invasion force? This force under Admiral Kondo was "the bait". The idea was that when the Americans discovered this force approaching Midway, it would tempt the Carriers to come out and attack it. It also acted to screen the Transport group carrying the invasion troops.
 
Craig Symonds, in his book The Battle of Midway summed it up best when he noted:
"All of these options were contemplated by a Japanese decision-making architecture that depended less on clear lines of hierarchy and authority than on subtle and constantly shifting political and personal relationships between power centers, relationships that were frequently jealous and competitive."

"If he wants the DECISIVE BLOW, why the Aleutians?" Yamamoto had to accept this operation as a price for getting the Midway op approved.

Why risk CARDIV 5 at Coral Sea? Because the Army wanted protection for their forces attacking Port Moresby.

Why keep the big battleships 600 FREAKING MILES behind the carrier force? The idea was to keep this force out of the range of American search planes; it would also be in a position to support whichever advance was attacked by the US fleet.

Why put the capable of fleet speeds light carrier Zuiho with the invasion force? Why have so many powerful and fast battleships/battlecruisers and heavy cruisers with the invasion force? This force under Admiral Kondo was "the bait". The idea was that when the Americans discovered this force approaching Midway, it would tempt the Carriers to come out and attack it. It also acted to screen the Transport group carrying the invasion troops.

Yeah, the Japanese Army-Navy rivalry was unreal. Most countries have it but they took it up to 11.
 
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Yeah, the Japanese Army-Navy rivalry was unreal. Most countries have it but they took it up to 11.
Rivalry? No it was Interservice WAR. You had Army and Navy officers assassinating rivals; hell Yamamoto was nearly killed. That's why he took command of the fleet, to get him out of the line of fire. Not only that, you had junior officers bullying superiors into bellicose behavior (that's how Yamamoto got his PH and Midway operations approved....by threatening to resign).

Anyway back to the OP; launching Midway in May would require at least postponing the Port Moresby operation which is VERY unlikely. Yamamoto had to do a lot of hard nosed negotiating just to get the Midway op approved and he had to make compromises to do so.
 
Rivalry? No it was Interservice WAR. You had Army and Navy officers assassinating rivals; hell Yamamoto was nearly killed. That's why he took command of the fleet, to get him out of the line of fire. Not only that, you had junior officers bullying superiors into bellicose behavior (that's how Yamamoto got his PH and Midway operations approved....by threatening to resign).

Anyway back to the OP; launching Midway in May would require at least postponing the Port Moresby operation which is VERY unlikely. Yamamoto had to do a lot of hard nosed negotiating just to get the Midway op approved and he had to make compromises to do so.

True, you even had junior officers assassinating their superiors.
 
Craig Symonds, in his book The Battle of Midway summed it up best when he noted:
"All of these options were contemplated by a Japanese decision-making architecture that depended less on clear lines of hierarchy and authority than on subtle and constantly shifting political and personal relationships between power centers, relationships that were frequently jealous and competitive."

"If he wants the DECISIVE BLOW, why the Aleutians?" Yamamoto had to accept this operation as a price for getting the Midway op approved.

Why risk CARDIV 5 at Coral Sea? Because the Army wanted protection for their forces attacking Port Moresby.

Why keep the big battleships 600 FREAKING MILES behind the carrier force? The idea was to keep this force out of the range of American search planes; it would also be in a position to support whichever advance was attacked by the US fleet.

Why put the capable of fleet speeds light carrier Zuiho with the invasion force? Why have so many powerful and fast battleships/battlecruisers and heavy cruisers with the invasion force? This force under Admiral Kondo was "the bait". The idea was that when the Americans discovered this force approaching Midway, it would tempt the Carriers to come out and attack it. It also acted to screen the Transport group carrying the invasion troops.

Totally agree with everything you are saying, but it still drives them to the basic issue that at the point of contact for the decisive engagement their forces are diluted.
 
Rivalry? No it was Interservice WAR. You had Army and Navy officers assassinating rivals; hell Yamamoto was nearly killed. That's why he took command of the fleet, to get him out of the line of fire. Not only that, you had junior officers bullying superiors into bellicose behavior (that's how Yamamoto got his PH and Midway operations approved....by threatening to resign).

Anyway back to the OP; launching Midway in May would require at least postponing the Port Moresby operation which is VERY unlikely. Yamamoto had to do a lot of hard nosed negotiating just to get the Midway op approved and he had to make compromises to do so.

Read in one book at that Nagumo (or maybe Yamaguchi) pulled a knife on another admiral during an argument.
 
It is a well gamed scenario if the Japanese had concentrated their forces more. If they did make a play for Midway in May, I wonder just what forces could be brought up and deployed together? On both sides.
 
That depends on if either or both Op C & the Miline Bat invasion are cancelled. Its near certain the Indian Ocean raid would be canceled, but there would still be pressure to execute the S Eastern New Guinea operation.

If the Miline Bay op is still executed it does not alter the IJN carriers avaialble for the Midway Op, but given the USN problem with decrypting the JN25 message traffic in April its very likely the Midway attack will be a suprise. The New guinea operations was part of a series of ops in that area. Air recon, & signal/traffic analysis helped the USN anticipate the move on Miline Bay, leading to the Coral Sea battle. Conversely actually reading the messages was essential for anticipating the Midway raid.

Result in this case would be the Enterprise & Hornet at Pearl Harbor & the Yorktown/Lexington tied up in the SE Pacific. The Saratoga would be four weeks before finishing refit and restocking for combat ops.

Even if the Miline Bay op is canceled the USN might continue using the Yorktown/Lexington to raid the Japanese in the SE Pacific as in Feb & March
 
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