WI: Japan withdraws from China?

Before moving on to a "KMT in Cold War" scenario...

Question One: would Japan abandon China entirely and hand everything back to Chiang (if Chiang ever accepted such a deal), or would they at least half-heartedly try to support the Wang Jingwei collaborationist regime?

Question Two: how long could the Wang regime last, with the absence of total Japanese military support?

Question Three: given the level of infiltration the collaborationist government suffered from the Communists, who would benefit more from a collapsing Wang regime?
 
Wang Jingwei's regime was utterly dependent on the Japanese military. It would collapse almost immediately upon Japanese withdrawal. It would not present any serious resistance to Chiang. Any warlord armies assisting him would defect back to Chiang. At most the government would continue to exist to prevent the Communists from seizing control of any areas, and surrender to Nationalist forces once they arrived. Wang himself would be smart to leave China as soon as possible
 
The KMT had good relations with the Soviet Union: a KMT dominated China is likely to be a neutral during the cold war and try to court both US/USSR for money/aid/territories (i.e Hong Kong/Mongolia etc) in exchange to side with one or the other.

I disagree. Chiang understood quite well that Moscow was predatory. It is true the Soviets gave China a lot of help against Japan, but that was in their own interest. Chiang understood the dynamic that Stalin wanted China just strong enough to keep bleeding Japan, but weak enough to keep China dependent on his goodwill. After the US entered the war, Chiang clearly moved into the American camp because he saw the US as not only being stronger the Soviet Union, but that it had the least predatory intent towards China.

IOTL, Chiang had to make a lot of concessions to Stalin in 1945 in the hopes Stalin would abandon the CCP so Chiang could consolidate control. That ended up not working, so the ROC repudiated many of them once it fled to Taiwan. So Chiang's attitude towards Moscow was always ambivalent at best.

This does not mean KMT China would take a hostile stand towards Moscow. Until China greatly improved its economy and military, it needed some amount of goodwill from the Soviet Union. It would make a certain amount of concessions and cooperation (mainly in terms of economic relations, and a privileged sphere in northern Manchuria), but it would broadly align itself with the US. As China got stronger, it would probably become more assertive towards Moscow and attempt to renegotiate earlier deals made with China. So I wouldn't classify it as neutral or non-aligned. I think it would be a dependable ally to the US (in the sense of favoring it more than Moscow), but with its own independent foreign policy.
 
a KMT dominated China is likely to be a neutral during the cold war and try to court both US/USSR for money/aid
The main problem with this in my opinion is that USSR cant match USA in the early cold war, a KMT China will probably get offered massive benefits from US aid and trade, that simply cant be matched....

Even a balanced neutral China meaning no wars in Korea and Vietnam will benefit the USA in the cold war, unless it finds some other way to damage itself instead?
 
If Japan withdraws from China in the middle of WW II, the RoC has become very dependent on and deeply engaged with the U.S. Post-war, China will be as much of a U.S. ally as the NATO countries.

If Japan withdraws from China before getting into WW II, the U.S. will not get involved to any great degree in China or the Western Pacific (at least compared to OT); the U.S. will be too much engaged in Europe. China will be somewhat non-aligned, and probably cultivate the USSR as a counterweight to still-dangerous Japan.
 
Before moving on to a "KMT in Cold War" scenario...

Question One: would Japan abandon China entirely and hand everything back to Chiang (if Chiang ever accepted such a deal), or would they at least half-heartedly try to support the Wang Jingwei collaborationist regime?
I find it hard to imagine that the Japanese militarists as such would stop offering the fake ROC at least token support. Of course it's also hard to imagine the Japanese Army abandoning any of their "gains." If there was some sort of regime change in Japan I feel the foreign policy ramifications would have to be pretty radical, perhaps something like a "watch the communists and nationalists duke it out from the walls of fortress Manchuria" strategy.
Question Two: how long could the Wang regime last, with the absence of total Japanese military support?
Probably not very long. In fact this (and the next question) is a pretty big motivator for the Japanese not to give up on Wang's regime —once they stop holding the reins, the puppet government and its army goes over to the enemy. Look at what the Afghan army is like, and they're up against the Taliban, not legitimate contenders for political power.

Question Three: given the level of infiltration the collaborationist government suffered from the Communists, who would benefit more from a collapsing Wang regime?
I'd wager to say still the Nationalists, because the main burden of having the Japanese gone would remedy their immediate survival crisis. It still might not be enough to save them but IMO the main thing that turned the war in Mao's favor were the decisive actions in Manchuria.
 
Up to the point where the Japanese government realize it has bigger problems than China. After the loss of Saipan, the Japanese leadership understood that their country was heading towards defeat. Suppose that the Japanese leadership simply grasps that the focus should switch from holding down the conquests to holding off the US in time before most of the IJA can be trapped in China.

In other words, withdraw from China precisely when Chiang was in a weak position and the Japanese were in the midst of a successful (at least for awhile...) Operation Ichi-Go? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ichi-Go Not very likely...
 
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This whole conversation seems weird to me. As has been stated before, there is little chance of Japan having anything but marginal benefits in withdrawing manpower from China once the Pacific War has begun.

So really, the focus of the discussion should be on the years between 1937 and 1941, when the Japanese first invaded from Manchuria, up until the closing months of 1941 where they had to decide on whether or not to attack the Western Powers.

Sometime between 1939 and early '41 the quagmire is obvious and it is decided that war with the West isn't worth it in order to keep going at it in China, and instead they try to create some kind of peace in China?

The issue of what kind of a deal can be made with Chiang Kai-Sheck while Japan is in a position of power, but can't finish the conquest has intriguing political ramifications for East Asia and eventually the world.
 
This whole conversation seems weird to me. As has been stated before, there is little chance of Japan having anything but marginal benefits in withdrawing manpower from China once the Pacific War has begun.

So really, the focus of the discussion should be on the years between 1937 and 1941, when the Japanese first invaded from Manchuria, up until the closing months of 1941 where they had to decide on whether or not to attack the Western Powers.

Sometime between 1939 and early '41 the quagmire is obvious and it is decided that war with the West isn't worth it in order to keep going at it in China, and instead they try to create some kind of peace in China?

The issue of what kind of a deal can be made with Chiang Kai-Sheck while Japan is in a position of power, but can't finish the conquest has intriguing political ramifications for East Asia and eventually the world.

Apparently Japan did put out peace feelers to Chiang around this time, but they were completely unsatisfactory to the Chinese, "demanding a semipermanent occupation of North China." https://books.google.com/books?id=MuyizRQAjt4C&pg=PA18 Chiang could not have accepted such terms even if he had wanted to do so. Chiang had sent out peace feelers of his own, but they required complete restoration of China's "territorial integrity and sovereignty" which of course was unsatisfactory to the Japanese. https://books.google.com/books?id=DUg2KGMQWHQC&pg=PA164

Wang Jingwei was not the problem; the Japanese had not yet officially recognized him, and would probably have sacrificed him if Chiang would agree to their peace terms, but this was not possible. To acquiesce in the loss of Manchuria and in de facto Japanese hegemony in North China was not an available option for Chiang--both the Communists and Chiang's opponents in the GMD would seize upon it as proof of his "treason."
 
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