That's what the British thought in Malaysia, and they got their butts handed to them by Japanese mini-tanks.
Even the worst tanks dominate the battlefield in the absence of other tanks. Anti-tank weapons early in the war were that bad.
WI Japan wins the Battle of Khalkhin Gol
- Thread starter Osakadave
- Start date
Even the worst tanks dominate the battlefield in the absence of other tanks. Anti-tank weapons early in the war were that bad.
No they do not, it's a matter of training. British anti-tank weapon, had they been there or had they been operational, would have been perfectly adequate in dealing with Japanese tanks. In fact, if troops were properly trained even improvised measures (satchel charges, Molotov coctails, some field pieces firing direct fire et al) would have succeeded in AT-defense.
The only gains Japanese had from tanks were in Chinese theater. More investment to motor transportation and heavy field pieces would have been a wiser idea. It's absurd to think that all in all, the Japanese produced thousands of tanks during the war for almost no gain at all. These tanks consumed a lot of technically able manpower, high-quality steel, gasoline etc. all of which could have been used more wisely elsewhere.
The fact of the matter is, Japan could not have occupied China, or taken Malaysia and Burma without its tanks. So I don't get where you come up with the idea that they served no purpose.
In Malaysia Japanese tanks overran British defenders, who had no tanks, and whose training and anti-tank weapons were not up to the task. Had the British developed more sophisticated anti-tank tactics or fielded more anti-tank weapons the Japanese certainly would've adjusted their own plans accordingly. Yamashita actually turned down additional forces available to him because he believed he could win with what he had.
History proved that light tanks worked in the jungle against the enemies Japan faced. They didn't need better tanks precisely because anti-tank weapons were either not very good or not available. Why would they build something better than what they needed when resources for ships and aircraft were more pressing?
And no, Molotov Cocktails don't work well against diesel tanks.
I just found some pictures of the terrain which illustrate why it was ASB for Japan to win a battle near near Khalkhin Gol without tanks or good anti-tank weapons http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=65&t=147360. Unfortunately as we diverged into the problems of achieving such an improbable victory (and Syracuse University), we never came near any conclusion on its consequences.
Two posters favoured a quick rematch
and
One counter argument is simply that Japan would need a way of defeating Soviet tanks to win in the first place. One difficulty about alternative history is that there is generally no agreement about the situation after the POD. Thus
Makes sense if the Japanese have shown greatly increased fighting power (for example deployed over a hundred type 4 Chi-To tanks!) but is less plausible if the battle was lost by Soviet incompetence. Either way, Stalin would want to focus on Europe, especially after June 1940, so any rematch has to be quick.
Thus we diverge into two possibilities. One is a massive Soviet attack at about the same time as the Winter War. As Stalin underestimated Finland, I do not see why there will not be a Winter War even if there is a simultaneous attack in the East. What will be the result of a late 1939 August Storm? The problem for prediction of a result is again that Japan has to have better anti-tank arms for the POD but how much better? However there are also diplomatic consequences. How will Japan's relations with Britain and America change if the USSR is at war with Japan and Finland?
If we assume no immediate Soviet attack but do not skip quickly to June 1941, we can ask how Japan's politics would change during 1940. There is a lot of literature on the Navy and Foreign Ministry's views on the Tripartite Pact but it is normally just said that the Army was in favour. Why? Would a victory at Khalkhin Gol have changed the Army's view?
Finally
Plausible if there were no worries about oil and other raw materials. However, would that be the situation? Seems to depend on USA -Japan relations up to June 1941. What I never understood is why Japan did not use the year from June 1940 to move most of its army from Manchuria to China and try to take Chungking. Would that be more likely in this POD?
Two posters favoured a quick rematch
and
One counter argument is simply that Japan would need a way of defeating Soviet tanks to win in the first place. One difficulty about alternative history is that there is generally no agreement about the situation after the POD. Thus
Makes sense if the Japanese have shown greatly increased fighting power (for example deployed over a hundred type 4 Chi-To tanks!) but is less plausible if the battle was lost by Soviet incompetence. Either way, Stalin would want to focus on Europe, especially after June 1940, so any rematch has to be quick.
Thus we diverge into two possibilities. One is a massive Soviet attack at about the same time as the Winter War. As Stalin underestimated Finland, I do not see why there will not be a Winter War even if there is a simultaneous attack in the East. What will be the result of a late 1939 August Storm? The problem for prediction of a result is again that Japan has to have better anti-tank arms for the POD but how much better? However there are also diplomatic consequences. How will Japan's relations with Britain and America change if the USSR is at war with Japan and Finland?
If we assume no immediate Soviet attack but do not skip quickly to June 1941, we can ask how Japan's politics would change during 1940. There is a lot of literature on the Navy and Foreign Ministry's views on the Tripartite Pact but it is normally just said that the Army was in favour. Why? Would a victory at Khalkhin Gol have changed the Army's view?
Finally
Plausible if there were no worries about oil and other raw materials. However, would that be the situation? Seems to depend on USA -Japan relations up to June 1941. What I never understood is why Japan did not use the year from June 1940 to move most of its army from Manchuria to China and try to take Chungking. Would that be more likely in this POD?
The likelihood of Japanese victory at Khalkin Gol was slim indeed. But that was due to Stalin having invested ample resources and competent commander to do the job. The operation in Finland for example had neither and the result was catastrophe against a far weaker opponent with far shorter logistic train.
My view is Stalin won't fight two simultaneous wars at the extremes of his territories because he was not insane. Stalin was basically a cautious and calculating person. Besides Finland was a distraction. If the Red Army lost at Khalkin Gol earlier he would be a lot more careful with Finland. But should the Red Army very publicly sweep Japan in 1939, the Finns would be much more deferential. If war do break out with Finland but at a later date, its likely the Finns would not do so well without the benefit of the Finnish winter.
The mountainous geography makes this impossible. The war had stalemated in China by 1940, with Japan suffering a significant defeat at Changsha is 1939, and a second and third time in 1941 and 1942.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Changsha_(1939)
The mountains do create problems but the Japanese offensives were generally not actually stopped by mountains. Changsha is low lying http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=94112&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=105 . Japan stops advancing at the end of 1938 until suddenly in 1944, when they are generally weaker and there is an American air force in China, they can advance again to take American air bases http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=14.
My view is that they did not realize that Stalin was focused on Germany and that it was safe to commit their reserves (for example the forces used for the Southern Advance). Thus the ghost Khalkhin Gol may have stopped Japan's advance into China.
Factors that need to be considered is that though the Kwantung army was eager to start a war with the Soviet Union there weas a disagreement in the Military command in Tokyo. The Emperor was also not ready to see his nation go to war against the Soviet Union and as a result the necessary resources were not committed to the struggle.
At this stage of the war the Japanese were producing a copy of the German 37mm ATG and it wasn't until later that the Japanese shifted to the more powerful 47mm gun. Still the Japanese could have committed far more resources and if the weather had been better they would have pour in far more air resources.
If there was a victory then the forces in Manchuria would have probably had there way and there might have been a much larger commiment of forces to the struggle which would have made war with Great Britain, United States and the Netherlands all but impossible.
At this stage of the war the Japanese were producing a copy of the German 37mm ATG and it wasn't until later that the Japanese shifted to the more powerful 47mm gun. Still the Japanese could have committed far more resources and if the weather had been better they would have pour in far more air resources.
If there was a victory then the forces in Manchuria would have probably had there way and there might have been a much larger commiment of forces to the struggle which would have made war with Great Britain, United States and the Netherlands all but impossible.
Hah, the irony!
Yes, you do go too far... it seem like every time someone uses SU for Soviet Union, you bring up this stupid "Syracuse University" thing. This is despite the fact it is always clear, from the context, that nobody's talking about your bloody uni. Also, "SU" is a widely-accepted, commonly used abbreviation. Do you insist that people use "the United States of America" instead of "the US"? Somehow, I think not.
I mean, I could keep on about the fact that "SU" also stands for "Students Union", but I don't. It could also just as well stand for at least 83 other things (I won't list them all here). Once again, the fact we're talking about the Soviet Union - and not, for instance, scientific Standard Units, or Scoville Units, or the Society of the Sisters of St. Ursula - is perfectly clear from context.
In short, there's really no need for you to KEEP ON BRINGING IT UP every time someone uses "SU". Because that's the kind of thing which irritates everyone, to no good end.
To be honest I have only ever seen "SU" on this site. Even the dumbest people I know (and trust me, I go to an American high school) know what the USSR and can take the time type two more letters. If you want Anaxagoras to quit, type those extra two letters for God's sake.
Oh! The holy Hresvelgr is unfamiliar with the acronym! Therefore it must be false! Hail to the great Hresvelgr, arbiter of all that is proper and grammatical!
Damn it, I swear I'll make a "WI the Reichswehr invaded Syracuse University" thread over in the ASB forum (POD Hitler is colorblind and mistakes Orange for Red) so maybe we can return to the actual thread here. 
pacifichistorian
Banned
Damn it, I swear I'll make a "WI the Reichswehr invaded Syracuse University" thread over in the ASB forum (POD Hitler is colorblind and mistakes Orange for Red) so maybe we can return to the actual thread here.
LOL.
I think the effect of this outside Manchuria/Siberia is very overstated. I had a (fairly) long discussion over it on a Wikipedia talk page awhile ago, & I was persuaded Moscow could be defended without them. (I will bow to superior sources, however.
)Not with IJA busily involved in its favorite fantasy.
Unlikely. IJA'd been pondering reform since 1905, & was still relying on bayonets & morale, rather than tanks, as agents of decision.
I think that's a real longshot, too. Japan would have to admit inferiority...
Now you're into ASB territory. Japanese engineering was incompetent to do it. Nor do I think she could spare the electric power. FWI read (posted elsewhere here, somewhere...), it took 50% of the U.S. electric power capacity to drive all the centrifuges. Japan didn't have it to spare.
Last edited:
Wha'? Never heard that before, and it sounds unlikely it would be that high... do you have a source?
pacifichistorian
Banned
I came across that in one of the threads here, The Shot that changed Europe.
pacifichistorian
Banned
OK... you know this is an alternate history site?
I do, & it was to explain why it wasn't possible for other countries than the U.S. to do it: because only the U.S. had the power to spare... I invite you to have a read & PM the poster if you doubt it.
Hendryk
Banned
What improvements were those?
That's something I've been pondering for a while, as it makes a difference in my TL as well: would it have been possible to exploit the large oil fields of northern Sakhalin with 1930s/1940s technology? Because there's definitely enough oil in there to keep the Japanese war machine going for a while.
Then again, if one wants to give the Japanese oil, all it takes is for them to get lucky and discover the Daqing oil field, which was beneath their feet all along in Manchuria. See this thread.
I tried searching for "The shot that changed the world", as well as "the shot herd round the world", and got nothing.I do, & it was to explain why it wasn't possible for other countries than the U.S. to do it: because only the U.S. had the power to spare... I invite you to have a read & PM the poster if you doubt it.
Are you sure you remembered the name correctly? If you give me the author's name, then I can narow the search.
I also tried googling for seperate info on this, and couldn't find anything useful...
I don't like to go on, but it seems unrealistic that fully 50% of the electrical output of a nation could go to a single project. And I realise Manhattan was not just based in Hanford, Washington... even so.
First of all, I would assume that if Japan gets utterly curbstomped in Eastern Asia it will be back for a revenge war in the 1960s or 70s, if the IJA is still out of control by this point.
No humiliation short of a Syracusian Landing in the home islands will ultimately solve this issue.
Sakhalin or "Karafuto" as the Japanese called it seems to have a large amount of offshore oil in known locations (~7 Billion Barrels), and estimates claim 45 Billion are present.
In 1950, Syracuse University extracted .6 Million tons of Oil; that's about one third of its 1990 figures. In 1965, that was up to 2.6 million tons.
Given the resources at hand and the obvious need for Japan to invest in Oil to support its armed forces, Japan should probably get the 1950 figures for oil if it manages to enjoy a peace deal that allows it to keep them. I Suspect that while Japan will not quickly enjoy the benefits of offshore oil, they'll have a major asset in holding Karafuto.
Source:
http://www.sakhalin.ru/Engl/Region/book/ussr.htm
No humiliation short of a Syracusian Landing in the home islands will ultimately solve this issue.
Sakhalin or "Karafuto" as the Japanese called it seems to have a large amount of offshore oil in known locations (~7 Billion Barrels), and estimates claim 45 Billion are present.
In 1950, Syracuse University extracted .6 Million tons of Oil; that's about one third of its 1990 figures. In 1965, that was up to 2.6 million tons.
Given the resources at hand and the obvious need for Japan to invest in Oil to support its armed forces, Japan should probably get the 1950 figures for oil if it manages to enjoy a peace deal that allows it to keep them. I Suspect that while Japan will not quickly enjoy the benefits of offshore oil, they'll have a major asset in holding Karafuto.
Source:
http://www.sakhalin.ru/Engl/Region/book/ussr.htm
Hendryk
Banned
How big a share of its needs would that cover?
And at which point would the exploitation of the larger offshore fields become technologically feasible? In OTL, their exploitation has only begun in the last few years.