I can imagine the Japanese proposing such a deal for various reasons, especially as an initiative by Matsuoka in 40-41, who was the kind of guy willing to try anything.
Here's a couple potential ideas:
1) Japan proposes a nonaggression or neutrality pact with Britain and France in between September 1939 and May 1940.
Japan's motives could be one-upmanship and retaliation against the Germans for surprising them with the Molotov Ribbentropp Pact, plus greater ability to concentrate on the Soviet threat.
The ideal agreement from the Japanese point of view would also see the British and French end or phase out their aid to China, or use of transport network for the same.
The Finnish War might give the Japanese impetus to offer it then, if they have not already. The Germans and Soviets are looking more like de facto allies, and the Japanese (and Italians) at this time don't like cozy German-Soviet ties one bit. Plus the Finnish War shows the Soviet appetite for territorial revision.
On the British and French end, they'd be happy to not have to worry as much about their Far East defense burden, and could see a deal as insurance against a repeat of the Tianjin incident. British and French interest in reciprocating Japanese overtures would probably reach its maximum point during the Finnish War as well, with Operation Pike being contemplated against the Soviets.
The tricky part for London and Paris would be to agree to cut off the Chinese, which would not please the Americans.
2) The Japanese could propose a nonaggression deal after the fall of France and penetration into Vichy French Indochina, Sep-Nov 1940, instead of going for the Tripartite Pact.
In this case, Japan's objectives would be to try to profit from British distress by extending the closure of the Burma Road, and to forestall British participation in any anti-Japanese embargoes or sanctions.
It could also be seen as an overture by Japan to demonstrate that their move in Southeast Asia (Tonkin) is just focused on supporting their China effort, not a stepping stone to further menacing of the British, Dutch or Americans. The Japanese could hope that could persuade Americans further sanctions are unwise. Also, the scrap iron embargo of November 1940, if it does happen, could sensitize the Japanese about the need to improve their diplomatic position, and at a time when Britain's fall has begun to look unlikely.
On the British end, a little extra reassurance in the Far East is nice to have at this time while facing a German-dominated continent alone and fighting for the empire in the Middle East and Africa. Again the risk is alienating the Americans over China. On the other other hand America may swallow any British move like this as a step to ensure their own survival. FDR could conceivably tolerate this as an updated, if distasteful, version of the Wilson Administration's Lansing-Ishii agreement.
3) A particularly dramatic scenario could be if Matsuoka pursues a deal with Britain right after the April 1941 signature of the Neutrality Pact with Japan. Matsuoka would be approaching talks at his point of maximum leverage, having just secured his northern flank. Especially so if the Tripartite Pact had been signed and the new deal promises to make the pact with Germany a dead letter. Britain also wasn't feeling that great militarily, having recently lost in Greece and about to lose in Crete.
Same calculations and arguments on either side of the ledger exist from the U.S. point of view. Boosting Britain and defeating Hitler was the strategic priority over China, even if it was an important U.S. interest.
4) A variant of #3 above could be if Matsuoka flies to Batavia for talks with the DEI authorities (and corresponds with the Dutch Govt in exile) offering a Nonaggression Pact with the DEI, that requires from the Dutch end that they sign an oil contract, accept payment in yen or at least gold, and refrain from participating in any economic embargoes or sanctions. If achievable, a deal with the Dutch could be followed by a deal with the British.