As many on this forum have said, Japan had to attack European and US colonies in South East Asia and Pacific to be able to continue the war with China, which they did. As will all know this didn't turn out to be the best idea. My question is: What if Japanese military leaders realized that they had no chance of winning a war with United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands and France and sued for peace with China with limited demands (some coastal cities, for example)? Would China accept it? If so, what impact would surviving Japanese empire have during the Cold War?
WI: Japan makes peace with China in 1942
- Thread starter Gwachiko
- Start date
This mean having a Japanese leaderships with some rationality...and this is pretty much ASB; plus the entire war with the USA and the European colonial empire is a mean to have a free hand in China so it will be difficult to sell at the IJA head honcos...and if they are not on board whoever suggest this idea is at risk of lead poisoning
I don't think Japan making peace with China is ASB. It just requires some human interaction POD.
The whole reason the Pacific War was launched was that the US required a general Japanese disengagement from occupied China in return for ending the oil embargo (Japan was and is totally dependent on imported oil). Tokyo chose war instead. If they are willing to make a compromise peace with China, they won't launch the other war in the first place.
I agree that this would be a hard sell, much like getting Hitler to back down after Czechoslovakia. However, assuming they did I think Japan is still in for a difficult time trying to hold onto their Chinese possessions. Even without the war they're also still going to be in a rough position regarding raw materials since the US isn't going to be on board with open trade again so soon and British and US seizing control of the various Pacific colonies of European powers seems probable.
I think Japan's best hope would be to consolidate what they have while playing Chinese factions off against each other in a bid for time until the war in Europe is over and major trade is reestablished. It would be dicey though as trying to keep even portions of China will likely result in a constant low-level war that will eat up money and resources.
I think Japan's best hope would be to consolidate what they have while playing Chinese factions off against each other in a bid for time until the war in Europe is over and major trade is reestablished. It would be dicey though as trying to keep even portions of China will likely result in a constant low-level war that will eat up money and resources.
Have you seen the Japanese leadership of the time? Rationality, strong contact with reality or having empathy was not required to become part of them.
Franky if such leadership can make a reasonable offer to the chinese...they will not in this situation in the beginning. By 1942 both side of the war are at the all or nothing stage
Alien Space Bats. It is short hand for a change in events that are so unlikely that intervention from some sort of nonhuman entity is required. It suggests a level of ahistorical behavior or actions that cross far over into the absurd. The term tends to be overused & applied where more nuanced phrases would be better.
History Learner
Banned
Entirely possible for Japan to do this and still achieve an overwhelming victory in China in the process. The Empire had planned to do an earlier version of Ichi-Go in 1942, but fighting around the Pacific basin, in particular after the Midway debacle, ruined such desires; in the absence of such, they can do their ATL Ichi-Go which would have the same devastating effects their 1944 one had upon the Chinese. Adding to this would be the fact that they could put pressure on the British to close the Burma Road, as they had previously done successful, amplifying the affects of their '42 Ichi-Go.
Not quite. It seems there was miscommunication between US and Japan. US demanded Japan to "withdraw from China", and Japanese understood this as abandoning Manchuria as well. That was unacceptable, so they chose war.
So sort of like History Learners' scenario, after the Japanese take over Burma in April/May 42 (Burma road was closed then). They then turn north east into southern China. And also occupy the same southern Chinese ports they occupied late in the war. (and go on defensive in Pacific avoiding Coral Sea and Midway and Guadalcanal and the Buna/Gona campaign. ).
However, even if driven into some part of western China, would the Chinese be prepared to offer peace on any terms????, even in June 42 it is pretty obvious to a lot of people that America+Soviet Union+Britain+Commonwealth will eventually win, and OTL they got all of China + Taiwan back, so all Chaing has to do is stay nominally in the war and he wins everything eventually.
Really any sort of compromise peace, neutrals joining the Axis or any other diplomatic possibilities are over on December 7th (USA is in and the Soviets are driving the Germans back in front of Moscow).
However, even if driven into some part of western China, would the Chinese be prepared to offer peace on any terms????, even in June 42 it is pretty obvious to a lot of people that America+Soviet Union+Britain+Commonwealth will eventually win, and OTL they got all of China + Taiwan back, so all Chaing has to do is stay nominally in the war and he wins everything eventually.
Really any sort of compromise peace, neutrals joining the Axis or any other diplomatic possibilities are over on December 7th (USA is in and the Soviets are driving the Germans back in front of Moscow).
Legend has it when they heard news of the attack on Pearl Harbor - Churchill opened a bottle of champagne, and Chiang Kai-shek put The Blue Danube on his record player.
On the other hand, even the most fanatical Japanese leaders understood that the US had such overwhelming industrial capacity that there was no chance of Japan winning a long drawn-out war with the US. The Pacific War became less and less about Japan holding on to China and more about defending the homeland from bombing and occupation. The Japanese were already sending out peace feelers in 1944, and although their offers were ridiculous, it's not too hard to imagine some high-level Japanese figuring that it would be best to try to get out of the Chinese quagmire and focus all resources on holding off the US colossus.
Of course, the problem then is to ensure how this can be done without the army assassinating those who advocate it.
History Learner
Banned
Having pondered on this some more, in the context of OP stating the Japanese just focus on the Chinese, I think you could actually change it a bit.
Without the need to plan for a Pacific wide campaign from December onward, the resources could be made available for the Alt Ichi Go to happen in the second half of the 1941 instead of mid-1942 as I originally stated (Since there would be no need to be doing fighting elsewhere). With that accomplished, Britain, as was done in 1939, can once again be pressured to close the Burma Road following the completion of Ichi-Go. With both of these accomplished, probably by the early months of 1942, the Chinese could definitely be knocked out by the following winter.
As to how to have this occur:
With their own source of oil, the Japanese are no longer dependent on Western supplies, thus allowing them to shrug off American economic warfare as well as remove the need to strike South. Thus, they can focus on China.
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The thing is the Chinese were capable of resisting the Japanese.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kunlun_Pass
The Chinese winning this, kept supplies from IndoChina open, forcing the Japanese into IndoChina to block the supplies from the French side of the border. The act of which starts the Japanese into a path of conflict with the USA.
Even if the Japanese don't attack the USA, Chinese resistance will be bolstered by the flying tigers and other such aid as in our TL, and the British won't back down again after the threat of invasion is over and the Burma road will stay open.
Now without the USA actively in the war, the Chinese might be tempted to take reasonable peace terms, but doubt the Chinese would take what the Japanese would accept.
As late as 1940 there were peace feelers put out by Chiang, and the Japanese delayed formal recognition of Wang Jingwei's government in the hope that some sort of agreement could be reached with Chiang. But probably Chiang was just stalling for time and trying to blackmail the US and the USSR--"give us more aid or we'll have to come to terms with the Japanese." (This technique of "getting aid by threatening collapse" would be a feature of Chiang's subsequent career. Not only did he repeatedly use it with FDR, but as late as the 1950's after being driven to Taiwan he was warning that he would have to come to terms with the Communists if the US didn't back him on Quemoy and Matsu...) In any event Japan's minimum terms for peace were formal recognition of Manchukuo and allowing Japan to station troops in north China. Chiang knew he could never accept such terms without being seen as a traitor and enormously boosting the popular appeal of the Communists. And if there was any slender hope of peace, it vanished on December 7, 1941. (Supposedly when Chiang heard about Pearl Harbor he celebrated by playing a record of "Ave Maria" on the phonograph. https://books.google.com/books?id=0LHJI0lsODcC&pg=PA189)
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I don't think the Japanese leadership considered anyone not Japanese to be, you know, actually human. That being the case why would anyone on the Imperial side want to talk to anyone or take their views into account. Don't forget the IJA had been carrying out actual war crimes and atrocities in China since they invaded, why would the Chinese want to make a deal with the the people who had spent years butchering, looting and raping everything in sight. Don't forget there were two players on the Chinese side, the Nationalists and the Communists. Even if the Japanese did make a deal with one side the other wouldn't and even if they did (Lord knows why or how) there would be enough people running around loose who would just take to guerrilla action and kill Japanese forces and civilians just for shits and giggles. Do you really think the Japanese would show any restraint should someone pot the odd Colonel or travelling salesman? No they would just go back to their previous policy of genocidal aggression against anyone not Japanese.
Had Japan been willing to settle for Manchukuo/Manchuria as their only territorial demand, peace would have been established in the 30s. The USA couls live with that. Some commercial concessions probably could have been negotiated. The problem was Japan, led by the Kwantung Army and fanatics in Tokyo wanted nothing less than China to lie prostrate under the Japanese and Japan present a Diktat. Given the penchant for junior officers to assassinate anyone they felt was obstructing their righteous path (remember Yamamoto had to live aboard ship to avoid assassination), the odds of any "peace" party actually offering some sort of reasonable terms was nil. Furthermore, the Kwantung Army was only marginally under control from Tokyo, unless there was a major purge of the staff of the Kwantung Army, down to many company level officers, you can rest assured they would find a way to restart the war to restore their "honor".
The Japanese leadership basically believed that the difference in population and industrial power between Japan and the USA (and the UK and Commonwealth as well) would be negated by the "spirit" of the Japanese military and people, thus rendering the statistics - which even the army acknowledged were accurate - meaningless. While there were many senior officers, especially in the navy, and civilian leaders, who believed that getting in to a war with the USA was folly, they were marginalized.
It is worth noting that Japan never made a serious direct overture for talks to the USA, the "feelers" they put out, up to 1945, were indirect and obscure. Even in the summer of 1945 what the Japanese offered was basically a return to status quo antebellum (Pacific Islands other than Okinawa and Formosa could go) with Japan retaining most of its Empire, no occupation of Japan, any trials for "war crimes" were to be run by the Japanese, and so forth. Those who put forth even these peace feelers risked their lives doing so. even after the atomic bombs were dropped, a coup was attempted by army officers to seize the recording of the surrender acceptance before it could be broadcast and put the Emperor under "protective custody".
IMHO Japan coming to a peace settlement with China and thereby avoiding the Pacific War would require a POD that takes away the militarization of Japan in the teens and twenties, and the elevation of the pseudo-bushido code. Impossible, I suppose not, but absent an entire rework of Japanese politics and society you need ASBs to make the POD happen.
The Japanese leadership basically believed that the difference in population and industrial power between Japan and the USA (and the UK and Commonwealth as well) would be negated by the "spirit" of the Japanese military and people, thus rendering the statistics - which even the army acknowledged were accurate - meaningless. While there were many senior officers, especially in the navy, and civilian leaders, who believed that getting in to a war with the USA was folly, they were marginalized.
It is worth noting that Japan never made a serious direct overture for talks to the USA, the "feelers" they put out, up to 1945, were indirect and obscure. Even in the summer of 1945 what the Japanese offered was basically a return to status quo antebellum (Pacific Islands other than Okinawa and Formosa could go) with Japan retaining most of its Empire, no occupation of Japan, any trials for "war crimes" were to be run by the Japanese, and so forth. Those who put forth even these peace feelers risked their lives doing so. even after the atomic bombs were dropped, a coup was attempted by army officers to seize the recording of the surrender acceptance before it could be broadcast and put the Emperor under "protective custody".
IMHO Japan coming to a peace settlement with China and thereby avoiding the Pacific War would require a POD that takes away the militarization of Japan in the teens and twenties, and the elevation of the pseudo-bushido code. Impossible, I suppose not, but absent an entire rework of Japanese politics and society you need ASBs to make the POD happen.
The problem with asking whether Japan would be willing to reach a compromise settlement with China after the Pearl Harbor attack is that if it were willing and able to make such a compromise, there would not have *been* a Pearl Harbor attack. China was the sticking point in the US-Japaese negotiations in 1941. And the reasons the Japanese gave for their adamacy on this point were deeply emotional:
"When Tojo dispatched Mr. Kurusu to the United States as Ambassador, he stressed again and again that this matter of withdrawal [from China] was the one point on which there could be absolutely no backing down; if Japan were to compromise on this, ‘he [Tojo] would never be able to sleep facing the Yasukuni Shrine.’ And in an article in the magazine *Pan-Asianism* General Matsui did his part in drumming up sentiment against any possible concession:
"'If we were now to settle the [China] Incident by compromising with England and America and co-operating with the Anglo-Saxons, how would we be able to face the myriad spirits of our war dead? Ultimately it is for the sake of the myriad spirits of the war dead that we are so adamantly opposed to any compromise with America.'"
"Leaving behind the rationale of 'the people won’t put up with it', Japan’s leaders had now finally come to the point of saying: 'The spirits of the war dead won’t put up with it.' Here the bond with the past reaches its apogee..."
https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet...n-Modern-Japanese-Politics#page/n121/mode/2up
"When Tojo dispatched Mr. Kurusu to the United States as Ambassador, he stressed again and again that this matter of withdrawal [from China] was the one point on which there could be absolutely no backing down; if Japan were to compromise on this, ‘he [Tojo] would never be able to sleep facing the Yasukuni Shrine.’ And in an article in the magazine *Pan-Asianism* General Matsui did his part in drumming up sentiment against any possible concession:
"'If we were now to settle the [China] Incident by compromising with England and America and co-operating with the Anglo-Saxons, how would we be able to face the myriad spirits of our war dead? Ultimately it is for the sake of the myriad spirits of the war dead that we are so adamantly opposed to any compromise with America.'"
"Leaving behind the rationale of 'the people won’t put up with it', Japan’s leaders had now finally come to the point of saying: 'The spirits of the war dead won’t put up with it.' Here the bond with the past reaches its apogee..."
https://archive.org/stream/in.ernet...n-Modern-Japanese-Politics#page/n121/mode/2up
trajen777
Banned
Not my area of expertise but i remember a massive misunderstanding .. The usa said china but meant not including Manchuria ... The Japanese thought it meant china with Manchuria. I also remember that japan wanted out of china