Well Phx, my posts stand on their merit, lest I post a large bibliography of sources/texts and anecdotal accounts that will likely never get read, and take a while to fully organise. As far as my (generally substantiated/reasoned) opinion goes, I think there is more plausible probability in the IJA being able to overrun China without Navy involvement, than with Navy involvement. The Navy simply wasn't the branch of the armed forces dictating Imperial Japanese policy in the early war phase, and only gained ascendancy as the Army began to quagmire itself in China, and suffered defeat and loss of face in Manchuria.
This is well documented in most official, and non-official sources, and so I can only point to wider reading to help those who doubt my stance in forming their own opinion of events in the early war phase.
A key crux of the issue is if a sino-japanese conflict starts with Marco Polo Bridge or in another shape or form. It also depends a lot on if the Unitied Chinese Front comes into play, as well as the other warlords reactions. Furthermore there are several large scale butterflies in Chiangs movements himself, and whatever anybody says Kai-Sheik was a driving force that allowed the Chinese to resist as they did.
Starting with the 'closest' perturbation of OTL. Marco Polo Bridge was a bungled chaotic affair that did not initially have the support of the Imperial General HQ. This gave Chaing ample time to mobilise his army and airforce and and counter attack the initial Japanese aggressions about a month later.
Had the Imperial Japanese Army in China gained prior support of 'the incident*' and planned to capitalise on it, they could have gained several early victories in North China, Qingdong and likely Shanghai too, with far less fighting and fewer casualties. This means that the Imperial Japanese Armed forces would have likely been able to march on Nanking before the fall of 1937. Less in number and embittered troops from the fall of Shanghai may have reduced the 'rape of Nanking' as well. Although the acts there cannot be condoned.
We must remember that it takes a fair amount of time into 1938 IOTL before the Imperial General HQ drops the notion of trying to keep this a 'limited conflict', while the Chinese had all but thrown in all the support they were able to muster for the time.
If the battle of Taizhuang(sp?) is a stalemate or minor victory, then that allows a march on Wuhan before it can become consolidated as a strong point for the nationalist army. Indeed, there is a slim but possible chance that Chiang could be captured or killed here depending on the butterflies, although I would not bet on it.
Without that clear victory, by the time the nationalists fall back to Chunking(sp?) there will have been a significant drop of Chinese morale, a big question revolves around if Chiang decides to stick it out against an 'invicible army', if he does, then he is bound to loose politically if he tries anything like his 1939 offensives south china, since if the Battle of Shanghai is less protracted, he will have lost considerably more critical military equipment.
Thus the thread premise...in loose terms.
*replace with 'an incident' as appropriate since this was a modus operandi of the Kwantung Armed forces, and does not in the context of this scenario have to be Beijing.
What about the United Front? Well IOTL both the nationalists and Communists never truly trusted one another, since each were preparing to fight/fighting the other while trying to push back the Japanese. Indeed, by 1938 the Communists were taking full advantage of guerilla forces left behind and taking out declared nationalist supporters in their wake. While in OTL the full breakdown of the union comes around late 1940, that doesn't withstand the fact that the alliance was very uneasy, and large parts of 'free china' fought more for themselves, than for either army.
When considering the PRC in this period, what if Chiang had been murdered in the 'Xi'an Incident', or kept prisoner, such that the United Front never existed in the first place!
If the Japanese only fought the Nationalists (initially), then what if a deal was struck between the Communists and Japanese for those Japanese coastal concessions..of course any such 'deal' is going to break down eventually from ideological factors, but there are a lot of 'what ifs' here that are far more important that Chiangs supply routes.
Chiang’s supply routes only become important in a scenario that runs exactly like OTL, until around late 1939 – mid 1940....at which point it's really for any POD that allows the scenario premise. The Chinese have got their stalemate that cannot be broken.
As far as we can say, the better Imperial Japan does in China, the less they have available to wage war elsewhere. Once the Japanese are committed to the Chinese interior, they are committed to China. IOTL, the Imperial Japanese Army in China was never fully committed to central China, and instead found itself in control of the Coastal and Urban centres of east, south and northern China. While the Nationalists stubbornly fought on and tried to gain international leverage because the war was dragging on...
...If the war itself doesn't drag, then then there is no reason to escalate anything further. Forget victory disease, the IJA has to now occupy a hostile country much larger than Japan, and there are still the Warlords to the North, and possibly west who pose a major threat to any occupation of China.
In this context there is bugger all to be gained from claiming Indochina and enraging more nations. Remember Indochina was the opportunistic small time prise that Imperial Japan could dominate, when it had discovered IOTL that it couldn't dominate China. If you've got the big fish in your mouth, why risk it for another smaller one...? Futhermore, there was significant internal pressure not to escalate things here...Another case of 'freelancing'.
1. Look at pilot accounts, depends on aircraft role. Miracle equipment will never 'save Imperial Japan' from it's own actions.
2. No. They don't need German aircraft design or doctrine in this period, and it would hurt them to adopt it if they did....plus it would be completely counter to their prior experience of air use, so is unlikely to be accepted anyhow.
This is well documented in most official, and non-official sources, and so I can only point to wider reading to help those who doubt my stance in forming their own opinion of events in the early war phase.
Debatable at best, unlikely at worst.
A key crux of the issue is if a sino-japanese conflict starts with Marco Polo Bridge or in another shape or form. It also depends a lot on if the Unitied Chinese Front comes into play, as well as the other warlords reactions. Furthermore there are several large scale butterflies in Chiangs movements himself, and whatever anybody says Kai-Sheik was a driving force that allowed the Chinese to resist as they did.
Starting with the 'closest' perturbation of OTL. Marco Polo Bridge was a bungled chaotic affair that did not initially have the support of the Imperial General HQ. This gave Chaing ample time to mobilise his army and airforce and and counter attack the initial Japanese aggressions about a month later.
Had the Imperial Japanese Army in China gained prior support of 'the incident*' and planned to capitalise on it, they could have gained several early victories in North China, Qingdong and likely Shanghai too, with far less fighting and fewer casualties. This means that the Imperial Japanese Armed forces would have likely been able to march on Nanking before the fall of 1937. Less in number and embittered troops from the fall of Shanghai may have reduced the 'rape of Nanking' as well. Although the acts there cannot be condoned.
We must remember that it takes a fair amount of time into 1938 IOTL before the Imperial General HQ drops the notion of trying to keep this a 'limited conflict', while the Chinese had all but thrown in all the support they were able to muster for the time.
If the battle of Taizhuang(sp?) is a stalemate or minor victory, then that allows a march on Wuhan before it can become consolidated as a strong point for the nationalist army. Indeed, there is a slim but possible chance that Chiang could be captured or killed here depending on the butterflies, although I would not bet on it.
Without that clear victory, by the time the nationalists fall back to Chunking(sp?) there will have been a significant drop of Chinese morale, a big question revolves around if Chiang decides to stick it out against an 'invicible army', if he does, then he is bound to loose politically if he tries anything like his 1939 offensives south china, since if the Battle of Shanghai is less protracted, he will have lost considerably more critical military equipment.
Thus the thread premise...in loose terms.
*replace with 'an incident' as appropriate since this was a modus operandi of the Kwantung Armed forces, and does not in the context of this scenario have to be Beijing.
What about the United Front? Well IOTL both the nationalists and Communists never truly trusted one another, since each were preparing to fight/fighting the other while trying to push back the Japanese. Indeed, by 1938 the Communists were taking full advantage of guerilla forces left behind and taking out declared nationalist supporters in their wake. While in OTL the full breakdown of the union comes around late 1940, that doesn't withstand the fact that the alliance was very uneasy, and large parts of 'free china' fought more for themselves, than for either army.
When considering the PRC in this period, what if Chiang had been murdered in the 'Xi'an Incident', or kept prisoner, such that the United Front never existed in the first place!
If the Japanese only fought the Nationalists (initially), then what if a deal was struck between the Communists and Japanese for those Japanese coastal concessions..of course any such 'deal' is going to break down eventually from ideological factors, but there are a lot of 'what ifs' here that are far more important that Chiangs supply routes.
Chiang’s supply routes only become important in a scenario that runs exactly like OTL, until around late 1939 – mid 1940....at which point it's really for any POD that allows the scenario premise. The Chinese have got their stalemate that cannot be broken.
As far as we can say, the better Imperial Japan does in China, the less they have available to wage war elsewhere. Once the Japanese are committed to the Chinese interior, they are committed to China. IOTL, the Imperial Japanese Army in China was never fully committed to central China, and instead found itself in control of the Coastal and Urban centres of east, south and northern China. While the Nationalists stubbornly fought on and tried to gain international leverage because the war was dragging on...
...If the war itself doesn't drag, then then there is no reason to escalate anything further. Forget victory disease, the IJA has to now occupy a hostile country much larger than Japan, and there are still the Warlords to the North, and possibly west who pose a major threat to any occupation of China.
In this context there is bugger all to be gained from claiming Indochina and enraging more nations. Remember Indochina was the opportunistic small time prise that Imperial Japan could dominate, when it had discovered IOTL that it couldn't dominate China. If you've got the big fish in your mouth, why risk it for another smaller one...? Futhermore, there was significant internal pressure not to escalate things here...Another case of 'freelancing'.
Hmm...Well I'll give you my opinion on it and discuss levels of plausibility, but I wouldn't 'play around' to suggest this is the only way, or if things are 'wrong' (unless factually/context inaccurate). I believe that this scenario premise requires big changes to policy and borderline 'wank' to make plausible...which is all it could ever be at best...
1. Look at pilot accounts, depends on aircraft role. Miracle equipment will never 'save Imperial Japan' from it's own actions.
2. No. They don't need German aircraft design or doctrine in this period, and it would hurt them to adopt it if they did....plus it would be completely counter to their prior experience of air use, so is unlikely to be accepted anyhow.
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