WI Japan does not attack Pearl Harbor but still invades the Philippines.

Sounds like that is passing the initiative to Japan for all of 1942, where the USN will be reacting.
I think there would be a lot of political pressure on the USN to do something, since they have an intact fleet.

Don't think it would go over well to be doing a little bit of island hopping and raids while Japan does even more Indian Ocean ops with a USN waiting for 1943 and even more ships.

I believe those intact Standards are an albatross around the USN's neck.

they just slow any TF they are included in. I don't see them as a benefit of having a couple at Java Sea, for ex.
 
Slightly off topic, but is it possible to quantify the number of lost sea battles it would take to sufficiently cajole the US into a white peace in this no-PH scenario?
 

SsgtC

Banned
No, I have read summaries of Plan Orange. Admiral Richardson, who commanded before FDR sacked him for saying the main battleline at Pearl was a bad idea, is a good source. While there is all type of hype of Plan Orange saving the PI in under 6 months, it was well understood that it would be two years to relieve the PI. It was mostly diversionary tactics aka OTL but with BB also for the first year or so.

IMO, if order to relieve the PI, the Navy begins to try to build a supply line to the PI. We call this IOTL the Central Pacific strategy. The first step, and likely last step til the 1943 ships show up, is to attempt to take Islands in the Marshals Islands. So we likely see an attempt to take a major atoll with roughly a Marine Divisions supported by the main fleet as protection. Think Midway in reverse. You probably have 8 plus BB in the main battle line with at least one carrier for scouting. The question is where the other CV go? Are they air cover for the marines? Or does Kimmel place them in front of the main battle line looking for the Japanese.

As to who wins, who knows. So many variables. Carrier warfare is hard to predict. Attacks on Atolls are short, bloody, and decisive. IMO, the best possible result the UK can hope for is to neutralize the Marshal Islands and open supplies to Guam. Then we wait for the 1943 ships to appear.

That's the ideal scenario for the USN, but they're not getting that. No way in hell will they be allowed to sit on their hands for a year+ with an intact and likely reinforced fleet "while American boys are dying." Domestic pressure and politics will see to that. The Navy will be forced into making some form of concerted, sustained effort to relieve the Philippines.
 
Absent a strike at Hawaii, the US, of course will still be at war, the Japanese will still be attacking the Philippines, Guam, and Wake.

The question is what is the IJN going to use the Carriers for? Will Kimmel try to reinforce Wake? If so we could see an early Carrier battle.

I would assume the Kimmel will keep some of the Battleships near Hawaii to "prevent an invasion" while using the Carriers to raid and get experience.

There will probably be some movement of ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific, particularly destroyers for carrier escort duty. I would also expect some of the older battleships heading to the West Coast or the East Coast for refits, and bringing the newest to Pearl. (My battle line, if you have to keep one in the Pacific, would be California, Tennessee, Maryland, West Virginia, Colorado*, Washington, North Carolina, and South Dakota).

*
After her refit. With no disaster, she can get the planned work done at Bremerton before heading back to Hawaii.

 
I would also expect some of the older battleships heading to the West Coast or the East Coast for refits, and bringing the newest to Pearl.

The same as OTL, after some had only taken minor damage, to the TL, being intact?

No, not seeing Kimmiel's first act to sending half the battleline to the shipyards for upgrades, 'while American boys are dying in the Philippines'
 
The same as OTL, after some had only taken minor damage, to the TL, being intact?

No, not seeing Kimmiel's first act to sending half the battleline to the shipyards for upgrades, 'while American boys are dying in the Philippines'

Hence my comment about keeping the seven newest battleships at Pearl.

I should note the public is not going to be getting a lot of info from the Navy Department or the War Department on ship or troop movements.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I think he would get a declaration of war. Not the unanimous one he got OTL, but the Philippines are American, and IIRC much of the public felt a sort of... what's the word... big-brotherly sort of bond with the Philippines.

What political difference would it make in the vote?

a) We get a few more (think single digits) Jeanette Rankin no votes and abstentions in one or both chambers of congress.

b) We get an increase in abstentions or no votes into the double digits, but still under 15 percent of either chamber, so no more than 14 Senators or 50 Representatives

c) A much more even split

Yes, FDR easily gets the war declaration. I am not sure the politics change that much.

I'm inclined to estimate the answer would be in line with "a" above, a change in the single digits.
 
What political difference would it make in the vote?

a) We get a few more (think single digits) Jeanette Rankin no votes and abstentions in one or both chambers of congress.

b) We get an increase in abstentions or no votes into the double digits, but still under 15 percent of either chamber, so no more than 14 Senators or 50 Representatives

c) A much more even split



I'm inclined to estimate the answer would be in line with "a" above, a change in the single digits.
Probably a, maybe b, definitely not c.

I wouldn't say that. Most are faster.
That's worth a lot.

See Rodney trying to catch Bismarck. Won't happen without lucky torpedo hit
The Japanese ships are faster as a line, but they lack uniform tactical handling, the Fusos had somewhat balky machinery that could very easily slow down the entire battle line, and even if the full speed advantage there I’m not convinced it’ll be of much help. The only advantage it might grant them is staying at long range (17k-28k yards), where the US Navy believed the Japanese had an advantage, and and it’s probably not enough to weigh out two to five more battleships. A T-crossing is unlikely; the American battle line had better handling and tactical homogeneity so as to get out of such situations.
 
I think he would get a declaration of war. Not the unanimous one he got OTL, but the Philippines are American, and IIRC much of the public felt a sort of... what's the word... big-brotherly sort of bond with the Philippines.

So the US goes to war. And here's where things get interesting.

See, the US Navy's strategic plan was to sit back and wait for... about two years or so, as of December 1941. This would allow them to start gaining warships from the Two-Ocean Navy Act to give them numerical superiority over Japan for good, and just as importantly to finish up a large run of logistics vessels, particularly oilers, that would allow them to push against Japan from the sea. It's not a coincidence that Tarawa happened when it did, nor that Guadalcanal was called "Operation Shoestring", depended on local bases in the South Pacific, particularly Espiritu Santo, and lacked any of the old battleships whatsoever. The problem was, this meant that there was no way the Army was holding the Philippines, no matter how much bluster MacArthur put out. The Navy's worst-case scenario was being demanded by Washington to sortie and try to relieve the Philippines, as that would be playing right into Japan's hands by neatly fitting into the Kantai Kessen plan.

ATL, the Philippines are being invaded, they have a battle fleet, the US Navy is very likely going to be forced to go relieve the Philippines. Now, let's make one thing clear: the Japanese battle plan is... well, it's full of wishful thinking, and outright considers many of its battleships and all of the carriers expendable. The scouting would likely be terrible. Their seven line battleships are, with the exception of Yamato, generally inferior to their American counterparts. On the other hand, the Americans have malfunctioning torpedoes, no way to coordinate carriers, lousy night-fighting capability, and they're off their own playbook.

What I'm saying is that it's going to be a fucking bloodbath, and either way, I seriously doubt the US Navy is going to be able to prevent the Japanese from overrunning the Philippines and a Southeast Asia. However, win or lose Japan is going to be largely out of ships, and at that point it all depends on whether public opinion can sustain the war while the US rebuilds the Pacific fleet. If it can, then the US steamrolls Japan in 1943/1944 and is knocking on the Home Islands by 1945. If it doesn't, well, Japan may actually get a negotiated peace. I'm leaning towards the former, myself.

There is a alternative to the Central Pacific 'bloodbath' frequently mentioned here. While it would not be easy or bloodless it does have a few advantages. Specifically extend more of the fleet to support the ABDA command. Unlike the Central Pacific it is actually possible for the USN to operate there in 1942. Fuel, port facilities, and sundry other necessities are available. Its also possible to stage at least a few aircraft from the DEI to PI. Some land based air cover is possible.

The naval battle at Balikpapan suggests what might be possible with a stronger Allied naval force. The Japanese naval & amphib operations lacked depth & derailing another one or two throws their schedule off & increases a bit the attrition that crippled them by the end of the year. If the US loses another couple cruisers, more destroyers & auxiliaries, a BB or two, & even a carrier January-March it will be worth the the set back to Japans tight schedule and overall damage to the operating forces. This is to say that instead of the decisive big battle the Japanese hope to have soon, they get a earlier start for the attritional battle that cost them so much in the later half of the year.
 
...
Of course, IF the US Pacific Fleet sails west under Plan Orange (?) then the Japanese have the chance of their "Decisive Battle" on favourable terms. I think The US government would come under pressure to do that but hope it would resist. Sticking to revisions made earlier in 1941 I think.

War Plan Orange at least from the 1920s never had the US fleet taking off the save PI. Among other things the Philippines were so weakly defended through to the late 1930s the Pacific fleet would hardly have time to load fuel and stores before the place was overrun. The idea was frequently tested in exercises, which largely proved the US fleet could not reach PI, even if based in Hawaii. This last point seems incredibly hard for folks to grasp. Under conditions of war operations the Pacific fleet could not reach PI in 1941. Refueling & provisioning a fleet on the fly was far to underdeveloped.

Capturing a intermediate base is not a panacea as there was no mobile base group to move there. There is also the matter of the bulk of the US landing forces being with Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet i Dec 1941. ie: the 2d Marine Division had a third of its strength sent off for the Icelandic occupation force. Until negotiations with Japan had broken down two months earlier in October 1941 everyone, including the Japanese leaders, thought the US would be involved in a European war long before a war with Japan occurred. So, the mobilization & deployment plans laid on in late 1940 oriented the US military towards Europe. That is the US had a very questionable ability to capture a intermediate base inside 3-4 months.
 
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