What if in September 1995 Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic hadn't agreed to a ceasefire in the war and allowing a peace settlement with the Dayton accord but instead tried to continue the Bosniak momentum following NATO's intervention and take the rest of Bosnia? In a few months the Serbs had lost a lot of territory going from 70% to around 50% with the rest controlled by Croat and Muslim forces. Under pressure by the US(and in return for eastern Slavonia), and reluctant to give the Muslims more ground, the Croats halted their offensive.
However Izetbegovic was reluctant IOTL and could have decided to continue the offensive and try to take Banja Luka from the Serbs. This could have led to hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Serbia, potentially resulting in an escalation of the war with Serbia intervening, as Montenegrin President Bulatovic said in The Death of Yugoslavia "We would have been forced to intervene directly with our army." Izetbegovic wanted to keep up the offensive, who was tempted with the reversal of Bosnia's fortunes to take it further. Izetbegovic's generals told him Bosnia could gain more ground and it was the wrong time to accept a ceasefire. This was despite Richard Holbrooke's warning that"There are a lot of signs that they're going to be able to punch holes in your lines because they're too thin." Izetbegovic ultimately agreed to a ceasefire, and later said "If we wanted to continue we would have to fight it alone, without the Croats and condemned by the world. We didn't have a chance in that situation."
What if Izetbegovic had instead rejected US pressure and decided to continue the offensive, even without Croat support? Could the Muslims gain more territory and potentially inflict a decisive defeat on the Serbs, rather than having the ultimate settlement of a divided, multi-ethnic Bosnia as happened at Dayton? Or would the decision backfire on Bosnia? How would the Bosnian War and the Yugoslav Wars go differently in this scenario? What if?