WI Izetbegovic doesn't agree to Bosnia ceasefire in 1995

What if in September 1995 Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic hadn't agreed to a ceasefire in the war and allowing a peace settlement with the Dayton accord but instead tried to continue the Bosniak momentum following NATO's intervention and take the rest of Bosnia? In a few months the Serbs had lost a lot of territory going from 70% to around 50% with the rest controlled by Croat and Muslim forces. Under pressure by the US(and in return for eastern Slavonia), and reluctant to give the Muslims more ground, the Croats halted their offensive.

However Izetbegovic was reluctant IOTL and could have decided to continue the offensive and try to take Banja Luka from the Serbs. This could have led to hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Serbia, potentially resulting in an escalation of the war with Serbia intervening, as Montenegrin President Bulatovic said in The Death of Yugoslavia "We would have been forced to intervene directly with our army." Izetbegovic wanted to keep up the offensive, who was tempted with the reversal of Bosnia's fortunes to take it further. Izetbegovic's generals told him Bosnia could gain more ground and it was the wrong time to accept a ceasefire. This was despite Richard Holbrooke's warning that"There are a lot of signs that they're going to be able to punch holes in your lines because they're too thin." Izetbegovic ultimately agreed to a ceasefire, and later said "If we wanted to continue we would have to fight it alone, without the Croats and condemned by the world. We didn't have a chance in that situation."

What if Izetbegovic had instead rejected US pressure and decided to continue the offensive, even without Croat support? Could the Muslims gain more territory and potentially inflict a decisive defeat on the Serbs, rather than having the ultimate settlement of a divided, multi-ethnic Bosnia as happened at Dayton? Or would the decision backfire on Bosnia? How would the Bosnian War and the Yugoslav Wars go differently in this scenario? What if?
 
Milošević's regime would certainly collapse due to the sheer amount of refugees flooding Serbia proper (and because of the total failure of his political plan which backfired horribly ITTL), and if Bosnia succeeds in pushing to the Drina then the Serbian Army might as well attack, initiating a proper war between the two nations, most likely prolonging the conflict for years on end, and most likely lasting until the Albanian uprising in Kosovo (if that doesn't happen earlier ITTL).

The UN would be thoroughly criticized for its inability to stop the conflict (coupled with the Rwandan Genocide) and it would be a major blow to Clinton's foreign policy as well, creating a bit more leeway for the Republicans in '96.

In conclusion, the Balkans would most definitely remain very unstable to this day (moreso than OTL) and Serbia-Bosnia relations would resemble OTL Israel-Arab nations, and don't forget more skepticism towards the UN and such institutions in general.
 
Could the Muslims gain more territory and potentially inflict a decisive defeat on the Serbs, rather than having the ultimate settlement of a divided, multi-ethnic Bosnia as happened at Dayton? Or would the decision backfire on Bosnia?

Izetbegovich had no power over forces on march towards Banya Luka. Those were croat forces, allies of ABiH, but not bosniak muslim army.
Izetbegovich`s Army of Bosnia was pathetic, even in 1995. They were barely defence capable against real armies. Only bosniak "succeses" include ethnic cleansing of Central Bosnia from Croats (Vareš, Travnik, Bugojno, Konjic). During whole war they were not able to take Mount Ozren (Doboj) which divides Tuzla and Zenica regions and controls Posavina coridor, or to break Seige of Sarajevo. Masacres of Srebrenica and Žepa happened in July 1995. Bosnian Army would lose Goražde if war continued. They only seized Donji Vakuf, Ključ and Sanski Most because serbs withdrew from them, after Croatian forces took Jajce, cutting serbs from behind.

Without Croatian army breaking seige of Bihać, and jointly with Croatian defence council forces liberating southwest Bosnia, and finally in operation "Southern Move" taking Jajce, Šipovo and Mrkonjić grad, those were Croatian troops that threatened serbian control of Banya Luka. Only Croatian forces could have marched on the city, and they new that it would be very hard battle. It would almost certainly guarantee entering of Yugoslavia (Serbia) into war, both in Bosnia and in Eastern Slavonia and Baranya. With american threats of air attacks on any forces marching onto city, it would be suicidal. War would escalate, with Croatia and Serbia fighting with all might. USA would have to chose, use air attack to frce ceasefire or stay neutral. Since they have already used no fly zones and aerial attacks on bosnian serb military instalation, it is reasonable to think they would attack any movement of major military forces.

Proposal that Bosniaks ALONE, without croatian help try to attack bosnian serbs would be a disaster for them. Bosnian serbs would alone defend themselves without problems. They would be on offensive, not defense. First, bosniaks would loose Goražde, as well a chance to take back serbian held Sarajevo suburbs and Brčko. All of bosniak army weapons and supplies comes from Croatia.

Bosniak used american pressure on b-h croats to take from them territory (Central Bosnia, Neretva) to compensate bosniak losses in Eastern Bosnia. Leader of Bosniak Croats, Krešimir Zubak even refused to sign peace treaty in Dayton (He relented in Paris). Without Dayton, Croatian republic continues to exist, and any new deal would have to include it. Croat forces would keep control of southwest Bosnia, including Jajce and Mrkonjićgrad, while Serbs would continue holding Odžak.

Cease fire would happen and war would simmer down, with frozen conflict similar to those in Kosovo, Cyprus, Donbas...
 
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And while it's possible Serbia would intervene, would this end up just being another Krajina? Milosevic wouldn't want to incur international wrath by invading Bosnia and is cynical enough to just abandon the Bosnian Serbs like he did the Krajina Serbs if he finds it's not in his interests to get involved.
 
Have to say that the elimination of Republika Srpska would have been the just thing to do, but Tudjman did not want to antagonize the EU/NATO. Militarily, if the Croat/ABiH forces wished to take Banja Luka, they would have been able to, before anyone could stop them. Sanctions are a possibility, but I doubt they would mean the absolute inability to trade- even North Korea manages to survive sanctions somehow. Plus, since the military aims of the alliance would have been achieved with the fall of BL, the sanctions would become pointless, soon.

One fairly major effect would be the area of occupied Eastern Slavonia becoming an actual war front, again. If the army of rump Yugoslavia would intervene once more, and likely fight Croatia over it, then there would be extra casualties. A military operation was drafted, for the liberation of Vukovar- that is a fact, but Serbs agreed to negotiate after Op. Storm, and then later some intelligence ploys, scared them.
 

Onlooker

Banned
Izetbegovich had no power over forces on march towards Banya Luka. Those were croat forces, allies of ABiH, but not bosniak muslim army.
Izetbegovich`s Army of Bosnia was pathetic, even in 1995. They were barely defence capable against real armies. Only bosniak "succeses" include ethnic cleansing of Central Bosnia from Croats (Vareš, Travnik, Bugojno, Konjic). During whole war they were not able to take Mount Ozren (Doboj) which divides Tuzla and Zenica regions and controls Posavina coridor, or to break Seige of Sarajevo. Masacres of Srebrenica and Žepa happened in July 1995. Bosnian Army would lose Goražde if war continued. They only seized Donji Vakuf, Ključ and Sanski Most because serbs withdrew from them, after Croatian forces took Jajce, cutting serbs from behind.

Without Croatian army breaking seige of Bihać, and jointly with Croatian defence council forces liberating southwest Bosnia, and finally in operation "Southern Move" taking Jajce, Šipovo and Mrkonjić grad, those were Croatian troops that threatened serbian control of Banya Luka. Only Croatian forces could have marched on the city, and they new that it would be very hard battle. It would almost certainly guarantee entering of Yugoslavia (Serbia) into war, both in Bosnia and in Eastern Slavonia and Baranya. With american threats of air attacks on any forces marching onto city, it would be suicidal. War would escalate, with Croatia and Serbia fighting with all might. USA would have to chose, use air attack to frce ceasefire or stay neutral. Since they have already used no fly zones and aerial attacks on bosnian serb military instalation, it is reasonable to think they would attack any movement of major military forces.

Proposal that Bosniaks ALONE, without croatian help try to attack bosnian serbs would be a disaster for them. Bosnian serbs would alone defend themselves without problems. They would be on offensive, not defense. First, bosniaks would loose Goražde, as well a chance to take back serbian held Sarajevo suburbs and Brčko. All of bosniak army weapons and supplies comes from Croatia.

Bosniak used american pressure on b-h croats to take from them territory (Central Bosnia, Neretva) to compensate bosniak losses in Eastern Bosnia. Leader of Bosniak Croats, Krešimir Zubak even refused to sign peace treaty in Dayton (He relented in Paris). Without Dayton, Croatian republic continues to exist, and any new deal would have to include it. Croat forces would keep control of southwest Bosnia, including Jajce and Mrkonjićgrad, while Serbs would continue holding Odžak.

Cease fire would happen and war would simmer down, with frozen conflict similar to those in Kosovo, Cyprus, Donbas...


I am sorry but your analysis is severely lacking and one might call it biased. Let's start from the top:

By the end of Croat Bosniak conflict the Croat area of control fell from +20% to under 10% of Bosnian territory. In the end Croats were disarmed and only allowed to keep 5 brigades, named guards brigades and subject to central Bosnian authority. Meanwhile the numbers of soldiers under Bosnian army grew from 30 000 (the numbers were larger, close to 100 000 though only 30 000 had automatic weaponry, which I'm using as a minimum requirement of calling someone a soldier)

The Croat involvement in the final operation consisted of artillery support by HV. For political reasons areas like Jajce were entered by Croat forces.

Secondly, Bosniaks waged different type of war to Serbs or Croats. Croatia blocked influx of heavy weaponry, primarily artillery and tanks, and from the starts of the war to its end no artillery piece or tank crossed the Bosnian Croat border with intend of ending up in Bosniak hands. Tudjman was paranoid regarding our intentions, and with his intent to anex parts of Bosnian teritory that may be understood. At the same time, he was in a tricky spot where he couldn't allow Bosniaks to fall outright, such as the Bihac pocket that you mentioned, which if it fell would allow unfethered railway connection from Belgrade to Krajina Serbs, under complete Serb control and cover.

Faced with weapons shortage and inability to conduct offensive operations of a kind Croats performed in Oluja, where tanks, artillery, helicopters, satelites and other modern weapons of warfare took part, they waged war of attrition and forced Serbs and Croats to enter it as well, by waging small scale offensives along the Frontline, esentially changing the face of the conflict from fast manouvers of mechanized forces which they had no chance of beating (such as Serb operation Coridor 92) into trench slogfest akin to WW1 replayed with automatic weaponry, where multy day battles were fought for several hundred yards of terrain. With that, they intended to impact one weakness of both Serb and Croat forces, lack of replacable manpower. Instead of maintaining momentum they dispersed their tanks and artillery along the 1000km frontline, severely weakening their own position.

At the start of the war total forces under Bosnian Serb control were a little over 250 000 men, which includes all formations, military and paramilitary. In essence almost every man was armed and part of a formation, even if it was a village protection unit. At the same time Serbs had access to 35 000 men in mobile brigades capable of conducting large offensive operations along any area of the front. By the end of the war Serb forces were down to 80 000 men stretched over 1100 kilometers of frontline, with only 3200 available for offensive operations.

The Croats as well were forced into such conflict, where they were unable to exploit their superiority in material, and forced into urban and mountain combat which kicked out of gear 20 000 Croats, dropping the HVO numbers from 50 000 to 30 000.

When set to number, the Bosniak military loses were 1.1 Bosniak soldier to 1 dead Serb or Croat.

By the end of the war, Army of Bosnia had 250 000 men under arms, with several corps, such as the VII and III completely free for redeployment due to lack of frontline with the enemy due to the signing of Croat - Bosniak peace. III corps had 35000-40500 men under arms, and was the only Corps in the Bosnian war that had superior equipment to the enemy. The VII Corps had 34500 men under arms and took part in numerous offensive operations to great success. These two are completely free Corps available for redeployment to the front, which was done.

The V. Corps out of Bihac had a complement of 25 000 men, and bore the brunt of combat in closing battles of the war, in a pincer manouver designed to cut of Serbs at Prijedor and trap them between the III. and VII. Corps prepared to advance from the south.

This is without mentionint the IV Corps which faced Herzegovina Serbs, the II. Corps out of Tuzla which faced Brcko and East Bosnia Serbs, or the I. Corps in Sarajevo.

Any weakening of frontlines by the Serbs to redeploy to Northern Bosnia would leave the other fronts fataly weakened.


That is not to say that Bosniaks could win the war with fall of Banja Luka. If Banja Luka fell the Bosnian Serb cause would colapse, probably starting an exodus similar to one caused by Oluja, and Bosnian Serbs would make their way to Serbia proper. Milosevic's response would then determine the outcome of the war.

If the Serbs attack it is likely the conflict would continue until the war in Kosovo, or in fact it might expedite the war in Kosovo, causing greater outer involvement. Serbs have the number but morale would be low, and with Bosnian Serbs no longer in Bosnia it would be questionable how willing the Serbian Serbs would be to bleed and die for them. I'd expect to see a lot more dead on all sides, especially if Bosniaks reach Drina River and manage to entrench. It would probably end in Milosevic's overthrow if victory is not atained quickly enough, or if enough people die. It really depends who wins the elections in US and what their policies are if the war stops before that point.

If the Serbs don't attack, Milosevic would likely get ousted due to outrage caused by spectacular failure of his politics, though Bosnia would likely be far more functional
 
Actually, it is obvious that you are the one who is biased.
Tudjman was paranoid regarding our intentions
Obviously not. After more than 20 years same (war) story. Ignoring history only guarantees repeating it.

While you have bombarded us with large quantity of numbers, readers should be aware that those numbers and nomenclature are based on Bosniak war propaganda, not reality. While officially claiming 250.000 man army with 7 corpses (ABiH), you recognise that only 30.000 had automatic weapons and could be really called soldiers. No heavy weapons or armoured tanks also. This forces were capable only of defensive and urban fighting, not major offensives. Only territorial expansion happened when they attacked their allies and ethnicly clensed large parts of Central Bosnia of Croats. Against organised forces, either serbian or croatian, they scored zero victories, conquered zero teritory, untill operation Maestral in 1995.

Bosnian Serb Army planned operation Vaganj for August 3,1995, an attack on Bihać, Grahovo, Glamoč, Kupres, Livno, Mostar, Goražde. Serbs were not prepared for defence, but offense. Croation operation Storm, just a day before drove them into withdrawal. Serbs also planned operations called "Sarajevo, Spreča, Sadejstvo, Lukavac and Zvijezda" with goals of taking mountains Igman and Bjelašnica, and cutting of Tuzla from Sarajevo. Those are not plans of a defeated army. All those forces of ABiH that were listed above would have a heavy task simply stopping serbian offensive.

The Croat involvement in the final operation consisted of artillery support by HV. For political reasons areas like Jajce were entered by Croat forces.
This is a blatant unthrouth !
ABiH was nowhere near fighting capable in 1995. Bihać corps was on its last breath, barely fighting against serbian agression. This is all happening weeks after Srebrenica and Žepa masacres. If Bosniak army was that strong, why did it not stop Serbs in genocide ? Because they could not ! This numbers are fantasies of Sarajevo armchair generals.

After Washington agreements Croatian forces, both Croatian Army (HV) and Croatian Defence Council (HVO) waged several operations liberating large areas of Bosnia. Cincar, Zima (Winter) `94, Skok 1, Skok 2, Ljeto (Summer) 95, Maestral, Južni potez (Southern move). Just in operation Maestral more than 5 % of BiH territory (>2550 sq.km) was liberated by HV and HVO forces. In operation Southern move they reached Banya Luka, and they droveserbs into panic. Forces of ABiH simply marched into evacuated serbian towns in western Bosnia. There were no battles.

In the end Croats were disarmed and only allowed to keep 5 brigades, named guards brigades and subject to central Bosnian authority.
This wording is highly charged, offensive and untrue. It implies that Bosniak forces dissarmed Croatian forces, when in reality simply demobilisation happened, both of Croatians and of Bosniaks. Forces of Republic of Croatia (HV) returned into Croatia. According to peace treaty, they (ABiH and HVO) both became part of an Army of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There is a huge diference between "central Bosnian authority" - created by Dayton peace accord, as an Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian joint armed forces and your implication of croatian forces being subject to Bosniak muslim Sarajevo control. You make it sound like they lost the war !

In any case, only Croat forces had an option of taking Banya Luka. And only them were threatened by Americans with an air attacks if they do not stop. USA was terrified of Serbia entering war, both in Bosnia and in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia).

Explanation of nomenclature:
Bosnian - Bosniak muslim, Croatian catholic or Serbian ortodox from Bosnia and Herzegovina, also any other minority
Bosniak - ethnic Bosnian muslim
 

Onlooker

Banned
Actually, it is obvious that you are the one who is biased.

Based on?

Obviously not. After more than 20 years same (war) story. Ignoring history only guarantees repeating it.

So you don't deny he was paranoid about us, you just say that he had a reason to? Did he fear Battle of Krbava 2?

While you have bombarded us with large quantity of numbers, readers should be aware that those numbers and nomenclature are based on Bosniak war propaganda, not reality. While officially claiming 250.000 man army with 7 corpses (ABiH), you recognise that only 30.000 had automatic weapons and could be really called soldiers. No heavy weapons or armoured tanks also. This forces were capable only of defensive and urban fighting, not major offensives. Only territorial expansion happened when they attacked their allies and ethnicly clensed large parts of Central Bosnia of Croats. Against organised forces, either serbian or croatian, they scored zero victories, conquered zero teritory, untill operation Maestral in 1995.

Those numbers are based primarily on a book called Balkan battlegrounds composed by CIA office of Russian and European analysis in 2003. You can find the whole book 1, and others here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2504738-balkan-battlegrounds-vol-1.html

Only 30k had automatic weapons indeed by the end of 1992. By 95 that number grew to quarter million men under arms. You also seem to ignore the entire point, and that is that Bosniaks waged different kind of warfare as opposed to Serbs or Croats. Croatia had years of peace to build up it's arsenal before operation Storm in 95. Meanwhile Bosnia had to face constant struggle and hostile neighbors unwilling to let heavy weaponry in. I will suppose you have heard of elastic defense doctrine, enforced by General Ludendorf in WW1, which was extensively used to grind down the enemy. And indeed, Bosnian army focused on small, wide front offensives which gained several hundred yards of land, and forced Serbs and Croats into doing the same, for whom such tactics were unsustainable, whereas for Bosniaks, who lacked heavy weaponry, that tactic was the only one viable.

How many victories have Croats and Serbs scored against equally armed and equiped Bosnian forces? It's a moot point, it is indeed easy to claim wast conquest with advantages on your side, especially when faced with war of attrition. The facts on the ground show us the efectiveness of such tactics, primarily the total defeat of HVO in Bosnia, loss of 50% of Croat controled teritory within a year, and having to sign Washington agreement which disolved HZHB. Victors don't do that.

As for ethnic cleansing, neither you nor I are relevant in judging or classifying them. What we do know is that Croat leadership has been sentenced before international courts for war crimes, while Bosnian wasn't, and the most high profile Bosnian official, general Delic, was sentenced to 2 years for not doing all he could to prevent his subordinate units from committing executing 12 captured Serb soldiers.

As for attacking allies, the first attack ocurred in May of 92 when Croats and Bosniaks disputed division of the spoils from captured Kaonik barracks, which resulted in Croats attacking Bosniak troops. The same scenario repeated at Bratstvo arms factory in Novi Travnik and over Ljuta territorial arms depo, where scenario repeated of Croats refusing to share arms captured by join forces, and forcing their views with firepower. Need I even go into 93? I suggest to read the book I attached.


Bosnian Serb Army planned operation Vaganj for August 3,1995, an attack on Bihać, Grahovo, Glamoč, Kupres, Livno, Mostar, Goražde. Serbs were not prepared for defence, but offense. Croation operation Storm, just a day before drove them into withdrawal. Serbs also planned operations called "Sarajevo, Spreča, Sadejstvo, Lukavac and Zvijezda" with goals of taking mountains Igman and Bjelašnica, and cutting of Tuzla from Sarajevo. Those are not plans of a defeated army. All those forces of ABiH that were listed above would have a heavy task simply stopping serbian offensive.

Hitler also planned his Welthaupstadt as Berlin crashed around him. The facts on the ground show Serbs had 80 000 men spread across 1100 kilometers of frontline, from whom they can manage to gather only 3200 men in the "intervention" units. To aid in visualization, imagine a line stretching from St Petersburg, Russia, to Kiev, Ukraine, all manned by merely 80 000 men.


This is a blatant unthrouth !
ABiH was nowhere near fighting capable in 1995. Bihać corps was on its last breath, barely fighting against serbian agression. This is all happening weeks after Srebrenica and Žepa masacres. If Bosniak army was that strong, why did it not stop Serbs in genocide ? Because they could not ! This numbers are fantasies of Sarajevo armchair generals.

Srebrenica and Zepa were defended by a single independent Division, same as Gorazde, and both areas were enclaves within sea of Serb teritory. You're talking Stalingrad managing to hold out from 42 to 45, all while surrounded by Serb units. Even so, those units managed to engage in limited offensive actions, resulting in the death of over 3000 Serb soldiers around Srebrenica. That is a complete military Brigade dead.

You are secondly, if I'm understanding you correctly, proposing that 5 Croat Brigades single handedly and out of goodness of their heart retook Bosniak teritory, while Bosniaks were incapable of anything for entire war? If you are going to acuse me of blatant untruth you'll need to provide more than your own words.

How could it stop? If they could reach Srebrenica then they could reach Drina and war would be over. And those numbers are provided by CIA analysts, who have nothing to do with Sarajevo.

After Washington agreements Croatian forces, both Croatian Army (HV) and Croatian Defence Council (HVO) waged several operations liberating large areas of Bosnia. Cincar, Zima (Winter) `94, Skok 1, Skok 2, Ljeto (Summer) 95, Maestral, Južni potez (Southern move). Just in operation Maestral more than 5 % of BiH territory (>2550 sq.km) was liberated by HV and HVO forces. In operation Southern move they reached Banya Luka, and they droveserbs into panic. Forces of ABiH simply marched into evacuated serbian towns in western Bosnia. There were no battles.


Here is the CIA analysis of the events:

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Or to put it simply, Bosnian army beats Serbs and is on verge of victory while Croats watch for days, and then decide to race into undefended town. And I won't even go about the further battles you listed. Croat wiki, vs CIA analyisis. On the other hand I do recomend to read the section of the book where those battles are indeed mentioned.


This wording is highly charged, offensive and untrue. It implies that Bosniak forces dissarmed Croatian forces, when in reality simply demobilisation happened, both of Croatians and of Bosniaks. Forces of Republic of Croatia (HV) returned into Croatia. According to peace treaty, they (ABiH and HVO) both became part of an Army of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
There is a huge diference between "central Bosnian authority" - created by Dayton peace accord, as an Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian joint armed forces and your implication of croatian forces being subject to Bosniak muslim Sarajevo control. You make it sound like they lost the war !

Bosniaks demobilized? Last I checked the 4th Corps remained at full strength, as did the 3rd and 7th, which faced Croats, while Croats were forced to cut down their military units to 5 "Guards brigades". And Croats did lose the war. They lost 50% of their teritory within a year of initiating conflict with Bosniaks, their separatist state of HZHB was disolved, and they had to subsume their forces and put them under central government control.

In any case, only Croat forces had an option of taking Banya Luka. And only them were threatened by Americans with an air attacks if they do not stop. USA was terrified of Serbia entering war, both in Bosnia and in Eastern Slavonia (Croatia).

Page 292 onwards deals with 95 and offensive operations, and calls HVO as "still playing minors league" and unable of conducting offensive operations. Read onwards from that page to gain better operational awareness.

Explanation of nomenclature:
Bosnian - Bosniak muslim, Croatian catholic or Serbian ortodox from Bosnia and Herzegovina, also any other minority
Bosniak - ethnic Bosnian muslim

I would really prefer if you didn't equate muslim and Bosniak. I am a Bosniak and not a muslim. It is plain insulting. Bosniaks are an ethnic group, not a religious one, originating from Bosnia. As simple showcase, Emir Kusturica was a muslim from Bosnia but was extensively engaged as a Serb in anti Bosniak effort, as well as VRS having a Mesa Selimovic brigade, composed of Bosnian Muslims of Serb ethnicity.
 
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