WI: Italians defeat Greece alone

There was also a lot of Captured Italian Kit as well - everything from Breda MGs to M13/40 tanks - with which to re-equip Greek forces on Crete - at least in the short term.
If sending a large force to mainland Greece before the end of 1940 delays Operation Compass that kit may not be captured early enough to be of use.
 
It is the unexplained handwave of this thread. Perhaps they don't focus on Cyrenaica and/or send forces to 'invade' Egypt and instead reinforce the Forces in Albania and elsewhere in the Balkans with the main goal of defeating Greece?

After all the British only have 30,000 Men in Egypt.....
To me Mussolini frittered his limited military resources away on too many fronts in the second half of 1940. He should have been concentrating on neutralising Malta, holding Libya and holding East Africa, but instead he invaded Greece and send the Regia Aeronautica's CAI to France.

Because of the OP Mussolini can't decide not to declare war on Greece, but it could send the aircraft allocated to the CAI to Greece instead of France. I'm not saying that it would tip the balance sufficiently to allow mainland Greece to be occupied by the end of 1940 on its own, but I think it would make a useful contribution towards achieving the OP.

I think that part of the problem IOTL is that his decision to enter the war in the first place was a spur of the moment one, because he was expecting a quick, easy and cheap victory. For example they would have at least recalled their merchant shipping before declaring war when they did had it been a premeditated move IMHO. It also seems to be the same with his decision to attack Greece. Mussolini wanted a quick, easy and cheap victory in the autumn of 1940 and Greece appeared to be the ideal candidate.

Therefore the first handwave might be that Mussolini did more to prepare Italy for war between September 1939 and June 1940. That assumes that he could have done more and I don't know if it was possible for him to do more than he did. The second handwave is that the invasion of Greece was a premeditated move too and therefore better preparations were made, but again that is assuming that they could have been better prepared and I have no idea how feasible that was.
 
This is a quote from the British official history on the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East about the location and capacity of the harbours on Crete.
These circumstances emphasized the disadvantages caused by the topography and generally backward state of the island. Crete is about 160 miles long and 40 miles across at its widest part. A backbone of barren mountains runs the entire length rising in places to over 7,000 feet. Towards the northern coast the slopes are gradual, but to the south they are steep. The only ports fit for cargo vessels are on the north; the few small fishing harbours on the south are exposed to the full force of the weather. Thus without elaborate harbour construction there was no choice but to bring all military cargoes from Egypt round to the north coast, which meant passing through the Kaso Strait on the east or the Kithera Channel on the west. Even Suda could take only two small ships at a time, and Heraklion, the chief commercial port, little more; at Canea and Retimo ships had to discharge into lighters. There were no railways. Telegraphs, telephones and transport were all primitive. There was a civil population of about 400,000 from which the able-bodied men had been mobilized to fight in Albania.
 
These are the opening paragraphs of Volume 2 of the British official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East. I have posted them here because they explain the state of the BEC land forces in the theatre at the end of Operation Compass.
THE ARRIVAL of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean in January 1941 had an immediate effect on British freedom of movement at sea. German aircraft began to mine the Suez Canal and caused serious delays in the turn-round of ships bringing re-inforcements and supplies to the Middle East round the Cape of Good Hope. The much more direct route through the Mediterranean became altogether too hazardous even for the passage of occasional convoys, and was likely to remain so until the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm became much stronger. Even the supply of Malta from the east would have to wait until the new aircraft carrier Formidable had replaced the damaged Illustrious. Meanwhile, the German bombing of Malta was limiting the extent to which the British could interfere with the passage of Axis shipping to North Africa. German intervention in the air had therefore abruptly altered the prospect at sea.

Nevertheless the total defeat of the Italian 10th Army and 5th Air Squadra in the campaign which ended at Beda Fomm on 7th February 1941 and the loss of most of the armour and artillery which the enemy had in North Africa seemed to have removed any threat to Egypt by land for some time. Within a week of the surrender the Defence Committee in London decided that Cyrenaica was to be held as a secure flank for Egypt with the minimum forces that the Commanders-in-Chief considered necessary and that all available land forces were to be concentrated in Egypt preparatory to moving to Greece. This order was easier to give than to carry out.

Of the divisions at General Wavell's disposal for all purposes, the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions were heavily engaged at Keren in Eritrea, and the 1st South African and the two African Divisions were just beginning to attack Italian East Africa from the south. In Palestine there was the 1st Cavalry Division, still for the most part horsed for want of motor vehicles, and the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions, both short of equipment and both in need of further training. In Cyrenaica were the two seasoned divisions of the 13th Corps—7th Armoured and 6th Australian. The latter was fully equipped and had not had heavy casualties. The former had been continually in action for eight months and was mechanically exhausted and needed complete overhaul. Of the divisions in Egypt, the New Zealand Division was ready for war as a two-brigade division; its third brigade had not yet arrived from England. 6th (British) was a division in name only, having no artillery or other supporting arms, and was being trained for landing operations in the Dodecanese which, as the Chiefs of Staff had confirmed, were to be undertaken at the earliest possible moment. The Polish Brigade Group was not fully equipped. The 2nd Armoured Division had arrived from England early in January, but two of its regiments had come on ahead to fill gaps in the 7th Armoured Division, had fought with it in the recent campaign, and had shared its wear and tear. This left the 2nd Armoured Division's two armoured brigades with a total of only two cruiser and two light tank regiments. The cruiser tanks were in a particularly bad mechanical state, and their tracks were almost worn out. As an additional misfortune the divisional commander, Major-General J. C. Tilly, died suddenly; he was succeeded by Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece and Crete, and who thus took over an unfamiliar and incomplete formation in most unfavourable circumstances.

The formations ready and available for use at reasonably short notice were therefore the three Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division, most of the 2nd Armoured Division, and the Polish Brigade Group. In a few weeks time one at least of the Indian Divisions might be able to leave Eritrea; also if all went well the 1st South African Division could be withdrawn from East Africa, though it rested with the South African Government to say whether it could be used any farther north. The two African Divisions were not suitable for use in Egypt or Europe even if they could be spared from East Africa. As for 7th Armoured Division, it was very difficult to say when this could again be made into a fighting force.

In these circumstances General Wavell decided to make available for Greece one armoured brigade group, the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division and the Polish Brigade Group, together with a large number of non-divisional troops, mostly British. Not all these would be able to go in the first flight. General Blarney advised that the 6th should be the first of the Australian divisions to go. This plan left available for Cyrenaica the 9th Australian Division and whatever remained of 2nd Armoured Division after one armoured brigade group had been fitted out to go to Greece. In view of the possibility that German troops would be sent to assist the Italians in North Africa it was obvious that a garrison of this size could not permanently secure the desert flank, but what information there was by the middle of February—and it was unquestionably meagre—led General Wavell to consider that there would be no serious threat to the British position in Cyrenaica before May at the earliest. By that time two more divisions and various non-divisional troops, notably artillery, might be available; the 9th Australian Division would be better trained, and the 2nd Armoured Division ought to be in a far better state to fight than it was at present. Evidence soon began to accumulate that this breathing space was likely to be greatly curtailed.
 
This is the information in Paragraph 3 of the quote in Post 44 in an easier to digest format. There were a grand total 13 divisions and one brigade group at Wavell's disposal in early February 1941. As follows:
5 divisions in East Africa.
  • The 4th and 5th Indian Divisions both heavily engaged at Keren in Eritrea.
  • The 1st South African and the two African Divisions that were just beginning to attack Italian East Africa from the south.
3 divisions in Palestine
  • The 1st Cavalry Division. It was still for the most part horsed for want of motor vehicles.
  • The 7th and 9th Australian Divisions. Both divisions were short of equipment and both of them were in need of further training.
2 seasoned divisions in Cyrenaica under the 13th Corps
  • The 7th Armoured Division. It had been continually in action for eight months and was mechanically exhausted and needed complete overhaul.
  • The 6th Australian Division. It was fully equipped and had not had heavy casualties.
3 divisions and one brigade group in Egypt:
  • The New Zealand Division, which was ready for war as a two-brigade division; its third brigade had not yet arrived from England.
  • The 6th (British) Division. This was a division in name only, having no artillery or other supporting arms, and was being trained for landing operations in the Dodecanese which, as the Chiefs of Staff had confirmed, were to be undertaken at the earliest possible moment.
  • The Polish Brigade Group, which was not fully equipped.
  • The 2nd Armoured Division. It arrived from England early in January, but two of its regiments had come on ahead to fill gaps in the 7th Armoured Division, had fought with it in the recent campaign, and had shared its wear and tear. This left the 2nd Armoured Division's two armoured brigades with a total of only two cruiser and two light tank regiments. The cruiser tanks were in a particularly bad mechanical state, and their tracks were almost worn out. As an additional misfortune the divisional commander, Major-General J. C. Tilly, died suddenly; he was succeeded by Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece and Crete, and who thus took over an unfamiliar and incomplete formation in most unfavourable circumstances.
 
W force sent to Greece OTL on 2nd March comprised the below 3 units as its main combat formations and in Jan they were doing the following

1st Armoured Brigade (Arrived in Theatre from UK on Jan 1st 1940 - so available from mid Jan)
6th Australian Infantry Division - (Mopping up Italians - later this unit would be sent to Greece as the 7th was insufficiently trained and equipped at the time - in this TL it would not be sent to Greece possibly the 7th or 9th would)
2nd New Zealand Division - (mostly in theatre - 1 Brigade sent to UK in late 1940 - all unit reconcentrated for deployment to Greece in March 41 - in this TL 2 of its Brigades are in Theatre with a 3rd arriving soon)
I'll have to concede that only one of the Australian divisions was sent to Greece instead of two because I consulted the chapter on the fall of Greece in the official history and it confirms the above.

I made the mistake because I misread this paragraph in the opening chapter of Volume 2 of the official history. However, now I have read it again it suggests that the plan was to send all 3 Australian divisions to Greece instead of two of them as I had previously thought, with only one actually being sent.
The formations ready and available for use at reasonably short notice were therefore the three Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division, most of the 2nd Armoured Division, and the Polish Brigade Group. In a few weeks time one at least of the Indian Divisions might be able to leave Eritrea; also if all went well the 1st South African Division could be withdrawn from East Africa, though it rested with the South African Government to say whether it could be used any farther north. The two African Divisions were not suitable for use in Egypt or Europe even if they could be spared from East Africa. As for 7th Armoured Division, it was very difficult to say when this could again be made into a fighting force.
 
And how exactly they manage that? OTL the battle wasn't exactly a close run thing they Italians suffered suffered something in the order of 9 to 1 casualties in their attack on the position before being thrown back. And even if they somehow manage as much the Greeks just move back to their fallback position on the Arachthos river and have only committed a single division to battle so far, there are 15 more behind it. They are then going to break the bulk of the Greek army defending mountainous positions with the same army that was in OTL pushed back when it was the one defending mountains and the now defending Greeks the ones doing the attacking?

My PoD supposes a much worse performance by the Greeks than a much better performance by the Italians which I think is more plausible.
As to how, really all the Greeks need to-do is panic prematurely once the advance on Igoumentisa happens.
If the coast falls the Italians could potentially roll up the entire defensive line.
 
My PoD supposes a much worse performance by the Greeks than a much better performance by the Italians which I think is more plausible.
As to how, really all the Greeks need to-do is panic prematurely once the advance on Igoumentisa happens.
If the coast falls the Italians could potentially roll up the entire defensive line.

Ok lets be cooperative and accept that the littoral group manages to turn Katsimitros left flank. First this was very much anticipated in the Greek plan of operations, which was calling for falling back to the Arachthos river and leaving Epirus in Italian hands if the Elaia-Kalamas could not be held. Second as already mentioned the Italians have defeated all of a single division. The 1st Greek corps is dug in on the Arachthos by the time the Italians reach it and the 2nd threatening the left flank of the Italian advance.

Third and worse the Italian plan... has worked at least for its initial part. So the Italians keep operating on their assumptions of the Greeks collapsing on the first push. XXVth corps keeps advancing south, the Italians launch their attack on Corfu committing the sole division that was on the way from Italy and there appears no need to ship just about every unit available from Italy to hold the front. Now insert the oops moment when the Greeks destroy Julia and attack in Korytza on schedule only this time their advance puts them in the rear of the Italian advance in Epirus.
 
Ok lets be cooperative and accept that the littoral group manages to turn Katsimitros left flank. First this was very much anticipated in the Greek plan of operations, which was calling for falling back to the Arachthos river and leaving Epirus in Italian hands if the Elaia-Kalamas could not be held. Second as already mentioned the Italians have defeated all of a single division. The 1st Greek corps is dug in on the Arachthos by the time the Italians reach it and the 2nd threatening the left flank of the Italian advance.

Third and worse the Italian plan... has worked at least for its initial part. So the Italians keep operating on their assumptions of the Greeks collapsing on the first push. XXVth corps keeps advancing south, the Italians launch their attack on Corfu committing the sole division that was on the way from Italy and there appears no need to ship just about every unit available from Italy to hold the front. Now insert the oops moment when the Greeks destroy Julia and attack in Korytza on schedule only this time their advance puts them in the rear of the Italian advance in Epirus.
OK, more cooperation is needed. Bad defense, triggered by better offense..With an earlier POD. Mussolini is maybe thinking a Little more preparation is needed urgently already from 1938 (Munich gives him some foresight?) and forms Division Folgore in time for the invasion of Greece as well as invade with a larger better prepared force.
Folgore division lands just as the British are setting up on Crete. Defense of Greece collapses without German help.
Will Italy ITTL take Malta as well?
Germans are over the Greec debacle, no invasion of Yugoslavia because the coup is suicidal, no aircraft lost.
Bad for the Italians in Libya though. At least in the short run unless Malta is taken.
I acknowledge it takes something to make the POD Work in isolation so not an easy one. However, we have to acknowledge that just a single brain cell firing would do the trick. The British and French that participated in Munich did have the caution to prepare for war, just in case. Basically, no-one but Italy was caught that much off guard.
 
If sending a large force to mainland Greece before the end of 1940 delays Operation Compass that kit may not be captured early enough to be of use.

I think Op Compass is going to trump Greece given that the purpose of Compass was to protect the Suez Canal - it was only after the staggering success of Compass and the removal of that threat that the British were able to even consider sending forces to Greece.

To me Mussolini frittered his limited military resources away on too many fronts in the second half of 1940. He should have been concentrating on neutralising Malta, holding Libya and holding East Africa, but instead he invaded Greece and send the Regia Aeronautica's CAI to France.

Because of the OP Mussolini can't decide not to declare war on Greece, but it could send the aircraft allocated to the CAI to Greece instead of France. I'm not saying that it would tip the balance sufficiently to allow mainland Greece to be occupied by the end of 1940 on its own, but I think it would make a useful contribution towards achieving the OP.

I think that part of the problem IOTL is that his decision to enter the war in the first place was a spur of the moment one, because he was expecting a quick, easy and cheap victory. For example they would have at least recalled their merchant shipping before declaring war when they did had it been a premeditated move IMHO. It also seems to be the same with his decision to attack Greece. Mussolini wanted a quick, easy and cheap victory in the autumn of 1940 and Greece appeared to be the ideal candidate.

Therefore the first handwave might be that Mussolini did more to prepare Italy for war between September 1939 and June 1940. That assumes that he could have done more and I don't know if it was possible for him to do more than he did. The second handwave is that the invasion of Greece was a premeditated move too and therefore better preparations were made, but again that is assuming that they could have been better prepared and I have no idea how feasible that was.

Agreed - he also between occupying Albania and the initial invasion of Greece ordered a demobbing of troops in order that they could return to their farms / Industry (I cannot recall the exact details) - I believe that this was not rescinded / reversed until things started going wrong...everywhere.

This is a quote from the British official history on the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East about the location and capacity of the harbours on Crete.

Good data as always

These are the opening paragraphs of Volume 2 of the British official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East. I have posted them here because they explain the state of the BEC land forces in the theatre at the end of Operation Compass.

Its a valid point 'but' If the Italians have dominated Greece in late 39 then why has Hitler sent so many assets to the region - OTL he did it to prop up the Italians who had failed miserably and needs to prevent the British from dominating the region as well as threatening the Oil fields in Romania.

Surely in this POD he is not going to bother and allow the Italians to Dominate the Balkans and keep more of his forces ready for the big show to the north - it's not until the Italians start to fail that Heer and Luftwaffe forces start to make an appearance and OTL this took about 6 months from Idea to Planning to actual Execution.

This is the information in Paragraph 3 of the quote in Post 44 in an easier to digest format. There were a grand total 13 divisions and one brigade group at Wavell's disposal in early February 1941. As follows:
5 divisions in East Africa.
  • The 4th and 5th Indian Divisions both heavily engaged at Keren in Eritrea.
  • The 1st South African and the two African Divisions that were just beginning to attack Italian East Africa from the south.
3 divisions in Palestine
  • The 1st Cavalry Division. It was still for the most part horsed for want of motor vehicles.
  • The 7th and 9th Australian Divisions. Both divisions were short of equipment and both of them were in need of further training.
2 seasoned divisions in Cyrenaica under the 13th Corps
  • The 7th Armoured Division. It had been continually in action for eight months and was mechanically exhausted and needed complete overhaul.
  • The 6th Australian Division. It was fully equipped and had not had heavy casualties.
3 divisions and one brigade group in Egypt:
  • The New Zealand Division, which was ready for war as a two-brigade division; its third brigade had not yet arrived from England.
  • The 6th (British) Division. This was a division in name only, having no artillery or other supporting arms, and was being trained for landing operations in the Dodecanese which, as the Chiefs of Staff had confirmed, were to be undertaken at the earliest possible moment.
  • The Polish Brigade Group, which was not fully equipped.
  • The 2nd Armoured Division. It arrived from England early in January, but two of its regiments had come on ahead to fill gaps in the 7th Armoured Division, had fought with it in the recent campaign, and had shared its wear and tear. This left the 2nd Armoured Division's two armoured brigades with a total of only two cruiser and two light tank regiments. The cruiser tanks were in a particularly bad mechanical state, and their tracks were almost worn out. As an additional misfortune the divisional commander, Major-General J. C. Tilly, died suddenly; he was succeeded by Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece and Crete, and who thus took over an unfamiliar and incomplete formation in most unfavourable circumstances.

Good break down - again though this is some months after the POD - at a time when Compass is being wound down in order to provide enough assets for Greece

At the same time a major campaign is being cranked up in East Africa with up to 100,000 Imperial troops vs 700,000 Italians eventually being involved

If compass has not been Launched then there is still 150,000 soldiers, 1,600 guns, 600 tankettes and tanks and 331 aircraft that threaten Egypt and the Suez Canal

I'll have to concede that only one of the Australian divisions was sent to Greece instead of two because I consulted the chapter on the fall of Greece in the official history and it confirms the above.

I made the mistake because I misread this paragraph in the opening chapter of Volume 2 of the official history. However, now I have read it again it suggests that the plan was to send all 3 Australian divisions to Greece instead of two of them as I had previously thought, with only one actually being sent.

My understanding is that this was the desired plan with the Australian Corps (3 Az ID and 1 NZ ID with the 1st Tank Brigade and several other smaller formations) forming the desired force but 2 of the AIDs were not sent before things became badly unstuck and half a Million Germans turned up.

So realistically the British cannot really send much to Greece much before Feb at the absolute earliest - so if Greece falls to the Italians by Jan 1941 then the British cannot send a large reinforced Corps 3 or more months earlier

Sending forces to Crete on the other hand is possible and using the Northern Ports only becomes an issue when lots of German aircraft appear (which also makes any southern port almost equally as dangerous) which may not happen ITTL as the Italians are not failing badly in late 1940
 
Good break down - again though this is some months after the POD - at a time when Compass is being wound down in order to provide enough assets for Greece

At the same time a major campaign is being cranked up in East Africa with up to 100,000 Imperial troops vs 700,000 Italians eventually being involved

If compass has not been Launched then there is still 150,000 soldiers, 1,600 guns, 600 tankettes and tanks and 331 aircraft that threaten Egypt and the Suez Canal.
There were 6 British Empire and Commonwealth (BEC) divisions in the Mediterranean and Middle East when Italy declared war. However, they were all under-strength.
  1. 7th Armoured Division formed in Egypt before World War II in Egypt as the Mobile Division. At the outbreak of war it was re-designated the Armoured Division (Egypt) and on 19/02/40 the 7th Armoured Division.
  2. 1st Cavalry Division formed in the UK on 31/10/39. It was at sea between 23/01/40 and 30/01/40. It disembarked in Palestine on 31/01/40. On 01/08/41 it was re-designated the 10th Armoured Division.
  3. 6th Infantry Division formed in Egypt by re-designating 7th Infantry Division. On 17/06/1940 the Divisional Headquarters was re-designated HQ Western Desert Force. The 6th Infantry Division was re-formed in Egypt on 17/02/41. It was re-designated 70th Infantry Division on 10/10/41.
  4. 6th Australian Division. The division was in Palestine when Italy declared war with two brigades. It seems to have been brought to full strength by the end of September 1940.
  5. 4th Indian Division. The division was in Egypt when Italy declared war with 2 brigades. It looks as if it was brought to full strength in September 1940 by incorporating a brigade from the 5th Indian Division. After Operation Compass the division was sent to The Sudan.
  6. 2nd New Zealand Division. The division was in Egypt when Italy declared war with one brigade. It seems to have been brought to full strength by the end of September 1940.
Another 7 divisions were either formed in the Middle East or arrived there between July 1940 and February 1941. They are arranged in what I think is the chronological order of their arrival in the Middle East or formation.
  1. 2nd (African) Division was formed in East Africa on 19/07/1940. It was re-designated the 12th (Africa) Division on 24/11/1940.
  2. 1st (African) Division was formed in East Africa on 24/07/1940. It was re-designed the 11th (Africa) Division on 24/11/1940.
  3. 5th Indian Division. The division (less one brigade) disembarked at Port Sudan in September 1940. It was brought to full strength by absorbing the 3 British infantry battalions in the country. Its third brigade seems to have gone to Egypt to bring the 4th Indian Division up to full strength.
  4. 1st South African Division. The 1st South African Brigade arrived at Mombassa in the second half of July 1940 and been expanded into a division by November 1940.
  5. 7th Australian Division. This division arrived sometime between 1st September 1940 and 31st December 1940.
  6. 9th Australian Division. I think this division arrived in January 1941.
  7. 2nd Armoured Division formed in the UK on 15/12/39. It was at sea between 26/10/40 and 31/12/40. It arrived in Egypt on 01/01/41. The division's headquarters was captured on 08/04/41 and the division was formally disbanded in Egypt on 10/05/1941.
I'm confident that the dates for the African and British are correct because they come from the book Orders of Battle. The dates for the Australian, Indian, New Zealand and South African divisions are as far as I can work out from the British official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East on Hyperwar.

Based on that my guess is that on 28th October 1940 (the date Italy declared war on Greece) the BEC land forces in the theatre consisted of 10 divisions as follows:
6 divisions in Egypt and Palestine
7th Armoured Division
1st Cavalry Division
6th Infantry Division without a divisional headquarters
2nd New Zealand Division
4th Indian Division
6th Australian Division​
1 division in The Sudan
5th Indian Division​
3 divisions in East Africa
1st South African Division but without its divisional headquarters which did not arrive until November
1st Africa Division
2nd Africa Division​
 
As I have done the growth of British Empire and Commonwealth armies in the Mediterranean and Middle East from June 1940 to February 1940 this is the best I can do for the air forces.

According to the copy of The Fight Avails on Hyperwar there were 29½ squadrons in the theatre on 10th June 1940 deployed as follows:
13½ squadrons (and a few D.W.I. Wellingtons for minesweeping) in Egypt
1 in Palestine
3½ in the Sudan
5½ (South African, Rhodesian and local auxiliary units) in Kenya
3½ in Aden, 1½ in Iraq
1 in Gibraltar. On 12th August the No. 200 Group at Gibraltar was transferred to Coastal Command.​

In January 1941 according to the same book there were 43 squadrons in the theatre. There was still one squadron at Gibraltar under No. 200 Group, RAF Coastal Command. The other 42 squadrons were under HQ RAF Middle East. They were deployed as follows:
In Egypt, the Sudan and the Western Desert
1 directly under HQ RAF Middle East
1 No. 201 Group
10 No. 202 Group
5 No. 203 Group in The Sudan
1 No. 252 (Fighter) Wing
3 No. 257 (Bomber) Wing​
1 RAF in Palestine and Transjordan
1 British Forces in Iraq
3 British Forces in Aden
4 RAF Mediterranean (Malta)
4 British Air Forces in Greece
8 AHQ East Africa​
 
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