The Italians had reason to be suspicious of the German völkisch right, whose pan-Germanism led most of them to advocate the incorporation of Austria and South Tyrol into a Greater Germany. Hitler was of course an exception--he was willing to concede the South Tyrol to Italy to make it an ally. But in 1923 it was hardly clear that Hitler would control a radical-right Germany, and indeed he had to devote an entire book years later (the "second book") to defending his South Tyrol position, which was unpopular in völkisch circles. Even if Hitler made his position clear to Mussolini in 1923, how could the latter know whether Hitler was sincere or whether he could control his own followers--even in the unlikely event the putsch would be successful? Besides, Mussolini would be the first to see that the putsch was modelled on a misunderstanding of the march on Rome and had very little chance of succeeding. In short, backing Hitler in 1923 would be an incredibly risky measure with no clear reward even if successful.