WI: Israel kept the Sinai?

The problem that Sadat, and other Arab leaders had, was that they were to a certain extent hostage to their own "street". For years anti-Israel/antisemitic propaganda had been fed to the "street" for a variety of reasons, one of the prime ones being that diverting attention to the external enemy/threat diverting from attention and upset being directed internally at repressive, corrupt, and incompetent local governments. Holding defensive lines ("doing nothing" in the view of the "street") was simply not possible - the leader/government would then be seen as without honor or courage in the face of the opportunity to crush the enemy. Up until the moment that you could not hide defeat, in all of the Arab-Israeli wars, Arab armies were advancing and inflicting defeat after defeat on the Israelis. This sort of slanted news, especially in a society where news was tightly controlled by the government, is standard during a war, but it was particularly deviant from the truth in the Middle East. Again, this trapped the government - hoist on its own petard. If the military is advancing, having one victory after another, then to stop before the final victory is cowardice.

Both the internal political reality and the inter-Arab political reality dictated the limits of Sadat's ability to make decisions based on military realities. It came to a choice of don't act, and your survival (literally) is at high risk or act and the odds of your survival (which is not directly linked to a military success) is much, much better.
 
The problem that Sadat, and other Arab leaders had, was that they were to a certain extent hostage to their own "street"....Holding defensive lines ("doing nothing" in the view of the "street") was simply not possible - the leader/government would then be seen as without honor or courage in the face of the opportunity to crush the enemy....
Both the internal political reality and the inter-Arab political reality dictated the limits of Sadat's ability to make decisions based on military realities. It came to a choice of don't act, and your survival (literally) is at high risk or act and the odds of your survival (which is not directly linked to a military success) is much, much better.

I don't buy this. Notwithstanding all the inflammatory rhetoric of May 1967, about driving Israel into the sea, all arab armies including that of Egypt were deployed defensively. It was assumed Israel would strike first and arab forces would do their best to hold out. By 1973, the arab view was considerably more moderate. Even military goals were limited. Before the war Ismail indicated that there was no intention of implementing the granite plan calling for a drive to the passes. During the war, he said they had to; it was a political order, strongly opposed by the generals. The "street" had nothing to do with it; there were no demonstrations calling for a big offensive. Like Adolf, and Stalin to an extent, Sadat was delusional, thinking he knew more than the pros about how to run a war...
 
While the more competent military leaders may have had a more realistic appreciation of what might be achievable, I would point out that Sadat was eventually assassinated because he was willing to come to a peace agreement with Israel, an agreement which was quite positive for Egypt. There were no demonstrations during the 1973 war because, as far as the average Egyptian knew, the armies were advancing and winning, and also because had there been a hint of any anti-government demonstrations they would have been shut down with a heavy hand. Once it became obvious things were going the wrong way, demonstrations for an offensive would have been ludicrous.

Sadat knew the only way Egypt was getting the Sinai back was through some sort of peace deal with Israel, not tanks. In my opinion, and that of many others, the 1973 war was basically a way for Sadat to build enough "street cred" and restore "pride" so that negotiating with Israel would not be seen as craven surrender. Of course, had a military miracle happened well and good.

I would also take issue with the idea that "by 1973, the Arab view was considerably more moderate." I'd take issue with that today, however that is a discussion I don't want to get in to and is skirting territory that Ursus Californicus would step on.
 
Given the warm relations between Israeli Jews and Israeli Bedouin Arabs, it's possible that Israel may find control of the Sinai much easier, given enough time.
 
While the more competent military leaders may have had a more realistic appreciation of what might be achievable, I would point out that Sadat was eventually assassinated because he was willing to come to a peace agreement with Israel, an agreement which was quite positive for Egypt.

Some of the assassins were motivated by a desire for revenge on Sadat, who probably purged, or murdered, several high ranking Egyptian officers including Badawy a hero of the '73 war.


There were no demonstrations during the 1973 war because, as far as the average Egyptian knew, the armies were advancing and winning....

In fact there were no significant advances in the first week after the crossing. Sadat faced no pressure at all either from the masses or his generals to attack on the 14th.

Sadat knew the only way Egypt was getting the Sinai back was through some sort of peace deal with Israel, not tanks.

Lol, sure, as long as he was in power. Sadat may have been a good politician but as a military commander he was completely inept. With him in charge Egypt stood no chance no matter how well armed it was...Since he'd rather sacrifice his country's capabilities than his power he opted for peace. A military solution wasn't impossible but it required better leadership than he could ever provide.

In my opinion, and that of many others, the 1973 war was basically a way for Sadat to build enough "street cred" and restore "pride" so that negotiating with Israel would not be seen as craven surrender.

This isn't quite correct. Sadat launched a major war to get the major powers to think the Mideast conflict was too dangerous to be left unresolved any longer hence they should step in a facilitate a political settlement. He didn't necessarily intend to negotiate with Israel, just get the US to pressure it.
 
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