The problem that Sadat, and other Arab leaders had, was that they were to a certain extent hostage to their own "street". For years anti-Israel/antisemitic propaganda had been fed to the "street" for a variety of reasons, one of the prime ones being that diverting attention to the external enemy/threat diverting from attention and upset being directed internally at repressive, corrupt, and incompetent local governments. Holding defensive lines ("doing nothing" in the view of the "street") was simply not possible - the leader/government would then be seen as without honor or courage in the face of the opportunity to crush the enemy. Up until the moment that you could not hide defeat, in all of the Arab-Israeli wars, Arab armies were advancing and inflicting defeat after defeat on the Israelis. This sort of slanted news, especially in a society where news was tightly controlled by the government, is standard during a war, but it was particularly deviant from the truth in the Middle East. Again, this trapped the government - hoist on its own petard. If the military is advancing, having one victory after another, then to stop before the final victory is cowardice.
Both the internal political reality and the inter-Arab political reality dictated the limits of Sadat's ability to make decisions based on military realities. It came to a choice of don't act, and your survival (literally) is at high risk or act and the odds of your survival (which is not directly linked to a military success) is much, much better.
Both the internal political reality and the inter-Arab political reality dictated the limits of Sadat's ability to make decisions based on military realities. It came to a choice of don't act, and your survival (literally) is at high risk or act and the odds of your survival (which is not directly linked to a military success) is much, much better.