WI: Israel kept the Sinai?

What if, after the Yom Kippur and Six Day War(s) Israel kept the Sinai Peninsula? It would obviously end any immediate hope for Israeli-Arab peace because Israel took the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. However, how long could Israel hope to keep it? Would international pressure force them to retreat? Internal pressure? How would it affect the rise of Islamic radicalism? How would it be governed?
 
Israel did keep the Sinai until there was a formal peace agreement with Egypt, demilitarization, and a US force stationed there to act as guarantor. A formal treaty with a US safety guarantee was worth more than keeping the Sinai. IMHO had Egypt been unwilling to sign a treaty and so forth, there would still be Israelis there today.
 
As background for my convoluted AH personal project, the future history portion has a "Greater Israel" that retains the Sinia but otherwise lacks the ridiculous expansion that the term usually implies.
 
If Egypt had launched another invasion but this time post 79' with Iran joining in post 79' coup and Saddam's military, they would have been successful and probably driven the Jews to the Seas like the prophecy.
 
If Egypt had launched another invasion but this time post 79' with Iran joining in post 79' coup and Saddam's military, they would have been successful and probably driven the Jews to the Seas like the prophecy.
Problem with that is the USA would be heavily involved then as Israel isn't going down with out a fight .
 
Hmm. What if Israel is much more successful in either the Suez Crisis or the Six-Day War (probably the latter), and occupies not only the Sinai but also large parts of the Nile delta. They unilaterally annex the Sinai and Gaza, and also start developing some settlements in the occupied parts of the Nile delta.

By the time Egypt and Israel manage to consider a peace treaty, the Sinai has a Jewish majority population and Israel is adamant that it will never give it up. As a result, they agree on peace. Egypt recognizes Israel, including the Sinai; and in return Israel ceases its occupation of parts of the Nile delta, withdraws its settlers from that area, and hands it back to Egypt. The final border between Egypt and Israel is set as the Suez Canal.

I think this is the only way you could do it. For the Sinai to stay a part of Israel, you need that international recognition and peace.
 
If Egypt had launched another invasion but this time post 79' with Iran joining in post 79' coup and Saddam's military, they would have been successful and probably driven the Jews to the Seas like the prophecy.

In that case, we'd be looking at armageddon, as the Isrealis would be wheeling out their nukes. Hell, they started doing that in '73 during Yom Kippur when it looked like they were going to lose.
 
If Egypt had launched another invasion but this time post 79' with Iran joining in post 79' coup and Saddam's military, they would have been successful and probably driven the Jews to the Seas like the prophecy.

If you think about it Egypt is one of the most vulnerable nations to nuclear assault, a small Western elite mainly in a few populated areas, two major ports and almost all its water comes from the Aswan' knock out Aswan and 1/3 of Egypt are flooded and the rest has no water. Say 20 nukes and Egypt is finished as a country. The Iran–Iraq War beginning on 22 September 1980, so any joint action would be unlikely then. The other point is that between Iraq and Israel is Jordan and Jordan will not allow Iraqi or Iranian troops in.


Hmm. What if Israel is much more successful in either the Suez Crisis or the Six-Day War (probably the latter), and occupies not only the Sinai but also large parts of the Nile delta.

In both wars, the only reason Israel stopped was for secure military defensive borders, if so why would Israel go to the Nile delta? If anything it would go South to the Aswan.

They unilaterally annex the Sinai and Gaza, and also start developing some settlements in the occupied parts of the Nile delta.

It is not the sort of area that lends itself to an Israeli settlement, with a high Arab population.


By the time Egypt and Israel manage to consider a peace treaty, the Sinai has a Jewish majority population and Israel is adamant that it will never give it up. As a result, they agree on peace. Egypt recognizes Israel, including the Sinai; and in return Israel ceases its occupation of parts of the Nile delta, withdraws its settlers from that area, and hands it back to Egypt. The final border between Egypt and Israel is set as the Suez Canal..

There were parts of the Eastern Sinai that Israel had a considerable population in them, the central parts had oil that Israel really wanted and yet Israel gave them all up for peace.

I think this is the only way you could do it. For the Sinai to stay a part of Israel, you need that international recognition and peace.

Why? The Golan has no such international recognition and peace. I think that peace might be a good start.
 
If Egypt had launched another invasion but this time post 79' with Iran joining in post 79' coup and Saddam's military, they would have been successful and probably driven the Jews to the Seas like the prophecy.


Even if Israel relied just on conventional weapons, there was virtually no possibility of eliminating that nation entirely. In 1973, Egyptian generals never thought they'd be able to advance clear across Sinai.
What might've been possible though, was a prolonged bloody stalemate sort of like the Iran-Iraq war. Had Israel refused to return Sinai, even in exchange for a separate peace with Egypt, Cairo would've had no choice but to rearm for another conflict. To do that, they'd have to remain on good terms with the USSR and get as much money as possible from oil producing states--which probably wouldn't have been difficult if deadlock was due to Israeli intransigence.
In fact, had that been the perception Egypt probably could've obtained advanced arms from France as well as the USSR, such as the F-1, in great numbers. In the OTL Cairo had a deal to get 200 F-1s, which would've represented an enormous improvement over its MIG-21s, and available MIG-23 variants such as the MIG-23MS. The deal fell through after Egypt opted for peace beginning with Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in '77. But if intransigence affected Israel's international standing and increased sympathy for the arabs, Cairo might've been able to get the Jaguar as well as all the F-1s it needed.
With Egypt still in the arab fold in '79, attention would've remained focused on Israel, and a high probability of war might've induced Saddam to lay off Iran, so Iraq could participate in syria again.
More and better weapons, plus plenty of Iraqi and Iranian reinforcements, might've made a big bloody stalemate possible sometime in the early '80s.
 
Last edited:
.... why would Israel go to the Nile delta? If anything it would go South to the Aswan.

In both the '67 and '73 wars, Israeli generals wanted to go on to Cairo, Amman and Damascus but Dayan rejected such advances.

There were parts of the Eastern Sinai that Israel had a considerable population in them, the central parts had oil that Israel really wanted and yet Israel gave them all up for peace.

The oil was along the Suez gulf e.g. Abu Rudeis.
 
.... IMHO had Egypt been unwilling to sign a treaty and so forth, there would still be Israelis there today.

Hard to say. Had Egypt still been a belligerent after '73, it could've massively rearmed as would other arab states, and they'd have help from Iran. They still may not have been able to advance much, but if a war were brutally costly Israel might opt to get out of Sinai in exchange for US/international guarantees(as opposed to a peace treaty with Egypt). Israel might've resorted to nukes but the US as well as the USSR would've pressured them not to.
 
@starman : Israel was "interested" in the strategic depth the Sinai provided, and the assurance that the Straits of Tiran would not be closed (again). The small oil field was extra but not essential. The peace treaty and the US monitoring force was adequate guarantee of that, absent that situation you would have seen Israel remaining and frankly the longer they stayed, the more infrastructure that was created (and paid for) the less likely any retreat would have been. The Sinai is basically empty, with small numbers of Beduoin who actually get along OK with Israel (they sort of leave each other alone) so no restive population, such small civilian settlements that might be established are basically not displacing anyone or having restive neighbors. The big question is what to do about the Suez Canal with the Israelis on one bank and the Egyptians on the other - there are several possibilities to reopen the canal.

In 1973 the Iranian Revolution is still in the future, and even after it happens the Iranians are not in any position to supply significant arms to anybody for decades. Whether or not the Shi'a Iranians and Sunni Arabs (Iran and Egypt) could work together in this way is, IMHO, a stretch. As OTL, the only source for Egyptian rearmament after 1973 absent a peace treaty and the flow of American aid, is the USSR - Egypt simply can't buy on the open market they have no money. At best that source is good for another 15 years and then the former USSR isn't giving away arms any more.

Having suffered one tactical defeat at the beginning of the Yom Kippur war, expect the Israelis to have more formidable defensive positions, and a mobile reserve positioned to deal with any crossing attempts, and the next time would not be so easy for the Egyptians. The choice of the attack date and Israeli hubris were big assists.
 
The peace treaty and the US monitoring force was adequate guarantee of that, absent that situation you would have seen Israel remaining and frankly the longer they stayed, the more infrastructure that was created (and paid for) the less likely any retreat would have been.

The most important infrastructure--air bases such as Gafgafa--had been captured not built. In the end the Israelis not only gave them up but forcibly removed settlers to facilitate a settlement. In part it was Egypt's performance early in the '73 war that convinced them peace was important enough to justify such concessions.


In 1973 the Iranian Revolution is still in the future, and even after it happens the Iranians are not in any position to supply significant arms to anybody for decades.

They wouldn't have been expected to, just send some air and ground forces to help Syria like Iraq did.

Whether or not the Shi'a Iranians and Sunni Arabs (Iran and Egypt) could work together in this way is, IMHO, a stretch.

In the OTL Sadat was on very good terms with the Shah, who provided some aid--at least $1 billion c 1975.

As OTL, the only source for Egyptian rearmament after 1973 absent a peace treaty and the flow of American aid, is the USSR - Egypt simply can't buy on the open market they have no money.


Na, as I just posted, above, in mid 1977 Egypt had a deal to get 200 F-1s from France. It fell through, but because its peacemaking from '77 onward alienated rich arab states who were prepared to underwrite such purchases--and an Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) to enable Egypt to build its own arms. Had Israel insisted on retaining Sinai, Egypt would've massively rearmed with much better weapons.

At best that source is good for another 15 years and then the former USSR isn't giving away arms any more.

:) You think the USSR gave away arms for nothing? By 1974 Egypt had incurred a very large debt which "was being paid back painfully in cotton, beer and furniture." The USSR granted credits but still insisted on payment.

Having suffered one tactical defeat at the beginning of the Yom Kippur war, expect the Israelis to have more formidable defensive positions, and a mobile reserve positioned to deal with any crossing attempts, and the next time would not be so easy for the Egyptians. The choice of the attack date and Israeli hubris were big assists.

But after the '73 war the Egyptians retained both the second and Third army bridgeheads. It's not like they had to start all over again; they were established in Sinai. There was another big asset btw--although possession of Sinai conferred strategic depth, it also meant long lines of communication, hence time for Egyptians to cross and establish defenses capable of dealing with the reserves, after the original standing force.
 
Last edited:
In both the '67 and '73 wars, Israeli generals wanted to go on to Cairo, Amman and Damascus but Dayan rejected such advances.

Israel policy has always been to avoid large Arab population centres, both for political and to reduce casualties only once has an Arab capital city been invaded and that was Beruit.

Which generals? Even if true its the Israeli government or people we are talking about. In 67, Israel could have easily kept going if it wanted too but prefered to stop at a defensible border.

Amman was not in the war in 73.

In 73 was by Israel driving to Damascus, the Egyptians were forced to leave their defensive position in the South to protect their ally. It certainly was not a target as such. Once the Egyptians moved the Israelis stopped in the North.

I am not aware of any Israeli general that wanted to go into Cairo, the drive by Israel was to cut the Egyptian third army supply line.

https://www.google.com/search?q=isr...sKHRoiBT0Q9QEwAHoECAEQBA#imgrc=nSke6vvXMNFJxM:

Most of the action was in the South.

The oil was along the Suez gulf e.g. Abu Rudeis.

Oops
 
Israel policy has always been to avoid large Arab population centres, both for political and to reduce casualties only once has an Arab capital city been invaded and that was Beruit.

Which generals? Even if true its the Israeli government or people we are talking about. In 67, Israel could have easily kept going if it wanted too but prefered to stop at a defensible border.

Even before the '73 war broke out Elazar proposed reaching Damascus in a counterattack, but Dayan rejected that option, just as he had in '67 when he had to refuse advances to all three arab capitals.

Amman was not in the war in 73.

Yes of course but it was a potential objective in '67.

In 73 was by Israel driving to Damascus, the Egyptians were forced to leave their defensive position in the South to protect their ally.

They didn't leave their defensive positions they just committed operational reserves on the 14th--foolishly.

It certainly was not a target as such. Once the Egyptians moved the Israelis stopped in the North.

Na, on the 12th the Iraqi advance toward the flank of the Israeli salient near Damascus caused the Israelis to redeploy to face them, thereby reliving pressure on Syrian forces.

I am not aware of any Israeli general that wanted to go into Cairo, the drive by Israel was to cut the Egyptian third army supply line.

Yes but there was a suggestion to press on to it in '67.

Most of the action was in the South.

Right because the terrain was more suited to tank warfare in that area.
 
Even before the '73 war broke out Elazar proposed reaching Damascus in a counterattack, but Dayan rejected that option, just as he had in '67 when he had to refuse advances to all three arab capitals.

Reaching is not conquering.

Yes of course but it was a potential objective in '67.

Hardly as Israel did not even cross the Jordan river.

They didn't leave their defensive positions they just committed operational reserves on the 14th--foolishly.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War#The_Egyptian_failed_attack


They did go beyond their defensive lines and were beaten back and then bypassed.

Na, on the 12th the Iraqi advance toward the flank of the Israeli salient near Damascus caused the Israelis to redeploy to face them, thereby reliving pressure on Syrian forces.

It was not the 12th but later and it took place after the failed Egyptian attack.

Yes but there was a suggestion to press on to it in '67.

There was nothing stopping Israel from doing it and they did not press on whatever reasons it was internal Israel decision.

Right because the terrain was more suited to tank warfare in that area.

That too, the targets for Israel were in the South of Egypt.
 
Reaching is not conquering.

The words can be interchangeable. I'm sure that was what was meant because Dayan, in refusing, said "we don't need a big arab population to hold down."

Hardly as Israel did not even cross the Jordan river.

It could easily have crossed if it wished in '67, just as it did at Karamah (sp?) the following year.

They did go beyond their defensive lines and were beaten back and then bypassed.

Yes I was aware of that...:) What I meant was, the original force that crossed, consisting of five infantry divisions, did not participate in the attack, which was carried out by operational reserves which crossed around the 13th. Ismail wanted the defense established by the infantry divisions to remain strong so they weren't used on the 14th.

It was not the 12th but later and it took place after the failed Egyptian attack.

Na in fact later Shazli, in The Crossing of the Suez, could not understand Sadat's reasons for the offensive. It couldn't have been to help Syria since the front there had already been stabilized by Iraqi intervention (as of the 12). (Tactically the Iraqis were mauled but they still diverted Israeli attention away from the Syrian forces trying to defend Damascus.)
 
The words can be interchangeable. I'm sure that was what was meant because Dayan, in refusing, said "we don't need a big arab population to hold down."

As Dayan quote shows they are not interchangeable.




It could easily have crossed if it wished in '67, just as it did at Karamah (sp?) the following year.

Clearly, they did not wish



..

Na in fact later Shazli, in The Crossing of the Suez, could not understand Sadat's reasons for the offensive. It couldn't have been to help Syria since the front there had already been stabilized by Iraqi intervention (as of the 12). (Tactically the Iraqis were mauled but they still diverted Israeli attention away from the Syrian forces trying to defend Damascus.)

Sadat had no choice, he could do nothing while the Arab line in front of Damascus was collapsing, despite what Shazli states.
 
As Dayan quote shows they are not interchangeable.
Clearly, they did not wish

Some did want to take arab capitals but Dayan rejected that--i.e. the wishes of others on three fronts in '67 and at least one in '73 had to be rejected.

Sadat had no choice, he could do nothing while the Arab line in front of Damascus was collapsing, despite what Shazli states.

But the collapsing ceased on the 12th, if only due to the Israelis being diverted away from Damascus toward the Iraqis on their flank. After that the front was stabilized and there was no need for the attack on the 14th.
 
Top