WI: Iranian Revolution Not Dominated By Islamists?

[Uhura's Mazda]

So, the opponents to the Shah in the 1970s were a hodge-podge of secular liberals, Marxists and Islamists who were only really united by their opposition to the Shah's secret police, opulence, penchant for pre-Islamic Iranian history and the Western World, as well as his egotistical style of ruling and cack-handed package of reforms in the White Revolution. IOTL, of course, the demonstrations against him forced him out of the country, and the Constitutionalist Prime Minister he left behind him was deposed by an increasingly hard-line opposition. At this time, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to the country and became the leader of the Revolution, with the unpleasant effects we are all familiar with.

So firstly, what would it take to prevent the clergy from taking over completely? Would the death of Khomeini do it? Secondly, if the National Front took over, would they keep the Shah, replace him with his son, or go for a Republic? And how would the foreign relations of Iran within the Middle East develop under that faction? And thirdly, would a Tudeh takeover be plausible?

 

[Thande]

I actually planned a TL including this at one point although what I know about it I mostly gleaned from David Owen's book. I can't remember exactly what POD I planned to use but it involved how the Shah had a blood disease and he could have been convinced it was the result of foul play by his French doctor.

 

[Redolegna]

You could have SAVAK whacking Khomeini when he was staying at Neauphle-le-Château or VGE denying him asylum.

 

[Cook]

At this time, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to the country and became the leader of the Revolution, with the unpleasant effects we are all familiar with.

It needs to be noted that ‘the clergy’ were, then and now, neither homogeneous in their political views, nor even in the belief that the clergy should even be involved in politics - many in Qom were incensed at the notion of clerics directly involved in politics. It also needs to be noted that Khomeini, despite having written his book Hokumat-e Eslami (lit: Islamic Government) while in exile, really wasn’t sure just how involved in the day-to-day governing of Iran the clergy were meant to be – his book didn’t state it and initially he seems to have been happy with just a broad overwatch approach while letting secular politicians continue the job of actual government (initially Bazaragn). What was necessary however, was for the revolution to have the support of the clergy; without them, no revolution in Iran has been successful. So it is entirely conceivable that the revolution could have proceeded much as it did, but with Khomeini being satisfied with a position of velayat-e faqih that relied far more on soft power than the hard power he ended up with.

For the events of the Islamic Revolution, its aftermath, and the evolution of the Islamic state under Khomeini and since, get hold of a copy of Michael Axworthy’s Revolutionary Iran.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

What about if the Tudeh domiate the Revolution?

 

[Uhura's Mazda]

It needs to be noted that ‘the clergy’ were, then and now, neither homogeneous in their political views, nor even in the belief that the clergy should even be involved in politics - many in Qom were incensed at the notion of clerics directly involved in politics. It also needs to be noted that Khomeini, despite having written his book Hokumat-e Eslami (lit: Islamic Government) while in exile, really wasn’t sure just how involved in the day-to-day governing of Iran the clergy were meant to be – his book didn’t state it and initially he seems to have been happy with just a broad overwatch approach while letting secular politicians continue the job of actual government (initially Bazaragn). What was necessary however, was for the revolution to have the support of the clergy; without them, no revolution in Iran has been successful. So it is entirely conceivable that the revolution could have proceeded much as it did, but with Khomeini being satisfied with a position of velayat-e faqih that relied far more on soft power than the hard power he ended up with.

For the events of the Islamic Revolution, its aftermath, and the evolution of the Islamic state under Khomeini and since, get hold of a copy of Michael Axworthy’s Revolutionary Iran.

Thanks for the recommendation.

In a no-Khomeini scenario, would it be plausible for a moderate like Shariatmadari to take a similar role with much less clergy influence on politics? Or even a lefty ayatollah?

 

[Cook]

The thing is, the Tudeh were active, but weren’t popular with the middle classes - hardly surprising given their far leftist revolutionary views. And they could never have dominated the revolution because they'd been the principal targets of the SAVAK; even as the Shah's control was collapsing, he and his advisors were convinced that the Tudeh were the primary threat and was targeting them overwhelmingly. Once the Shah had fled, Khomeini was able to ally with the moderate centrist parties against the left and slowly push them out of control of the revolutionary committees (the komiteh).

 

[Cook]

In a no-Khomeini scenario, would it be plausible for a moderate like Shariatmadari to take a similar role with much less clergy influence on politics? Or even a lefty ayatollah?

Without Khomeini, virtually anything is possible. Most likely scenario, if you don't have the charismatic figure of Khomeini dominating events, would be a committee of senior clerics forming a moral advisory role to the president. As to 'a lefty ayatollah'; Khomeini's economic views were decidedly leftist. His social views not so much.

 

[Sulemain]

Without Khomeini, virtually anything is possible. Most likely scenario, if you don't have the charismatic figure of Khomeini dominating events, would be a committee of senior clerics forming a moral advisory role to the president. As to 'a lefty ayatollah'; Khomeini's economic views were decidedly leftist. His social views not so much.

In a world without the embassy siege and the subsequent break down of relations with the states, I can see the Iran-Iraq War going a very different way, if indeed it happens at all.

 

[Cook]

In a world without the embassy siege and the subsequent break down of relations with the states, I can see the Iran-Iraq War going a very different way, if indeed it happens at all.

Not having the occupation of the embassy is easy: don't let the Shah into the United States, or expel him immediately. The relationship was going to be badly damaged anyway once the Shah had fallen and details of General Huyser's visit to Tehran in the last days of the Shah's reign became known (he'd been sent to Iran by Carter to see if the Iranian army had the strength to impose martial law, and if so whether they were still loyal enough to the Shah to do so), but Bazaragn worked hard to keep some link with the US open and he planned to slowly improve relations when the rug was pulled out from under him by the Shah's admission to the US. That letting the Shah into the US would be the diplomatic equivalent of pouring gasoline over oneself and lighting a stogie was, well, completely predictable - and most of the State Department warned against it.

 

[Maponus]

What about if the Tudeh domiate the Revolution?

That would require them to not be a transparent Soviet front with a incoherent ideological message that peaked in 1953.

 

[Cook]

That would require them to not be a transparent Soviet front with a incoherent ideological message that peaked in 1953.

That never stopped the Castro brothers.


but you are right; they were a too easy target for the SAVAK and alienated what little middle class Iran had, not to mention the clergy.

 

[Heat]

VGE denying him asylum.

Do you think Mitterrand winning 1974 would change anything there?

 

[Redolegna]

Do you think Mitterrand winning 1974 would change anything there?

Not sure. He granted asylum to Cesare Battisti. But he might not be comfortable with Khomeini.

 

[Maponus]

That never stopped the Castro brothers.

Actually it would have, the Cuban Revolutionaries had much more credibility as a non-aligned, non-Communist revolutionary movement. The Middle Class, and probably many Revolutionaries, were stunned when Castro suddenly transformed into a Marxist. Tudeh's pretensions to being a non-Communist Social Democratic party where, however, utterly laughable.

 

[fasquardon]

That never stopped the Castro brothers.

Castro wasn't a Soviet stooge before he became their ally and even after he became their ally he was a monumental pain in the Soviet butt and often managed to be the tail that wagged the dog.

By contrast, Tudeh was a fully tamed poodle of Moscow. Also, SAVAK had put them under such pressure during the Shah's reign that they were a mess. IMO there is no way for them to lead the revolution without a PoD back in the 50s (and being a much more independent party, actually responding to the desires of the Iranian people first, not the desires of Moscow first).

The only way for Tudeh to gain total power with a Revolutionary PoD is for either the Islamists or a coalition of parties to win power after the Revolution and for Tudeh to recover during the 80s (as it did OTL, during the time Khomeini tolerated the party), before some crisis tipped Iran into a second revolution, in which Tudeh could emerge dominant.

And even that requires that Tudeh not act like a bunch of stooges. Iranians had quite reasonable suspicions of people who were too close to the Russians.

fasquardon

 

[Cook]

You know, I'm really going to have to work on my material, seems some people can't see a joke even when I make it obvious with an emoticon.

 

[fasquardon]

You know, I'm really going to have to work on my material, seems some people can't see a joke even when I make it obvious with an emoticon.

I DID think it was an odd error for you to make, but I am so used to people assuming that all Marxists were Moscow stooges during the cold war, my reaction is a bit reflexive now.

fasquardon

 

[Simon]

You could have SAVAK whacking Khomeini when he was staying at Neauphle-le-Château or VGE denying him asylum.

Another option is to have Iraq, in the person of Saddam Hussein when he was Vice President, not encourage him to leave Najaf where he'd been in exile for thirteen years. From what I can recall whilst geographically closer visitation and communication links in Najaf were much poorer than in Paris, after the move Khomeini apparently found it much easier to communicate with people and influence events in Iran.

 

[Cregan]

Another option is to have Iraq, in the person of Saddam Hussein when he was Vice President, not encourage him to leave Najaf where he'd been in exile for thirteen years. From what I can recall whilst geographically closer visitation and communication links in Najaf were much poorer than in Paris, after the move Khomeini apparently found it much easier to communicate with people and influence events in Iran.

Why not just have Saddam execute him?