WI: Ioannis Kapodistrias not assassinated

[GauchoBadger]

I'll be frankful that i've been reading a bit about national heroes in mutiple countries, and this one came to my sights.
Ioannis Kapodistrias, known in italian as Giovanni Capodistria (due to being born in then-venetian Corfu), was first the foreign minister of post-napoleonic Russia, then the first head of state of the first fully independent greek state after the fall of Constantinople (if you don't count the septinsular republic), the Hellenic State (his title was a bit cloudy -- it seems to me that his title of "governor" was in reference to the state's provisional nature).
Ioannis governed with impunity and virtual dictator status, but he was well-respected by his people.
He was, unfortunately, assassinated in 1831 at the steps of a church. The greek state he helped build, however, would survive.
But what if Ioannis had decided to stay at home that day?
What would be overall the consequences of his survival?
Could he become King of Greece?

 

[GauchoBadger]

Bumping for interest.
What happens to Corfu ITTL?

 

[Zealot]

Wasn't he viewed as too pro-Russian?. IMO, since independent Greece was a condominium of the 3 Protecting Powers (Fance, Britain & Russia), Kapodistrias would'nt be given free hand as ruler. Unless someone else could act as counterbalance......maybe a foreign King?

 

[Earl Marshal]

I can't see him becoming King if he survived as he had made too many enemies by the time of his death. He could possibly become Prime Minister under King Otto, or whoever else becomes King of Greece in his stead.

While he was certainly an abrasive figure to many of the Greek leaders, he was a gifted statesman and he was well respected across Europe. His survival could have some interesting effects on the young Greece. That said his apparent Russian association might make negotiations with Britain over the Ionian Islands somewhat contentious, despite his attempts to remain impartial.

 

[Spatharios]

This is one of the big "what ifs" of modern Greek history, and there are not few historians who trace the ills that plague the modern Greek state (at least in part) to his assassination, which left his modernizing and centralizing work undone and even reversed it through the near-civil war that followed. A Kapodistrias who is allowed to remain in office as governor (or prime minister) for his full 7-year term until 1834/5 will mean a strengthened Greece post-independence, with a relatively sound institutional base, and the beginnings of a modern infrastructure. Furthermore, unlike the institutions imported wholesale from France and Germany by the Bavarian regents of King Otto IOTL, these will be much more home-grown and adapted to the actual needs and capabilities of the country.

There will still be the problem of the pre-Greek revolution provincial and Phanariote elites, as well as the warband leaders of the Revolution itself. The former had considerable political power and wealth, and were also the most opposed to the centralizing tendencies of Kapodistrias (and later of the Bavarians) and his more authoritarian regime (since in a democratic regime as during the Revolution they could rely on their wealth, education, and ties of patronage to get elected to office). For this and other reasons having to do with relations with the European powers, Kapodistrias as king is out of the question, and he himself probably never envisioned such a development, despite what hostile press at the time might insinuate at times. The best thing for him would have probably been Leopold of Saxe-Coburg accepting the Greek throne, and using his authority to back Kapodistrias up politically (and by the same stroke remove English-inspired intrigues against him). IOTL, Leopold refused since his minimum demands for the territory of the new Greek state were not met, but in the event, in 1832 the final borders of Greece were pretty much those demanded by Leopold. Plus it will avoid Greece getting an imbecile as king (Otto's mental facilities were very limited), and its meagre resources going towards financing a bloated and inefficient Bavarian occupation corps and bureaucracy, which was IOTL often drawn from the lowest dregs and most hopeless cases, who returned home rich men after a few years.

Now, a surviving Kapodistrias also raises some interesting questions about his place in a post-independence Greek state. His stature is such as to easily eclipse all other Greek political figures, and as the de facto head of state until Leopold arrives, and the unofficial head of the Russian party, he probably commands more loyalty than the king at first. I can easily see the other political factions rallying around the king to cut Kapodistrias down to size, allowing Leopold to become the king-maker (pun intended) of Greek politics much like IOTL King George I. The problem of course will be how long this competition remains in the political arena, rather than spilling over into armed clashes. IOTL there were several revolts against Otto, but this was as much a result of his incompetent and autocratic regime as due to the centralizing and Europeanizing policies followed. Both Leopold and Kapodistrias are probably too shrewd and experienced, and will have as much a stake in an orderly political system, than to engage in a repeat of the factional civil war during the Revolution.