WI: Invasion of South Africa by MK

The military wing of the African National Congress, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), was known to be a pretty inept force, incapable of even participating in the Border Wars of the 1970s and 1980s.

It never seriously threatened the Apartheid South African government, and despite a good number of camps and facilities in the frontline states, it never expanded its efforts beyond token bombings.

It is interesting to wonder what would have happened had they tried to invade South Africa at some point in the 1980s and forcefully depose the government. Perhaps they could have had support from SWAPO, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the Cubans. Would such an invasion have much chance at success, perhaps in touching off a domestic rebellion to aid their efforts? Would SADF, who would not have access to air support, be able to crush such an invasion using their superior armored car, light infantry, and guerrilla tactics?

Where would the invasion be kicked off from? A broad front, or perhaps a strike directly at what is now known as Limpopo Province, where in OTL, MK found its only border area where they would try to infiltrate with any measure of success.

If such an invasion would see the deaths of major figures like Chris Hani, and perhaps the execution of those held at Robben Island, would this be the death knell of the African Nationalist wing of the anti-apartheid movement, assuming it ends in failure? Would such a move alienate the classical liberal opposition to apartheid as expressed by the Progressive Party and Helen Suzman?
 
There won't be a peaceful transition to black rule, that's for sure. The 90s are going to be REAL interesting with sanctions and a now radicalized South Africa on both sides.
 
If the MK is as inept as you say then they will loose very badly. The militant branch of the ANC will lose most, if not all, of their credibility.
The transition black rule will be delayed but once the transition starts I doubt that there will be as much fighting between the various factions as OTL. So the transition will be less bloody.
Maybe, just maybe, if the militants loose prestige then the lingering racism in SA will be more dimensioned than OTL.
 
If the MK is as inept as you say then they will loose very badly. The militant branch of the ANC will lose most, if not all, of their credibility.
The transition black rule will be delayed but once the transition starts I doubt that there will be as much fighting between the various factions as OTL. So the transition will be less bloody.
Maybe, just maybe, if the militants loose prestige then the lingering racism in SA will be more dimensioned than OTL.
They were quite bad. The fact of the matter, however, is that they were representing the majority of the population. ZANU in Zimbabwe was also a tactically inept force that suffered almost inconceivable video game esque casualty disparities in the Rhodesian Bush War, but in the end, the political settlement of the conflict was in their favor because they had the demographic fact on their side.

And without air support, and possibly with civil unrest as the Bantustan system gets tested by the possibilities of rebellion, SADF might find itself in a bad situation. That of course requires that all of the other frontline states join in on the effort. But most likely, it would fail, as SADF was a pretty solid force with a strong officer corps.

I think that with a kickoff date after 1985, the change was still going to be in the works, as the international sanctions were what caused the internal failure of the state as it put the writing on the wall and encouraged looting. However, if it was before 1985, it could harden the attitudes of whites and coloureds in South Africa against reform.
 
There won't be a peaceful transition to black rule, that's for sure. The 90s are going to be REAL interesting with sanctions and a now radicalized South Africa on both sides.
It is worth mentioning that South Africa might get some international moral high ground of sorts from being invaded by all the frontline states in this scenario. SWAPO and MPLA were by no means internationally popular.

Its possible that some of the more fringe, third force nations in the Cold War (Western aligned, but not considered "polite company"), might send aid (like Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Lebanese Maronite Phalangists, Nicaraguan Contras, etc.) to South Africa, while other African factions (RENAMO, UNITA, Malawi) might fight on the side of South Africa.
 
ZANU in Zimbabwe was also a tactically inept force that suffered almost inconceivable video game esque casualty disparities in the Rhodesian Bush War,
Going off wikipedia from December 1972 to December 1979 I got a 7.68
Kill/Death rate for Rhodesian forces so not that bad for an insurgency

Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Lebanese Maronite Phalangists, Nicaraguan Contras, etc.) to South Africa,
With the exception of Israel and Taiwan , The others will not sent aid and NATO will certainly sent aid though third parties and in secret

while other African factions (RENAMO, UNITA, Malawi) might fight on the side of South Africa.
Malawi will stay neutral but RENAMO,UNITA and even ZAPU depending on the time period will fight on South Africa's side

Perhaps they could have had support from SWAPO, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the Cubans.
Libya, Zambia,Angola and before 1985 Tanzania can give support and even troops
 
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Any large scale African Nationalist military campaign would strengthen the support for the Apartheid government among the White and probably Colored/Indian populations. I don't see such a campaign, even with covert foreign support, making substantial gains, and the whole affair would likely be a very bloody mess that would delay the negotiated end of Apartheid.
 

Brunaburh

Gone Fishin'
The US and British support for apartheid South Africa would be more overt than OTL, Reagan would get pro-South Africa bills through congress, maybe openly arming them. Anti-racism worldwide would be weakened, OTL we saw members of the British young conservatives wearing springbok shirts and "hang Nelson Mandela" t-shirts, there would be a lot more of that.
 
Didn't SA still have nukes at this point?
Yes, but if they handle things right there would be no need to use them. I don’t think MK, MPLA, FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZANU, or the Cubans for that matter had any real offensive power projection capabilities and the effort would have collapsed pretty quickly in an attempt of this kind.

Remember, SADF without air support was able to keep a stalemate in Namibia basically until the end and really could have fought on longer. Even with all of the Soviet advisors and Cuban manpower on the side of MPLA and SWAPO, UNITA was not militarily defeated in detail. On the other hand, the border region of South Africa had a lot of desert and flat grassland without cover, which would go in the favor of the side with air support.

Now, if things go badly for them (most likely because the invasion might set of domestic rebellion and the collapse of a few northern and eastern Bantustans), maybe they threaten to nuke Harare and Luanda
 
Now, if things go badly for them (most likely because the invasion might set of domestic rebellion and the collapse of a few northern and eastern Bantustans), maybe they threaten to nuke Harare and Luanda

SA would never have used nukes on Luanda or Harare. Popping a nuke on a foreign capital would have seen any support for them in the West go straight out the window.
 
SA would never have used nukes on Luanda or Harare. Popping a nuke on a foreign capital would have seen any support for them in the West go straight out the window.
Yeah, that's probably right. I wouldn't rule out use of nuclear weapons in a tactical manner if things were desperate (although very unlikely), but you are probably right that western support is more important than perhaps appeasing some of the more radical types in the government.

Ultimately, it matters what happens on the UN Security Council. There wasn't much support for South Africa there during the Angolan War, but if somehow the Frontline States were able to invade, it probably means that they had significant help in assembling that invasion.

In the long run, it would be interesting to see how the narratives of struggle ideology and who was most important would proceed if the ANC's military wing takes a decisive defeat, which would be the most likely outcome,, in this situation. It'd be a lot harder to minimize the contributions of others. Perhaps it would lead to the MKMVA being chastened a bit (while they aren't Zimbabwe Veterans levels toxic, they are much more powerful than just a social club) because they'd be associated more with defeat.
 
What about the PAC? They just might change sides to fight the ANC
No, they wouldn't. They might not take up arms, perhaps out of pragmatic reasons (they could be crushed quickly), but remember, their motto was "One settler, one bullet". They were not standing with the government in this scenario or in any scenario.

Now, that isn't to say no black South African groups would. The Inkatha Party fought the ANC in the early 90s in running battles across KwaZulu Natal, although Buthelezi during the 80s demanded the release of Robben Island prisoners before he would agree to true settlement and self rule. Perhaps he would agree to rally the Zulus for the defense of KwaZulu Natal as a local militia of sorts, but not contribute resources to the broader war effort, and he might use the opportunity to, depending on Swaziland's position on the conflict (and they very well might have supported SA because their economy was completely dependent on it), use force to try to change the border with Swaziland. Some of the Bantustan leaders might have also supplied manpower to fight against the frontline state invasion.

It would be interesting to see how the traditional chiefs would react in this scenario. Their relations with the ANC now are quite good in many cases (because Zuma in many ways wants to be a traditional African chief with his wives and cattle and mansions, and therefore has reached out to many of them), but when the ANC was more of an ideologically African Nationalist organization (it still is, but with more traditionalism and big tent elements today), things were a lot more strained. Chiefs and Fanonists quite frankly do not get along. On the other hand, the chiefs have to worry about their own position, and getting too cozy with either side might go poorly for them.
 
Kaiser mantanzima government line all the way. Venda chief will be led by his brother who actually has an education. Ciskei gozo will rock with the wind. Bophatswana is the wild card. Mangope actually tried to make separate development work. He saw himself as heir to Biko.
 
Chiefs and Fanonists quite frankly do not get along. On the other hand, the chiefs have to worry about their own position, and getting too cozy with either side might go poorly for them.

The struggle between liberation movements and traditional culture seems to have been a universal. Pierre Vallieres' Quebec sovereigntist manifesto White N*ggers Of America(bowdlerization mine) contains a few passages condemning the religious/political cult of St. Jean Baptiste, who was basically the French Canadian equivalent of St. Patrick, if not moreso.

These days, I think most Quebecois who identify as nationalist/sovereigntist still celebrate St. Jean Baptiste Day, or at least don't object to the celebration. But it's more cultural/political than religious, I think.
 
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