WI: Initial mass use of tanks at the Somme by the British.

I recently completed a short story set during the battle of the Somme showing the first use of tanks in history (Shameless plug) and it got me thinking. Yes nearly fifty tanks was quite alot of a completely new type of vehicle to commit to a battle. But when they were finally used in 1916 only 32 were in fighting condition, the rest having broken down along the way.

But what if rather than committing what vehicles they had to that battle and forgetting the vehicles undergoing repairs the British field commanders had instead waited a week or two for the tanks to be all repaired before sending them out. Lets say by this point that forty to forty five are operational and all of them are committed to the attack.

What would the affects be? I would imagine they would be better, if we follow the logic that more means better. In which case forty five is far superior to thirty two. But could the British, given a few extra tanks and some more time to work out a strategy, achieve the hoped for breakthrough of the German lines? Perhaps bringing in more tanks for further pushes into Germany proper? Or is this all outlandish and borderline ASB?
 

Caspian

Banned
I recently completed a short story set during the battle of the Somme showing the first use of tanks in history (Shameless plug) and it got me thinking. Yes nearly fifty tanks was quite alot of a completely new type of vehicle to commit to a battle. But when they were finally used in 1916 only 32 were in fighting condition, the rest having broken down along the way.

But what if rather than committing what vehicles they had to that battle and forgetting the vehicles undergoing repairs the British field commanders had instead waited a week or two for the tanks to be all repaired before sending them out. Lets say by this point that forty to forty five are operational and all of them are committed to the attack.

What would the affects be? I would imagine they would be better, if we follow the logic that more means better. In which case forty five is far superior to thirty two. But could the British, given a few extra tanks and some more time to work out a strategy, achieve the hoped for breakthrough of the German lines? Perhaps bringing in more tanks for further pushes into Germany proper? Or is this all outlandish and borderline ASB?

I don't believe the British Army could logistically support a breakthrough in 1916, no matter how many tanks they have or what condition they're in. The supply network can't do it, the army can't move fast enough, they haven't mastered pre-registered counter-battery fire, and so on.
 
I don't believe the British Army could logistically support a breakthrough in 1916, no matter how many tanks they have or what condition they're in. The supply network can't do it, the army can't move fast enough, they haven't mastered pre-registered counter-battery fire, and so on.
But given the opportunity would they try it? I mean if the tanks did manage to break the German lines would they try a breakthrough, perhaps placing to much faith upon their new wonder weapons?
 
But given the opportunity would they try it? I mean if the tanks did manage to break the German lines would they try a breakthrough, perhaps placing to much faith upon their new wonder weapons?

If they did, then their attempts would probably stall out on secondary lines of defense before losing their progress to German counterattacks. Breaking through wasn't nearly as difficult as doing so sustainably.
 
There was a number of deficiencies in the BEFs abilities during the Somme in 1916 - Very Poor Op Sec (basically the Germans knew about virtually every op before it happened), poor Mission command (specifically the use of reserves in a timely fashion), insufficient artillery and incorrect type of artillery, poor quality ammo (60+% duds in some sectors) and many of the battalions where not yet fully trained and this against a plan that was to grand to accomplish

Perhaps if a 'multiple', limited objective bite and hold strategy had been used from the outset then certainly I can see groups of Tanks supporting attacks would have been very successful.

The problem is that the best lessons were learned by the survivors!
 
Although this isn't my province I'll hazard a guess that the best possible result (rather than the most likely one) was a mini-Cambrai.

IIRC 324 gun tanks in 9 battalions were employed at the real Cambrai plus reserves and other Mk I, II, II and IV tanks converted into supply, radio and recovery tanks. The force you propose is about one-seventh of the force employed at Cambrai so a temporary breakthrough one-seventh the scale of Cambrai might be possible.

IIRC the original establishment of the Machine Gun Corps (Heavy Section) was 6 companies of 24 tanks each = 144 tanks for which 100 Mk I, 25 Mk II and 25 Mk III tanks were ordered and AFAIK all were delivered in 1916. That is the equivalent of 4 Tank Corps battalions at their Cambrai establishment. Therefore if the Top Brass had waited until all 150 tanks had been delivered to the front and put in working order then a short-term victory on 4/9 the scale of Cambrai might have been possible.

IIRC another problem with the first tank action was that the men on the spot ignored the advice that Colonel Elles (IIRC) gave in a paper he wrote about the employment of tanks and followed their own ideas, which later experience proved to be inferior to what Elles had suggested.

I doubt that there would have been a significant effect on the result of the Battle of the Somme. However, if the generals had waited until all the tanks had reached the front, put them all in working order and then employed all 150 in one attack using the methods Elles had suggested then it would have given Haig and London a better idea of what tanks could do if used properly. That might have been sufficient for 4,000 tanks to be produced in 1917 as IIRC was originally proposed instead of it being cut back to 1,350 tanks. Then it would have been possible to employ 972 tanks in 27 Tank Corps battalions at Cambrai plus a trebled reserve of gun tanks and 3 times as many supply, radio and gun carrier tanks. Tank production in 1918 would also have been trebled so that the German offensives of 1918 might not have got so far and the BEF might have advanced further during the Hundred Days.

However, to produce 3 times as many tanks in 1917 and 1918 British industry would have had to produce less of something else.
 
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What would the affects be? I would imagine they would be better, if we follow the logic that more means better. In which case forty five is far superior to thirty two. But could the British, given a few extra tanks and some more time to work out a strategy, achieve the hoped for breakthrough of the German lines? Perhaps bringing in more tanks for further pushes into Germany proper? Or is this all outlandish and borderline ASB?
As others have written a few more thanks won't make any difference at the operational or strategic levels. However, if you could find a plausible way for the Government to have more tanks to be built in 1916 (say 450 gun tanks and 50 gun carrier tanks instead of the OTL 150 gun tanks only) and don't use them until they all arrive at the front and put in working order then you might get a tank battle on the scale of Cambrai in 1916. In 1916 there was still enough unused manufacturing capacity to build more tanks without reducing production elsewhere to compensate.

But like the OTL Cambrai you won't be able to exploit it.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
insufficient artillery and incorrect type of artillery, poor quality ammo (60+% duds in some sectors) and many of the battalions where not yet fully trained and this against a plan that was to grand to accomplish
Well, Britain still face the problem of insufficient HE shells for artillery due to technical deficiencies in its industry, which made production could not meet demand both in term of quantity and quality.
 
First to the the Counts question. The problem with all tanks in WW1 was reliability losing a third before battle was to be expected of a new weapon, hurried into production using still new technologies like the internal combustion engine. Therefore to wait until all the tanks could be fixed would require leaving the tanks at the front so surprise would be lost. If they tried to pull them back then more would breakdown both on the retreat and then on the subsequent redeployment. It is possible to get more out of the runner at the Somme. Listening to the tankers would be a start and then coming up with a basic doctorine for the use of tanks would be a close second (OTL some where ordered to advance into a wood!). Some joint training would also have been very beneficial. If however if the Bristish has been able to start the battle on 15 September with 45 tanks then perhaps more ground would have been taken for the same or a small reduction in the cost of lives suffered OTL. A breakthrough at any point in the war was highly unlikely. The tanks where horrendous to operate for their crews to the extent that a few hours within would leave them needing days to recover. This meant that a significant reserve of tanks at least 50% of the force would be needed just to keep the armour in action for a second day let alone the week or two that was required for an armoured breakthrough to succeed in WW2.

Could more tanks have been made available? In my opinion yes. There was a lot of delays and periods of relative inactivity during the early design stages of the tank in 1915. Reducing some of these would either mean more tanks could have been produced by September or tantalisingly for the first day of the battle of the Somme. Alternately the time could have been spent on designing improvements like suspension and a separate engine compartment that would have improved reliability and combat effectiveness.
 
If it's of any interest this is a summary of tank deliveries that I took from Appendix VI of the History of the Ministry of Munitions:

1916 - 150 - all Mk I
1917 - 1,100 - 50 Mk II, 50 Mk III, 910 Mk IV, 55 Medium Mk A and 45 Gun Carrier Mk I tanks
1918 - 1,359 - 105 Mk IV, 1,033 Mk V, one Mk VIII, 25 Mk IX, 155 Medium Mk A, 45 Medium Mk B and 5 Gun Carrier Tanks Mk I. These are the totals delivered to 31.12.18.

Total - 2,619 - 150 Mk I, 50 Mk II, 50 Mk III, 1,015 Mk IV, 1,033 Mk V, one Mk VIII, 25 Mk IX, 200 Medium Mk A, 45 Medium Mk B and 50 Gun Carrier Tanks Mk I.

The table did not include the 205 Mk IV tanks that were converted to Supply Tanks. However, most other sources I have read say that 1,004 Mk V were built. They say 579 Mk V* were built but the official history says that 632 were built.
 
Perhaps use of what tanks were available coupled with a more realistic objective - that of drawing away German forces from Verdun to relieve French forces rather than a knock out blow, all the way to Berlin, war will be over by Christmas and medals all round type objective which was totally unrealistic - as I suggested earlier 'Multiple Limited Objectives' then multiple small successes might have been achieved - with each corps making a Division size 'bite' each day - supported by some tanks.

How this might have been perceived and acted on by the Germans - with their counter attack methodology?
 
Well, Britain still face the problem of insufficient HE shells for artillery due to technical deficiencies in its industry, which made production could not meet demand both in term of quantity and quality.

What you have to appreciate is that the British army in 1914 was geared up for a war of manoeuvre with a relatively small well trained army and its guns were designed to be highly mobile and fire shrapnel shells (against manoeuvring Infantry, Cavalry and gun batteries in the open) and therefore the munitions industry as it was had been geared up to supply such ammunition in the quantities expected.

What actually happened was post the race to the sea (where such weapons were great) all sides went very rapidly to trench warfare and such mobile shrapnel shell 'quick firing' weapons were no longer suitable and the expenditure of ammunition at such quantities was unforeseen.

In addition by mid 1916 the British Army had stood up a continental army and had grown exponentially - including the number of guns etc

Lloyd George post the Shell crisis in May 1915 when it was fully realised that HE shells were required at a much higher number than previously expected - managed, as the newly minted Minister for Munitions, to create a massive munitions industry in the space of a Year (it was his leadership in this aspect that got him moved into No10 in 1916) and during the first year of operation these factories improved both their Quality and quantity of shells - although achieving this did give us that awful sentence "Last orders at the bar please" as licenced hours were introduced to prevent inebriated munitions workers (Often young impressionable working class women suddenly away from home often for the first time in their lives and possessed of a working wage) from blowing themselves and their colleagues up the following day (or indeed before such licencing was introduced - later on that same morning).
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
What would the public reaction be when it learned that Haig has a "war-winning weapon" available for use in September's attacks but did not use them?

There would also be the question of security - more men learning of the presence of tanks and training with them over another couple of weeks increases the possibility of leaks.

Probably Haig's decision to use the tanks at Flers was the least-worse option.
 
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