WI: In 1942, General Gott Had NOT Died & Had Taken Command of the 8th Army?

Dave Shoup

Banned
If Infantry was so superfluous, one wonders why the Brits, S.Africans, guys fron NZ and Oz, the Free French and the German and Italians just didn't send all back home and fight just with Armor. Would have been a lot easier on logistics, right?

Much less the Indians and Gurkhas...
 
If Infantry was so superfluous, one wonders why the Brits, S.Africans, guys fron NZ and Oz, the Free French and the German and Italians just didn't send all back home and fight just with Armor. Would have been a lot easier on logistics, right?

How much did infantry contribute to the outcome of, say, Gazala or Crusader?

Lorried infantry was of course useful; infantry without transport was often seen as a liability in the desert.
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
How much did infantry contribute to the outcome of, say, Gazala or Crusader?

Gazala - the Free French brigade, and the British 50th and South African 1st chewed up a fair amount of German and Italian infantry, obviously. The Axis infantry, for their part, forced the surrender of Tobruk, which removed the South African 2nd Division from the Allied order of battle, which was pretty significant. Klopper's force was the last division-sized Allied force to surrender to the Axis in the west.

CRUSADER - The 70th Division (plus the Polish Brigade and the 32nd Tank Brigade) held Tobruk, which was kind of the point. The Axis infantry, for their part, were too weak to force the surrender of Tobruk, which was also kind of the point.

The motorized infantry on all sides, when it was used intelligently and in mutual support with field and anti-tank artillery, was quite effective in rough terrain and in channelizing the mobile forces movement.
 
Gazala - the Free French brigade, and the British 50th and South African 1st chewed up a fair amount of German and Italian infantry, obviously. The Axis infantry, for their part, forced the surrender of Tobruk, which removed the South African 2nd Division from the Allied order of battle, which was pretty significant. Klopper's force was the last division-sized Allied force to surrender to the Axis in the west.

Not a decisive effect on the battle, and IIRC the assault on Tobruk was spearheaded by German tanks. The German failure the previous year to take Tobruk is I think the only example of infantry fighting off an armoured assault at close quarters.

The motorized infantry on all sides, when it was used intelligently and in mutual support with field and anti-tank artillery, was quite effective in rough terrain and in channelizing the mobile forces movement.

True, but they could not act independently - they needed the support (or threat of support) by their own armoured forces.
 
To all (^^^) interested, I linked to that video on "CRUSADER", for a reason.

Here it is again.


Lessons learned and summary.

1. The defense around Tobruk was terrain based and built around infantry.
2. Halfaya Pass was terrain based and built around infantry.
3. The most successful "British" formations (And apparently misused, as in frittered.), were combined arms raid units called "Jock columns" which were built around, wait for it... "motorized infantry".
 
Fighter airfields were often just patches of desert - the RAF at times operated airfields behind the German front lines.

And lost them to German and Italian infantry.

Fighter pilots make headlines; bomber pilots make history. ;)

How many airbois will be annoyed? A few. It is only my opinion. YMMV and it should.

Big Week counter-argument. "Hey Bomber guys! You know you are staked 'flying bait', right?" IOW... the bomber guys made history while the fighter "glamour boys" went about the dirty business of killing the Luftwaffe pilot corps so that the bombers could finally get through. In the western desert, context, the British needed fighter cover to deny German aerial reconnaissance and protect their own movements from German and Italian bomber attacks. It is too early for fighter bombers with all that close air support jazz, and besides the RAF (As it will show in Singapore a bit later... ) is kind of completely TACAIR incompetent; a trait the USAAF will also demonstrate it shares with the RAF throughout much of the war. (Different topic, but both gentlemen's flying clubs contained inept commanders {Leigh Mallory, Popham, Pulford, Harris, Brereton, Brett, Bissell, all of them should have served jail time, especially Popham, Pulford, Bissell and Brereton} better suited for cleaning latrines than leading critical air campaigns.).
 

formion

Banned
I have one question to the more knowledgeable of the Middle East theater: Why was the 4th Indian taken from the Western Desert to be sent to Sudan? It doesn't make sense to me.

In Sudan, the Sudan Defence Force had 3 British battalions and was reinforced by the 5th Indian division. In the South they had the 1st South African, 11th and 12th African divisions. It would be ASB to think that the Italians with what they had could capture Aden or even Port Sudan. If they advanced lets say 100 more miles in the interior of Sudan, it would not have matter at all. I understand that Massawa with its submarines and destroyers posed a bit of danger to the Read Sea life-line, but even so, its strategic value was far less that Tobruk or even Crete.

By sending the blooded 4th division (comprised by regulars and well-trained compared to other Indian formations during 1941-1943) and have a 2 week break of the advance, the chance was lost to actually fortify Cyrenaica and rest. In any case, I don't think it was plausible to capture Tripoli during Compass or in its afternath, even without sending the ANZACs to Greece. It all comes down to logistics. The distance to Tripoli is great and there is the possibility to suffer an even greater defeat than OTL in Sirte of Misurata instead of Cyrenaica.

Moreover, the British command failed to interdict the sea-lines after Taranto, fortify Crete and further reinforce Malta. There was a precious window of opportunity and it was not utilized. For example, only on the 21st of April the Mediterranean fleet bombarded (without much effect) Tripoli's port. Perhaps an earlier and more accurate bombardment would cause further delays in the arrival of the DAK. In Crete, the British after almost 6 months of presence, they had only to produce two hald-prepared landing strips and the placement of a handful of coastal guns. Lastly, to have a few Hudsons, Baltimores and another Stringbag squadron in Malta could have been a priority after Taranto instead of Q4 1941.

There was a chance to stop Rommel's attack in El Agheila or Benghazi. 2 or 3 extra weeks may have given some breathing space. I think it is quite possible to gain even a month of respite.
 
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  • Midway.
  • STRANGLE.
  • The Transportation Plan.
  • The Oil Plan.
  • MEETINGHOUSE and the follow on incendiary raids.
  • 20th AF's aerial minelaying campaign against the Home Islands.
  • Midway.> (B-26 Marauders came closest but bad advice negated their efforts so yeah USAAF boloed. That was a USN TACAIR show.)
  • STRANGLE. > (LTG Carl Spaatz and LTG John K. Cannon are not exactly incompetent. Neither was GEN Jimmy Doolittle, arguably one of the 3 greatest flyers and air tacticians alive at the time. See them again under the Transportation Plan.)
  • The Transportation Plan. > (Eisenhower. Give him the credit that he deserves. Refer to STRANGLE for some of the other guys.)
  • The Oil Plan. > (Brereton screwed up the initial strikes, Doolittle, Spaatz and Cannon did better. Harris and the RAF were "marginal")
  • MEETINGHOUSE and the follow on incendiary raids. > (LeMay the Mad Bomber, one of the other greatest living air tacticians of the day. Tokyo was razed.)
  • 20th AF's aerial minelaying campaign against the Home Islands. > (Same again. Japan starved.)
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
  • Midway.> (B-26 Marauders came closest but bad advice negated their efforts so yeah USAAF boloed. That was a USN TACAIR show.)
  • STRANGLE. > (LTG Carl Spaatz and LTG John K. Cannon are not exactly incompetent. Neither was GEN Jimmy Doolittle, arguably one of the 3 greatest flyers and air tacticians alive at the time. See them again under the Transportation Plan.)
  • The Transportation Plan. > (Eisenhower. Give him the credit that he deserves. Refer to STRANGLE for some of the other guys.)
  • The Oil Plan. > (Brereton screwed up the initial strikes, Doolittle, Spaatz and Cannon did better. Harris and the RAF were "marginal")
  • MEETINGHOUSE and the follow on incendiary raids. > (LeMay the Mad Bomber, one of the other greatest living air tacticians of the day. Tokyo was razed.)
  • 20th AF's aerial minelaying campaign against the Home Islands. > (Same again. Japan starved.)

Midway - An SBD is a bomber. Point remains.

All the rest - we are in agreement. Bomber pilots make history; fighter pilots make headlines.
 
I have one question to the more knowledgeable of the Middle East theater: Why was the 4th Indian taken from the Western Desert to be sent to Sudan? It doesn't make sense to me.

In Sudan, the Sudan Defence Force had 3 British battalions and was reinforced by the 5th Indian division. In the South they had the 1st South African, 11th and 12th African divisions. It would be ASB to think that the Italians with what they had could capture Aden or even Port Sudan. If they advanced lets say 100 more miles in the interior of Sudan, it would not have matter at all. I understand that Massawa with its submarines and destroyers posed a bit of danger to the Read Sea life-line, but even so, its strategic value was far less that Tobruk or even Crete.

By sending the blooded 4th division (comprised by regulars and well-trained compared to other Indian formations during 1941-1943) and have a 2 week break of the advance, the chance was lost to actually fortify Cyrenaica and rest. In any case, I don't think it was plausible to capture Tripoli during Compass or in its afternath, even without sending the ANZACs to Greece. It all comes down to logistics. The distance to Tripoli is great and there is the possibility to suffer an even greater defeat than OTL in Sirte of Misurata instead of Cyrenaica.

Moreover, the British command failed to interdict the sea-lines after Taranto, fortify Crete and further reinforce Malta. There was a precious window of opportunity and it was not utilized. For example, only on the 21st of April the Mediterranean fleet bombarded (without much effect) Tripoli's port. Perhaps an earlier and more accurate bombardment would cause further delays in the arrival of the DAK. In Crete, the British after almost 6 months of presence, they had only to produce two hald-prepared landing strips and the placement of a handful of coastal guns. Lastly, to have a few Hudsons, Baltimores and another Stringbag squadron in Malta could have been a priority after Taranto instead of Q4 1941.

There was a chance to stand Rommel's attack in El Agheila or Benghazi. 2 or 3 extra weeks may have given some breathing space. I think it is quite possible to gain even a month of respite.

My stuff is naval and it is the Pacific, but from what I have learned so far, I can suggest the following.

1. There were a lot of armed Italians and colonial askaris in the AOI (Italian East Africa); about 300,000 of them. I think the Anglo-South Africans were outnumbered about 4-1 at least.
2. At least 1 veteran motorized formation who knew what they were doing would be necessary in the Sudan (north). The SA troopers were extremely good (south), but most of them were "amateurs" and they had to cross Ethiopia.
3. Sudan is on the way to Ethiopia, and the British were correct to be worried. Far too few troops and an extremely HOSTILE anti-British populace Note that the British had to put down several rebellions and they lost a whole army (Gordon 1885) in the Sudan less than 55 years earlier. It was also not certain the Italians could march up the Nile and make trouble.
4. Compass was an exploitation of a raid. Whether Tripoli was possible, I give it a 45% chance. Well worth the risk for the strategic dividends to be gained.
5. Surt as a fallback was possible to hold. Rommel at that stage was reckless and knew nothing about the desert. He could have been bagged as he was almost during Crusader and that op was just as bungled as anything O'Connor was likely to [not] screw up as Cunningham and Gort actually did during Crusader.
6.
the British command failed to interdict the sea-lines after Taranto, fortify Crete and further reinforce Malta.

(^^^) That warms the sea-power cockles of my heart. You know the RN was absolutely great at doing almost everything at what it did well and does, but those guys sure have major WW II issues and horrendous mistakes that British WW II historians gloss over. Technical stuff like air defense, aircraft carrier operations, early ASW and so forth is either misrepresented or distorted, but the thing that really hurts a factored balanced view of the RN is its failure to support the British desert army by being the sea guard, it should have been.

I also cringe when I see the accounts of the risks the USS Wasp ran in the Mediterranean to ferry planes and cover shipping to Malta, only to note the Spitfires she ferried are destroyed on the ground as they land at Malta or all those freighters get sunk. This not only happened with Wasp but many a British flattop risked her all and saw similar efforts go to naught because the Malta air and sea defense was not up to snuff.

One more reason to try for Tripoli. Or at least MINE the port!
 

formion

Banned
4. Compass was an exploitation of a raid. Whether Tripoli was possible, I give it a 45% chance. Well worth the risk for the strategic dividends to be gained.

Well, after Alamein, the 8th Army, after years of experience with desert logistics and significantly more assets, was able to utilize only the 7th Armored, 2 Infantry divisions and 1 Armor brigade for the advance from Agheila to Tripoli. The ports between Benghazi and Tripoli were at best fishing villages with no remarkable port capacity. To supply by sea for a swift campaign you would need LSTs landing on beaches. If we are being extremely generous, the Western Desert Force may used all its truck capacity to send a reinforced division in February-April. Can this division deal with 5 Italian ones plus whatever german units are formed? Personally I doubt because the closer they get to Tripoli the worse their supply would be.

I consider even a succesful defence in El Agheila difficult without a small breathing space, due to its distance from Benghazi. Even with the 2 ANZAC divisions and the Armored Brigade not in Greece, there is no chance that they would be entrenched in El Agheila in the crucial period in question. When fester in his timeline had the COmmonwealth hold the line closer to Benghazi rather than El Agheila, I found it quite plausible considering the logistics of spring 1941.

https://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/capacity-of-tripoli-and-benghazi-harbours-1941/ Here is a link regarding the port capacity of Tripoli and Benghazi.

1. There were a lot of armed Italians and colonial askaris in the AOI (Italian East Africa); about 300,000 of them. I think the Anglo-South Africans were outnumbered about 4-1 at least.
3. Sudan is on the way to Ethiopia, and the British were correct to be worried. Far too few troops and an extremely HOSTILE anti-British populace Note that the British had to put down several rebellions and they lost a whole army (Gordon 1885) in the Sudan less than 55 years earlier. It was also not certain the Italians could march up the Nile and make trouble.

Perhaps its the fears from the old disaster that moved the policy makers. However, regardless the number of Italians (basically 2 regular 6-battalion Italian divisions and the rest Colonials regarding the major formations), the British were masters in colonial warfare and its challenges. In OTL they were sceptical about their capacity to fight the Russians in the North-Western Territory of the Raj due not only number of troops but also logistics. They also had a great experience of fighting von Lettow-Vorbeck during WW1. I find it difficult to have them thinking that the Italian who have to garrison a recently conquered restive country, would be able to throw a major attack. After all they know the terrain and the infrastructure.

However, policy making is based in many cases in irrational fears and projections. In truth the 8 italian submarines in Massawa were the most significant asset of Italy in the theater. Gideon Force and Selassie can throw a wrench in any Italian plans. A cheap replacement for the 4th Indian division could have been 1 or 2 green Indian Brigades to act as garrison troops in Sudan before they can be either replaced or trained enough to be sent in an offensive.

One more reason to try for Tripoli. Or at least MINE the port!

With the means of late 1940-early 1941 that would have been difficult. The Italians a fair number of light ships if I remeber correctly to sweep minefields in Tripoli and plant counter minefields. At the same time the light ships of the RN protected the sea lines to Greece, Cyprus, Haifa and Malta. The only viable surface solution is a raid as the one ABC did on April 21st. However it had to be earlier and with greater accuracy. The raid as it was was daring because the sea was full of italian minefields.
 
Well, after Alamein, the 8th Army, after years of experience with desert logistics and significantly more assets, was able to utilize only the 7th Armored, 2 Infantry divisions and 1 Armor brigade for the advance from Agheila to Tripoli. The ports between Benghazi and Tripoli were at best fishing villages with no remarkable port capacity. To supply by sea for a swift campaign you would need LSTs landing on beaches. If we are being extremely generous, the Western Desert Force may used all its truck capacity to send a reinforced division in February-April. Can this division deal with 5 Italian ones plus whatever german units are formed? Personally I doubt because the closer they get to Tripoli the worse their supply would be.

I will get to this one in a moment. But it is worth noting that if Benghazi is 1,000 tonnes a day, then the depot head (port) can support 1 division day movement forward.

I consider even a succesful defence in El Agheila difficult without a small breathing space, due to its distance from Benghazi. Even with the 2 ANZAC divisions and the Armored Brigade not in Greece, there is no chance that they would be entrenched in El Agheila in the crucial period in question. When fester in his timeline had the COmmonwealth hold the line closer to Benghazi rather than El Agheila, I found it quite plausible considering the logistics of spring 1941.

https://rommelsriposte.com/2011/06/01/capacity-of-tripoli-and-benghazi-harbours-1941/ Here is a link regarding the port capacity of Tripoli and Benghazi.

You might be correct. There has to be a workaround that involves over the beach supply. There is no other way. LSTs could move about 1,000 tonnes of dry-weight.

From your citation.

Constraints in getting additional supplies across the Med were multi-faceted, and direct port capacity was only one aspect, as the conference minute from 12 September 1941 makes clear. Even before the heavy losses of merchant vessels in the last quarter of 1941, there was a shortage of shipping space and convoy escorts for the North Africa route. At the Italian end, capacity of the railways made it difficult to load ships up to ideal weights. The sending across of motor vehicles led to ships ‘cubing out’ before they ‘weighed out’ – i.e. the trucks took up a lot of space compared to their weight, meaning that they restricted overall load. In assembling the convoys, restrictions in number of berthing space at the Libyan end had to be taken into account, limiting the number of ships, but then ships were sunk, leaving capacity in the receiving harbour idle. In those harbours, trucks were missing to handle transport of goods from the quays, Benghazi and probably Tripoli were missing storage, and there were not enough lighters and barges. RAF attacks restricted capacity further, both in Benghazi and Tripoli, with part of Benghazi blocked due to ships sunk in harbour. But this is all related actual capacity, rather than real capacity.

You might ask, why not LOAD the trucks before loading the trucks into the ships? Anyway, an American logistician would make inquiry about tonne loads per kilometer along that nice hard surface Italian coastal road? You are looking at about 250 trucks (1000 tonnes for a 2 division corps so 500 trucks total) per British division and about 20,000 liters POL per kilometer for that huge [500] truck convoy.

Not easy. But doable roundtrip not to exceed 2000 km.

Sudan.

Perhaps its the fears from the old disaster that moved the policy makers. However, regardless the number of Italians (basically 2 regular 6-battalion Italian divisions and the rest Colonials regarding the major formations), the British were masters in colonial warfare and its challenges. In OTL they were skeptical about their capacity to fight the Russians in the North-Western Territory of the Raj due not only number of troops but also logistics. They also had a great experience of fighting von Lettow-Vorbeck during WW1. I find it difficult to have them thinking that the Italian who have to garrison a recently conquered restive country, would be able to throw a major attack. After all they know the terrain and the infrastructure.

Well, they should have. But as I have noted in my commentary about India, Burma and Singapore and what a MESS the British made of things in those areas, to such an extent that the absolute catastrophes they engendered had to be redeemed by the Americans with much blood and treasure, one cannot assume that a colonial master knows the subjugated people or the terrain or the local politics. Come to think of it, I came to the same exact conclusions about the Americans who screwed up postwar far worse than the British in those same regions. I am satisfied that if Wavell thought he needed the 4th India in the Sudan, he probably had good reasons.
However, policy making is based in many cases in irrational fears and projections. In truth the 8 italian submarines in Massawa were the most significant asset of Italy in the theater. Gideon Force and Selassie can throw a wrench in any Italian plans. A cheap replacement for the 4th Indian division could have been 1 or 2 green Indian Brigades to act as garrison troops in Sudan before they can be either replaced or trained enough to be sent in an offensive.

I agree with that assessment. Where were they going to go without fuel?

With the means of late 1940-early 1941 that would have been difficult. The Italians a fair number of light ships if I remeber correctly to sweep minefields in Tripoli and plant counter minefields. At the same time the light ships of the RN protected the sea lines to Greece, Cyprus, Haifa and Malta. The only viable surface solution is a raid as the one ABC did on April 21st. However it had to be earlier and with greater accuracy. The raid as it was was daring because the sea was full of italian minefields.

Well... I would have sent bombers and air dropped mines, like the Germans were doing, but that might have been one of those things the British overlooked. Or use subs, which the Americans did against Japan to mine IJN anchorages, but that is just me kriegspieling (German war gaming) available options.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
However, policy making is based in many cases in irrational fears and projections. In truth the 8 italian submarines in Massawa were the most significant asset of Italy in the theater. Gideon Force and Selassie can throw a wrench in any Italian plans. A cheap replacement for the 4th Indian division could have been 1 or 2 green Indian Brigades to act as garrison troops in Sudan before they can be either replaced or trained enough to be sent in an offensive.

The British 1st Cavalry Division or the 2nd New Zealand Division, both of which were - for the most part - in Palestine at the time of the East African Campaign would have been obvious choices, and allowed the 4th Indian Division to stay in the Western Desert.
 
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formion

Banned
Well... I would have sent bombers and air dropped mines, like the Germans were doing, but that might have been one of those things the British overlooked. Or use subs, which the Americans did against Japan to mine IJN anchorages, but that is just me kriegspieling (German war gaming) available options.

Both the RAF and the RN were up to the task. The problem was that too few Wellingtons and submarines were available. Malta and British Strategic Policy, 1925-43 mentions that there was a plan in late 1940-1941 to use the Wellingtons in transit from UK to Egypt. They hoped to have 24 planes at all times. Malta rarely reached this number of available bombers. If I remember correctly usually they wouldn't be more than a dozen. This dozen had to mine Sicilian and Italian ports and attack enemy airfields. One attack in Tripoli destroyed 29 planes.

At the same time, in the first year of the italian entry, the RN experienced staggering losses in submarines by a RM who was far better in ASW than the IJN. In that case also were too few submarines to patrol both West and Eastern Med. Especially after the greek collapse, the british subs had to additionally operate in the Aegean with a string of Luftwaffe bases around. A number of submarines was also used in missions such as delivery of SOE agents and retrieving personnel from the continent. At the same time a number of submarines had to stay in Norwegian waters were they had a fair number of successes against the german communication lines.

Since the assets were not available, they should have pushed more convoys to Malta and Crete. In Malta the plan to transform it in an offensive base was to:
a) Install the full compliment of AA guns
b) Have enough ground support for air operations
c) Increase the number of fighters
d) Increase the number of reconnaissance planes (mostly Baltimores)
e) Only then build a proper bomber force.

There was a window of opportunity before January 1941 to accelerate the afforementioned development.
 
the RN experienced staggering losses in submarines by a RM who was far better in ASW than the IJN. In that case also were too few submarines to patrol both West and Eastern Med. Especially after the greek collapse, the british subs had to additionally operate in the Aegean with a string of Luftwaffe bases around. A number of submarines was also used in missions such as delivery of SOE agents and retrieving personnel from the continent. At the same time a number of submarines had to stay in Norwegian waters were they had a fair number of successes against the german communication lines.

You would be surprised at the blowback I receive when I write that the Italians (RM) were probably better at ASW than anyone, except maybe the Anglo-Canadians in 1940. I would not want to shave with the difference. Of course the Mediterranean Sea is a horrible submarine environment like the coastal seas off East Asia, with shallows; easy ASW aerial patrol interlocks from shore based air forces and a clarity of water that allows fliers to see shallow dived boats and good listening for noisy boats. I would say Japanese ASW 1944 was about on a per with the Italians in 1940, good, but not as good as Allied submarine operations evolved toward by that same 1944 era.

Anyway.

a) Install the full compliment of AA guns
b) Have enough ground support for air operations
c) Increase the number of fighters
d) Increase the number of reconnaissance planes (mostly Baltimores)
e) Only then build a proper bomber force.

Med1.png


The circles are what each side has. The triangles are what each side wants. Since nobody could read a map apparently, it might not be obvious that Malta is the nexus of decision? Operation Merkur hit the wrong target. Let the British have Crete, (For the moment; for they cannot stay there.). As a corollary, that long march from Alexandria to Naples has to be seaborne and supported. There is no other way to do it. And that march has to be made, for if the British lose the Mediterranean (See the airpower fix they are geographically in?), the Allies lose the war. Hitler's armies don't even have to get further than Egypt. Cutting the canal is enough.
 
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