WI: In 1942, General Gott Had NOT Died & Had Taken Command of the 8th Army?

Dave Shoup

Banned
Hmm. That sure does not sound like XX Corps or the DAK at all. OTOH a Matilda II was a very tough machine. Italian 4.7 cm AT guns would have been useless.

BREVITY was a raid, and nothing more, given the available forces. Even the British mobile forces for BATTLEAXE, which occurred in June, 1941, and was delayed to allow the 7th Armoured to reequip with the 200+ medium tanks shipped through the Med during Operation TIGER in May, amounted to four armoured battalions, two equipped with Matilda IIs, one with a mix of Cruisers, and one with Crusaders, for a grand total of four. These were split into two brigades (4th Armoured, with Matildas, and 7th Armoured, with the other two battalions of mediums). The rest of the British forces amounted to the 4th Indian Division (headquarters and division troops) but with only two infantry brigades, one Indian and one British. Given the reality of the sea-beach-narrow coastal plain-escarpment-high desert, neither operation (BREVITY/BATTLEAXE) was exactly "good tank country" and in both cases, the British were on the offensive against dug-in Axis infantry and artillery, in constricted terrain. The Axis forces, moreover, almost always had more or at lest comparable numbers of armor and mobile troops.

Bottom line, the British were always outnumbered or underequipped in Egypt and Libya for almost all of 1940-41, and they never even got an army-sized force into the field until CRUSADER, in November-December, 1941, at which point Auchinleck - who finally had four (1st Tank, 4th, 7th, and 22nd armoured) reasonably well-equipped armored/mobile brigades, and three infantry division equivalents - managed a victory on the offensive, which seems a clear indicator that absent an equivalently-sized force, any attempt at an offensive in the desert was pretty questionable. O'Connor managed it in 1940 with only three mobile brigades and an infantry division equivalent, but that was against the Italians. Expecting Neame or Beresford-Pierce to do the same with a couple of brigades of mobile troops and an infantry division equivalent (or less) seems pretty unrealistic.
 
BREVITY was a raid, and nothing more, given the available forces. Even the British mobile forces for BATTLEAXE, which occurred in June, 1941, and was delayed to allow the 7th Armoured to reequip with the 200+ medium tanks shipped through the Med during Operation TIGER in May, amounted to four armoured battalions, two equipped with Matilda IIs, one with a mix of Cruisers, and one with Crusaders, for a grand total of four. These were split into two brigades (4th Armoured, with Matildas, and 7th Armoured, with the other two battalions of mediums). The rest of the British forces amounted to the 4th Indian Division (headquarters and division troops) but with only two infantry brigades, one Indian and one British. Given the reality of the sea-beach-narrow coastal plain-escarpment-high desert, neither operation (BREVITY/BATTLEAXE) was exactly "good tank country" and in both cases, the British were on the offensive against dug-in Axis infantry and artillery, in constricted terrain. The Axis forces, moreover, almost always had more or at lest comparable numbers of armor and mobile troops.

Bottom line, the British were always outnumbered or underequipped in Egypt and Libya for almost all of 1940-41, and they never even got an army-sized force into the field until CRUSADER, in November-December, 1941, at which point Auchinleck - who finally had four (1st Tank, 4th, 7th, and 22nd armoured) reasonably well-equipped armored/mobile brigades, and three infantry division equivalents - managed a victory on the offensive, which seems a clear indicator that absent an equivalently-sized force, any attempt at an offensive in the desert was pretty questionable. O'Connor managed it in 1940 with only three mobile brigades and an infantry division equivalent, but that was against the Italians. Expecting Neame or Beresford-Pierce to do the same with a couple of brigades of mobile troops and an infantry division equivalent (or less) seems pretty unrealistic.

Hmm. That plethora of British weapons used during Battleaxe has always bothered me. It always struck me, that the British hobbled themselves in the early war in the land arm by botching two key areas of the military art, logistics and training.

By logistics I mean they failed to keep their tech simple to use, simple to repair and effective to the need and in sufficient quantity to meet attrition. Take the Cruiser Mark VI and the 25 pounder gun (8.8cm/28) The Cruiser shows up for BATTLEAXE brand new from the UK (TIGER) sans many repair tools, instruction manuals, adequate spare parts and instructors for service, repair and use, and armed with the 4cm/60 with no stocks of grenade/canister or HE ammunition. What kind of army sends a tank into action like that?


With the 8.8cm/28 there was another howler. When the Italians found their 4.7cm/55 armed M-13/1940s were outclassed, what did they do?

M41-06.Tanks.jpg


HESH and a howitzer cures a lot of ills.

The reason I am also down on the 25 pounder, is that there were all those surplus 8.4cm/28 barrels laying around and that surplus ammunition... I mean if you have surplus Cruiser Is and IIs running and those barrels and ammunition post Dunkirk...

That is called expediency to take care of these fellows:

Jerry88mm.jpg


AND THESE GUYS, who are very dangerous;

c2d6ee4cdbab44d04a61ed0467e0c5a1.jpg


and these guys, who are also very dangerous.

e41aceaf83900b1ac7c440f1e4a5248c.jpg


IOW, why is it that the British, who should have known from their experimental armored brigade in 1928-1931, never realized that the tank spends most of it time fighting infantry who are trying to kill it?
 
The reason I am also down on the 25 pounder, is that there were all those surplus 8.4cm/28 barrels laying around and that surplus ammunition... I mean if you have surplus Cruiser Is and IIs running and those barrels and ammunition post Dunkirk...
And all those 18pdr too.
It's still a 1000 pound gun that could have been moved around on a tracked box
BirchGun.jpg

Or open topped, as they did in 1928
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Hmm. That plethora of British weapons used during Battleaxe has always bothered me. It always struck me, that the British hobbled themselves in the early war in the land arm by botching two key areas of the military art, logistics and training.

By logistics I mean they failed to keep their tech simple to use, simple to repair and effective to the need and in sufficient quantity to meet attrition. Take the Cruiser Mark VI and the 25 pounder gun (8.8cm/28) The Cruiser shows up for BATTLEAXE brand new from the UK (TIGER) sans many repair tools, instruction manuals, adequate spare parts and instructors for service, repair and use, and armed with the 4cm/60 with no stocks of grenade/canister or HE ammunition. What kind of army sends a tank into action like that?

IOW, why is it that the British, who should have known from their experimental armored brigade in 1928-1931, never realized that the tank spends most of it time fighting infantry who are trying to kill it?

It's a fair question, but the obvious answer is an army serving a democracy where the official government policy for most of the 1920s and 1930s was that war was at least a decade way; until it wasn't.

That being said, it emphasizes the point that the British/Imperial forces in Africa and Southwest Asia actually did pretty well, all things considered, in 1940-41, given what they had to work with, except when directed past the realms of military reality by London - as they were in Greece.

Given the above, it seems that in ether the Wavell era, or the Auchinleck era, a little more realization of reality and a little less "total pigheadness unwillingness to look facts in the face" spirit might have done wonders.

 
armed with the 4cm/60 with no stocks of grenade/canister or HE ammunition. What kind of army sends a tank into action like that?

Most nations, as you can't get a useful amount of HE into an early war gun. The US 37mm had 39g of TNT, equivalent to a grenade.

IOW, why is it that the British, who should have known from their experimental armored brigade in 1928-1931, never realized that the tank spends most of it time fighting infantry who are trying to kill it?

Not in North Africa where, apart from fortified ports, infantry units could be bypassed.
 
a clear indicator that absent an equivalently-sized force, any attempt at an offensive in the desert was pretty questionable. O'Connor managed it in 1940 with only three mobile brigades and an infantry division equivalent, but that was against the Italians. Expecting Neame or Beresford-Pierce to do the same with a couple of brigades of mobile troops and an infantry division equivalent (or less) seems pretty unrealistic.

Absolutely; once either side was seriously inferior in operational tanks, they had to withdraw back to good defensive positions.
 
IOW, why is it that the British, who should have known from their experimental armored brigade in 1928-1931, never realized that the tank spends most of it time fighting infantry who are trying to kill it?

Wasn't that why they put a 3in howitzer in some tanks as a close support variant?
 
Most nations, as you can't get a useful amount of HE into an early war gun. The US 37mm had 39g of TNT, equivalent to a grenade.

The US 3.7cm was effective killing infantry with the "grenade" and with canister.

Not in North Africa where, apart from fortified ports, infantry units could be bypassed.

In North Africa the German and Italian infantry were dangerous.

Especially as no German worth his sand, thought of anything less than combined arms.

Summary, an army that does not use its infantry to bodyguard its tanks in attack or defense will soon have neither armor, nor infantry.

Summary of the above.

As always, RTL, if you paid attention to four basic truisms of combined arms drill, the troops basic combat training, logistics and kept your situational wits about you in North Africa, then you won through to decision. No matter that I think Montgomery could never read ground or fight a map, lacked the necessary speed of decision, was less able to OODA loop as to armored warfare compared to his American and German compeers and was not good at all at the op-art level (His fumbling and delay both in Husky, Baytown {allowing the Germans to concentrate against Clark at Salerno, a costly two days for which he can never be forgiven}, and Overlord [particularly Caen], and Market Garden demonstrates all of the above.) I still think that he understood the basic truisms better than any Allied or German general in the West.

That made him possibly the best Allied general among the Anglo-Americans in Europe at the army level or below. Just don't compare him to any of the great op-art war masters like Brooke, Marshal, King, Nimitz, Vandegrift, Spruance, Fletcher, Kenney or to a really GREAT tactical op-art land warfare general like William Slim.
 
Most nations, as you can't get a useful amount of HE into an early war gun. The US 37mm had 39g of TNT, equivalent to a grenade
And a Grenade is better than using a 2pdr like a giant sniper rifle potting one German crewman at a time.
Then there is what the Soviet did with their big 45mm HE round
45mmFrag-UO-243-w.jpg
100 grams
Also had cannister like the US 37mm.

The Brits really didn't think about killing infantry fromtanks, other than with an .303 or 7.92mm Machine gun
<insert Colonel Blimp Harrumph here>
 

No, well-sited antitank guns were dangerous, infantry was potentially a liability in North Africa.

Infantry unsupported by tanks needed anti-tank ditches, mines, anti-tanks guns, supporting artillery and trenches to withstand attacks by tanks. If they held off a hasty attack by tanks, then they were at risk of having their supply being cut off and being left to bake in the desert. Alternatively the enemy could concentrate stronger forces and take their position by a combined arms assault eg 150th brigade box at Gazala, or the 3 times that Bardia was captured by the British.

Those assaults showed that the British could do combined arms; what they failed to do before El Alamein was to properly concentrate and co-ordinate their armoured brigades, leading to them being defeated in detail on multiple occasions.
 
Can I thow in an outside view?

I like the idea, & it's one I've had myself. (As someone who despises Monty, the chance to screw him over also appeals to me a lot. :) )

Don't forget, tho, the Germans were reading British tactical comm (which, IIRC, weren't encrypted). They were also reading Black, in which Bonner Fellers was sending detailed reports on British dispositions. Those changed, which helped Monty; just when, & why, I don't recall, but ISTM that bears on how successful Gott is going to be: if he doesn't get the benefit, & Monty did OTL, it doesn't matter how good Gott is.

I'm also dubious of the claim Monty made so many important changes to Eigth Army. AIUI, there were significant changes in train, made by Wavell before he was replaced, & they were reversed by Monty. (My recall may be faulty, here, however...)
An earlier end to the North African campaign comes from taking Tripoli from the west
Not solely.

It could have been closed, if not ended, months sooner, with Husky advanced as much, had the senior commanders not insisted on clearing Tunisia & instead been satisfied with bottling PAA (& giving RN's MTBs the chance they hoped for, but never got, OTL).
 
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No, well-sited antitank guns were dangerous, infantry was potentially a liability in North Africa.

Infantry unsupported by tanks needed anti-tank ditches, mines, anti-tanks guns, supporting artillery and trenches to withstand attacks by tanks. If they held off a hasty attack by tanks, then they were at risk of having their supply being cut off and being left to bake in the desert. Alternatively the enemy could concentrate stronger forces and take their position by a combined arms assault eg 150th brigade box at Gazala, or the 3 times that Bardia was captured by the British.

Those assaults showed that the British could do combined arms; what they failed to do before El Alamein was to properly concentrate and co-ordinate their armoured brigades, leading to them being defeated in detail on multiple occasions.

Tanks cannot hold ground, nor artillery. Infantry can. Nor can tanks operate without their bodyguard infantry to act as their eyes and protectors, lest enemy infantry close up to the tanks and grenade, mine, Molotov cocktail or simply improvise explode the machines. This is the same lesson learned over and over again since the first use of tanks and it is true in all types of terrain and all kinds of weather. Examples: Iraq, Chechen, Afghanistan, ANY Arab-Israeli war, Vietnam, ANY WWII campaign anywhere. Even happens in WW I where German infantry, once they got over their "tank fright" noticed that the British lumbered around in their machines as if they were drunk and blind. Once the Germans figured out that the British WERE drunk on carbon monoxide and could not notice anything much either in their stupors because they could not see much outside of their damned noisy overheated boxes through the narrow slits provided, the German infantry closed up on the British tanks and used whatever expedient they had to set the British tanks afire. Next time, there was bodyguard infantry!
 
Tanks cannot hold ground, nor artillery. Infantry can. Nor can tanks operate without their bodyguard infantry to act as their eyes and protectors, lest enemy infantry close up to the tanks and grenade, mine, Molotov cocktail or simply improvise explode the machines.

But not in the desert, where there was very little vital ground to hold, and great visibility - tanks can simply drive around infantry positions, and everything that is mobile drives away from tanks.
 
But not in the desert, where there was very little vital ground to hold, and great visibility - tanks can simply drive around infantry positions, and everything that is mobile drives away from tanks.

Wells, wadis, oasis, passes (See Halfaya Pass above: Operation Battleaxe) ports (Tobruk), etc.


Infantry needed to hold high ground and key terrain features (ridges surrounded by sand marshes) in the desert where tanks could not go (flotation issues.). And there is a lot more of that kind of terrain than one thinks.

I forgot to mention airfields. That terrain is kind of "vital".

Also, when one has this...

South-Africans-Mines-1942-595x597.jpg


One absolutely needs infantry. Those are called "minefields".
 
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But not in the desert, where there was very little vital ground to hold, and great visibility - tanks can simply drive around infantry positions, and everything that is mobile drives away from tanks.
If Infantry was so superfluous, one wonders why the Brits, S.Africans, guys fron NZ and Oz, the Free French and the German and Italians just didn't send all back home and fight just with Armor. Would have been a lot easier on logistics, right?
 
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