WI: In 1942, General Gott Had NOT Died & Had Taken Command of the 8th Army?

Desalination at ports doesn't help as there will be civilian water supplies anyway. For desalination elsewhere please provide the maths for water supply for the army to show:

I wonder if the Quartermasters and logistic staff who had to get water for hundreds of thousands of men across the desert thought it wasn't a problem and whether the veterans who were plagued with kidney problems after the war having spent so long on such short water rations agree?
 
And there was nothing they could do that was practical to affect the outcome in Russia, there. What was practical and that action the British could do, and did not do, was clear out North Africa and force the Germans to divert air and ground forces to defend their southern flank from British operations in the Mediterranean. I always maintained Churchill was a landlubber when it came to geopolitical; strategy.


Probably not but given that in summer 42 it looks a lot like a total soviet collapse in southern Russia ( I mean they have already lost two army groups and the third is apparently broken and in full retreat, the soviet summer offensive ( Mars) is going nowhere so it looks an awful lot like the brits will have an army group of Nazis supplied across the black sea trying to raise up anti British revolts in Iran and Iraq and before motoring to the guld and Kirkuk oilfields, so putting forces in place to prevent that seems prudent.

And all of this is in response to McPherson asking why 9 CW divs were in Iraq Persia in 42.


he implication of mistrust and chicanery involved, still, is staggering.


Not really, a division is a tactical unit that gets rotated in and out. A corps on the other hand is both the planner of operations ( in British system) and attracts the support units. Its not chicanery and distrust its just the way things work. Manage an army formation even better. Which is why the Aussies formed a corps as fast as possible.


Whether it was "feasible" was not the point. Timing of events aside, it was patently obvious, that if the Germans moved airpower into the region and if the British could not respond in kind and sustain, and Wavell said they could not, then whatever ground forces the British commit to Greece were going to be chewed up and spat out. So why be stupid? Pick and choose the fight at the time and place where the enemy cannot win. Same argument as regards SW Russia; cannot do a thing about that one, but can do something about Libya which will help in a sidereal way with the situation in Russia by forcing the Axis powers to divert resources against a threat. Cannot save Greece, but wiping out Libya opens up the Mediterranean and clears the Axis threat to the Middle East all the way to India. Now Allied exploitation is subject to argument, but the necessity for the Axis to guard southern Europe is not. Troops stuck in Greece are not fighting in Russia.


Feasibility kinda is the point. There is not infinite german airpower. If its operating n the north Aegean its not in Sicily, or support army groups in Russia or U boats or bombing Alexandria. Wavell at the March Conference said the defence of Greece was feasible, period. Cunningham said it was feasible provided he had the light forces to support resupply and clear mines, but he also said that without those he could not keep the canal open or supply north Africa. Longmire is most cautious but even he says its feasible and a risk worth taking.


With an April start point the Luftwaffe has around 8 weeks operational time, at the outside before the bulk of the air force has to be withdrawn for Barbarossa, which is known to the Brits ( and that assumes there is a delay in Barbarossa, if the schedule is kept to its much less). The issue of feasibility is can a position in Greece be held for long enough for long enough until the Germans withdraw for Barbarossa.


The problem with Wiping out Libya is a) is not feasible b) it does not open up the Med in 1941.


It is not feasible unless the start point is back in October 40 or possibly earlier allowing 6th and 9th Australian to be trained and situated in the middle east with sufficient LoC troops. Compass is envisaged as a 5 day raid prior to deployment to Greece. So none of the logistics of a conquest of Libya are addressed.

At no point in q1 41 does the WDF exceed two divisions. And at that point Cunningham, is clear that he has issues with supplying the force available at Benghazi much less further forward. Adding another division just adds to the problem. After Compass the brits have to refit the armour and transport which can only be done in Egypt at the time and then redeploy it forward. At best then there is 1.5 amd div, 3 inf divs and a 1000 mile advice to Tripoli to meet the 5 italian inf divs, Ariete and DAK. To change that means forming the ANZAC corps of 6th Aus and the NZ div. NOT moving 9th Aus to the middle east but instead deploying the LoC troops ( Wavell was offered 50 Div or 15,000 LoC troops and chose the latter, shipping was only available for one or the other.) which leaves one cav div in Palestine and delays the formation of 10th Armoured. And that probably does not work because of the need to refit the armour after Compass in Egypt and redeploy it back forward which breaks it again.

Even if it does it will leave the Italian fleet intact, Greece will still fall and the Germans have an intact airborne corps available for use, with a airfields as far east as Rhodes to operate from.


Occupying Tripoli does not open up the Med occupying, Tripoli and deploying an air force large enough to supress Sicily does but as you say the British air strength does not allow for much and certainly does not allow for the resupply of a sustained air campaign based out of Tripoli in 41.


There are really no good offensive options for Mediterranean command in 40/41- really until Crusader which is badly managed but also exposes the geographic limits of the force available. Particularly the air force. The veering to Greece in October/November 40 is rooted not in peripheralist fantasy but in the threat to the entire position of the Italian Bases in the Dodecanese which can mine the Canal, Alex, Haifa and the need to support the Greeks as a minimum.


62,612 men

100 tanks

200–300 aircraft


But Cunningham is clear he cannot guarantee supply of the force then in place much less a larger one, the SLOC was continually vulnerable, in his view to mining and he had to keep the canal clear and he has very limited shipping. Not helped by the water situation which is entirely dependent on the plant at Sollum, which is broken at the time.


The allied supply position and infrastructure in 42/3 is on a different planet from that available in 41.


And there was nothing they could do that was practical to affect the outcome in Russia, there. What was practical and that action the British could do, and did not do, was clear out North Africa and force the Germans to divert air and ground forces to defend their southern flank from British operations in the Mediterranean. I always maintained Churchill was a landlubber when it came to geopolitical; strategy.


Probably not but given that in summer 42 it looks a lot like a total soviet collapse in southern Russia ( I mean they have already lost two army groups and the third is apparently broken and in full retreat, the soviet summer offensive ( Mars) is going nowhere so it looks an awful lot like the brits will have an army group of Nazis supplied across the black sea trying to raise up anti British revolts in Iran and Iraq and before motoring to the guld and Kirkuk oilfields, so putting forces in place to prevent that seems prudent.


he implication of mistrust and chicanery involved, still, is staggering.


Not really a division is a tactical unit that gets rotated in and out. A corps on the other hand is both the planner of operations ( in British system) and attracts the support units. Its not chicanery and distrust its just the way things work. Manage an army formation even better.


Whether it was "feasible" was not the point. Timing of events aside, it was patently obvious, that if the Germans moved airpower into the region and if the British could not respond in kind and sustain, and Wavell said they could not, then whatever ground forces the British commit to Greece were going to be chewed up and spat out. So why be stupid? Pick and choose the fight at the time and place where the enemy cannot win. Same argument as regards SW Russia; cannot do a thing about that one, but can do something about Libya which will help in a sidereal way with the situation in Russia by forcing the Axis powers to divert resources against a threat. Cannot save Greece, but wiping out Libya opens up the Mediterranean and clears the Axis threat to the Middle East all the way to India. Now Allied exploitation is subject to argument, but the necessity for the Axis to guard southern Europe is not. Troops stuck in Greece are not fighting in Russia.


Feasibility kinda is the point. There is not infinite german airpower. If its operating n the north Aegean its not in Sicily, or support army groups in Russia or U boats or bombing Alexandria. Wavell at the March Conference said the defence of Greece was feasible, period. Cunningham said it was feasible provided he had the light forces to support resupply and clear mines, but he also said that without those he could not keep the canal open or supply north Africa. Longmire is most cautious but even he says its feasible and a risk worth taking.


With an April start point the Luftwaffe has around 8 weeks operational time, at the outside before the bulk of the air force has to be withdrawn for Barbarossa, which is known to the Brits ( and that assumes there is a delay in Barbarossa, if the schedule is kept to its much less). The issue of feasibility is can a position in Greece be held for long enough for long enough until the Germans withdraw for Barbarossa.


The problem with Wiping out Libya is a) is not feasible b) it does not open up the Med in 1941.


It is not feasible unless the start point is back in October 40 or possibly earlier allowing 6th and 9th Australian to be trained and situated in the middle east with sufficient LoC troops. At no point in q1 41 does the WDF exceed two divisions. And at that point Cunningham, is clear that he has issues with supplying the force available at Benghazi much less further forward. Adding another division just adds to the problem. After Compass the brits have to refit the armour and transport which can only be done in Egypt at the time and then redeploy it forward. At best then there is 1.5 amd div, 3 inf divs and a 1000 mile advice to Tripoli to meet the 5 italian inf divs, Ariete and DAK. To change that means forming the ANZAC corps of 6th Aus and the NZ div. NOT moving 9th Aus but instead deploying the LoC troops ( Wavell was offered 50 Div or 15,000 LoC troops and chose the latter, shipping was only available for one or the other.) And that probably des not work because of the need to refit the armour after Compass and redeploy it back forward.


Occupying Tripoli does not open up the Med occupying, Tripoli and deploying an air force large enough to supress Sicily does but as you say the British air strength does not allow for much.


There are really no good offensive options for Mediterranean command in 40 - or really until Crusader which is badly managed but also exposes the geographic limits of the force available. Particularly the air force. The veering to Greece in October/November 40 is rooted not in peripheralist fantasy but in the threat to the entire position of the Italian Bases in the Dodecanese which can mine the Canal, Alex, Haifa and the need to support the Greeks as a minimum.


62,612 men

100 tanks

200–300 aircraft


But Cunningham is clear he cannot supply the force then in place much less a larger one, the SLOC was continually vulnerable, in his view to mining and he had to keep the canal clear.


The allied supply position and infrastructure in 42/3 is on a different planet from that available in 41.


You are stuck and sealed off at the end of a peninsula and going nowhere. It eats up supply and burns up sea and airpower like crazy and allows no path for exploitation because only a damned fool looks at Balkan geography and politics and thinks an attack south to north has a snowball's chance in hell. An argument for Italy could be made, but look how that parallel fiasco turned out?



I suggest you look at the Entente advance after the Vardar range was breached in 1918. The Balkans (Danube and Save basins are basically flat plans up to Prague until you get to the coast or Macedon ( the Greek Yugo/Bulgar border area) after that it’s a series of pretty rough mountain ranges punctuated by small valleys maybe 10km wide. For the length of Greece.



As to the Italian campaign. Well apart from being a sinkhole for the Luftwaffe it also requires between 20-25% of all German Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions to keep the allies in place. And the Allied units include all the ones they can’t easily get replacements for, NZ, SA, Polish, Jewish, Indian, Brazilian and later a corps + of Italians. Supported by a mainly Italian labour, transport and increasing AA defence in an attritional battle the Allies control, and lets them bomb Ploesti and Southern Germany. Now there is a good argument that once you reach the Alps what then, but Italy is a theatre that contains the troops the Allies cannot use else elsewhere opposed by German units Desperately needed elsewhere.



Rather than quote. The Brtish did not have the sealift. There is a world of difference between landing troops at a first class port with a friendly labour force and AA defence and an assault landing. The Brits have the three Glens available but only from March 9th. Which allow for around and inf Bn each to be landed but no tanks artillery or sustained supply until a port is captured. Until then its whaleboats.



The Orbat you give for East Africa is misleading. 4th and 5th Indian yes, but hardly reinforced the corps troops are 1 medium 2 mountain bty, 6 Matilda II an AT battery two home made motor MG company and at most 300 men of 51 commando (aka Palestine police) about a BDE worth of French light infantry with limited ammunition stocks ( French kit, no resupply until they get reequipped) 1st South African yes. But 11 and 12 African are a colonial gendarmerie that needed retraining and reequipping before being committed to sustained combat so on a par with the Italian colonial BDE but with a divisional structure. VS 25 Colonial Infantry Brigades 14 infantry Bn 2 complete Italian divisions and 4 tank companies, defending ultimately a mountain position.

Take away 4th Indian and its 2 British infantry divs vs 2 Italian with supporting colonial forces. It’s the mobility of the British forces attacking at basically three sectors that overstreches the Italians wh have no comparable mobility.



2nd NZ is not formed as a division until mid march 41, and 7th Aus is not ready until march shortly before it went to Greece. 9th Aus is still training as a division until the invasion of Syria and if initially deployed without the artillery AT and carriers. Neither are ready as a solid formation until late March proposing using any of them to go deeper into Libya is really proposing to use them either as undertrained light infantry fillers for other units ( which the commanders would rightly object to) or delaying until late march, by which Time DAK and XX Motorized corps are formed.



There is a world of difference between providing water for a crew of 600 and an army of 60,000 plus the radiators of all the vehicles needed to move it. This early water is a major issue, the RN has one water tanker and moving bulky evaporating goods by road is a losing proposition – wear and tear on hard to replace trucks. Forward of Egypt there is one major plant at Sollum, which happens to be broken a the time. The Italian wells were found to be brackish and are on the Egyptian border.



This is the reasons Wavell declined 50 div, to have the LoC troops available to make sustained forward ops possible, but they are not there in the first half of 41.
 
And?

You disagreed that Tarhuna-Homs was a strong natural defensive position; none of what you've posted addresses this key point. Rommel choosing to put the effort into the Buerat position was a mistake that led to Tripoli falling earlier.

And another German's general's assessment of defensive positions in North Africa:

1. Rommel was out of supply, that would be the key reason he failed at Buerat. Given that and the hard going south and west, as he retreated to the Mareth Line I fail to see how being enveloped by a turning movement makes Tarhuna Kkoms a "defensible position" at all?

2.
(3) The Tarhuna-Homs position east and south of Tripoli is flanked by the Djebel Nefusa in Tripolitania and takes advantage of the mountainous terrain, which is not easily covered by motor vehicles.* Since the mountains descend steeply to the west but gently to the east, it can be more easily defended from attacks from the west.

What direction was Montgomery travelling? He was attacking toward the eastern slopes. Even your own source states what I've tried to ILLUSTRATE with my "useless maps".

3. Meet the Erdalator.
 
McPherson said:

And there was nothing they could do that was practical to affect the outcome in Russia, there. What was practical and that action the British could do, and did not do, was clear out North Africa and force the Germans to divert air and ground forces to defend their southern flank from British operations in the Mediterranean. I always maintained Churchill was a landlubber when it came to geopolitical; strategy.

Probably not but given that in summer 42 it looks a lot like a total soviet collapse in southern Russia ( I mean they have already lost two army groups and the third is apparently broken and in full retreat, the soviet summer offensive ( Mars) is going nowhere so it looks an awful lot like the brits will have an army group of Nazis supplied across the black sea trying to raise up anti British revolts in Iran and Iraq and before motoring to the guld and Kirkuk oilfields, so putting forces in place to prevent that seems prudent.

Persia, let's just jolly well drive across those mountains and that plateau and get that oil?

Iran_Topography.png


And all of this is in response to McPherson asking why 9 CW divs were in Iraq Persia in 42.

IOW... That is not likely to happen. The distances from the Caucasus to the Persian and Iraqi fields over terrain and infrastructure worse than the UKRAINE which is despite the lack of roads, fairly good going. The terrain you propose the Germans to cross to reach those oil fields is a lot worse with HOSTILE Turkish and Kurd and Parthian populations solidly in the way.

BTW, I never asked why 9 CWs were in Iraq. It is obvious the British were putting down an Iraqi uprising at the time and I knew it.
McPherson said:

The implication of mistrust and chicanery involved, still, is staggering.

Not really, a division is a tactical unit that gets rotated in and out. A corps on the other hand is both the planner of operations ( in British system) and attracts the support units. Its not chicanery and distrust its just the way things work. Manage an army formation even better. Which is why the Aussies formed a corps as fast as possible.

I think you misunderstand. Government to government chicanery, as in Churchill lying to Menzies and Curtin (routinely), not internal army shenanigans, though the British army and navy also routinely lied to their allies and to their dominions partners as well. You want a specific case example of that kind of tomfoolery? How about when the USN asked the RN where all those damned British type radars started showing up on IJN warships in mid 1943? Not German type, but British as in both wave form emitted metric and centimetric characteristics picked up on US detectors. Turns out that the Malaya campaign had been a tech haul for the Japanese. The RAF and RN had not destroyed their gear. They did not want to admit that they had failed in that op-sec matter. (Guadalcanal Radar was the fingerprint and giveaway clue.). NTS that bumbling MacArthur had not failed to keep 2 US air search radars (Brereton should have been shot for it.) out of Japanese hands, either, but the Americans belatedly warned the British about that utter disaster.

McPherson said:

Whether it was "feasible" was not the point. Timing of events aside, it was patently obvious, that if the Germans moved airpower into the region and if the British could not respond in kind and sustain, and Wavell said they could not, then whatever ground forces the British commit to Greece were going to be chewed up and spat out. So why be stupid? Pick and choose the fight at the time and place where the enemy cannot win. Same argument as regards SW Russia; cannot do a thing about that one, but can do something about Libya which will help in a sidereal way with the situation in Russia by forcing the Axis powers to divert resources against a threat. Cannot save Greece, but wiping out Libya opens up the Mediterranean and clears the Axis threat to the Middle East all the way to India. Now Allied exploitation is subject to argument, but the necessity for the Axis to guard southern Europe is not. Troops stuck in Greece are not fighting in Russia.

Feasibility kinda is the point. There is not infinite german airpower. If its operating n the north Aegean its not in Sicily, or support army groups in Russia or U boats or bombing Alexandria. Wavell at the March Conference said the defence of Greece was feasible, period. Cunningham said it was feasible provided he had the light forces to support resupply and clear mines, but he also said that without those he could not keep the canal open or supply north Africa. Longmire is most cautious but even he says its feasible and a risk worth taking.

Airpower is very mobile, easy to concentrate and disperse and much the fastest kind of military power to concentrate and move. 30-40 day LW campaign to wipe the British out in Greece and then fly off to Rumania (2 days) to wipe out the Red Air in the southern front for Barbarossa (2 weeks). That actually happened, so your conjectures are not sustained by the RTL events.

With an April start point the Luftwaffe has around 8 weeks operational time, at the outside before the bulk of the air force has to be withdrawn for Barbarossa, which is known to the Brits ( and that assumes there is a delay in Barbarossa, if the schedule is kept to its much less). The issue of feasibility is can a position in Greece be held for long enough for long enough until the Germans withdraw for Barbarossa.

Already dealt with (^^^).

Wiping out Libya.

The problem with Wiping out Libya is a) is not feasible b) it does not open up the Med in 1941.

Let's read the support for that assertion?

It is not feasible unless the start point is back in October 40 or possibly earlier allowing 6th and 9th Australian to be trained and situated in the middle east with sufficient LoC troops. Compass is envisaged as a 5 day raid prior to deployment to Greece. So none of the logistics of a conquest of Libya are addressed.

It grew beyond a spoiling attack. Happens. Exploitation is the term for follow up planning and execution. One should plan for it. Somebody seems to have tried RTL because COMPASS was exploited.

At no point in q1 41 does the WDF exceed two divisions. And at that point Cunningham, is clear that he has issues with supplying the force available at Benghazi much less further forward. Adding another division just adds to the problem. After Compass the brits have to refit the armour and transport which can only be done in Egypt at the time and then redeploy it forward. At best then there is 1.5 amd div, 3 inf divs and a 1000 mile advance to Tripoli to meet the 5 italian inf divs, Ariete and DAK. To change that means forming the ANZAC corps of 6th Aus and the NZ div. NOT moving 9th Aus to the middle east but instead deploying the LoC troops ( Wavell was offered 50 Div or 15,000 LoC troops and chose the latter, shipping was only available for one or the other.) which leaves one cav div in Palestine and delays the formation of 10th Armoured. And that probably does not work because of the need to refit the armour after Compass in Egypt and redeploy it back forward which breaks it again.

As opposed to the Greek adventure where 3 division equivalents are destroyed? Where does this (^^^) line of argument make any sense?

Even if it does it will leave the Italian fleet intact, Greece will still fall and the Germans have an intact airborne corps available for use, with a airfields as far east as Rhodes to operate from.

The Germans and Italians get that anyway, if you don't take Libya. The point in clearing out Libya is to get those airfields and start bombing southern Italy from that north African shore and split the Med in two.

The Regia Marina actually goes nowhere. (See map.)

upload_2019-9-19_12-35-48.png


Occupying Tripoli does not open up the Med occupying, Tripoli and deploying an air force large enough to suppress Sicily does but as you say the British air strength does not allow for much and certainly does not allow for the resupply of a sustained air campaign based out of Tripoli in 41.

Non-sequitur. Those airpower circles are Beaufort radii of action. You can pass through Malta Convoys under RAF fighter air cover, too, if your airfields are close enough to cover. You have to take them, though.

There are really no good offensive options for Mediterranean command in 40/41- really until Crusader which is badly managed but also exposes the geographic limits of the force available. Particularly the air force. The veering to Greece in October/November 40 is rooted not in peripheralist fantasy but in the threat to the entire position of the Italian Bases in the Dodecanese which can mine the Canal, Alex, Haifa and the need to support the Greeks as a minimum.

Can't mine if you can't reach. And BTW, the British op-sec at Alexandria, Gibraltar and the canal was a joke, so any argument that the RM could not hit them if the British succeed in Greece is not viable. Greece does not defend the Canal. Immobilizing the RM (see map) does.

But Cunningham is clear he cannot guarantee supply of the force then in place much less a larger one, the SLOC was continually vulnerable, in his view to mining and he had to keep the canal clear and he has very limited shipping. Not helped by the water situation which is entirely dependent on the plant at Sollum, which is broken at the time.

Dare I say, Cunningham did not know what he was doing, or talking about? Maybe the RN needed a Nimitz. WATCHTOWER went in against more odds stacked against it and succeeded.

The allied supply position and infrastructure in 42/3 is on a different planet from that available in 41.

This is true to a certain extent. The US is not in the game in 1941, but considering that Churchill had just thrown away 30% of the active British army and 8% of the RN in his insane Greek adventures and was not showing signs of having learned a damn thing from the disaster (Singapore and Anzio later.), one wonders if maybe FDR might have done better if he had been given this mess to untangle? I mean the Philippine Islands was a deliberate FDR write off and so was the DEI, but when it came time to fight for Australia, the Pacific allies seem to have done much better than the Brits in North Africa. Once again the parallel with WATCHTOWER and COMPASS is striking to me.

McPherson said:

You are stuck and sealed off at the end of a peninsula and going nowhere. It eats up supply and burns up sea and airpower like crazy and allows no path for exploitation because only a damned fool looks at Balkan geography and politics and thinks an attack south to north has a snowball's chance in hell. An argument for Italy could be made, but look how that parallel fiasco turned out?

Probably not but given that in summer 42 it looks a lot like a total soviet collapse in southern Russia ( I mean they have already lost two army groups and the third is apparently broken and in full retreat, the soviet summer offensive ( Mars) is going nowhere so it looks an awful lot like the brits will have an army group of Nazis supplied across the black sea trying to raise up anti British revolts in Iran and Iraq and before motoring to the guld and Kirkuk oilfields, so putting forces in place to prevent that seems prudent.

It has already been pointed out by better people than me, that it is not 1942.

I suggest you look at the Entente advance after the Vardar range was breached in 1918. The Balkans (Danube and Save basins are basically flat plans up to Prague until you get to the coast or Macedon ( the Greek Yugo/Bulgar border area) after that it’s a series of pretty rough mountain ranges punctuated by small valleys maybe 10km wide. For the length of Greece.

End of the Great War AH collapse that was.. This, however, is the Wehrmacht at flood tide and the Balkans after a generation of political bushwhacking and petty wars. Not the same situation geopolitically, technologically or even geographically at all.

As to the Italian campaign. Well apart from being a sinkhole for the Luftwaffe it also requires between 20-25% of all German Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions to keep the allies in place. And the Allied units include all the ones they can’t easily get replacements for, NZ, SA, Polish, Jewish, Indian, Brazilian and later a corps + of Italians. Supported by a mainly Italian labour, transport and increasing AA defence in an attritional battle the Allies control, and lets them bomb Ploesti and Southern Germany. Now there is a good argument that once you reach the Alps what then, but Italy is a theatre that contains the troops the Allies cannot use else elsewhere opposed by German units Desperately needed elsewhere.

Once you take the Foggia air complex, you can make that argument. You can make it for Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica from the airpower PoV, as well, but as a land campaign beyond the Foggia objectives, Italy is a complete Allied logistics and tactical disaster. So the case for Italy is "iffy".

Rather than quote. The British did not have the sealift. There is a world of difference between landing troops at a first class port with a friendly labour force and AA defence and an assault landing. The Brits have the three Glens available but only from March 9th. Which allow for around and inf Bn each to be landed but no tanks artillery or sustained supply until a port is captured. Until then its whaleboats.

If you have a wharf, OR FLAT BEACH you can land tanks and infantry. Again I refer to Guadalcanal. It does not require LCVPS and LSTs. Just a standard barge lighter which Turner did not have. Those and AKs the RN (Cunningham) has.

Someone else: but I'll deal with it as to the Abyssinia and Palestine.

The Orbat you give for East Africa is misleading. 4th and 5th Indian yes, but hardly reinforced the corps troops are 1 medium 2 mountain bty, 6 Matilda II an AT battery two home made motor MG company and at most 300 men of 51 commando (aka Palestine police) about a BDE worth of French light infantry with limited ammunition stocks ( French kit, no resupply until they get reequipped) 1st South African yes. But 11 and 12 African are a colonial gendarmerie that needed retraining and reequipping before being committed to sustained combat so on a par with the Italian colonial BDE but with a divisional structure. VS 25 Colonial Infantry Brigades 14 infantry Bn 2 complete Italian divisions and 4 tank companies, defending ultimately a mountain position.

Yet somehow they won?

Take away 4th Indian and its 2 British infantry divs vs 2 Italian with supporting colonial forces. It’s the mobility of the British forces attacking at basically three sectors that overstretches the Italians wh have no comparable mobility.

Might want to take a look at the South African Air Force.

2nd NZ is not formed as a division until mid march 41, and 7th Aus is not ready until march shortly before it went to Greece. 9th Aus is still training as a division until the invasion of Syria and if initially deployed without the artillery AT and carriers. Neither are ready as a solid formation until late March proposing using any of them to go deeper into Libya is really proposing to use them either as undertrained light infantry fillers for other units ( which the commanders would rightly object to) or delaying until late march, by which Time DAK and XX Motorized corps are formed.

Again what about the units burned up in Greece? (6th Australian Division, the New Zealand 2nd Division and the British 1st Armoured Brigade.)

There is a world of difference between providing water for a crew of 600 and an army of 60,000 plus the radiators of all the vehicles needed to move it. This early water is a major issue, the RN has one water tanker and moving bulky evaporating goods by road is a losing proposition – wear and tear on hard to replace trucks. Forward of Egypt there is one major plant at Sollum, which happens to be broken a the time. The Italian wells were found to be brackish and are on the Egyptian border.

The distillation of seawater for a WARSHIP is for her boilers. Far more than "600 men".

Already provided the US answer.

This is the reasons Wavell declined 50 div, to have the LoC troops available to make sustained forward ops possible, but they are not there in the first half of 41.

That is probably the only valid argument offered and it is a good one, nevertheless, the British picked the wrong target and the wrong fight. They should have tried for Libya when they had the means, motive and opportunity. As King explained for WATCHTOWER; "After Midway it was the opportunity to wear the Japanese down at a place of our choosing and where we could beat them. I wasn't going to wait a whole {string of expletives deleted} year for the Central Pacific and the forces building up for it to mount it. My war was not going to play second string to Marshal."
 
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Without burning up band width & my time quoting; theres been multiple references to the British & Commonwealth 'divisions' scattered across the ME wit related questions about why they were up to ect... There been some vague hints about the composition of these units, & I am really curious about the details of these divisions size, equipment and the associated army or corps support groups. A important part of this is the logistics cost, Numbers that could be compared to the effort for some of the other operations might be a useful analysis.

Counting division HQ is often significantly misleading as many things in their composition and support of them is often not equivalent from one situation to another.
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Again what about the units burned up in Greece? (6th Australian Division, the New Zealand 2nd Division and the British 1st Armoured Brigade.)

The third of a division slice of 2nd NZ that was diverted to the UK in mid-1940 unloaded at Port Tewflik 3rd - 8th March. Warning Order for shipping 7th March, left camp for Alexandria 17th March. The other 2/3rds of the Division wasn't available for offensive operations because Freyberg and the NZ Govt said so (more precisely, Wavell didn't want to risk secrecy to ask permission ahead of the December operations), although many NZ (and other forces) medical, engineer and transport units were supporting the advance. 2NZ had been intended (pre-Greece) to become GHQ reserve once it was complete.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Without burning up band width & my time quoting; theres been multiple references to the British & Commonwealth 'divisions' scattered across the ME wit related questions about why they were up to ect... There been some vague hints about the composition of these units, & I am really curious about the details of these divisions size, equipment and the associated army or corps support groups. A important part of this is the logistics cost, Numbers that could be compared to the effort for some of the other operations might be a useful analysis.

Counting division HQ is often significantly misleading as many things in their composition and support of them is often not equivalent from one situation to another.

Check Joslen; he broke the British forces down to the brigade (and the brigades to their battalion) , and movement from one theater to another by the day. Pick a date.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Persia, let's just jolly well drive across those mountains and that plateau and get that oil?



That is probably the only valid argument offered and it is a good one, nevertheless, the British picked the wrong target and the wrong fight. They should have tried for Libya when they had the means, motive and opportunity.

Yep. As has been said, reinforce success - not failure.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
But he doesn't do the Commonwealth forces.

Joslen has some "snapshot" orders of battle on particular dates, however, that include Commonwealth and Imperial forces.

The Indian, South Africa, Australian, and New Zealand official histories and orders of battle were all published as well; they're a little harder to find, but not impossible.

Probably most importantly, the only armoured formations (brigades and divisions) that saw action in the greater Mediterranean theater(s) in 1940-42 were all British, and those are pretty easily tracked using Joslen.

Bottomline, in the winter and spring of 1941, the British deployed the 1st Armoured Brigade Group (two tank battalions, one motorized infantry battalion, and three towed artillery battalions) to Greece; at the same time, in Libya, they had the 3rd Armoured Brigade and 2nd Support Group, under the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters, with three (mixed) tank battalions, a motorized cavalry battalion, three motorized infantry battalions, and three motorized artillery battalions. The 3rd Indian Brigade included three motorized cavalry battalions, and there was a motorized Free French battalion.

In Egypt, there was the 7th Armoured Division headquarters, the 4th and 7th armoured brigades and 7th Support Group, with a total of eight armoured and motorized cavalry battalions, one motorized infantry battalion, and three motorized artillery battalions, although several of the maneuver battalions that had served in COMPASS were severely understrength and/or underequipped.

The rest of the available Allied forces were, essentially, standard infantry, artillery, engineers, etc.

So in a situation where they had - at best - 10 British and four Allied "mobile" battalions and six artillery battalions - seems like it would have been prudent to concentrate the mobile forces in Libya, where they could have provided an effective mobile defense, rather than splitting them between Libya and Greece, leading to an ineffective defense in both theaters.
 
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Check Joslen; he broke the British forces down to the brigade (and the brigades to their battalion) , and movement from one theater to another by the day. Pick a date.

My object there is to understand what the forces in Iraq, Persia, ect.. constituted, what they actually represented in terms of operational or stratigic combat power. It's been forty years since I read anything about them. My memory is the 'divisions' we're understrengh & equipped with second & third tier material suitable for suppressing the local armies or insurgents. Perhaps my memory is wrong here. But equally or more important might be the corps/army support group and the material consumed by the logistics support. What did all that represent in terms of Fielding larger more capable forces in Greece or Cyrinacia.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
My object there is to understand what the forces in Iraq, Persia, ect.. constituted, what they actually represented in terms of operational or stratigic combat power. It's been forty years since I read anything about them. My memory is the 'divisions' we're understrengh & equipped with second & third tier material suitable for suppressing the local armies or insurgents. Perhaps my memory is wrong here. But equally or more important might be the corps/army support group and the material consumed by the logistics support. What did all that represent in terms of Fielding larger more capable forces in Greece or Cyrinacia.

So in the winter-spring of 1941 (i.e., the end of the Greek Campaign and Rommel's 1st Campaign in Cyrenaica) the Allies:

  • didn't have ANY forces in Iran (Persia); the Anglo-Soviet invasion didn't start until August, and was essentially complete by mid-September.
  • in Iraq, there weren't any significant forces other than the existing RAF garrison/base forces until April, when the Iraqi nationalists under Rashid Ali staged their coup; the British responded with two invasion forces, one from India by sea and one from Palestine and Jordan overland. The force from India amounted to the 10th Indian Division, with three full brigades; two more separate brigades followed up. From the west, the invasion force amounted to a reinforced motorized cavalry brigade.
  • in Italian East Africa, the campaign had begun in June, 1940. By 1941, the Allied forces involved included Platt's Northern Force, with the 4th and 5th Indian divisions, both with three full brigades (so six in total), a Free French brigade, and various irregulars; and Cunningham's Southern Force, with the South African 1st Division (three full brigades) and the 11th and 12th African divisions (each had three brigades, so six in total). The two African divisions were understrength in artillery, but the Indian and South African divisions were not. Aosta surrendered at Amba Alagi in May, 1941, which essentially ended the conventional phase of the campaign.
  • EXPORTER, the British invasion of Lebanon and Syria, didn't begin until June, 1941, and ended with the Vichy surrender in early July, after a month of fighting. Obviously, this came long after the Allied withdrawal from Greece (April, 1941) and the collapse of British resistance in Cyrenaica, which ended the same month.
The bottom line is the British had four armoured brigades and three motorized brigades in the theater in the winter-spring of 1941; three were in Cyrenaica, one was in Greece, and three were refitting in Egypt after COMPASS. Splitting the operational mobile forces, such as they were, between Libya and Greece amounted to ensuring defeat in both theaters.

Sending a corps-sized force to Greece was an foolish decision, doomed to failure, that is laid squarely at the feet of the decision-makers in London; typical Churchillian peripheralism and, yet again, illusions about the Balkans.
 
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Joslen has some "snapshot" orders of battle on particular dates, however, that include Commonwealth and Imperial forces.

The Indian, South Africa, Australian, and New Zealand official histories and orders of battle were all published as well; they're a little harder to find, but not impossible.

Probably most importantly, the only armoured formations (brigades and divisions) that saw action in the greater Mediterranean theater(s) in 1940-42 were all British, and those are pretty easily tracked using Joslen.

Bottomline, in the winter and spring of 1941, the British deployed the 1st Armoured Brigade Group (two tank battalions, one motorized infantry battalion, and three towed artillery battalions) to Greece; at the same time, in Libya, they had the 3rd Armoured Brigade and 2nd Support Group, under the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters, with three (mixed) tank battalions, a motorized cavalry battalion, three motorized infantry battalions, and three motorized artillery battalions. The 3rd Indian Brigade included three motorized cavalry battalions, and there was a motorized Free French battalion.

In Egypt, there was the 7th Armoured Division headquarters, the 4th and 7th armoured brigades and 7th Support Group, with a total of eight armoured and motorized cavalry battalions, one motorized infantry battalion, and three motorized artillery battalions, although several of the maneuver battalions that had served in COMPASS were severely understrength and/or underequipped.

The rest of the available Allied forces were, essentially, standard infantry, artillery, engineers, etc.

So in a situation where they had - at best - 10 British and four Allied "mobile" battalions and six artillery battalions - seems like it would have been prudent to concentrate the mobile forces in Libya, where they could have provided an effective mobile defense, rather than splitting them between Libya and Greece, leading to an ineffective defense in both theaters.

That makes sense to me. Problem is that one needs motorized cavalry and a lot of infantry of some kind in the Mandate and in Iraq because of the rebellions in progress; so not all available mobile forces can be brought to bear at the critical decision nexus. Some rear area security has to be maintained. Compounding the problem is that whole British command and administrative arrangements from theater level on in the Middle East down are AWFUL, and their staff and civil work is extremely "questionable" as in incompetent. Don't get me started on their logistics shambles. Overall, the situational chaos goes back to London and directly to Sir Winston Churchill and or his crown administration. He is great for grabbing the flag and yelling "charge" but he was an absolute disaster as a strategist and a complete op-art amateur.

He needed a strong competent hand to guide him in the ways of war, and until Alan Brooke arrived, he did not have it.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
That makes sense to me. Problem is that one needs motorized cavalry and a lot of infantry of some kind in the Mandate and in Iraq because of the rebellions in progress; so not all available mobile forces can be brought to bear at the critical decision nexus. Some rear area security has to be maintained.

There's a reason the 1st Cavalry Division went to Palestine in January, 1940 (passing through France on the way); the 4th, 5th, and 6th Cavalry brigades had nine mobile battalions between them, while division troops amounted to three field artillery battalions, divisional engineers and signals, etc.

The prewar British garrison in Palestine was built around two infantry division headquarters and garrison troops; the 7th and 8th. The 7th division headquarters went to Egypt in 1939, was redesignated as the 6th Infantry Division, provided the headquarters for the Western Desert Force (corps equivalent) in June, 1940, and then slowly built up to a full field division with three British infantry brigades and divisional troops, and then redesignated the 70th Division before being committed at Tobruk in April, 1941. The 8th Division headquarters lasted until early in 1940, at which point it was absorbed into the headquarters, Palestine and TransJordan, and the division's brigades were attached to other formations.

Most of the Australian 6th and 7th divisions and the 2nd New Zealand Division were in Palestine and/or Egypt in 1940, so it's not like the British were shy of infantry suitable for use as internal security troops in the theater in 1940 and afterwards.

It comes down to the reality of the 2nd and 7th armoured divisions, which had six British brigades between them, and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade - essentially, those seven brigades were what amounted to the British mobile force in the theater at the time, and the best allocations the British could come up with in the winter-spring of 1941 was to split them three ways, between Libya (three brigades), Egypt (three brigades, refitting), and Greece (one brigade).

Not surprisingly, once the Germans were in action in the theater, the British were defeated in detail.
 
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Sending a corps-sized force to Greece was an foolish decision, doomed to failure, that is laid squarely at the feet of the decision-makers in London; typical Churchillian peripheralism and, yet again, illusions about the Balkans.

A decision which was made more on political than military grounds.

EDIT: And a thread which has drifted to Spring 1941 from Summer 1942. :) Perhaps we should cover Gott's role in Brevity?
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
A decision which was made more on political than military grounds. EDIT: And a thread which has drifted to Spring 1941 from Summer 1942. :) Perhaps we should cover Gott's role in Brevity?

True. But as far as politics go, in wartime such decisions need to be based on military reality - which LUSTRE definitely was not.

As far as BREVITY goes, given that Gott had all of 50 medium tanks to work with, he mounted a brigade-sized raid, took two objectives away from the Italians on the frontier, and withdrew in relatively good order, all before the Germans showed up in force. Doing anything more would have required all the armor shipped to Egypt in the TIGER convoy, and that was not ready until BATTLEAXE (if then).
 
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True. But as far as politics go, in wartime such decisions need to be based on military reality - which LUSTRE definitely was not.

As far as BREVITY goes, give that Gott had all of 50 medium tanks to work with, he mounted a brigade-sized raid, took two objectives away from the Italians on the frontier, and withdrew in relatively good order, all before the Germans showed up in force. Doing anything more would have required all the armor shipped to Egypt in the TIGER convoy, and that was not ready until BATTLEAXE (if then).

I'm not qualified to discuss the tactical employment of assets to hand (BREVITY is not in my repertoire.) but technologically and operationally; if Gott's raid force is in the attack and if the Germans/Italians are in prepared positions, I expect that he got himself shot up by an AT gun line, had a lot of mechanical breakdowns, (British cruiser Mark II's?) misused his infantry and suddenly found he could not stay at Halfaya Pass without the arriving Germans turning his left to the south? (Skorpion.)
 
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Dave Shoup

Banned
I'm not qualified to discuss the tactical employment of assets to hand (BREVITY is not in my repertoire.) but technologically and operationally; if Gott's raid force is in the attack and if the Germans/Italians are in prepared positions, I expect that he got himself shot up by an AT gun line, had a lot of mechanical breakdowns, (British cruiser Mark II's?) misused his infantry and suddenly found he could not stay at Halfaya Pass without the arriving Germans turning his left to the south? (Skorpion.)

British units equipped with medium tanks for BREVITY included a half-strength battalion with 24 Matildas and another half-strength battalion with 29 cruisers, a mix of Is, IIs, and IVs ... there was also an Australian half-strength battalion with less than 30 Mk. VI light tanks, armed with machine guns.

They ended up facing three German tank battalions, two from Pz Rgt. 5 and one from Pz. Rgt. 8, plus German and Italian motorized infantry, artillery, etc., and all on the defensive. All in all, for a "first battle" against the German-Italian team in the desert, and on the offensive, Gott and his detachment drawn from 7th Armoured Division did well in comparison to their 2nd Armoured peers in Cyrenaica in 1940 or their 1st Armoured peers in 1942. Of the three "first battles" fought by British armoured divisions against the Germans-Italians in 1940-42 before 2nd Alamein, it was the only one on the the offensive and certainly the most successful.
 
British units equipped with medium tanks for BREVITY included a half-strength battalion with 24 Matildas and another half-strength battalion with 29 cruisers, a mix of Is, IIs, and IVs ... there was also an Australian half-strength battalion with less than 30 Mk. VI light tanks, armed with machine guns.

They ended up facing three German tank battalions, two from Pz Rgt. 5 and one from Pz. Rgt. 8, plus German and Italian motorized infantry, artillery, etc., and all on the defensive. All in all, for a "first battle" against the German-Italian team in the desert, and on the offensive, Gott and his detachment drawn from 7th Armoured Division did well in comparison to their 2nd Armoured peers in Cyrenaica in 1940 or their 1st Armoured peers in 1942. Of the three "first battles" fought by British armoured divisions against the Germans-Italians in 1940-42 before 2nd Alamein, it was the only one on the the offensive and certainly the most successful.

Hmm. That sure does not sound like XX Corps or the DAK at all. OTOH a Matilda II was a very tough machine. Italian 4.7 cm AT guns would have been useless.
 
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