And there was nothing they could do that was practical to affect the outcome in Russia, there. What was practical and that action the British could do, and did not do, was clear out North Africa and force the Germans to divert air and ground forces to defend their southern flank from British operations in the Mediterranean. I always maintained Churchill was a landlubber when it came to geopolitical; strategy.
Probably not but given that in summer 42 it looks a lot like a total soviet collapse in southern Russia ( I mean they have already lost two army groups and the third is apparently broken and in full retreat, the soviet summer offensive ( Mars) is going nowhere so it looks an awful lot like the brits will have an army group of Nazis supplied across the black sea trying to raise up anti British revolts in Iran and Iraq and before motoring to the guld and Kirkuk oilfields, so putting forces in place to prevent that seems prudent.
And all of this is in response to McPherson asking why 9 CW divs were in Iraq Persia in 42.
he implication of mistrust and chicanery involved, still, is staggering.
Not really, a division is a tactical unit that gets rotated in and out. A corps on the other hand is both the planner of operations ( in British system) and attracts the support units. Its not chicanery and distrust its just the way things work. Manage an army formation even better. Which is why the Aussies formed a corps as fast as possible.
Whether it was "feasible" was not the point. Timing of events aside, it was patently obvious, that if the Germans moved airpower into the region and if the British could not respond in kind and sustain, and Wavell said they could not, then whatever ground forces the British commit to Greece were going to be chewed up and spat out. So why be stupid? Pick and choose the fight at the time and place where the enemy cannot win. Same argument as regards SW Russia; cannot do a thing about that one, but can do something about Libya which will help in a sidereal way with the situation in Russia by forcing the Axis powers to divert resources against a threat. Cannot save Greece, but wiping out Libya opens up the Mediterranean and clears the Axis threat to the Middle East all the way to India. Now Allied exploitation is subject to argument, but the necessity for the Axis to guard southern Europe is not. Troops stuck in Greece are not fighting in Russia.
Feasibility kinda is the point. There is not infinite german airpower. If its operating n the north Aegean its not in Sicily, or support army groups in Russia or U boats or bombing Alexandria. Wavell at the March Conference said the defence of Greece was feasible, period. Cunningham said it was feasible provided he had the light forces to support resupply and clear mines, but he also said that without those he could not keep the canal open or supply north Africa. Longmire is most cautious but even he says its feasible and a risk worth taking.
With an April start point the Luftwaffe has around 8 weeks operational time, at the outside before the bulk of the air force has to be withdrawn for Barbarossa, which is known to the Brits ( and that assumes there is a delay in Barbarossa, if the schedule is kept to its much less). The issue of feasibility is can a position in Greece be held for long enough for long enough until the Germans withdraw for Barbarossa.
The problem with Wiping out Libya is a) is not feasible b) it does not open up the Med in 1941.
It is not feasible unless the start point is back in October 40 or possibly earlier allowing 6th and 9th Australian to be trained and situated in the middle east with sufficient LoC troops. Compass is envisaged as a 5 day raid prior to deployment to Greece. So none of the logistics of a conquest of Libya are addressed.
At no point in q1 41 does the WDF exceed two divisions. And at that point Cunningham, is clear that he has issues with supplying the force available at Benghazi much less further forward. Adding another division just adds to the problem. After Compass the brits have to refit the armour and transport which can only be done in Egypt at the time and then redeploy it forward. At best then there is 1.5 amd div, 3 inf divs and a 1000 mile advice to Tripoli to meet the 5 italian inf divs, Ariete and DAK. To change that means forming the ANZAC corps of 6th Aus and the NZ div. NOT moving 9th Aus to the middle east but instead deploying the LoC troops ( Wavell was offered 50 Div or 15,000 LoC troops and chose the latter, shipping was only available for one or the other.) which leaves one cav div in Palestine and delays the formation of 10th Armoured. And that probably does not work because of the need to refit the armour after Compass in Egypt and redeploy it back forward which breaks it again.
Even if it does it will leave the Italian fleet intact, Greece will still fall and the Germans have an intact airborne corps available for use, with a airfields as far east as Rhodes to operate from.
Occupying Tripoli does not open up the Med occupying, Tripoli and deploying an air force large enough to supress Sicily does but as you say the British air strength does not allow for much and certainly does not allow for the resupply of a sustained air campaign based out of Tripoli in 41.
There are really no good offensive options for Mediterranean command in 40/41- really until Crusader which is badly managed but also exposes the geographic limits of the force available. Particularly the air force. The veering to Greece in October/November 40 is rooted not in peripheralist fantasy but in the threat to the entire position of the Italian Bases in the Dodecanese which can mine the Canal, Alex, Haifa and the need to support the Greeks as a minimum.
62,612 men
100 tanks
200–300 aircraft
But Cunningham is clear he cannot guarantee supply of the force then in place much less a larger one, the SLOC was continually vulnerable, in his view to mining and he had to keep the canal clear and he has very limited shipping. Not helped by the water situation which is entirely dependent on the plant at Sollum, which is broken at the time.
The allied supply position and infrastructure in 42/3 is on a different planet from that available in 41.
And there was nothing they could do that was practical to affect the outcome in Russia, there. What was practical and that action the British could do, and did not do, was clear out North Africa and force the Germans to divert air and ground forces to defend their southern flank from British operations in the Mediterranean. I always maintained Churchill was a landlubber when it came to geopolitical; strategy.
Probably not but given that in summer 42 it looks a lot like a total soviet collapse in southern Russia ( I mean they have already lost two army groups and the third is apparently broken and in full retreat, the soviet summer offensive ( Mars) is going nowhere so it looks an awful lot like the brits will have an army group of Nazis supplied across the black sea trying to raise up anti British revolts in Iran and Iraq and before motoring to the guld and Kirkuk oilfields, so putting forces in place to prevent that seems prudent.
he implication of mistrust and chicanery involved, still, is staggering.
Not really a division is a tactical unit that gets rotated in and out. A corps on the other hand is both the planner of operations ( in British system) and attracts the support units. Its not chicanery and distrust its just the way things work. Manage an army formation even better.
Whether it was "feasible" was not the point. Timing of events aside, it was patently obvious, that if the Germans moved airpower into the region and if the British could not respond in kind and sustain, and Wavell said they could not, then whatever ground forces the British commit to Greece were going to be chewed up and spat out. So why be stupid? Pick and choose the fight at the time and place where the enemy cannot win. Same argument as regards SW Russia; cannot do a thing about that one, but can do something about Libya which will help in a sidereal way with the situation in Russia by forcing the Axis powers to divert resources against a threat. Cannot save Greece, but wiping out Libya opens up the Mediterranean and clears the Axis threat to the Middle East all the way to India. Now Allied exploitation is subject to argument, but the necessity for the Axis to guard southern Europe is not. Troops stuck in Greece are not fighting in Russia.
Feasibility kinda is the point. There is not infinite german airpower. If its operating n the north Aegean its not in Sicily, or support army groups in Russia or U boats or bombing Alexandria. Wavell at the March Conference said the defence of Greece was feasible, period. Cunningham said it was feasible provided he had the light forces to support resupply and clear mines, but he also said that without those he could not keep the canal open or supply north Africa. Longmire is most cautious but even he says its feasible and a risk worth taking.
With an April start point the Luftwaffe has around 8 weeks operational time, at the outside before the bulk of the air force has to be withdrawn for Barbarossa, which is known to the Brits ( and that assumes there is a delay in Barbarossa, if the schedule is kept to its much less). The issue of feasibility is can a position in Greece be held for long enough for long enough until the Germans withdraw for Barbarossa.
The problem with Wiping out Libya is a) is not feasible b) it does not open up the Med in 1941.
It is not feasible unless the start point is back in October 40 or possibly earlier allowing 6th and 9th Australian to be trained and situated in the middle east with sufficient LoC troops. At no point in q1 41 does the WDF exceed two divisions. And at that point Cunningham, is clear that he has issues with supplying the force available at Benghazi much less further forward. Adding another division just adds to the problem. After Compass the brits have to refit the armour and transport which can only be done in Egypt at the time and then redeploy it forward. At best then there is 1.5 amd div, 3 inf divs and a 1000 mile advice to Tripoli to meet the 5 italian inf divs, Ariete and DAK. To change that means forming the ANZAC corps of 6th Aus and the NZ div. NOT moving 9th Aus but instead deploying the LoC troops ( Wavell was offered 50 Div or 15,000 LoC troops and chose the latter, shipping was only available for one or the other.) And that probably des not work because of the need to refit the armour after Compass and redeploy it back forward.
Occupying Tripoli does not open up the Med occupying, Tripoli and deploying an air force large enough to supress Sicily does but as you say the British air strength does not allow for much.
There are really no good offensive options for Mediterranean command in 40 - or really until Crusader which is badly managed but also exposes the geographic limits of the force available. Particularly the air force. The veering to Greece in October/November 40 is rooted not in peripheralist fantasy but in the threat to the entire position of the Italian Bases in the Dodecanese which can mine the Canal, Alex, Haifa and the need to support the Greeks as a minimum.
62,612 men
100 tanks
200–300 aircraft
But Cunningham is clear he cannot supply the force then in place much less a larger one, the SLOC was continually vulnerable, in his view to mining and he had to keep the canal clear.
The allied supply position and infrastructure in 42/3 is on a different planet from that available in 41.
You are stuck and sealed off at the end of a peninsula and going nowhere. It eats up supply and burns up sea and airpower like crazy and allows no path for exploitation because
only a damned fool looks at Balkan geography and politics and thinks an attack south to north has a snowball's chance in hell. An argument for Italy could be made, but look how that parallel fiasco turned out?
I suggest you look at the Entente advance after the Vardar range was breached in 1918. The Balkans (Danube and Save basins are basically flat plans up to Prague until you get to the coast or Macedon ( the Greek Yugo/Bulgar border area) after that it’s a series of pretty rough mountain ranges punctuated by small valleys maybe 10km wide. For the length of Greece.
As to the Italian campaign. Well apart from being a sinkhole for the Luftwaffe it also requires between 20-25% of all German Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions to keep the allies in place. And the Allied units include all the ones they can’t easily get replacements for, NZ, SA, Polish, Jewish, Indian, Brazilian and later a corps + of Italians. Supported by a mainly Italian labour, transport and increasing AA defence in an attritional battle the Allies control, and lets them bomb Ploesti and Southern Germany. Now there is a good argument that once you reach the Alps what then, but Italy is a theatre that contains the troops the Allies cannot use else elsewhere opposed by German units Desperately needed elsewhere.
Rather than quote. The Brtish did not have the sealift. There is a world of difference between landing troops at a first class port with a friendly labour force and AA defence and an assault landing. The Brits have the three Glens available but only from March 9th. Which allow for around and inf Bn each to be landed but no tanks artillery or sustained supply until a port is captured. Until then its whaleboats.
The Orbat you give for East Africa is misleading. 4th and 5th Indian yes, but hardly reinforced the corps troops are 1 medium 2 mountain bty, 6 Matilda II an AT battery two home made motor MG company and at most 300 men of 51 commando (aka Palestine police) about a BDE worth of French light infantry with limited ammunition stocks ( French kit, no resupply until they get reequipped) 1st South African yes. But 11 and 12 African are a colonial gendarmerie that needed retraining and reequipping before being committed to sustained combat so on a par with the Italian colonial BDE but with a divisional structure. VS 25 Colonial Infantry Brigades 14 infantry Bn 2 complete Italian divisions and 4 tank companies, defending ultimately a mountain position.
Take away 4th Indian and its 2 British infantry divs vs 2 Italian with supporting colonial forces. It’s the mobility of the British forces attacking at basically three sectors that overstreches the Italians wh have no comparable mobility.
2nd NZ is not formed as a division until mid march 41, and 7th Aus is not ready until march shortly before it went to Greece. 9th Aus is still training as a division until the invasion of Syria and if initially deployed without the artillery AT and carriers. Neither are ready as a solid formation until late March proposing using any of them to go deeper into Libya is really proposing to use them either as undertrained light infantry fillers for other units ( which the commanders would rightly object to) or delaying until late march, by which Time DAK and XX Motorized corps are formed.
There is a world of difference between providing water for a crew of 600 and an army of 60,000 plus the radiators of all the vehicles needed to move it. This early water is a major issue, the RN has one water tanker and moving bulky evaporating goods by road is a losing proposition – wear and tear on hard to replace trucks. Forward of Egypt there is one major plant at Sollum, which happens to be broken a the time. The Italian wells were found to be brackish and are on the Egyptian border.
This is the reasons Wavell declined 50 div, to have the LoC troops available to make sustained forward ops possible, but they are not there in the first half of 41.