WI: In 1942, General Gott Had NOT Died & Had Taken Command of the 8th Army?

According to notes I have - British Imperial deployments were as follows on 7th Dec 1941

United Kingdom
29 divisions--6 Armoured Divs,21 Inf Divs,2 Dominion Inf Divs

Middle East
13 divisions--3 Armoured Divs,2 Inf Divs,6 Dominion Inf Divs,2 Indian Divs

Persia-Iraq
3 divisions--3 Indian Divs

Far East
3 divisions--1 Dominion Inf Div,2 Indian Divs

Not all divisions are created equally certainly the 3 divisions in Malaya are not the equal of the Divisions in the Middle east and some of those Divisions in the UK would still be training
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
According to notes I have - British Imperial deployments were as follows on 7th Dec 1941

United Kingdom
29 divisions--6 Armoured Divs,21 Inf Divs,2 Dominion Inf Divs

Middle East
13 divisions--3 Armoured Divs,2 Inf Divs,6 Dominion Inf Divs,2 Indian Divs

Persia-Iraq
3 divisions--3 Indian Divs

Far East
3 divisions--1 Dominion Inf Div,2 Indian Divs

Not all divisions are created equally certainly the 3 divisions in Malaya are not the equal of the Divisions in the Middle east and some of those Divisions in the UK would still be training

So how does that equate to:

Which is an important point I think at peak the UK had around 10 divs in parts of Middle East command not covered by 8th Army.

Because at most you're suggesting five "UK" divisions in the entirety of Southwest Asia.
 
I thought it was "everyone knows" Richard O'Connor was a far more superior and more dashing general... ;)

Granted, his victory was with a single corps equivalent over an Italian field army, but still - Sidi Barrani to Beda Fomm, 8 December 1940 to 7 February 1941. 800 miles in 60 days.

Start of Second Alamein (east of Sidi Barrani): 23 October
Start of El Agheila (south of Beda Fomm): 12 December
50 days apart ;)
 
So how does that equate to:



Because at most you're suggesting five "UK" divisions in the entirety of Southwest Asia.

I did say at peak, so aroud eo July 42,

5 Indian, 3 Carpathian Rifle, 6 Indian, 31 Indian Amd, 5 Inf, 56 inf, 8th Indian 10 Indian plus 7 Amd Bde, 10 Indian Motor and All of which are Persia and Iraq command mainly 10 army.

With at an overlapping date, 1, 2 Greek Bde, Free French, 2nd Polish bde, Palestine and 7 Indian Bde in Cyprus, so 8 div, 1 amd 6 Inf Bde.

( technically 10 amd and 26,29 Indian Bde are in Egypt but not part of 8th army) so 9 Divs, 1 amds Bde 8 Inf Bde as part of Middle East Command ( although note Persia Iraq is part split off during the period.) when 8th army consists of 8 Divs.

by Alamein in October the forces in Palestine and X amd are in 8th army but at their peak there are around 10 divs in Middle East command not part of 8th Army. In fact with an near equal army in Iraq/Persia.

Except your "first" wasn't what was suggested; what was suggested were Blamey, Freyberg, etc. questioning the Balkan deployment, raising the issue with their governments, their governments reaching out to the War Cabinet, Churchill having to defend the strategy, etc.

.

Well the strategy is to establish air bases on Crete and Lemnos in order to bomb Ploesti and supply a minimal force to the Greeks to assist them vs Italy and eventually prevent the Germans from establishing bases on the Northern Aegean. Don't forget that the Brits had been deployed there since November 1940, so its hardly novel. At the same time Italy has been crushed in East Africa and Tripolitania, being defeated in Albania and driven from the Eastern Med. There is a fair prospect of Italy being knocked out of the war.

Also ofc the strategy includes a pro Allied, or initially neutral Yugoslavia able to block the Struma and the Brits know that Germans are on a clock for any operation in the Med, they know about Aufbau Ost and tracked the movement of armoured forces away from Yugoslavia prior to the pro allied coup. Churchill writes this to Stalin.

The problem is not the Strategy its events. A neutral Yugoslavia blocks ( its terms of the tripartite pact with Hitler) access to Greece. A pro allied but mobilised Yugoslavia forces germany into a head on offensive against the Metaxis line while the Italians are being pushed back. Its the speed of the German reaction and success of the invasion of Yugoslavia which makes it fail, none of which can be known in late march when the deployment begins.

Any complaint by a division commander about the strategy ( which is a big deal, Division commanders are supposed to obey orders) has to rest on the strategy being wrong in planning not in execution.

And you have to ask what is the alternative. Sit in Tripolitania or continue the advance to the Borders of Vichy North Africa at a time when the planning or the Invasion of Syria is advanced. Rashid Ali after the failed coup in Iraq controls the Syrian/Iraq border and Syria is within a few miles of the oil pipeline to Haifa which supplies the entire med theatre.

This is a complex fast moving situation. An Alternative is the Yugoslavs do mobilise in time ( i.e. the Germans delay) the Left flank of the Metaxis line is secured, Italy knocked out of the war and a large part of Army Group South not available and a shaky Romania.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I suspect that Alexander would have kept Gott on a fairly short leash. Gotts defect, whatever they were, would have been largely covered by Alexanders operational skills and intervention. This leads to another question, of why Alexander did not push Monty harder in the pursuit, or replace him. Was there something Alexanders perception of the situation that caused him to think the pursuit was as fast as practical?

Alexander was also an infantry specialist (Irish Guards) who had spent World War I on the Western Front, did the usual round of garrison, staff, training, and career education assignments one would expect in the interwar period, and then served as commanding general of the regular 1st Division and then the I Corps in France in 1939-40, including the final days at Dunkirk. After that, he had a defensive command in the UK, and then went out to Burma in 1942, and was defeated by the Japanese. He went back to the UK, got the nod for commanding the British expeditionary force for TORCH, and then was called upon to replace Auchinleck as what amounted to a theater commander in Egypt and Libya.

So, all in all, his experience in mobile warfare on the offensive wasn't exactly overwhelming in 1942.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
I did say at peak, so aroud eo July 42, 5 Indian, 3 Carpathian Rifle, 6 Indian, 31 Indian Amd, 5 Inf, 56 inf, 8th Indian 10 Indian plus 7 Amd Bde, 10 Indian Motor and All of which are Persia and Iraq command mainly 10 army.

Well the strategy is to establish air bases on Crete and Lemnos in order to bomb Ploesti and supply a minimal force to the Greeks to assist them vs Italy and eventually prevent the Germans from establishing bases on the Northern Aegean. Don't forget that the Brits had been deployed there since November 1940, so its hardly novel. At the same time Italy has been crushed in East Africa and Tripolitania, being defeated in Albania and driven from the Eastern Med. There is a fair prospect of Italy being knocked out of the war.

Also ofc the strategy includes a pro Allied, or initially neutral Yugoslavia able to block the Struma and the Brits know that Germans are on a clock for any operation in the Med, they know about Aufbau Ost and tracked the movement of armoured forces away from Yugoslavia prior to the pro allied coup. Churchill writes this to Stalin.

The problem is not the Strategy its events. A neutral Yugoslavia blocks ( its terms of the tripartite pact with Hitler) access to Greece. A pro allied but mobilised Yugoslavia forces germany into a head on offensive against the Metaxis line while the Italians are being pushed back. Its the speed of the German reaction and success of the invasion of Yugoslavia which makes it fail, none of which can be known in late march when the deployment begins.

Any complaint by a division commander about the strategy ( which is a big deal, Division commanders are supposed to obey orders) has to rest on the strategy being wrong in planning not in execution.

And you have to ask what is the alternative. Sit in Tripolitania or continue the advance to the Borders of Vichy North Africa at a time when the planning or the Invasion of Syria is advanced. Rashid Ali after the failed coup in Iraq controls the Syrian/Iraq border and Syria is within a few miles of the oil pipeline to Haifa which supplies the entire med theatre.

This is a complex fast moving situation. An Alternative is the Yugoslavs do mobilise in time ( i.e. the Germans delay) the Left flank of the Metaxis line is secured, Italy knocked out of the war and a large part of Army Group South not available and a shaky Romania.

Still a long way from 10 "UK" divisions, however, which is the statement I was curious about. It's also worth pointing out that your July, 1942 list (which is both long after the "continue and reinforce COMPASS" idea in the winter of 1940-41, and a few months before the "Gott remains in command of 8th Army" OP in the summer/autumn of 1942) only includes two British infantry divisions, three Indian infantry divisions, and a Polish light (2 brigade) division that actually saw combat as such at some point after that date; the Indian 6th Infantry and 31st Armoured divisions both remained in Southwest Asia as garrison forces until the end. The 6th Division was broken up in 1944, for example.

As far as the Greek strategy goes, Commonwealth contingent commanders communicated with their governments at home on a regular basis; sometimes they won, sometimes they lost, but MacNaughton and Blamey didn't hesitate to do so, historically.

The alternative in the winter of 1940-41 would be to reinforce success and defeat the Italians in Libya (and become "masters of the North African shore" and all that roughly 24 months ahead of when that was achieved historically) or reinforce failure in the Balkans. Seems a pretty clear choice, and given that was exactly what some British commanders were arguing for at the time, it's not exactly hindsight.
 
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Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Any complaint by a division commander about the strategy ( which is a big deal, Division commanders are supposed to obey orders) has to rest on the strategy being wrong in planning not in execution.

It isn't division commanders complaining, it's the commanders of Dominion Expeditionary Forces getting confirmation that their Governments have agreed to the their forces being used in a new area of operations (as required by inter-Government agreement). The NZ Division wasn't used until Greece because Freyberg used this authority to prevent 'his' forces being deployed until the Division was all together.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
True. Blamey was responsible for two divisions in the theater, with a third and some corps-level troops on their way. Freyberg's command was "only" one division, but it also amounted to about 3/5ths of the ground combat units New Zealand deployed overseas from 1939-45. The Canadians and South Africans, as "white" dominions, had the same ability to communicate with their civilian governments, and frequently did. Too bad for the men of the South African 2nd Division that Klopper didn't get more support in time.
 
Getting back to Gott. Any opinions on how he would have done in pursuing any Axis retreat to Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunisia?

Depends on 5 factors:

1. Will the Desert Air Force get its act together?
2. Will the 8th Army staff work be up to snuff?
3. How sick is Rommel?
4. Will the RN advance and forward base as the 8th Army advances? *(They were a bit tardy to do so.)
5. Will the British Achilles HEEL (Monty worked very hard on it.) LOGISTICS be fixed?
 
Still a long way from 10 "UK" divisions, however, which is the statement I was curious about. It's also worth pointing out that your July, 1942 list (which is both long after the "continue and reinforce COMPASS" idea in the winter of 1940-41, and a few months before the "Gott remains in command of 8th Army" OP in the summer/autumn of 1942) only includes two British infantry divisions, three Indian infantry divisions, and a Polish light (2 brigade) division that actually saw combat as such at some point after that date; the Indian 6th Infantry and 31st Armoured divisions both remained in Southwest Asia as garrison forces until the end. The 6th Division was broken up in 1944, for example.

As far as the Greek strategy goes, Commonwealth contingent commanders communicated with their governments at home on a regular basis; sometimes they won, sometimes they lost, but MacNaughton and Blamey didn't hesitate to do so, historically.

The alternative in the winter of 1940-41 would be to reinforce success and defeat the Italians in Libya (and become "masters of the North African shore" and all that roughly 24 months ahead of when that was achieved historically) or reinforce failure in the Balkans. Seems a pretty clear choice, and given that was exactly what some British commanders were arguing for at the time, it's not exactly hindsight.

True, should have said Commonwealth or Empire, But its does not alter the point, The British ( CW Imperial) did not regard the Western Desert as the main objective of Middle East Command at this point until, the Soviets had fended off the 42 German Offensive into the Caucasus. And Gott takes command at the beginning of August so its all Mid East Command.

And Tripolitania, where there is an Italian army of 5 Divisions whose only mission would be to defend the ports one of which has its own fortress division, and which can expect reinforcement from Italy and the Afrika Korps which starts to disembark on11 February, in Tripoli about 600 miles away from the high point of Compass. And you don't becomes masters of the north African shores until you reach Morocco. The other half is owned by the French who you have pissed off by sinking their fleet and who have a significant armed force, 35,000 men, 90 tanks and 100 rising to 300 OTL aircraft about 20 miles from your oil supply and can resupply or allow the Italians and Germans ( the Italians have bases in Rhodes after all) to reup Rashid Ali in Iraq.

The problem is the British were not reinforcing failure. The decision to reinforce is made in January repeated in February when the Greeks were at worst holding off the Italians. ( and the island bases in November 40) with Lustre starting in late March. It only becomes failure several days after force W occupied the Haliacmon line, its only after this occupation that the Greeks insist on using the Metaxis position ( or only after that the British understood this to be intent).

It isn't division commanders complaining, it's the commanders of Dominion Expeditionary Forces getting confirmation that their Governments have agreed to the their forces being used in a new area of operations (as required by inter-Government agreement). The NZ Division wasn't used until Greece because Freyberg used this authority to prevent 'his' forces being deployed until the Division was all together.

Actually it is. Freyburg's use of his authority to prevent the NZ division being broken up would have been expected, its what all the Commonwealth contingent commanders did in WW1 and reasonable except in exceptional circumstances. The intergovernmental agreement may not apply as the Middle East command was established as the whole of the Mediterranean basin, (and expanded to include Greece, and East Africa) by the Committee of Imperial defence pre war. Raising the Issue in January and February 41 is clearly possible but if the strategy is lets attack superior Italian German Force 600 miles away across the Desert with the Italian Battlefleet in being ( Matapan is an attempt to prevent forces going to Greece) its borderline daft.

Again the British know about Aufbau Ost. With Yugoslavia signing the tripartite pact 3 Pz Divs immediately start moving to southern Poland, the British know this at the time. The Germans are on the clock for an attack on the USSR ( or the believe the Russians are gearing up for an attack on Germany) if your primary enemy is the British you have the workers producing aircraft and submarines or move forces to where they can engage the British, not camped in Poland in unprecedented numbers.
 
True, should have said Commonwealth or Empire, But its does not alter the point, The British ( CW Imperial) did not regard the Western Desert as the main objective of Middle East Command at this point until, the Soviets had fended off the 42 German Offensive into the Caucasus. And Gott takes command at the beginning of August so its all Mid East Command.

As mad as that reads; that is quite correct. What were they smoking? And did it come from Turkey?
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Depends on 5 factors:

1. Will the Desert Air Force get its act together?
2. Will the 8th Army staff work be up to snuff?
3. How sick is Rommel?
4. Will the RN advance and forward base as the 8th Army advances? *(They were a bit tardy to do so.)
5. Will the British Achilles HEEL (Monty worked very hard on it.) LOGISTICS be fixed?

1. Perhaps
2. Possibly.
3. Historically.
4. One can hope.
5. Maybe.

However, to give Gott some credit for his experience serving and fighting in Egypt, the Western Desert, and Libya since (roughly) 1938, presumably he has a better idea of what even shoestring logistics can accomplish in Africa than Montgomery ever would...

Gott led the 7th Support Group (with two motorized infantry battalions, a motorized artillery battalion, and - at most a battalion or two of tanks and mechanized cavalry) from Bardia to Beda Fomm. When you consider the distances involved and the shortfalls in resources, it is very impressive what O'Connor, O'More Creagh, Gott, Campbell, Combe, and the rest accomplished in the Desert in 1940-41, with less than a quarter of the resources Alexander and Montgomery had in 1942-43.
 
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Errolwi

Monthly Donor
The intergovernmental agreement may not apply as the Middle East command was established as the whole of the Mediterranean basin

That wasn't the argument used by the British High Command at the time. Instead they mislead Blamey, Freyberg and their Governments and received the required permissions.
The NZ cable is here.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
True, should have said Commonwealth or Empire, But its does not alter the point, The British ( CW Imperial) did not regard the Western Desert as the main objective of Middle East Command at this point until, the Soviets had fended off the 42 German Offensive into the Caucasus. And Gott takes command at the beginning of August so its all Mid East Command.

The problem is the British were not reinforcing failure. The decision to reinforce is made in January repeated in February when the Greeks were at worst holding off the Italians. ( and the island bases in November 40) with Lustre starting in late March. It only becomes failure several days after force W occupied the Haliacmon line, its only after this occupation that the Greeks insist on using the Metaxis position ( or only after that the British understood this to be intent).

O'Connor and Wavell felt otherwise, as is made clear in Lewin's biography of Wavell. As far as Churchill's chimera of a Balkan alliance, after Poland, the Low Countries, Norway, and France - and being driven off the continent at least (arguably) three times - what did Churchill think the RAF - with all of 80 available aircraft, according to Longmore - was going to accomplish in the Balkans in 1941?

German airpower was a force the British were utterly unable to cope with in expeditionary operations in Europe in 1940-41, for obvious reasons; given the available air strength in the greater Mediterranean Theater in 1941, seems pretty obvious putting any British/Commonwealth/Imperial/Allied forces into Greece in 1941 was simply asking for a re-run of Norway, France, etc., with the RN, as ever, getting the short end of the stick.

Which is what the entire effort turned out to be, after all.

Even if London was unable to reinforce O'Connor's forces to the point where they could have moved forward in Tripolitania - which is an open question - certainly reinforcing and re-equipping the forces in Cyrenaica after Beda Fomm would have made more sense, and in fact could have allowed Wavell et al to make "a strong flank for Egypt" and be "secure in Benghazi," which is exactly what Churchill himself wrote to Wavell on Feb. 12, 1941.

Of course, in the next sentence, he wrote "and concentrate all available forces in the Delta in preparation for movement to Europe."

Typical peripheralism from WSC.
 
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Gott led the 7th Support Group (with two motorized infantry battalions, a motorized artillery battalion, and - at most a battalion or two of tanks and mechanized cavalry - from Bardia to Beda Fomm. When you consider the distances involved and the shortfalls in resources, it is very impressive what O'Connor, O'More Creagh, Gott, Campbell, Combe, and the rest accomplished in the Desert in 1940-41, with less than a quarter of the resources Alexander and Montgomery had in 1942-43.

Adhockery and improv might work against an amateur like Graziani. I mean this man did not even provide sufficient water for his forward deployed troops or make any provisions for resupply if his forces were cut off from their wells. When we get to Rommel and Mersa Matruh, we have a different Italian army and a different kind of general with Ettore Bastico actually handling a lot of the logistics for both the DAK and the Italian XX Corps. That is a terrible case of shoestring logistics if one wants one. The British problem is that the Axis did a better job of ad hockery than the British did. Incidentally, Mersa Matruh suggests to me that Gott was not the go-to man after the Auk is sacked. Gott, based on faulty information he received, and wrong tactical thinking made at least two major errors during the battle.

… While this attack was being prepared, XIII Corps was actually holding its own. In the south the 1st Armoured Division was still successfully holding up 15 Panzer and Ariete. 21 Panzer had moved south, and was now attacking the New Zealand division from the east, but again without success. The main threat now came from 90th Light, which was heading towards the coast road. More confusion was caused on the Allied side when General Freyberg was wounded. He was succeeded by Brigadier Inglis, who asked for a target for any side-step. Gott misinterpreted this as meaning that the division was in quite a bad state, and appears to have suggested that it should move back to the El Alamein line.

Late in the afternoon an armoured unit from 1st Armoured Division attacked 21 Panzer east of Minqar Qaim. 21 Panzer halted its own attacks, and asked for help. Rommel's rather typical response was to order the Afrika Korps to prepare to pursue the Allies east towards Fuka. He also sent the Littorio division to the front, and repeated 90th Light's orders to cut the coast road.

At 1900 90th Light reached the coast road. X Corps HQ moved west into Marsa Matruh, temporarily putting it out of touch with 8th Army HQ.

At 1920 Gott issued the retreat orders to 1st Armoured and 5th Indian Divisions of XIII Corps, without first checking with Army HQ. This left X Corps dangerously isolated, and Auchinleck ordered them to withdraw. If this order had arrived promptly, then X Corps would probably have been able to break through the German forces on the coast road, but this order didn’t reach the Corps HQ until 0430 on the following day.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Adhockery and improv might work against an amateur like Graziani. I mean this man did not even provide sufficient water for his forward deployed troops or make any provisions for resupply if his forces were cut off from their wells. When we get to Rommel and Mersa Matruh, we have a different Italian army and a different kind of general with Ettore Bastico actually handling a lot of the logistics for both the DAK and the Italian XX Corps. That is a terrible case of shoestring logistics if one wants one. The British problem is that the Axis did a better job of ad hockery than the British did. Incidentally, Mersa Matruh suggests to me that Gott was not the go-to man after the Auk is sacked. Gott, based on faulty information he received, and wrong tactical thinking made at least two major errors during the battle.

About par for the course the British during Gazala, but nonetheless, Mersa Matruh predated Churchill's decision to give Gott the entire 8th Army, so apparently he was forgiven. The history of the British effort in the eastern Med in 1940-42 was a repeated series of poor decisions in London reverberating down to the men at the sharp end. Given the above, it's a wonder that those in command in 1940-41 (Wavell et al) or in 1941-42 (Auchinleck et al) did as well as they did.

Focusing on ONE front in 1941 and destroying the Italians in Africa would have paid dividends, and in 1942, given the largesse coming because of US entry in the war, it seems unlikely the British et al under Gott would have been any less effective on the defensive (1st Alamein) then they were historically. Whether 8th Army under Gott on the offensive in 1942 (2nd Alamein) and the pursuit would have been any more or less effective is an open question; Gott, at least, knew the desert and the Axis desert army in 1942; Montgomery did not.
 
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Focusing on ONE front in 1941 and destroying the Italians in Africa would have paid dividends

But which front? - the Italians were not cleared from Red Sea ports until June 1941. The East African campaign is often overlooked but this, and Syria/Iraq campaigns, stretched Wavell's resources.

it seems unlikely the British et al under Gott would have been any less effective on the defensive (1st Alamein)

Technically the British spent much of 1st Alamein on the offensive, but to no great effect. British casualties in this battle were very close to those of 2nd Alamein.
 
This leads to another question, of why Alexander did not push Monty harder in the pursuit, or replace him

Monty was almost as good as Rommel or even McClellan for ignoring what High Command ordered.

And really can't can him after the PR crowing over him winning at 2nd Alamein
 
As mad as that reads; that is quite correct. What were they smoking? And did it come from Turkey?

They were looking at the apparent collapse of the Soviet Southern Armies during Blue. 2nd week of the August the Germans are in Krasnodar Pyatigorsk and have a flag on Mt Elbrus.

That wasn't the argument used by the British High Command at the time. Instead they mislead Blamey, Freyberg and their Governments and received the required permissions.
The NZ cable is here.
Which refers to operating as a division, with armour and alongside the Australians ( basically get a corps command and you are at the top table) it says nothing about location. In fact the war cabinet sought permission from the Aus and NZ government, which was given in March.

O'Connor and Wavell felt otherwise, as is made clear in Lewin's biography of Wavell. As far as Churchill's chimera of a Balkan alliance, after Poland, the Low Countries, Norway, and France - and being driven off the continent at least (arguably) three times - what did Churchill think the RAF - with all of 80 available aircraft, according to Longmore - was going to accomplish in the Balkans in 1941?

German airpower was a force the British were utterly unable to cope with in expeditionary operations in Europe in 1940-41, for obvious reasons; given the available air strength in the greater Mediterranean Theater in 1941, seems pretty obvious putting any British/Commonwealth/Imperial/Allied forces into Greece in 1941 was simply asking for a re-run of Norway, France, etc., with the RN, as ever, getting the short end of the stick.

Which is what the entire effort turned out to be, after all.

Even if London was unable to reinforce O'Connor's forces to the point where they could have moved forward in Tripolitania - which is an open question - certainly reinforcing and re-equipping the forces in Cyrenaica after Beda Fomm would have made more sense, and in fact could have allowed Wavell et al to make "a strong flank for Egypt" and be "secure in Benghazi," which is exactly what Churchill himself wrote to Wavell on Feb. 12, 1941.

Of course, in the next sentence, he wrote "and concentrate all available forces in the Delta in preparation for movement to Europe."

Typical peripheralism from WSC.

Well it was not obvious to Wavell or Cunningham or Longmore in March 41 where, with the knowledge of the German deployment into Bulgaria, they agreed that it was feasible. And it had been the strategy since November 40. The reason there were 80 aircraft there is because they had been deployed since November 40.



'A point which required instant decision was whether the Italians should be chased back to Tripoli . It was certain that if Tripoli were not captured at once the Germans and Italians would reinforce it. Its capture would remove the last of the Italian troops from North Africa and make it impossible for the enemy to invade Egypt again without first undertaking a sea-borne operation. Tripoli would provide another base from which bombers could attack Sicily, though it would not enable fighters to provide cover for convoys passing through the Narrows. At Tripoli the British forces would find themselves close to the French, which might be useful at some future date. Thus there would be advantages in possessing the place, and it was quite possible that the Army could go forward on the crest of the wave and take it, for Italian morale and fighting power were at a very low ebb and resistance was likely to be weak. But, even if Tripoli were captured at once, its defence would make heavy demands on the resources with which it was hoped to oppose a German occupation of the Balkans, especially the already stretched fighter

aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. The Navy, too, would find it very difficult to safeguard a supply line to Tripoli in addition to its other commitments, to which might soon be added a greatly increased scale of movement to Greece or Turkey. The Defence Committee were firmly convinced that they must retain the ability to intervene in the Balkans and came to the conclusion that they ought to adhere to their previous policy of halting when a secure flank for Egypt had been gained after the capture of Benghazi. No serious operations, therefore, were to be undertaken beyond this. The garrison of Cyrenaica was to be reduced to the minimum, and the largest possible land and air force concentrated in Egypt in preparation for movement to Europe

Is from Playfair and reads like the minute of he 10 Feb Defence committee. In fact lead elements of the DAK begin disembarkation on 10 Feb Ariete having started disembarkation in January. The British Intelligence at 10 February is wrong. There were already 5 complete Italian infantry divisions in Cyrenaica, with an Amd Division 5th Light and by the time they could have advanced 15th Pz would be available as well as FleigerFuhrer Afrika and Tripoli the only reason for the advance being in range of Bombers from Sicily.

Given German Air Power it seems obvious that attempting to move as far west as Tripoli is doomed to failure as well. The proposition is that a force with a limited number of hard used Matildas, the cast offs of the Experimental Armoured Force and whatever Italian salvage they could manage operating at the end of a 600- 1000 mile supply line ( only part of the load could be carried by Bengazi this early) across a desert could defeat two brand spanking new Panzer divisions, Italian XX motorised corps, 5 infantry divisions who can operate within a days march of their main supply base with its port and permanent airfields.

And one has to ask, then what?

It is by no means obvious that putting British forces into Greece is a rerun of Norway France etc etc ( or possibly you just mean Norway and France.) That only becomes an issue after the deployment with the Greek insistence the Metaxas line is occupied, not the Alaikmon line and the reluctance to withdraw forces from the Epirus army and unexpected collapse of the Yugoslav army. Is it a risk yes. Its a war that is the province of risk.

And one has to ask and then what. IF it works the British have a lodgement in Europe, an allied army they can equip with all the goods America can produce, will have closed off Rhodes and removed the mining threat to Canal, Alex and Haifa and drawn off a significant part of the Axis forces assembling for Barbarossa. Which the British are convinced is about to happen.

Second Front NOW. In the context of April 41 with no USSR and no US direct involvement Greece is not in fact the periphery.


But throughout all of this the main objective of Middle East command is to secure the Canal and oil supply, because as long as this is done the new formations and supplies currently being produced will arrive and then all things become possible.
 
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