WI: In 1942, General Gott Had NOT Died & Had Taken Command of the 8th Army?

As far as the Sardinia and Corsica garrisons go, English language sources on-line are mixed, but from what I can tell, in the summer of 1943, it stacked up as follows:

German: 90th PGD (Sardinia); SS RF PG Brigade (Corsica);

Italian: 20th Infantry (Corsica); 30th Infantry (Sardinia); 31st Infantry (Sardinia); 44th Infantry (Corsica); 47th Infantry (Sardinia); 184th Parachute (-) (Sardinia); 203rd CD (Sardinia); 204th CD (Sardinia); 205th CD (Sardinia); 225th CD (Corsica); 226th CD (Corsica);

That's a German motorized division, four Italian infantry divisions, and three Italian coastal divisions in Sardinia, and a German motorized brigade, two Italian infantry divisions, and two Italian coastal divisions in Corsica. Obviously, a German or Italian division was not directly comparable to a US Army or British Army division in 1943, but the Axis forces in Corsica were (roughly) equivalent to four reinforced Allied divisions and those in Corsica were (roughly) equivalent to two reinforced Allied divisions. So call it two corps equivalents between the two islands, both significantly smaller than Sicily, which would suggest an Allied expeditionary force that would have to be roughly an army in size - so about half to two-thirds of the HUSKY assault force?

That all appeared in the latter spring & summer. Most had been intended for reinforcement for Africa, but never made it. My observation was, with Tunisia secured in December the Joint Chiefs can take much more seriously the proposal for a March invasion somewhere else. What the Axis have would be reflected in what never reached Africa in December. How they redeploy those forces depend in a large part on the already proven effectiveness of British Deception operations, and Italian/German disagreements.
 
That all appeared in the latter spring & summer. Most had been intended for reinforcement for Africa, but never made it. My observation was, with Tunisia secured in December the Joint Chiefs can take much more seriously the proposal for a March invasion somewhere else. What the Axis have would be reflected in what never reached Africa in December. How they redeploy those forces depend in a large part on the already proven effectiveness of British Deception operations, and Italian/German disagreements.

Back of the napkin estimate: 1 more motorized division (probably UK force pool) TARGET: Bone; eventual lodgements Sock Abron snd Soak el Arba. Final objectives, Tunis and Bizerte

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That is modern, but that is where you are trying to come ashore.

Ugh. You are going to need a lot of engineers, at least a full regiment of infantry and LOTS of luck. Lift estimated? 100 ships (AKs), plus a full (UK?) close cover force of at least 1 BB, 1 CV, 3CAs, 7-8 DDs and assorted mine sweepers, tugs, surveyors and auxiliaries, cause that coast ain't charted so well. How about barge lighters and landing craft? About 150 of those. And LSTs, at least 5 to land a full tank Bn.

Follow on has to be 2 divisions minimum. (Hence the 100 ships lift.).
 
I wonder what that looked like in 1942? Principally if there were any automotive roads off the beach.

The larger question revolves around the size of the French garrison @ Bone' & the attitude of the commander & staff. OTL the Allis had turned one commander & suffered only token opposition to the landing at that sector. Operation RESERVIST failed because of the adequate harbor defense and that they fought. What the actual harbor defense at Bone was I cant say.

If the US accepts the British judgement the Spanish were negligible threat, then all three TF can be shifted one space east & a landing at Bone does not require extra forces. I suspect the US judgement of the Spanish threat resulted from the Brit unwillingness to divulge the sources and details of their political intelligence.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
That all appeared in the latter spring & summer. Most had been intended for reinforcement for Africa, but never made it. My observation was, with Tunisia secured in December the Joint Chiefs can take much more seriously the proposal for a March invasion somewhere else. What the Axis have would be reflected in what never reached Africa in December. How they redeploy those forces depend in a large part on the already proven effectiveness of British Deception operations, and Italian/German disagreements.

Agreed, but erring on the side of not giving the Allies an unwarranted best case scenario... if they're facing a German motorized division, four Italian infantry divisions, and three Italian coastal divisions in Sardinia, and a German motorized brigade, two Italian infantry divisions, and two Italian coastal divisions in Corsica, in the second or third quarter of 1943, the Allied forces in French North Africa included:

US 1st, 2nd armored divisions; 1st, 3rd, 9th, 34th, 45th infantry divisions (the 36th arrived in April); British 6th Armoured and 1st, 4th, 46th, and 78th infantry divisions.

The US 1st, 3rd, and 9th divisions all had significant amphibious warfare training before TORCH, and all three participated as divisions in the TORCH assault landings, while the 45th had gone through the Army amphibious center training in the US before being deployed to North Africa. Elements of both US armored divisions participated in the TORCH assaults, and had some amphibious training in the US or UK. Elements of the 34th Division participated in the TORCH assault, but the division as a whole did not have the training opportunities the other US infantry divisions had before the landings.

The British 78th division had been formed specifically for amphibious operations, and two of its brigades participated in the TORCH assaults; the British 1st Division was trained and ready for use in CORKSCREW, the Pantellaria operation, in June, while the US assault divisions for HUSKY included the 1st, 3rd, and 45th. The British 5th Division, which had some amphibious experience from the Madagascar campaign, was (historically) still in Syria until June. The other two British HUSKY assault divisions, the 50th and 51st, had been part of 8th Army in the desert since 1941-42, so I'd expect they wouldn't have gotten the nod for an amphibious operation before July, while the Canadian 1st Division was still in the UK in the spring of 1943.

Given all of the above, presumably any expeditionary force assembled for Sardinia and Corsica in the spring of 1943, and in a situation where the active TORCH campaign had ended in December or January, would have been built around Patton's corps headquarters with the 1st, 3rd, 9th, and 45th divisions, with the 2nd Armored Division as follow-up. The 78th would have been an obvious choice for an accelerated operation against Pantellaria.
 
....

Given all of the above, presumably any expeditionary force assembled for Sardinia and Corsica in the spring of 1943, and in a situation where the active TORCH campaign had ended in December or January, would have been built around Patton's corps headquarters with the 1st, 3rd, 9th, and 45th divisions, with the 2nd Armored Division as follow-up. The 78th would have been an obvious choice for an accelerated operation against Pantellaria.

Strictly speaking the Joint Chiefs proposal at the Symbol conference specified the Brit 1st Army plan & execute the Sardinian op. I've not seen any specifications for composition. Presumably that would have been Eisenhowers call in his role commanding Allied forces in the western Med. I can't recall when the US 5th & 7th Army HQ was activated as a planning agency for future ops. March 43?

Agreed, but erring on the side of not giving the Allies an unwarranted best case scenario... if they're facing a German motorized division, four Italian infantry divisions, and three Italian coastal divisions in Sardinia, and a German motorized brigade, two Italian infantry divisions, and two Italian coastal divisions in Corsica, in the second or third quarter of 1943, ...

Wanking the Allies here depends on how fast they follow up their victory in Tunisia. & where they attack. Theres pros and cons for Sicilly or Sardinia/ I tend to favor Sardinians a better long term position.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Strictly speaking the Joint Chiefs proposal at the Symbol conference specified the Brit 1st Army plan & execute the Sardinian op. I've not seen any specifications for composition. Presumably that would have been Eisenhower's call in his role commanding Allied forces in the western Med. I can't recall when the US 5th & 7th Army HQ was activated as a planning agency for future ops. March 43? Wanking the Allies here depends on how fast they follow up their victory in Tunisia. & where they attack. Theres pros and cons for Sicilly or Sardinia/ I tend to favor Sardinians a better long term position.

US Fifth Army was activated in January, 1943, and Seventh Army in July, although the Seventh's headquarters was largely a redesignation of the I Armored Corps, which had active in one form or another since July, 1940. Fifth Army's staff drew on the US elements of the European Theater and the joint Allied Forces headquarters as well, so there was some continuity there, although not as much in Clark's command as there was eventually in Patton's.

Anderson's British 1st Army included Allfrey's V Corps headquarters and Crocker's IX Corps, so presumably they could each have two infantry divisions and an armored brigade (21st and 25th were both in the theater by March, 1943), with the 6th Armoured Division as a follow-up. If there's pressure to use an Allied force, than 2-3 British infantry divisions and and a tank brigade and 2-3 US infantry divisions plus strong elements of the 2nd Armored seems as likely as anything.

Obviously, any "early" amphibious offensive depends on what happens differently after November, but given the reality the US army in North Africa included three divisions that had made the TORCH assaults, and a fourth that had a specialized amphibious focus, it would have been tempting to consider Patton and I Armored/Western Task Force headquarters.
 
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All that is certainly adequate for Sardinia. Probablly overkill in March, but both armies need actual operating experience & there is only one way you get that. So, why not curb stomp the Italian garrison. Corsica is the next obvious target, so the surplus can be used there as well in the next month.

One of the other things I've not researched is the increase in Allied air strength each month in the MTO November through August 42 & 43. It looks like the Allies go from parity in operating numbers in oct 42, to a 2-1 superiority by April or earlier. But the organizational tables at the start of TORCH, and later in 1943 are more distorted snapshots than a useful long term picture. The usual over focus on the two dozen Tiger tanks sent to Tunisia or Sicilly & other History Channel trivia have left the air battles of 1943 under appreciated.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Gott was born in 1897, so 45 is fairly young for an army commander in 1942. He was an infantry specialist, had commanded a motorized infantry battalion in what became the 7th Armoured Division in 1938-39, served as a staff officer at the divisional level, then commanded what amounted to a motorized brigade in the initial 1940-41 campaign against the Italians in Egypt and Libya, served as a staff officer and planner with 7th Armoured, and then took command of the division in time for CRUSADER, where Gott's command amounted to the most effective "mobile" force in 8th Army's order of battle. He was promoted to command the XIII Corps in time for the Gazala offensive, so he gets credit for the corps' performance both in terms of the defensive stand against the Axis offensive and the losses in Tobruk. He also successfully commanded the corps for 1st Alamein.

Given all of the above, his appointment to take command of 8th Army after Auchinleck is understandable. His ability to successfully plan and command a defensive stand (Alam Halfa, for example) seems reasonable; whether he could have planned and carried out a methodical set-piece offensive like 2nd Alamein is unknown, much less a pursuit and mobile offensive after an Alamein-scale victory.

However, it's worth considering that of the British "army" level commanders in the west who actually saw significant combat as such, Gort, Ritchie, Auchinleck, Montgomery, Leese, and Dempsey were all infantry officers; Cunningham was a gunner; and only McCreery was a cavalryman. None of the other corps commanders in the Desert who predated Gott were available or considered ready, so given that, Gott's experience as commander of mobile forces in 1940-42 was equal or better than anyone else - and if that's the requirement for a possibly "faster" pursuit than what Montgomery was able to deliver, presumably Gott would not have been any "worse" than Montgomery.
 
I suspect that Alexander would have kept Gott on a fairly short leash. Gotts defect, whatever they were, would have been largely covered by Alexanders operational skills and intervention. This leads to another question, of why Alexander did not push Monty harder in the pursuit, or replace him. Was there something Alexanders perception of the situation that caused him to think the pursuit was as fast as practical?
 
Was there something Alexanders perception of the situation that caused him to think the pursuit was as fast as practical?

Benghazi Stakes:
Start of Gazala to El Alamein line - 26 May to 1 July ie 36 days
Start of 2nd El Alamein to capture Benghazi - 23 October to 20 November ie 28 days
 
Benghazi Stakes:
Start of Gazala to El Alamein line - 26 May to 1 July ie 36 days
Start of 2nd El Alamein to capture Benghazi - 23 October to 20 November ie 28 days

This is obviously total BS because 'as everyone knows' that Rommel was a far more superior more dashing general with an extra topping of Auftragstaktik sauce while Monty was a plodding moron despite outnumbering Rommel 50:1 and knowing every thought he had before he had it through Ultra.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
This is obviously total BS because 'as everyone knows' that Rommel was a far more superior more dashing general with an extra topping of Auftragstaktik sauce while Monty was a plodding moron despite outnumbering Rommel 50:1 and knowing every thought he had before he had it through Ultra.

I thought it was "everyone knows" Richard O'Connor was a far more superior and more dashing general... ;)

Granted, his victory was with a single corps equivalent over an Italian field army, but still - Sidi Barrani to Beda Fomm, 8 December 1940 to 7 February 1941. 800 miles in 60 days.

A classic what if, of course, is if 4th Indian Division stays with the XIII Corps (send the New Zealanders to Sudan to invade Ethiopia alongside 5th Indian?), 7th Armoured gets everything approximating an armored or motor vehicle, or mobile battalion, in the theater beyond what O'Moore Creagh already had, and O'Connor is allowed to drive west immediately after Fort Capuzzo; presumably the 4th Indian takes Bardia days to weeks earlier than the 6th Australian did historically, and then the British move west "early" on Tobruk and Beda Fomm. If the British, at that point, forgo Greece and reinforce in Cyrenaica (presumably 1st Armoured is shuffled to bring 7th Armoured up to strength), and with the 6th and 7th Australian divisions also both under O'Connor, presumably they can hold off Rommel's first offensive with the 5th Light Division and the Italians, if the Axis even attack...

Then later in 1941, O'Connor is in command of what the "Desert Army" with the 1st, 2nd, and 7th armoured divisions, 6th and 7th Australian, 2nd New Zealand, 4th and 5th Indian, and 1st and 2nd South African, with (presumably) Neame, Alan Cunningham, and Blamey as his corps commanders for CRUSADER...
 
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I thought it was "everyone knows" Richard O'Connor was a far more superior and more dashing general... ;)

Granted, his victory was with a single corps equivalent over an Italian field army, but still - Sidi Barrani to Beda Fomm, 8 December 1940 to 7 February 1941. 800 miles in 60 days.

A classic what if, of course, is if 4th Indian Division stays with the XIII Corps (send the New Zealanders to Sudan to invade Ethiopia alongside 5th Indian?), 7th Armoured gets everything approximating an armored or motor vehicle, or mobile battalion, in the theater beyond what O'Moore Creagh already had, and O'Connor is allowed to drive west immediately after Fort Capuzzo; presumably the 4th Indian takes Bardia days to weeks earlier than the 6th Australian did historically, and then the British move west "early" on Tobruk and the Beda Fomm. If the British, at that point, forgo Greece and reinforce in Cyrenaica (presumably 1st Armoured is shuffled to bring 7th Armoured up to strength), and with the 6th and 7th Australian divisions also both under O'Connor, presumably they can hold off Rommel's first offensive with the 5th Light Division and the Italians, if the Axis even attack...

Then later in 1941, O'Connor is in command of what the "Desert Army" with the 1st, 2nd, and 7th armoured divisions, 6th and 7th Australian, 2nd New Zealand, 4th and 5th Indian, and 1st and 2nd South African, with (presumably) Neame, Alan Cunningham, and Blamey as his corps commanders for CRUSADER...

Ohhh I have a POD for that

When the Australian and New Zealand commanders were told told by Wavell that their Divisions were going to form the core of W force - the Commonwealth reinforcement to Greece - when asked if their respective government were okay with the deployment Wavell gave a "hmm whot? yes yes they are...anyway moving swiftly on..." type response - have both commanders instead wait to query the deployment delaying the deployment of W Force thus keeping both Divisions (6th AID and 2nd NZID along with the 1st BR armoured Brigade) in Egypt while the decision is moved up to the government level. The Germans blitz their way into Greece before it gets resolved and British Naval forces are instead involved in evacuating as much of the Greek army as possible onto Crete where it is rearmed with as much of the Italian equipment that can be spared.

With 2 additional fully leaded Infantry Divisions and an armoured Brigade still capable of reinforcing Cyrenaica and not having lost all of their heavy equipment in Greece and Crete - Rommel delays his attack.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Ohhh I have a POD for that ... When the Australian and New Zealand commanders were told told by Wavell that their Divisions were going to form the core of W force - the Commonwealth reinforcement to Greece - when asked if their respective government were okay with the deployment Wavell gave a "hmm whot? yes yes they are...anyway moving swiftly on..." type response - have both commanders instead wait to query the deployment delaying the deployment of W Force thus keeping both Divisions (6th AID and 2nd NZID along with the 1st BR armoured Brigade) in Egypt while the decision is moved up to the government level. The Germans blitz their way into Greece before it gets resolved and British Naval forces are instead involved in evacuating as much of the Greek army as possible onto Crete where it is rearmed with as much of the Italian equipment that can be spared. With 2 additional fully leaded Infantry Divisions and an armoured Brigade still capable of reinforcing Cyrenaica and not having lost all of their heavy equipment in Greece and Crete - Rommel delays his attack.

Pretty good point of departure. More realistic than a lot of them.

If O'Connor has what amounts to a field army ready to go in the autumn of 1941, the Axis may even think remaining on the defensive in Tripolitania makes sense.
 
Pretty good point of departure. More realistic than a lot of them.

If O'Connor has what amounts to a field army ready to go in the autumn of 1941, the Axis may even think remaining on the defensive in Tripolitania makes sense.

Not realistic for two reasons. First is that the commonwealth PM have no reason to throw over the declaration guaranteeing Greek independence and obtaining bases to attack Ploesti, the German attack on Greece is also an attack on Yugoslavia, its 20/20 hindsight. At the time of deployment this is a marginal reinforcement, and substantial air reinforcement to a combined Yugoslav and Greek army of 1.2 million men. The German attack on Yugoslavia prevents it mobilising, but stores up no end of problems in for the future and the greeks ofc are all deployed against Italy.

The second reason is Tripolitania is not Mid East Commands priority in any way. The defence of the canal is, and Compass has achieved that. After that its East Africa, Iraq, Persia, Syria and given the 'imminent collapse' of the USSR in 41 and 42 that means more and more of Persia needing to be occupied. If there are spare troops they will be going somewhere else not Tripolitania.

Which is an important point I think at peak the UK had around 10 divs in parts of Middle East command not covered by 8th Army.

Third reason, Rommel would not have delayed his attack, he is a German general attack is what they do. The level of success is another issue but a single amd bde is not going to stop a Pz Div and 5th light nor are two inf div with inadequate AT, they basically have to retreat as the panzers can always flank them inland and force them to until they reach Tobruk where some can adopt an all round defence.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Not realistic for two reasons. First is that the commonwealth PM have no reason to throw over the declaration guaranteeing Greek independence and obtaining bases to attack Ploesti, the German attack on Greece is also an attack on Yugoslavia, its 20/20 hindsight. At the time of deployment this is a marginal reinforcement, and substantial air reinforcement to a combined Yugoslav and Greek army of 1.2 million men. The German attack on Yugoslavia prevents it mobilising, but stores up no end of problems in for the future and the greeks ofc are all deployed against Italy.

The second reason is Tripolitania is not Mid East Commands priority in any way. The defence of the canal is, and Compass has achieved that. After that its East Africa, Iraq, Persia, Syria and given the 'imminent collapse' of the USSR in 41 and 42 that means more and more of Persia needing to be occupied. If there are spare troops they will be going somewhere else not Tripolitania.

Which is an important point I think at peak the UK had around 10 divs in parts of Middle East command not covered by 8th Army.

Third reason, Rommel would not have delayed his attack, he is a German general attack is what they do. The level of success is another issue but a single amd bde is not going to stop a Pz Div and 5th light nor are two inf div with inadequate AT, they basically have to retreat as the panzers can always flank them inland and force them to until they reach Tobruk where some can adopt an all round defence.

Except your "first" wasn't what was suggested; what was suggested were Blamey, Freyberg, etc. questioning the Balkan deployment, raising the issue with their governments, their governments reaching out to the War Cabinet, Churchill having to defend the strategy, etc.

Your "second" is true, but that is the reason why the earlier post suggested it as a "what if" as an alternative to the failed strategy that Churchill advanced, and which ended in defeat.

Third, historically the British committed what amounted to seven armoured/motorized brigades to the theaters bounded by the eastern Med in 1940 and the first six months of 1941 (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th armoured brigades, 2nd and 7th support groups) under two armoured division headquarters (2nd and 7th); absent the Greek deployment, that's the equivalent of two full divisions, each with two armoured brigades and a support group, and a separate armoured brigade. Undoubtedly they would have all faced shortfalls of equipment and supplies, but the same reality faced the Axis mobile forces in Africa in the same period.

Source for all the above is HF Joslen's Orders of Battle, Second World War, 1939-45.

Re this statement: "Which is an important point I think at peak the UK had around 10 divs in parts of Middle East command not covered by 8th Army. " Please name them.
 
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