WI: In 1942, General Gott Had NOT Died & Had Taken Command of the 8th Army?

Thank you everyone for your responses! After reading your posts, let me also ask this
if I may: Assuming that Gott HAD managed to bring the North African campaign to a victorious conclusion sooner than Montgomery was able to manage in IOTL, would
the Italian campaign had than been butter-
flied away? (I for one would like to think yes; Churchill’s mantra of “the soft under-
belly of Europe” has for a long time struck me as dumb as can be. It resulted in many needless deaths & the most useless Allied campaign of WWII. OK, sorry- I’m starting to get into a whole other post! Just remember my question everybody! Thanks!)
 
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I have a few scenarios:
1. If Gott remains in command of the Eighth Army to the end of the North African Campaign he could ask to be relieved if he is feeling burnt out. Gott could be promoted to a staff position and Monty leads the Eighth Army into the Sicilian/Italian campaign.

2. If Gott soldiers on for the rest of the war he remains in Italy with the Eighth Army for the rest of the war and Montgomery still goes back to Britain for Overlord. Maybe Monty is in command of the Second Army instead of Dempsey?
 
I think the Italian campaign still occurs.

Sicily will be taken to secure the Mediterranean shipping routes. Once Sicily falls, Italy looks like it is on the ropes and the political desire is there to knock them out of the war for morale issues.
There are several good threads here on how the invasion of Italy is impacted if Sardinia is taken first.
With Sardinia and Sicily taken, the Italians may even start backdoor negotiations with the Wallies before troops land on the boot itself.
 
I have a few scenarios:
1. If Gott remains in command of the Eighth Army to the end of the North African Campaign he could ask to be relieved if he is feeling burnt out. Gott could be promoted to a staff position and Monty leads the Eighth Army into the Sicilian/Italian campaign.

That gets my vote. Instead of a staff position, he would likely get some administrative role in Egypt or Libya with an impressive title but few responsibilities over military operations.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
With Gott in Egypt, Montgomery is in charge of Torch instead of Richardson. Torch suffered from coordination issues advancing into the countryside after the original landings. It seems likely Monty would be better managing the units on the map than Richardson.

If he changes the invasion plan for earlier capture of a port east of Algiers, things could change a lot. Those details might have been set in stone by the time Gott was shot down.

If Tunis or Bizerte can be captured before the rainy season, then there are huge butterflies for North Africa. Tripoli might fall from the west instead of the east.

Who is "Richardson"?

Eisenhower was the Allied cinc for TORCH; if you are referring to the commanding general of the British 1st Army, you mean Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth Anderson, who was not in a position to begin the offensive into Tunisia until Nov. 25, which given the landings were Nov. 8, really doesn't provide enough time for a successful overland advance to Tunis and Bizerte, no matter whether Anderson or Montgomery commanded the British field forces.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
They were always short. Op TORCH had three assault divisions with a corps in immediate follow up for each. The proposed Sardinian operation of March never had a detailed plan but was to be run by the British 1st Army. The Italians considered the place indefensible & never kept more than a reinforced corps there, mostly second a third rate formations. Sicily was similar until December 1942 when reinforcements not destined for Africa started showing up. There probably would have been a more substantial field army on Sicily by March. Absent the larger losses in Tunisia.

The initial assault of Op HUSKY rivaled that of Op NEPTUNE with five assault divisions. The difference between the two were in the much larger follow up forces, those were unnecessary for the Sicilian campaign, so the fewer landing craft and transports were not missed. The Allied commanders always wanted more amphib craft, incessantly complained they did not have enough, and had to make some tough choices vs doing everything they wanted. Churchill never really understood the limits, which was one reason the underserved SHINGLE operation was forced forward over the objections of the local commanders.

TORCH had the equivalent of five divisions afloat on Nov. 8 (including an armored division equivalent and four infantry divisions or their equivalents); HUSKY had eight reinforced divisions, including three US Army infantry and one armored divisions, three British infantry divisions, and a Canadian infantry division, all heavily reinforced.

The Axis force in Sardinia in the summer of 1943 amounted to a German motorized division and three reinforced Italian infantry divisions, with a reinforced German motorized brigade and two reinforced Italian divisions in Corsica. Not insurmountable, especially given Allied sea and air supremacy, but not something to overlook, either.
 
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That gets my vote. Instead of a staff position, he would likely get some administrative role in Egypt or Libya with an impressive title but few responsibilities over military operations.
The way I imagine it Alexander and Brooke would use the “promotion” as a way of saving face for Gott rather than say he is mentally exhausted.
 
Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth Anderson,

I missed that, but in defense of the notion that Montgomery could have been more decisive, could I suggest that he might have pushed the landings further east? He might have taken the risk to get those airfields around Bone and Bizerta?

Torch-1.png


sooner?
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
The Americans and British both considered landings farther east, but there were real concerns about relying on carrier-based air cover much east of Algiers -where the Axis air forces based in Sardinia or Sicily could have intervened.

And given the need to seize Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers in the initial assaults, the available landing forces, amphibious shipping, and the escort and covering forces were stretched about as far as they could be.
 
if I may: Assuming that Gott HAD managed to bring the North African campaign to a victorious conclusion sooner than Montgomery was able to manage in IOTL,

Not really possible - the timing of the advance from El Alamein to Tripoli was driven by logistics which would not be changed.

An earlier end to the North African campaign comes from taking Tripoli from the west by the Torch forces, as was the original plan.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Which encapsulates the arguments about Torch planning - the US thought it was needed, the British didn't.

True, but given the complexity of the strategic situation in the western Mediterranean in the autumn of 1942, the American strategy of gaining control of Morocco - which had several excellent ports out of reach of Axis airpower, even if deployed to southern Spain - seems prudent.
 
...
The Axis force in Sardinia in the summer of 1943 amounted to a German motorized division and three reinforced Italian infantry divisions, with a reinforced German motorized brigade and two reinforced Italian divisions in Corsica. Not insurmountable, especially given Allied sea and air supremacy, but not something to overlook, either.

Into March 43 there were only two Italian infantry divisions of variable strength, some corps units, and militia. I'm unsure about coast artillery. Air strength was at a low of 130 operational aircraft in November, which increased after 6th Nov. It appears the airfields there were capable of supporting more than 130 on a permanent basis, but its not clear if the Axis were doing more than staging raids off the air fields & keeping the aircraft out of reach. The P40 could escort to the south end of Sardinia & Allied bombers attacked the airfields there with increasing frequency.

The Americans and British both considered landings farther east, but there were real concerns about relying on carrier-based air cover much east of Algiers -where the Axis air forces based in Sardinia or Sicily could have intervened.

And given the need to seize Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers in the initial assaults, the available landing forces, amphibious shipping, and the escort and covering forces were stretched about as far as they could be.

They were considering the PEDESTAL operation, just 87 days earlier. The oil slicks from the dozen odd Allied ships sunk were still there when Op TORCH planning was underway.

Torch-1.png


Landing at Bone puts the amphib fleet in range of the Sicilian airfields. While Sardinia had a relatively weak air strength Sicilly was scary. Of the 650+ sorties flown against the PEDESTAL convoy better than 70% were from Sicilly. Conversely the Allies were a bit better prepared to deal with submarines in November. Those accounted for much of the damage in August & had there been only damage/sinkings from aircraft the PEDESTAL operation would have been considered much more successful. Also the Italian surface fleet was less a threat/distracction in November. Unlike in August the Axis were caught by surprise & the Italian fleet less ready to sortie. Landing at Bone, or further east is one of those operations that looks really risky, but has not just operational but big strategic payoffs if it succeeds.
 
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Well by then Auk is fired as commander middle east and replaced by Alexander. He was acting down as 8th Army commander. After Gazala two things will happen. Auckinlek will be replaced by Alex and an 8th army commander appointed. Gott is the man on the spot but apart from that he is really noones first choice. If Alex decides Gott is too inexperienced or too tired, both of which are probably true, he will get recalled and replaced with either Wilson or Montgomery. But the basic issue is the same. Alex will restore order and start fighting doctrinally sound and successful corps level battles.
I know I'm being pedantic but please what does "noone" mean?
 
The way I imagine it Alexander and Brooke would use the “promotion” as a way of saving face for Gott rather than say he is mentally exhausted.

No saving face needed. Gott is a substantive colonel and Brevet Lt General. In the situation of the day Auk has lost the confidence of everyone, especially the Dominion generals who complain to their governments who complain to Churchill, and Churchill and Brooke fly out to assess and fire Auk, who is now also 8th Army commander having fired Ritchie and Norrie with Auk out then the senior guy on the spot is Gott.

The decision would have been to not appoint him, and leave things in chaos or make the appointment of the ranking corps commander, which is the sensible thing to do. But Brooke is not impressed, Gott seems to think he is unsuited and its easy to see why, this guy has gone from brigadier to Army commander in about a year with limited training for the post. Alexander will arrive but by the time he does Gott is dead ( appointed 5th dies 7 August). The Theatre commander does have a say and given what Brooke reported Gott is likely to tell Alex that he is unsuited but will obey orders. Given the careers of other British Generals Gott is the stand out and not in relation to any outstanding achievement. Its difficult to see him as anything but a stop gap pending Alex arrival but given he is dead by then no point in labouring the point in the memoirs.

if he lives its probably the same fate as Ritchie, rest in the UK, Corps command later. He could indeed command 8th army but its more likely to be in Italy.

How fast that happens anyone guess but the replacement is probably Montgomery as Brooke wanted him. In fact the original commander for 1st army for Torch was Alex, Monty is only appointed after Alex is promoted and Anderson only takes over after Schreiber goes sick in November.

But with or without Gott all the corps commanders and major staff officers in 8th army will be replaced. They now have combat experience which needs to be passed on, but have missed on 2 years of developments in the UK which they need to catch up on as well as advice on the next gen of weapons and tactics.
 
True, but given the complexity of the strategic situation in the western Mediterranean in the autumn of 1942, the American strategy of gaining control of Morocco - which had several excellent ports out of reach of Axis airpower, even if deployed to southern Spain - seems prudent.

Up to a point.

The objective of the campaign (and nearest Axis base) was Tripoli, some 1200 miles from Casablanca. Even Oran was some 500 miles from Casablanca. Taking Morocco is helpful for controlling the Atlantic, but is a long way from the frontline.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Into March 43 there were only two Italian infantry divisions of variable strength, some corps units, and militia. I'm unsure about coast artillery. Air strength was at a low of 130 operational aircraft in November, which increased after 6th Nov. It appears the airfields there were capable of supporting more than 130 on a permanent basis, but its not clear if the Axis were doing more than staging raids off the air fields & keeping the aircraft out of reach. The P-40 could escort to the south end of Sardinia & Allied bombers attacked the airfields there with increasing frequency. They were considering the PEDESTAL operation, just 87 days earlier. The oil slicks from the dozen odd Allied ships sunk were still there when Op TORCH planning was underway.

Landing at Bone puts the amphib fleet in range of the Sicilian airfields. While Sardinia had a relatively weak air strength Sicily was scary. Of the 650+ sorties flown against the PEDESTAL convoy better than 70% were from Sicilly. Conversely the Allies were a bit better prepared to deal with submarines in November. Those accounted for much of the damage in August & had there been only damage/sinkings from aircraft the PEDESTAL operation would have been considered much more successful. Also the Italian surface fleet was less a threat/distraction in November. Unlike in August the Axis were caught by surprise & the Italian fleet less ready to sortie. Landing at Bone, or further east is one of those operations that looks really risky, but has not just operational but big strategic payoffs if it succeeds.

As far as the Sardinia and Corsica garrisons go, English language sources on-line are mixed, but from what I can tell, in the summer of 1943, it stacked up as follows:

German: 90th PGD (Sardinia); SS RF PG Brigade (Corsica);

Italian: 20th Infantry (Corsica); 30th Infantry (Sardinia); 31st Infantry (Sardinia); 44th Infantry (Corsica); 47th Infantry (Sardinia); 184th Parachute (-) (Sardinia); 203rd CD (Sardinia); 204th CD (Sardinia); 205th CD (Sardinia); 225th CD (Corsica); 226th CD (Corsica);

That's a German motorized division, four Italian infantry divisions, and three Italian coastal divisions in Sardinia, and a German motorized brigade, two Italian infantry divisions, and two Italian coastal divisions in Corsica. Obviously, a German or Italian division was not directly comparable to a US Army or British Army division in 1943, but the Axis forces in Corsica were (roughly) equivalent to four reinforced Allied divisions and those in Corsica were (roughly) equivalent to two reinforced Allied divisions. So call it two corps equivalents between the two islands, both significantly smaller than Sicily, which would suggest an Allied expeditionary force that would have to be roughly an army in size - so about half to two-thirds of the HUSKY assault force?

Good point re the realities of PEDESTAL. Mounting an effective amphibious operation east of Algiers would require a lot more assault troops, amphibious and follow-on shipping, naval escort and covering forces, and more carrier air power. In the autumn of 1942, the only theaters where the Allies could have found those forces would have been the South Pacific and Indian oceans ... which seems unlikely.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Up to a point. The objective of the campaign (and nearest Axis base) was Tripoli, some 1200 miles from Casablanca. Even Oran was some 500 miles from Casablanca. Taking Morocco is helpful for controlling the Atlantic, but is a long way from the frontline.

Yes, but mounting an effective amphibious operation east of Algiers would require a lot more assault troops, amphibious and follow-on shipping, naval escort and covering forces, and more carrier air power. In the autumn of 1942, the only theaters where the Allies could have found those forces would have been the South Pacific and Indian oceans ... which seems unlikely.
 
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