marathag
Banned
almost as good, as with the 18 pdr.
The French had a good thing it that, but it is possible to have too much of a good thing, as it caused them to overlook the role of gun-howitzers and true howitzers
WI: Imperial Germany does not attempt to compete with Royal Navy
- Thread starter RousseauX
- Start date
The French had a good thing it that, but it is possible to have too much of a good thing, as it caused them to overlook the role of gun-howitzers and true howitzers
To try to answer all:
As I see it there is no good answer for the british. To secure the Empire they have to somehow neutralize Russia and France - their only real rivals on the colonies. They are the ones who - especially allied - are a threat to the Empire.
The traditional answer to the situation for London would have been to ally Germany - because at the time it was the only land power who could oppose the Franco-Russian alliance in Europe. Than have a war in Euope where Germany fights France and Russia and the british concentrate on the colonies with maybe some auxilliary forces deployed to Germany. On paper this should have worked - Germany too was viewing the Franco-Russian alliance as the number 1 threat to it. The problem was that though they had the same potential enemies and (we are speaking late 1890's very early 1900's) they did share them on possibly different theatres of war. Germany was not so interested in the colonial conflict that it would dare risk a 2 front life and death war in Europe for it - this is a very understandable position I think but it also ment that London could not rely at all on Germany to help protect its Empire. This was actually tried and failed - see the Yangtze Agreement. Germany was bound to help London to oppose Russia in Manchuria but still refused to do so - Berlin really had no interest in Manchuria and to risk an european confrontation with Russia because of it was out of the question.
So with a german alliance out of the picture - we are around 1902 - London has none to rely on in Europe who could help against Russia and France. So first they ally Japan but ultimately they decide that if they can't (or don't want to) oppose the Franco-Russian alliance they have to join which leads to the entente.
The naval arms race I really see as a convenient tool by the british admirality: they needed someone to point at when demanding more and more money for more and bigger ships. This does not mean that on the German part Tirpitz did not hope to oppose the Royal Navy - but i don't think it was realistic ambition (as soon as their land supremacy was challenged the naval arms race went right out the window - the army was life and death in importance and a navy a luxury for Germany). But back to the british: look at the debates in pairlament: the admirality was not even demanding the ships based on how many ships Germany was building but on how many ships it could potentially build. OTOH I do think that the naval arms race did do much to cement Germany as the number one enemy in the minds of the british public.
But there were problems with the Entente as well: Russia was not respecting the treaty in regards of Persia. At the time the politicans of western Europe vastly overestimated the stregth and potential of Russia (though seeing how they became one of the superpowers of the 20th century the potential maybe not so much). The point is some (IIRC Sir Arthur Nicolson was one of them) saw a conflict with Russia in the long run hopeless and supported a strongly pro Russian line based on this. But because of Russian disregard of previous agreements its doubtful how much longer this line could be supported.
For the british the status quo was ideal. In any European conflict one side would win - and necesserily be the hegemon of the continent (none would have guessed that the winning would cost so much that it will cripple the winner - and the whole continent - as well) and free to sooner or later turn its attention on the colonies.
As I see it there is no good answer for the british. To secure the Empire they have to somehow neutralize Russia and France - their only real rivals on the colonies. They are the ones who - especially allied - are a threat to the Empire.
The traditional answer to the situation for London would have been to ally Germany - because at the time it was the only land power who could oppose the Franco-Russian alliance in Europe. Than have a war in Euope where Germany fights France and Russia and the british concentrate on the colonies with maybe some auxilliary forces deployed to Germany. On paper this should have worked - Germany too was viewing the Franco-Russian alliance as the number 1 threat to it. The problem was that though they had the same potential enemies and (we are speaking late 1890's very early 1900's) they did share them on possibly different theatres of war. Germany was not so interested in the colonial conflict that it would dare risk a 2 front life and death war in Europe for it - this is a very understandable position I think but it also ment that London could not rely at all on Germany to help protect its Empire. This was actually tried and failed - see the Yangtze Agreement. Germany was bound to help London to oppose Russia in Manchuria but still refused to do so - Berlin really had no interest in Manchuria and to risk an european confrontation with Russia because of it was out of the question.
So with a german alliance out of the picture - we are around 1902 - London has none to rely on in Europe who could help against Russia and France. So first they ally Japan but ultimately they decide that if they can't (or don't want to) oppose the Franco-Russian alliance they have to join which leads to the entente.
The naval arms race I really see as a convenient tool by the british admirality: they needed someone to point at when demanding more and more money for more and bigger ships. This does not mean that on the German part Tirpitz did not hope to oppose the Royal Navy - but i don't think it was realistic ambition (as soon as their land supremacy was challenged the naval arms race went right out the window - the army was life and death in importance and a navy a luxury for Germany). But back to the british: look at the debates in pairlament: the admirality was not even demanding the ships based on how many ships Germany was building but on how many ships it could potentially build. OTOH I do think that the naval arms race did do much to cement Germany as the number one enemy in the minds of the british public.
But there were problems with the Entente as well: Russia was not respecting the treaty in regards of Persia. At the time the politicans of western Europe vastly overestimated the stregth and potential of Russia (though seeing how they became one of the superpowers of the 20th century the potential maybe not so much). The point is some (IIRC Sir Arthur Nicolson was one of them) saw a conflict with Russia in the long run hopeless and supported a strongly pro Russian line based on this. But because of Russian disregard of previous agreements its doubtful how much longer this line could be supported.
For the british the status quo was ideal. In any European conflict one side would win - and necesserily be the hegemon of the continent (none would have guessed that the winning would cost so much that it will cripple the winner - and the whole continent - as well) and free to sooner or later turn its attention on the colonies.
Actually looking at Germany's actions in the early 1900's from a british POV I can see why the relations deteroitated as much as they did:
1. in 1900 the british-german relationship was at its zenit. But in a few years things changed rapidly.
2. The germans clearly sympathized with the boers during the war and made no seecret of it.
3. The germans refused to honor the Yangtze agreement - an agreement signed 1-2 years ago and refused even to show the bare minimum of support to the british (like a joint diplomatic protestation).
4. The troubles about the Bagdad railway started in 1903
5. During the Russo-japanese war they clearly sympathized with Russia, and a german company undertook the fuelling of the Russian Baltic Fleet on its way to the Far East
6. The first reaction of the germans to the anglo-french entente ended in Bjorko. Im not sure how much London knew about that but it was a very strongly anti british move that aimed at creating a continental superbloc that could only be aimed at the UK.
7. The second reaction was again to try and destroy it (the 1st Morocco crisis). In this Germany tried to play nice with the british but London decided it would rather remain in the french camp - understandably.
8. With russia's defeat in the war against Japan and the following revolution Germany clearly attained a near hegemonic position on the Continent. Before that the Franco-Russian alliance was enough of a counter balance to that but Russia has both been proven much weaker than everyone thought and was out of the picture for years. A german-french war ower Morocco was seemingly (we know only with hindsight that fighting at the time would not have gone well for Germany thanks to french superiority in artillery) threatening Germany attaining a real hegemony making it even more important for the british to stand with France
9. Germany was building up its fleet in an increasing speed and became a naval power to be reconed with - the arms race is not on yet but the troubles were already on the horizon. Add in Tirpitz's clearly anti-british plans and the picture looks even worse (again im not sure how much of these were known to London).
And all the above happened in just 6 years from 1900 to 1906. Beside's refusing to renew the reinsurance treaty with Russia in 1890 this was the biggest blunder of german diplomacy. And we are still before the naval arms race - it's just about to start. I stand by my previous post about the naval-race - it clearly did a tremendous harm to german-british relations but ultimately it was icing on the cake and not the real reason for the british-german animosity.
1. in 1900 the british-german relationship was at its zenit. But in a few years things changed rapidly.
2. The germans clearly sympathized with the boers during the war and made no seecret of it.
3. The germans refused to honor the Yangtze agreement - an agreement signed 1-2 years ago and refused even to show the bare minimum of support to the british (like a joint diplomatic protestation).
4. The troubles about the Bagdad railway started in 1903
5. During the Russo-japanese war they clearly sympathized with Russia, and a german company undertook the fuelling of the Russian Baltic Fleet on its way to the Far East
6. The first reaction of the germans to the anglo-french entente ended in Bjorko. Im not sure how much London knew about that but it was a very strongly anti british move that aimed at creating a continental superbloc that could only be aimed at the UK.
7. The second reaction was again to try and destroy it (the 1st Morocco crisis). In this Germany tried to play nice with the british but London decided it would rather remain in the french camp - understandably.
8. With russia's defeat in the war against Japan and the following revolution Germany clearly attained a near hegemonic position on the Continent. Before that the Franco-Russian alliance was enough of a counter balance to that but Russia has both been proven much weaker than everyone thought and was out of the picture for years. A german-french war ower Morocco was seemingly (we know only with hindsight that fighting at the time would not have gone well for Germany thanks to french superiority in artillery) threatening Germany attaining a real hegemony making it even more important for the british to stand with France
9. Germany was building up its fleet in an increasing speed and became a naval power to be reconed with - the arms race is not on yet but the troubles were already on the horizon. Add in Tirpitz's clearly anti-british plans and the picture looks even worse (again im not sure how much of these were known to London).
And all the above happened in just 6 years from 1900 to 1906. Beside's refusing to renew the reinsurance treaty with Russia in 1890 this was the biggest blunder of german diplomacy. And we are still before the naval arms race - it's just about to start. I stand by my previous post about the naval-race - it clearly did a tremendous harm to german-british relations but ultimately it was icing on the cake and not the real reason for the british-german animosity.
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TheSwedishHistorian
Banned
not competing with the royal navy is a very risky proposition as it is no guarantee of British neutrality or support. Would britain dismantle its army to score an alliance with Germany? Its a big sacrifice for a none-promised return
A far less risky option is to strengthen the triple alliance between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany
A far less risky option is to strengthen the triple alliance between Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany
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marathag
Banned
What British Army? They weren't large enough to be a point of contention. It was focused on Colonial security.
Despite the fact that it is a trope, the British Army was not a non-issue in 1914 for the CP. The Germans mobilized 1,850,000 men, the French mobilized 1,650,000 men in 1914, whilst the British mobilized 700,000 men in 1914. The British Army played a huge role in von Moltke's planning, with the man intending to capitulate France before British troops arrived, lest the Germans be outnumbered 2:1 on the Western Front. Of course, historically, things went awry for both London and Berlin, but that is in hindsight, and in 1914, the British Army was very much a concern for the CP, especially in 1913, when the German War staff worryingly submitted that in 1900, Britain could have only mobilized 420,000 on short notice. The Haldane Reforms made the British Army very much a concern for the CP.
Evans II
Banned
Moreover, supposedly neutral countries like Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands already under German economic dominance, and through the potential of customs unions were obviously on the path to German political domination. You add that to Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, a cautious Italy, and German dynastic links with Bulgaria and Romania, and you may have by the 1930s a 90 million strong Germany with political and economic hegemony from Northern Europe to the Middle East. Makes the war from the German perspective, of course with the benefit of hindsight, slightly irrational.
RousseauX
Donor
The British army before 1914 was almost non-existent by continental European standards, and very focused on colonial/overseas warfare
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It not that Germany was viewed as Continental Hegemon in 1914 in the way France was in 1811, it's that Germany was viewed as likely hegemon if they won (especially if teamed up with AH).
Right but no one bets on a 50:50 if they can help it right?
better to jump in to swing the odds on your sides favour and win, than risk having to face a triumphant Germany and AH without an undefeated France and Russia on you side
Your reference to Imperial France dominant in Europe under Napoleon is a good one, but it's the German equivalent of that the British were trying to avoid because how may years of war and how many grand alliances did it take to end that, and economies and populations have only got bigger
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RousseauX
Donor
Grey's logic was basically that either the German or Franco-Russian alliance was going to win the war
If Germany wins then UK is isolated because Germany won
If France/Russia wins then UK will be isolated because France/Russia will be pissed at UK for not helping
The impression I get (this is from reading "sleepwalkers") was that the German bloc was not viewed as the clear superior alliance.
The British Liberal government was basically indecisive about entering the war and until the last minute was against it.
In the end the decision to enter the war wasn't so much done based on grand geopolitical realist strategy or trying to calculate the precise balance of power. It was because the Liberals thought if the cabinet divided over the war the Liberal government was going to fall. They intervened in WWI due to domestic politics.
I suspect it actually wouldn't have taken that much to keep UK neutral in 1914: if Germany had being less antagonistic (as other posters alluded to) in the 1900-1912 period or if they didn't violate Belgian neutrality the British might have just sat on the sidelines. At least until it's 1915 or something and the French were clearly losing but by that point it might have being too late.
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TheSwedishHistorian
Banned
Honestly the end result of ww1 couldn't have been worse for Britain with much of Europe under socialist rule. The best cause scenario for Britain is that ww1 never happens
The thing is this doesn't negate the other (the stuff about Hegemons) because either side* winning very much implied the end of the previous status quo in Europe
It's just another reason to go and be part of the decision making process.
FWIW it been while since I studied it but I don't think the UK gov was actually that divided on declaring war when it came to it, the earlier hesitancy had been more about could war be avoided by other means during the July Crisis. and the fact that no one in the Britain was really looking for war as a positive move to be sought after.
Don't get me wrong you are right it wasn't just grand geopolitical strategy, but it didn't need to be, there were other reasons. E.g. it was also the treaty** with Belgium and the Germans being seen as the aggressors.
*which in abstract implies one side is as good as the other from the British perspective, but in reality the historical context means that is not actually true.
**You could argue that this treaty was only there in the first place in service to that grand geopolitical strategy!
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On the contrary.
The British Army had been rebuilt from the ground up after the Boer War, and the old strategic debate between the Indian School and the European School had been decided in favour of the pro-French "continental" faction a decade earlier.
The staff rides to France, Sandhurst lectures, the way Indian Army stopped upgrading their war plans against Russia after 1907...the Haldane Reforms were focused on building an army capable of waging war against Germany, with the capacities for prolonged campaign and future expansion.
Bollocks
Hansard goes against you as does the near collapse of the government when going to war over Belgium (and to be clear, the declaration of war by Germany on France was enough) goes against you.
Imperial Germaby was utterly at fault for the British entry to the Great War.
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RousseauX
Donor
it's kinda interesting to think what if Germany played diplomacy a little better and UK sits out in 1914
By 1915 or so though France/Russia are clearly losing and it's gonna be obvious to the UK it has to do -something-.
Does the UK gov decide to jump in then, iniitally with naval support but ground forces later? Or does it choose to appease Germany?
By 1915 or so though France/Russia are clearly losing and it's gonna be obvious to the UK it has to do -something-.
Does the UK gov decide to jump in then, iniitally with naval support but ground forces later? Or does it choose to appease Germany?
kham_coc
Banned
No, no, the UK was getting involved one way or another - Appart from the francophiles, and the commitments the UK had already made, the conservatives wanted to join the war, The gov would either join, or collapse, and then join.
kham_coc
Banned
It should focus on ships that helps it execute its strategic war plans - Or in other words, Subs, Mines, and Light ships to interdict shipping to France, Russia, and the UK.
An extended guerre de course, in the North, and South Atlantic, the Channel, the Norwegian Sea, (the pacific should be discounted) - And, with sufficient heavy elements to contain the Russian Baltic fleet.
But It should also integrate it's Naval and Army war plans - More particularly, the army should be told to prioritise the channel ports.
And the Navy should be told that Utilising those forward ports is what it should do.
Frankly, it could do everything the same, and just integrate their war plans and things would be better.
To be fair to the Dutch they did win 2 rounds out of 3
Unfortunately for them they lost the last one
MittelEuropa. Around half of Europe was on the path to being dominated by Germany directly, indirectly or through their allies.