WI Ike backs Britain and France over Suez?

The big reason why Britain was forced to back down in the Suez crisis was US disapproval of the invasion, and their consequent financial pressures. Ike ordered the sale of UK Government sterling bonds, and had an oil embargo too.

What if Ike is neutral? Or, do we need to maintain US support for the Aswan dam project, so that Nasser doesnt feel the need to nationalise the canal (although I think he would do so anyway).

As a result, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, felt emboldened, and Nasser aligned himself with the Soviets, while the UN became weaker.
 
The Soviets would have been pushed out of the region, and their influence in Syria might be weakened if a pro-Western government was installed in Egypt.

The US would have probably had more influence in the Middle East than OTL, instead of waiting until the late 1970s to gain a toehold in Egypt.

A pro-Western Egypt and Israel might have signed a peace treaty earlier than OTL.

Egypt might have developed faster economically being closer to the Western powers and at peace with Israel.

It might have gave the Soviets second thoughts in Hungary and like the OP said not have emboldened them so much, as the UK, France and Israel demonstrated they could successfully project military power abroad, especially against weak states the USSR was trying to court.

The US might have had more influence in Western Europe. Instead by backstabbing their allies, France developed its own independent nuclear arsenal and withdrew from the NATO command structure.
 
The monarchy would be restored a regency for young Faud! I think Algeria would still get its freedom but under a more westernized government.
 
agreed - too much 19th century "benevolent intervention" in this thread's responses for my taste.

I don't think anyone's making a White Man's Burden argument here, they're simply opining that there would be more pro-Western regimes in the region. If you want to take the view that's beneficial wishful thinking, hey, I don't blame you, I wish it too, but it's not inherently a biased argument.
 
The US loses favour across the Muslim world and much of the rest of the third world because such an action would make the US look like an imperialist power. Likely, communism is strengthened across the third world.

Colonial empires don't straight-up collapse as they did IOTL. They would slowly fall apart, but again, I'd expect communist rebellion in these colonies because communism would be associated even more than OTL with anticolonialism.
 
I don't think anyone's making a White Man's Burden argument here, they're simply opining that there would be more pro-Western regimes in the region. If you want to take the view that's beneficial wishful thinking, hey, I don't blame you, I wish it too, but it's not inherently a biased argument.
I hear what your saying and no offense to the poster of tthe example i use further down, but I often see a "Rudyard Kipling" persepctive applied to PoDs concerning Western intervention in the developing world where in reality it's done just as much harm as good.

Egypt might have developed faster economically beingcloser to the Western powers and at peace with Israel.

Not to say thats not a possible outcome of course - its that I see this line of thinking repeated over and over again in the context of this type of subject matter on this forum is all.
 
No offense to the poster but I see the follow quite often when it comes to Western intervention PoDs

Not to say thats not a possible outcome - its that I see repeated over and over again in the context of this subject matter on here.

Fair enough. I do think "west wins in X = instantly new Asian Tiger analogue" is a little overdone and not a foregone conclusion.
 
The best chance for the British and French is that they wait until after the US elections (Nov 6). It would only be something like a week delay. The US may still publicly be against the invasion, but Ike may not take actual measures to compel the British to back down. Since the invasion would occur after the Soviet invasion of Hungary (Nov 4), it might be seen as a kind of quid pro quo retaliation against a Soviet proxy and therefore be more accepted by some of the international public.

I think the British and French would be more successful in regaining control of the canal, perhaps under some form of international supervision with Egyptian participation but not control, but not successful in removing Nasser. Nasser would receive a huge blow to prestige and Nasserite version of Arab Nationalism be much less attractive, but I don't think the monarchy is coming back. At most, one of the other 1952 coup leaders will step up and replace Nasser eventually, although Nasser will likely still have a role unless he is totally removed from power in palace intrigue. Any long term benefits to the West really depends on what happens in Cairo behind close doors as a result.

Everything depends on whether the Anglo-French forces completely control the canal zone and defeat Nasser's "people's war". If so, Nasser has to come to some sort of political deal - perhaps with US mediation. If not, then it'll turn out in defeat regardless. But if Israel controls all of the Sinai, and Britain & France controls the canal zone (and shipping can go through), then they can hold out indefinitely as long as they retain popular support at home and can fend off international diplomacy against them. Both are a big if, but is possible. If so, then eventually Egypt has to make some kind of deal.

There will be no peace deal between Israel and Egypt although the Sinai might be completely demilitarized (and if there is international control of the canal, there may never be Egyptian troops allowed back there) and Gaza occupied. Israel won't get to keep the Sinai although strategically they may never have to worry about an attack there ever again.

Arab Nationalism will likely take a more Soviet turn, and the Ba'athist version gain dominance over the Nasserite version. ITTL, the attack is probably blamed for an eventual increase in Soviet influence in Syria and Iraq, although compared to OTL it is probably almost no different.

British and French prestige in the region would be increased although at the price of greater hostility. But this will not confer any real advantage to either of them.

The US is put in a very hard position if diplomatically it supports Egypt, but takes no practical action to force the British out. Things could go right that the US looks good in the Arab world, but a lot could go wrong. Again, much depends on what happens in Cairo during the crisis.
 
The best chance for the British and French is that they wait until after the US elections (Nov 6). It would only be something like a week delay. The US may still publicly be against the invasion, but Ike may not take actual measures to compel the British to back down.

Why would Ike do that? He supported Suez not because of fears of the electorate, but because of fears of the third world thinking he was on the side of the colonial empires.

Since the invasion would occur after the Soviet invasion of Hungary (Nov 4), it might be seen as a kind of quid pro quo retaliation against a Soviet proxy and therefore be more accepted by some of the international public.

I doubt it. The resemblance between Suez and Hungary were even noted IOTL and it was one of the reasons Britain and France lost favour in regards to it, because it would make the US look like a hypocrite. If the similarities were more apparent, the US would be less likely to support Suez, not more.
 
Why would Ike do that? He supported Suez not because of fears of the electorate, but because of fears of the third world thinking he was on the side of the colonial empires.

I think you are discounting the severity of Ike's reaction as to its timing. Ike has to show he is a strong leader in only a few days before the election lest it somehow impact the election. Afterwards, he can act in a much more leisurely manner.

I doubt it. The resemblance between Suez and Hungary were even noted IOTL and it was one of the reasons Britain and France lost favour in regards to it, because it would make the US look like a hypocrite. If the similarities were more apparent, the US would be less likely to support Suez, not more.

I think there is a huge difference between attacking Egypt before the Soviet attack - which complicates denouncing them at the time it happens, and an attack on Egypt afterwards when it is obvious nothing will dissuade the Soviets. In the Third World, people won't care, but it will go down much more smoothly in the First.
 
I think there is a huge difference between attacking Egypt before the Soviet attack - which complicates denouncing them at the time it happens, and an attack on Egypt afterwards when it is obvious nothing will dissuade the Soviets. In the Third World, people won't care, but it will go down much more smoothly in the First.

But the point was that Eisenhower wanted to avoid alienating the Third World, and he obviously did it at the expense of the First.
 
But the point was that Eisenhower wanted to avoid alienating the Third World, and he obviously did it at the expense of the First.

Which is why I still say he will publicly condemn the attack. I'm not convinced though he will move so quickly to hit the British hard on the financial issue if it happens after the election and after the Soviets invade Hungary first. People are going to concentrate on the public aspects of diplomacy. Governments concentrate on actual effective measures.
 
I think a big difference would be the success of CENTO; Nasser was a major opponent of the Baghdad Pact as it would shift the centre of power in the middle east from Cairo to Baghdad. If Nasser ended his opposition to CENTO Suez wouldn't have happened.

Oh, and CVA01!
 
The best chance for the British and French is that they wait until after the US elections (Nov 6). It would only be something like a week delay. The US may still publicly be against the invasion, but Ike may not take actual measures to compel the British to back down. Since the invasion would occur after the Soviet invasion of Hungary (Nov 4), it might be seen as a kind of quid pro quo retaliation against a Soviet proxy and therefore be more accepted by some of the international public.

I think the British and French would be more successful in regaining control of the canal, perhaps under some form of international supervision with Egyptian participation but not control, but not successful in removing Nasser. Nasser would receive a huge blow to prestige and Nasserite version of Arab Nationalism be much less attractive, but I don't think the monarchy is coming back. At most, one of the other 1952 coup leaders will step up and replace Nasser eventually, although Nasser will likely still have a role unless he is totally removed from power in palace intrigue. Any long term benefits to the West really depends on what happens in Cairo behind close doors as a result.

Everything depends on whether the Anglo-French forces completely control the canal zone and defeat Nasser's "people's war". If so, Nasser has to come to some sort of political deal - perhaps with US mediation. If not, then it'll turn out in defeat regardless. But if Israel controls all of the Sinai, and Britain & France controls the canal zone (and shipping can go through), then they can hold out indefinitely as long as they retain popular support at home and can fend off international diplomacy against them. Both are a big if, but is possible. If so, then eventually Egypt has to make some kind of deal.

There will be no peace deal between Israel and Egypt although the Sinai might be completely demilitarized (and if there is international control of the canal, there may never be Egyptian troops allowed back there) and Gaza occupied. Israel won't get to keep the Sinai although strategically they may never have to worry about an attack there ever again.

Arab Nationalism will likely take a more Soviet turn, and the Ba'athist version gain dominance over the Nasserite version. ITTL, the attack is probably blamed for an eventual increase in Soviet influence in Syria and Iraq, although compared to OTL it is probably almost no different.

British and French prestige in the region would be increased although at the price of greater hostility. But this will not confer any real advantage to either of them.

The US is put in a very hard position if diplomatically it supports Egypt, but takes no practical action to force the British out. Things could go right that the US looks good in the Arab world, but a lot could go wrong. Again, much depends on what happens in Cairo during the crisis.
Actually, it would help French prestige in Algeria. Would it suffice to let them keep it? Certainly no, but as I see it the low-level stage of the insurgency would last longer, thus causing a later Gaullist takeover of France under the Vth Republic.
Or, it could mean, if De Gaulle comes in power around the OTL date, that the Constantine Plan has larger success chances. In case of a successful Constantine Plan, France might keep North Algeria and keep for several more decades West Africa in its current state - aside for Guinea - or as the French Union.
Overall, it might make French colonialism in Africa last longer, with larger chances of integrating bits and pieces - including Gabon, Senegal or Djibouti.
 
I think the real question here in the long-term is how long does Eden remain in power in the UK? I don't believe he would resign as he did in OTL, and Macmillan not becoming PM delays the sudden decolonisation of British colonies through the 1960s
 
I am not, by the way, saying that *no* argument could be made against Ike's policy. But that argument should be, not that the (very poorly thought out) Anglo-French actions would otherwise have succeeded. Rather, it is that for the sake of better US relations with western Europe, the US should have simply *let them fail* instead of acting in such a drastic manner. As Henry Kissinger put it in *Diplomacy*, "The British and French expedition had been ham-handedly conceived and amateurishly implemented; designed in frustration, and lacking a clear-cut political objective, it doomed itself to failure. The United States could never have supported so flawed an enterprise. Yet the gnawing question remains whether America's dissociation from its allies needed to be quite so brutal..." https://books.google.com/books?id=HhfceQZ3pmoC&pg=PT495
 
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Eisenhower isn't the only Western variable at play in Suez. If Britain or Britain and France had a bit more in the cupboard in July, quicker action could take place while the iron was hot, so to speak.

Not having things happen at the same time as Hungary would change matters, albeit not decisively; furthermore, in order to get to a situation where quick and decisive action could occur, there would need to be fairly significant changes in force structure, doctrine, strategy and posture in the earlier 1950s and even beforehand. As Kissinger says, it was poorly conceived and poorly designed. To change that needs a fair few different decisions earlier on.

Eisenhower's gambit, although done for the right reasons, didn't have the results that he envisaged, with Egypt and the other Arab states swinging towards a Soviet orbit for the next two decades and the Western alliance severely shaken. He thought that Nasser could be manipulated into a pro-American orbit, which rather underestimated his political aims and world view. In terms of results, it was not his most successful circumstance.

I concur that actually achieving victory in Egypt would be rather more difficult than simply landing troops and bombing various targets; that was wishful thinking. There was no capacity for the Soviets to intervene directly, given the presence of British troops in Libya and effective Anglo-French control of the sea and air approaches to Egypt.
 
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