Wi:HMS Queen Elizabeth supercarrier

FAir point about the Cargo ships, but how good was the Argentinian ASW compared to USSR capabilities the SSN's were meant to handle?
I think that there were S-2's onboard Vienticinco de Mayo and since the Argentine's would know that the SSN's were hunting cargo ships supplying the islands it wouldn't be beyond conceivability to try and lay some sort of trap.
 
I think that there were S-2's onboard Vienticinco de Mayo and since the Argentine's would know that the SSN's were hunting cargo ships supplying the islands it wouldn't be beyond conceivability to try and lay some sort of trap.

I would have presumed that the de Mayo would be a priority target for any extended war situation given that she was in danger of being sunk OTL.
 
I would have presumed that the de Mayo would be a priority target for any extended war situation given that she was in danger of being sunk OTL.
That depends on the British government's position. Given that any UK task force would be months away, I'd wonder if sinking VdM could potentially mean retaliation on the island population. Even without VdM in the amount of time that the Argentine's would have before the UK task force got there they could maybe fit helicopter platforms to some cargo ships in order to operate a modern Q-ship-esque trap. Anything that provides a significant threat to the SSN's operating far from support is likely to constrain their actions, which would make them less effective in blockading the islands.
 
SSN's could be vulnerable to Argentine Navy ASW
IOTL did conqueror not break up the one stealthy attack on a major Argentinian navy force (Belgrano and two escorts) to phone london to ask for permission? Doesn't this show at least a rather relaxed view of the effectiveness of the threat of Argentinian ASW?
I'd wonder if sinking VdM could potentially mean retaliation on the island population.
Unlikely since sinking Belgrano didn't lead to anything?
Would this not mean also at least the threat of (conventional) Vulcan's over Argentina? Would the Junta really dare to commit large scale war crimes against civilians of a nuclear power, not forgetting the international response once it gets out?
 
Would that mean that as well as the CVA's you'd have new Amphibs within the fleet meaning potentially a greater capability to land forces?

The Fearless and Intrepid and the 6 LSLs were new in the 60s and the Hermes was converted into a Commando carrier in 1970 when she was 11 years old. That gives an amphibious capability that doesn't need replacement until the 80s.

If Britain isn't going provide any extra resources to keep these carrier and amphibious capabilities up to strength then it will have to make minor cuts elsewhere to find the funds and manpower within the allocation.
 
IOTL did conqueror not break up the one stealthy attack on a major Argentinian navy force (Belgrano and two escorts) to phone london to ask for permission? Doesn't this show at least a rather relaxed view of the effectiveness of the threat of Argentinian ASW?
Fair enough, but it's a different situation. I'm talking about SSN's operating for several months 6000km from their nearest support rather than SSN's operating a few hundred miles from air support.
Unlikely since sinking Belgrano didn't lead to anything?
Possibly and possibly not. I'd imagine that if VdM was considered a prime target it would be sunk as soon as reasonable after entering the MEZ, so there'd be several months between the sinking and retaliation, and the UK task force arriving.
Would this not mean also at least the threat of (conventional) Vulcan's over Argentina? Would the Junta really dare to commit large scale war crimes against civilians of a nuclear power, not forgetting the international response once it gets out?
I wasn't really thinking about massacres, more abut making life as difficult as possible for the islanders in the months between VdM being sunk and the UK task force retaking the islands. I'd imagine that sequestering all livestock to provision Argentine forces while denying imported food to islanders would be devastating to the Islanders over a period of months but nowhere near enough to justify Vulcan's over Argentina.
 
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How big is this design or from my American perspective, what class of US CV would these have been roughly equivalent to?

Somewhere between reconstructed Midways and Forrestal, probably closer to the former than the latter.

Edit: it's actually slower than the reconstructed Midways, at around 28kts, that's pretty sad.
(source: Conway)
 
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I think that there were S-2's onboard Vienticinco de Mayo and since the Argentine's would know that the SSN's were hunting cargo ships supplying the islands it wouldn't be beyond conceivability to try and lay some sort of trap.

exactly how well maintained and how much training did they have?
 
exactly how well maintained and how much training did they have?
No idea. My point was more that if the UK was unable to mount a task force until the late Spring due to CATOBAR carriers being less able to operate in Autumn sea states the Argentine forces would have had several months to devise tactics to entrap SSN's enforcing the MEZ.
 
No idea. My point was more that if the UK was unable to mount a task force until the late Spring due to CATOBAR carriers being less able to operate in Autumn sea states the Argentine forces would have had several months to devise tactics to entrap SSN's enforcing the MEZ.

British SSNs were built to fight and win against the Soviet Navy with solid crews I wouldn't give the Argentinians good odds
 
British SSNs were built to fight and win against the Soviet Navy with solid crews I wouldn't give the Argentinians good odds
It's a very different set of circumstances. The SSN's would be operating a blockade for at least five months with their nearest support 3,000nmi away. Their enemy would know that the SSN's could only engage within the 200nmi circular MEZ. Combine those two facts and I don't think that it's terribly unlikely that Argentines would come up with a plan to entrap at least one of them. And even if that trap is unsuccessful the possibility of new attempts to entrap the SSN's will constrain the tactics of the UK SSN's when enforcing the blockade.
 
No idea. My point was more that if the UK was unable to mount a task force until the late Spring due to CATOBAR carriers being less able to operate in Autumn sea states the Argentine forces would have had several months to devise tactics to entrap SSN's enforcing the MEZ.

Firstly , 4 S2E would be marginal at best in capability against an SSN. In particular the S2E used the Julie/Jezebel sonobouys that used explosive charges to provide the pings for the sonobouys, which subs could hear miles or even tens of miles away.

Secondly the CVA01 was specifically designed to operate aircraft in rough weather, and at the time Britain was operating 4 carriers and had a wealth of experience in foul weather carrier flying . The weather down south in May 1982 won't be a major problem.
 
It's a very different set of circumstances. The SSN's would be operating a blockade for at least five months with their nearest support 3,000nmi away. Their enemy would know that the SSN's could only engage within the 200nmi circular MEZ. Combine those two facts and I don't think that it's terribly unlikely that Argentines would come up with a plan to entrap at least one of them. And even if that trap is unsuccessful the possibility of new attempts to entrap the SSN's will constrain the tactics of the UK SSN's when enforcing the blockade.

The distance from base won't be a problem for an SSN other than the transit time eating into the time on station as SSNs don't cooperate with ither assets much. The transit time is 2 weeks there and another 2 back and the usual mission duration is ~90 days although one SSN in the 80s did 108 days down south.

If the mission duration becomes a problem then the RN can stage from Gibraltar to give themselves another week or so on station and stretch each mission out to 100 days.
 
I'm thinking if the RN actually has legit cats and traps CVs in their inventory that are more or less equivalent to the US Midway class post re-design, then Argentina doesn't even try.

Even one of those carriers in the South Atlantic in 1982 with Phantoms flying CAP supported by E-2s or something similar and the Argentinians get curb stomped good and hard.

That's something I disagree with to be honest - the Argentinians went for it thinking the UK wouldn't fight not that we 'only' had Invincibles rather than QE and DofE.

To deter an invasion you'd need to change the attitude of the British government in the 1970s not just what flavour of flat top the RN are driving round in.
 
That's something I disagree with to be honest - the Argentinians went for it thinking the UK wouldn't fight not that we 'only' had Invincibles rather than QE and DofE.

To deter an invasion you'd need to change the attitude of the British government in the 1970s not just what flavour of flat top the RN are driving round in.

Yes, I agree with you completely. The Argentinians didn't care at all what hardware the UK had, it barely even registered in their decision-making from what I can tell. The decisive factor was that they thought the UK wouldn't use the hardware it had, and that was based on how they interpreted the actions of the UK government. It wouldn't matter if the RN had two leaky rowboats or the complete US 7th Fleet to throw around - somehow make Argentina believe that the UK would actually fight, and they won't go near the islands.
 
So the question is does Britain which pursues a naval strategy within NATO and thereby keeps up a powerful out of area capability as a side benefit still spend the 70s negotiating away Falklands Sovereignty?

And if this still happens does the existence of an obviously powerful out of area capability due to NATO naval commitment despite the 1974 and 1981 Defence Reviews/Cuts deter the Argentines, bearing in mind that the Intrepid LPD was offered to Argentina?
 
Secondly the CVA01 was specifically designed to operate aircraft in rough weather, and at the time Britain was operating 4 carriers and had a wealth of experience in foul weather carrier flying . The weather down south in May 1982 won't be a major problem.
Oh, fair enough then. In that case Argentine forces surrender earlier with minimal British loses.
 
Oh, fair enough then. In that case Argentine forces surrender earlier with minimal British loses.

Hard to say, shit happens in war. However a single CVA01 gives the RN a good chance of achieving better results than OTL in battle, and 2 provides overwhelming airpower. This stacks the deck in Britain's favour, so much so that they might not land at San Carlos and go land close to Stanley for a short and direct land campaign.
 
Hard to say, shit happens in war.
Of course, but assuming things go largely as they did for the UK except that they have a high degree of air superiority (if not supremacy), then that's the most likely outcome.
However a single CVA01 gives the RN a good chance of achieving better results than OTL in battle, and 2 provides overwhelming airpower. This stacks the deck in Britain's favour, so much so that they might not land at San Carlos and go land close to Stanley for a short and direct land campaign.
Mare Harbour close or just jump straight in at Bluff Cove?
 
The fast jet compliment of CVA01 was 36 aircraft, and because the RN had more Buccaneer than Phantom (assuming the RN gets all 48 they ordered ) they might have 14-16 Phantoms and 20-22 Buccaneers including those permanently configured as tankers. This compares favourably to the 20 Sea Harriers that initially went south in 1982, and the 25 SH and 6 GR3 that the force peaked at on 21 May.

In a broader sense, Britain would have to emphasize her naval commitment to NATO, in particular contributing a strike carrier to NATO strike fleet Strike Group 2 and amphibious capability to the same fleet. They would also likely have to buy the F111k or a large run of Buccaneers and maybe take up the extra Phantom options for the RAF.

Its a massive increase in capability over OTL as each Phantom would carry 4 BVR Sparrow Missiles and 4 Sidewinders vs SHAR1/GR3s 2 Sidewinders and the Phantom had a far greater performance Envelope than SHAR 1/GR3 allowing them to operate further out and for longer than a given Harrier CAP

Also with Buccaneers providing the strike capability this pressure is off the Phantoms allowing them to concentrate purely on providing the fleet CAP

And then there is the is the then AEW capability

As for the configuration of the airgroup - for the South Atlantic mission I would expect the British to cram more aircraft onto this Flattop than they would have carried in peacetime and therefore far more than the 36 peacetime compliment

And that the airwing would bias towards Phantom given the primary mission being one of Fleet CAP with a secondary Strike Capability

So 45 AC - 5 Wessex (Mix of AsW and HC), 6 Gannet AEW, 22 Phantom and 12 Buccaneers
 
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