What if instead of the illustrious class carrier been built the Queen Elizabeth class carrier was built. What would the knock on effect be regarding the Falklands war
Do you mean the CVA type Queen Elizabeth or the modern CVF version?
Cvf version built instead of the illustrious class carriers
Cvf version built instead of the illustrious class carriers
What if instead of the illustrious class carrier been built the Queen Elizabeth class carrier was built. What would the knock on effect be regarding the Falklands war
Good point. The task force was operating in South Atlantic autumn. With CATOBAR carriers it might have been necessary to delay the operation until late-September/early-November. That would have given the Argentine force a substantial opportunity to dig. I'd think that sending a couple of SSN's down to enforce the exclusion zone would make that a lot more difficult for the Argentines, but I wonder whether they'd be put at too much risk operating without supporting forces.Potentially useful in deterring the invasion to begin with.
Engaged as per the Hermes and Invincible IOTL however they aren't quite a panacea. Depending on the maintenance requirements of the air-wing embarked sortie rates might be lower than that achieved with the Harriers, and South Atlantic weather would definitely reduce the sortie rate compared to that achieved with the Harrier. The Harriers continued operating in weather that would have (and did in fact with the Vienticinco de Mayo) halted conventional carrier ops.
Good point. The task force was operating in South Atlantic autumn. With CATOBAR carriers it might have been necessary to delay the operation until late-September/early-November. That would have given the Argentine force a substantial opportunity to dig. I'd think that sending a couple of SSN's down to enforce the exclusion zone would make that a lot more difficult for the Argentines, but I wonder whether they'd be put at too much risk operating without supporting forces.
It was, but I expect that the slow-moving cargo ships that'd be supplying the Argentine forces would be at least as vulnerable to Mark VIII's as General Belgrano was. My concern is that without supporting surface ships the SSN's could be vulnerable to Argentine Navy ASW. I don't think that if they're hunting cargo ships resupplying Argentine forces on the Islands then it wouldn't be impossible to lay a trap of some sort.One issue at the time regarding the SSN's was the reliability of the the Tigerfish Torpedoes wasn't it?
The fast jet compliment of CVA01 was 36 aircraft, and because the RN had more Buccaneer than Phantom (assuming the RN gets all 48 they ordered ) they might have 14-16 Phantoms and 20-22 Buccaneers including those permanently configured as tankers. This compares favourably to the 20 Sea Harriers that initially went south in 1982, and the 25 SH and 6 GR3 that the force peaked at on 21 May.
In a broader sense, Britain would have to emphasize her naval commitment to NATO, in particular contributing a strike carrier to NATO strike fleet Strike Group 2 and amphibious capability to the same fleet. They would also likely have to buy the F111k or a large run of Buccaneers and maybe take up the extra Phantom options for the RAF.
It was, but I expect that the slow-moving cargo ships that'd be supplying the Argentine forces would be at least as vulnerable to Mark VIII's as General Belgrano was. My concern is that without supporting surface ships the SSN's could be vulnerable to Argentine Navy ASW.