WI HMS Hermes and HMS Indomitable had been able to join up with Force Z?

Could the two carriers with their fighter complements stave off Japanese air attack to such an extent that the British squadron might have arrived in Singapore without the loss of the capital ships?
 
Could the two carriers with their fighter complements stave off Japanese air attack to such an extent that the British squadron might have arrived in Singapore without the loss of the capital ships?


HMS Hermes was only equipped with the biplane SeaGladiator as fighter, besides her normal complement of Swordfishes. Hardly effective, as the Gladiator was slower than the G3N and G4N bombers the IJN used. HMS Indomitable only had a small number of aircraft as well, primarily navalised SeaHurricane fighters, with non foldiong wings, reducing the total number of aircraft to around 30 at best. A smaller number of Fulmar twinseat fighter/spotters were also included as well as the normal number of around a dozen or so Swordfishes and Albacores. The Sea Hurricane was a capable, but short ranged fighter, but inferior to the A6M-2 also present, but not deployed in the OTL against Force-Z. The IJN had two groups of around 36 each fighters around Saigon, which had the range to reach Singapore, when using droptanks. With a total of 72 Zero's available, the Royal Navy's two illequipped carriers could only boost around 30 or so fighters, all of whom were inferior in speed and performance to the IJN Aircraft.

Conclusion would be the Royal Navy might be better of without these flattops, as these would go the same way as the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse otherwise.
 
Would it be safe to assume that the British pilots had inferior training to their Japanese counterparts in addition to inferior aircraft?
 
Given a straight addition of a carrier to the OTL "final" situation... there's three obvious changes:
1. Having Fighters up may be able to disrupt the Japanese attack (depends on how many Zeros were with the bombers at the time).
2. The Japanese have to split their attacks over three rather than two targets.
3. The poms have significantly more heavy AA.
So, there's a chance that between those three the Japanese attacks are less effective. I'd still expect at least one ship to be crippled or sunk though, and likely the others damaged enough they have to withdraw from Singapore.

But the reality is by including the carriers you change the board completely...
1. The carrier is unlikely to come alone (add additional Destroyers and Cruisers to Force Z).
2. The Japanese will react at the minimum by ensuring their bombers have extra escorts.
3. The carrier's aircraft change the situation... Japanese submarines forced to run deep to avoid British ASW sweeps (less chance of Force Z being spotted); Japanese search aircraft shot down (ditto) and the Brits able to dispatch their own aircraft to check the false report of a Japanese landing that caused Force Z to divert on it's way back south in OTL.
So, there's actually a fair chance that Force Z would end up withdrawing back to Singapore undetected. Of cause, then it'll either have to venture back out, tempting fate again; withdraw or come under air attack in harbour...
 
Given a straight addition of a carrier to the OTL "final" situation... there's three obvious changes:
1. Having Fighters up may be able to disrupt the Japanese attack (depends on how many Zeros were with the bombers at the time).
Depends on the types of fighters, as the Hermes was still equipped with the biplane SeaGladiator, which was slower than the IJN bombers of the day.
2. The Japanese have to split their attacks over three rather than two targets.
The IJN bombers already had been split up in seperate groups and actually did not coordinate their attacks.
3. The poms have significantly more heavy AA.
That seems to be debatable at best, given the problems of faulty munittions experienced by Force-Z during the airattack.
So, there's a chance that between those three the Japanese attacks are less effective. I'd still expect at least one ship to be crippled or sunk though, and likely the others damaged enough they have to withdraw from Singapore.

But the reality is by including the carriers you change the board completely...
1. The carrier is unlikely to come alone (add additional Destroyers and Cruisers to Force Z).
The Royal Navy barely had spare ships and these were more needed in other parts of the world of bigger importance (Europe). Destroyers were very short in supply and could not be spared for the Eastern Fleet. Cruisers too were in short supply and the ones actually in the region were mostly old D class obsolete and unmodernised vessels. Perhaps it would have been better to join an early form of ABDA alliance, but time simply was too short to do so.
2. The Japanese will react at the minimum by ensuring their bombers have extra escorts.
3. The carrier's aircraft change the situation... Japanese submarines forced to run deep to avoid British ASW sweeps (less chance of Force Z being spotted); Japanese search aircraft shot down (ditto) and the Brits able to dispatch their own aircraft to check the false report of a Japanese landing that caused Force Z to divert on it's way back south in OTL.
Also debatable, as the ASW capabilities of the four DD's in the OTL was compromised by the high speed of the TF, denying them to slow down to make use of their ASDIC sets. The Carrier too would not have made much difference as it only had a few bombers available for ASW at all time, since it also had to keep back some against the expected IJN surface forces, which Force Z was hunting for in the first place.
So, there's actually a fair chance that Force Z would end up withdrawing back to Singapore undetected. Of cause, then it'll either have to venture back out, tempting fate again; withdraw or come under air attack in harbour...
Since the IJN Airforce was launching its bombers in search and destroy type mission fashion, the change one would sight and attack the larger than OTL British force was increased, rahter than decreased. It would also radio the location to its fellow bombersquadrons, so the result would be simmilar as in the OTL. Thsi time the presence of a carrier would only reult in the deployement of the Zero groups as well, to escort the bombers and knock down the expected CAP.
By the way, the first contact was made at dusk, when flightoperations were not possible. The overflying IJN patrol aircraft missed to spot the British, but the British did not know that at the time. Perhaps a better sighting IJN crew in the planes could have sighted the larger taskforce.
 
Since the IJN Airforce was launching its bombers in search and destroy type mission fashion, the change one would sight and attack the larger than OTL British force was increased, rahter than decreased. It would also radio the location to its fellow bombersquadrons, so the result would be simmilar as in the OTL. Thsi time the presence of a carrier would only reult in the deployement of the Zero groups as well, to escort the bombers and knock down the expected CAP.
By the way, the first contact was made at dusk, when flightoperations were not possible. The overflying IJN patrol aircraft missed to spot the British, but the British did not know that at the time. Perhaps a better sighting IJN crew in the planes could have sighted the larger taskforce.

I thought the RN had night operations training fro their Carrier Squadrons?
 
Perhaps with an aerial recon capability Phillips wouldn't have taken his fleet right up to 120 miles off Vietnam as he blundered around looking for something to do. Perhaps the carriers would have protected the capital ships' seaward flank as they went to Khota Baru and attacked the landing there.
 
I thought the RN had night operations training fro their Carrier Squadrons?

That is correct, although only in ASUW, not ASW in late 1941. HMS Hermes certainly was not equipped for ASW missions anyway, lacking the required equipment for her Swordfishes. HMS Indomitable had this equipment after spring 1942, so still too late.
 
Perhaps with an aerial recon capability Phillips wouldn't have taken his fleet right up to 120 miles off Vietnam as he blundered around looking for something to do. Perhaps the carriers would have protected the capital ships' seaward flank as they went to Khota Baru and attacked the landing there.


Admiral Phillips was not an Aircraft supporter, but a classical Naval Officer trained in the old fashioned pre-aircraft period of teh Royal Navy. He did not alter his tactics, even at Singapore, knowing the IJN and IJA airforces had concentrated in the Saigon area and only asked fro airsupport AFTER his Flagship already had been mortally wounded.

This makes it unlikely he would use airpower otherwise, with the presence of a carrier, as it was even likely he would have had this carrier ordered to operate independently from his big gunned ships. (Like Admiral Cunningham had done in the Mediteranean Sea.)
 
That is correct, although only in ASUW, not ASW in late 1941. HMS Hermes certainly was not equipped for ASW missions anyway, lacking the required equipment for her Swordfishes. HMS Indomitable had this equipment after spring 1942, so still too late.

Fair enough Warspite, I didn't know the dates/details only that they had some level of operation capability
 
Admiral Phillips was not an Aircraft supporter, but a classical Naval Officer trained in the old fashioned pre-aircraft period of teh Royal Navy. He did not alter his tactics, even at Singapore, knowing the IJN and IJA airforces had concentrated in the Saigon area and only asked fro airsupport AFTER his Flagship already had been mortally wounded.

This makes it unlikely he would use airpower otherwise, with the presence of a carrier, as it was even likely he would have had this carrier ordered to operate independently from his big gunned ships. (Like Admiral Cunningham had done in the Mediteranean Sea.)

I can't stand Phillips, he was an incompetent halfwit, almost as bad as Percival for idiocy.
 
I can't stand Phillips, he was an incompetent halfwit, almost as bad as Percival for idiocy.

I am not sure that is entirely fair.

Phillips' mistakes cost countless lives and quite possibly Malaya. However, it is easy with hindsight to call him incompetent because he didn't see aircraft in the same light as we do today.
 
Leaving aside his disdain for aircraft how can you explain his track prior to the air attacks which took him within spitting distance of Vietnam, almost running into an IJN cruiser force in the process?

As for the aircraft, by Decemeber 1941 the RN had been at war for more than 2 years and had given and received powerful air attacks from Norway to Crete. That Phillips didn't incorporate this hard-won experience and act accordingly shows that he was indeed incompetant.
 
Oh and what of the opinion of the US and UK officers that the Japanese were a bunch of incompetent savages? By that moment, not one battleship has been lost at sea as a consequence of an air attack. Yes, bunch was lost in the harbor, at anchor. It was hard to imagine that aircraft could successfully take on a battleship in its natural element. Royal Navy by that moment had ample experience (which you mention, btw) of operating in the conditions of aerial inferiority and managed to come through every time. And it was against the Germans, not the Japanese.

Phillips may have made a few mistakes, but it was understandable at the time.
 
Leaving aside his disdain for aircraft how can you explain his track prior to the air attacks which took him within spitting distance of Vietnam, almost running into an IJN cruiser force in the process?

As for the aircraft, by Decemeber 1941 the RN had been at war for more than 2 years and had given and received powerful air attacks from Norway to Crete. That Phillips didn't incorporate this hard-won experience and act accordingly shows that he was indeed incompetant.


The real problem of the entire Force-Z operation was the complete lack of information about the Japanese capabilities and what they had in the field. The British Admiralty and Military intelligence still thought like other intelligence services of the West and underestimated the true capabilities of the inventory of the Japanese prior to WW2 in the Pacific region. Nobody could know the true range of the new G3M and G4M bombers and the A6M as well, which was only seen so far in China in a small number. (Its first large scale use was at Pearl Harbor, just three days prior to the operation which resulted in the loss of Force-Z.) The fact that the Zero could range from Saigon all the way to Singapore and back was a sudden shock for the Allies, as was the even bigger range of the twin engined naval bombers, which also could use torpedoes as a weapon, something unheard of before.

To say in short words, Admiral Phillips still thought the maximum range of the IJN aircraft to be much less than the actual ones and must have thought he could operate as close as some 200 miles from Saigon savely, but not closer. In reality he was only save as far as 900 miles away (the efffective range of torpedo carrying G3Nm and G4M bombers, still with a reserve calculated in) from Saigon, which is even not the case in Singapore itself. G3M's even bombed far away Soerabaja in 1942, but with a reduced bombload and additional fuel.

Admiral Phillips was not at sea for several years and proved to be an excelent organiser at the Admiralty. His lack of sea experience for so long is sad, but not the most crucial thing. His lack of experience with airpower was more important, while he was still mostly trained as a gunnery specialist for old fashioned batlteship commanders. Perhaps someone else might have been better as commanding officer, but it was Churchill, who appointed the man, even though Phillips actually wanted to stay at the Admiralty, as he was the one likely to succeed the already elderly Sir Dudly Pound as First Sealord. (It finally became Cunningham of the Mediteranean Fleet, due to Phillips demise.)
 

The Sandman

Banned
Out of curiosity, what were Hosho, Zuiho and Ryujo doing at the time? Obviously the six fleet carriers are all rather busy elsewhere, but if the Japanese know that the British have carrier support in the area would it cause them to bring their own light carriers out to play? Or were they also being used elsewhere and in some capacity where they couldn't be reassigned to hit Force Z without crippling part of the initial offensive?
 

abc123

Banned
Oh and what of the opinion of the US and UK officers that the Japanese were a bunch of incompetent savages? By that moment, not one battleship has been lost at sea as a consequence of an air attack. Yes, bunch was lost in the harbor, at anchor. It was hard to imagine that aircraft could successfully take on a battleship in its natural element. Royal Navy by that moment had ample experience (which you mention, btw) of operating in the conditions of aerial inferiority and managed to come through every time. And it was against the Germans, not the Japanese.

Phillips may have made a few mistakes, but it was understandable at the time.

Agreed.

Also, what else he could do? Run away and let Japanese do whatever they want in Malaya without even trying to do something?

What he did was an act of pure desperation and it isn't like RAF had zillions of Spitfires in Malaya just waiting for his call...
 
HMS Hermes was only equipped with the biplane SeaGladiator as fighter, besides her normal complement of Swordfishes. Hardly effective, as the Gladiator was slower than the G3N and G4N bombers the IJN used. HMS Indomitable only had a small number of aircraft as well, primarily navalised SeaHurricane fighters, with non foldiong wings, reducing the total number of aircraft to around 30 at best. A smaller number of Fulmar twinseat fighter/spotters were also included as well as the normal number of around a dozen or so Swordfishes and Albacores. The Sea Hurricane was a capable, but short ranged fighter, but inferior to the A6M-2 also present, but not deployed in the OTL against Force-Z. The IJN had two groups of around 36 each fighters around Saigon, which had the range to reach Singapore, when using droptanks. With a total of 72 Zero's available, the Royal Navy's two illequipped carriers could only boost around 30 or so fighters, all of whom were inferior in speed and performance to the IJN Aircraft.

Conclusion would be the Royal Navy might be better of without these flattops, as these would go the same way as the HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse otherwise.

+1

the loss of Force Z would probably be doubled with losing those carriers too
 
Out of curiosity, what were Hosho, Zuiho and Ryujo doing at the time? Obviously the six fleet carriers are all rather busy elsewhere, but if the Japanese know that the British have carrier support in the area would it cause them to bring their own light carriers out to play? Or were they also being used elsewhere and in some capacity where they couldn't be reassigned to hit Force Z without crippling part of the initial offensive?


Historically Hosho was deployed as a trainingship in Japanese homewaters during the first month of the Pacific War. Ryujo was deployed from Palau, supporting the South East front, (Mindanao) attack on the Philippines. Zuiho was recently commissioned and fully trained and operated first from Formosa, supporting the north forces against the Philippines, later joining with Ryujo, furhter south to support the attack on Davao. Shoho was not yet in commission.

By the way, why operate IJN carriers with limmited airgroups, (Zuiho: 18 A6M + 9 B5N, Ryuho: 27 A5M + 12 B5N, Hosho: 6x A6M + 5x B5N) when you already have landbased forces of 72+ A6M fighters and over 100 G3M and G4M bombers, all of them already covering the target area? Also note that Ryuho still had her fightergroup equipped with the older and lesser performing A5M Claude waiting to change these with the more modern and much more capable A6M.
 
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The comment that 'not one battle ship was lost at sea' is usually used to defend Phillips, but I find that to be a very tight caveat about the then current state of play. Certainly the Bismark was crippled at sea by aircraft and other battleships in port, and other large ships like carriers and cruisers had been damaged at sea by aircraft and the RN FAA has sunk a cruiser in Norway by air attack. So surely Phillips should know that aircraft at least have the potential to cause serious damage to his ships, damage which might curb his mission. But its more than that, apparently he created an atmosphere of dread and silence amongst his staff aruond the subject of air attack because he was so pig headed and dogmatic about his invulnerability to air attack. They would not bring the subject up in his presence because of his attitude, which doesn't strike me as the mark of an open minded commander.
 
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