WI: Hitler Goes For a "Moscow First" Strategy

If a Moscow-First strategy is attempted and falls apart as per Nuker's belief (and mine as well - Germany was incredibly lucky to make it that far as they did), it's not hard to believe seeing the Soviets enter Berlin sometime mid-1943. If Army Group Center is nearly annihilated, German morale will take a dive after seeing a repetition of Napoleon (not considering the problems that a Moscow-First strategy will have either - Southwestern Front is still intact with Kirponos, no Vyazma-Bryansk pockets or way smaller ones at that, and perhaps even Odessa is still kicking against the Romanians - who knows). Things like the Lyuban Offensive (if there's a need for it) are very likely to be more successful with AGC needing to be propped up and no German offensives happening. An analog to 2nd Kharkov could happen in the Dnieper against AGS except more successful (whether it involves crossing the Dnieper near the south around Kremenchug or Dnipropetrovsk or breaking out from Kiev is up to your imagination). Either way, the Wehrmacht is mortally wounded from being crushed around Moscow.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Agreed, the Russian road system was non-extant and the railways the wrong gauge. Simply throwing more men and equipment in without fixing this first will lead to serious problems.

OTOH if the Germans take Moscow it will hurt the Soviets badly. Enough to make them surrender? Doubtful, but it will cause all sorts of butterfiles...
In the most comprehensive and well documented study I have so far seen of the Barbarossa Campaign (Nigel Askey: "Operation Barbarossa, the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation") one of the main points is that the logistics, replacement system etc. actually worked quite well for the part of the campaign that was planned, and Askey even documents that a lot of available resources were not utilised for Barbarossa in 1941.

This could of course also be used to say that the Germans underestimated the Red Army, but the image of a campaign run at full throttle all the time probably isn't true. We can't know if a campaign sticking to its original momentum - going for Moscow - would have succeeded, but IMHO it would have had a fair chance and anyway a much bigger chance than the later OTL decisions. Personally I think the idea of marching entire Panzer Corps 100s of kms at the zenith of battle was a major operational blunder, first because it imposed attrition similar to battle looses on them without any engagement with the enemy and because it IMHO was unnecessary to counter the Red Army in the south. A mainly infantry force would have dealt with that superbly, but apparently the fascination with Blitzkrieg had outshadowed the main virtue of the Wehrmacht - the extreme flexibility and tenacity of a standard Wehrmacht Infantry Division - horse carts and all.
 
Agreed, the Russian road system was non-extant and the railways the wrong gauge. Simply throwing more men and equipment in without fixing this first will lead to serious problems.
IIRC the coal and water stops were also further apart than the Germans had planned for, introducing another issue for the Germans.
 
IMHO was unnecessary to counter the Red Army in the south. A mainly infantry force would have dealt with that superbly, but apparently the fascination with Blitzkrieg had outshadowed the main virtue of the Wehrmacht - the extreme flexibility and tenacity of a standard Wehrmacht Infantry Division - horse carts and all.

South was ideal country for mechanized war, but there was nothing there that would win the war in one campaign season.

500 km i.e Dnieper-Dvina line was the absolute theoretical maximum that could be reached with Blitzkrieg, so German planners assumed that if they destroyed everything west of D-D, they would win the war and rest was just forced infantry march to Urals.

D-D was reached in just 3 weeks and then Wehrmacht stopped until adequate supply could be brought with railways. According to van Crevelds Supplying war, German rail system was absolute clusterfsck operating at 1/3 capacity and 1/6 of the actual needs of the Army Group Center.

So the idea of continuing towards Moscow in August/September is a non-starter unless ammo, fuel, replacements and spare parts somehow appear in Minsk
 
In the most comprehensive and well documented study I have so far seen of the Barbarossa Campaign (Nigel Askey: "Operation Barbarossa, the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation") one of the main points is that the logistics, replacement system etc. actually worked quite well for the part of the campaign that was planned, and Askey even documents that a lot of available resources were not utilised for Barbarossa in 1941.

As long as the weather cooperated the dirt roads were at least usable, but once the Rasputa hit anything wheeled was immobilized. Even tracked equipment had problems with the mud, not to mention the extreme cold...

IIRC the coal and water stops were also further apart than the Germans had planned for, introducing another issue for the Germans.

Soviet locomotives were larger so that's why.

And it's not just putting up more water towers and coal piles in addition to moving the rails closer together. You have to have switching points, not to mention guards to keep those pesky partisans away. My father loved model railroads, I attended his meetings to learn more about real railways and how they worked - especially on the Russian Front where they were vital to quickly moving large amounts of men and material around...
 
South was ideal country for mechanized war, but there was nothing there that would win the war in one campaign season.

What the South had was a lot of Soviet troops - which managed to hold the Axis at bay with few outside reinforcements until the end of September.
This allowed the Soviets to send the bulk of their reinforcements against AG Center and AG North. While eventually also forcing AG Center to send forces southwards against Kiev.

For the Germans, focusing on destroying these troops close to the border would probably bring far more benefits than pushing the Soviets even father east in the center (while at the same time moving farther away from their supply base).

so German planners assumed that if they destroyed everything west of D-D, they would win the war and rest was just forced infantry march to Urals.

Something they failed to do in the Ukraine.

So the idea of continuing towards Moscow in August/September is a non-starter unless ammo, fuel, replacements and spare parts somehow appear in Minsk

Going all the way from Smolensk to Moscow in one leap in August was certainly out of the question.
Going part of the distance isn't. After all - the mechanized troops of AG Center wasn't exactly sitting idle by in the second hald of August. Nor were the infantry for that matter.
 

Redbeard

Banned
South was ideal country for mechanized war, but there was nothing there that would win the war in one campaign season.

500 km i.e Dnieper-Dvina line was the absolute theoretical maximum that could be reached with Blitzkrieg, so German planners assumed that if they destroyed everything west of D-D, they would win the war and rest was just forced infantry march to Urals.

D-D was reached in just 3 weeks and then Wehrmacht stopped until adequate supply could be brought with railways. According to van Crevelds Supplying war, German rail system was absolute clusterfsck operating at 1/3 capacity and 1/6 of the actual needs of the Army Group Center.

So the idea of continuing towards Moscow in August/September is a non-starter unless ammo, fuel, replacements and spare parts somehow appear in Minsk

Askey has a lot of details on this, I'll try to look it up when I'm home (can be quite tedious - he has something like 1500 pages!) , but anyway the turn to the South in itself was a logistic burden which could have been utilised much better if keeping the Panzer Corps on their original tracks. I don't think anybody expect Moscow being taken in one long "jump" - but to put it very short: Better use what could be brought up in keeping momentum than trying to create a new momentum in another direction.
 
We can't know if a campaign sticking to its original momentum - going for Moscow - would have succeeded, but IMHO it would have had a fair chance and anyway a much bigger chance than the later OTL decisions.

Actually, we know quite well: it would have backfired spectacularly.

A mainly infantry force would have dealt with that superbly, but apparently the fascination with Blitzkrieg had outshadowed the main virtue of the Wehrmacht - the extreme flexibility and tenacity of a standard Wehrmacht Infantry Division - horse carts and all.

A mainly infantry force would allow the Soviets to retreat from defense line to defense line until said force exhausted itself. Given the logistical realities in the south, this would see AGS stall out just east of the D'niepr. They simply move too slowly to pull off the required encirclements. That leaves AGC with a enormously exposed southern flank as it struggles towards Moscow and powerful Soviet forces on said flank. It was only because AGCs panzer forces were brought down and the Soviet forces at Ukraine were destroyed that AGS was able to advance through Eastern Ukraine to Rostov.

Going part of the distance isn't. After all - the mechanized troops of AG Center wasn't exactly sitting idle by in the second hald of August. Nor were the infantry for that matter.

It actually is. Given the logistical difficulties and the fact Soviet defenses were more powerful in late-August then they were in late-September (as the Yel'niya counteroffensive and Kiev encirclement would weaken them considerably), any further attempt to move eastward then would see AGC take massive losses for little progress.

I don'tthink anybody expect Moscow being taken in one long "jump" - but to put it very short: Better use what could be brought up in keeping momentumthan trying to create a new momentum in another direction.

The Germans had long lost their olinitial momentum when the decision to turn southward came down. It was that turn which restored it.
 
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Situation in August 1941, Van Creveld, Supplying War p. 170-171:
To meet current consumption and build up stocks for the attack on Moscow Bock estimated that he needed 30 trains daily. Gercke only promised 24, however, and the average number for the first half of the August did not in fact exceed 18. [] target number of 30 trains was never reached.

In september von Kluge (4.th Army) wrote:

Army is almost completely dependent on the railways. At the moment the latter meet current consumption only. ... Army lives from hand to mouth, especially as regards the fuel situation.

AGC will not and cannot move one step further until the rail transport is sorted and that did not happen until late september.
 
where do they fall off the cliff in terms of logistics? Minsk? Smolensk?

From the beginning.

It is simply not feasible to beat Russia with infantry warfare, it has been tried by everyone and their uncles. Russia’s space and manpower will swallow invaders. So if the Germans had any chance to win they had to do it quickly with mechanized war i.e. Blitzkrieg.

There are limits to Germany's ability to wage mechanized. If Germany takes every truck in western Europe (they did) and loads the trucks with every drop of oil available to them (they did) then they will be able to drive about 500 km i.e 300 miles or 2500 furlongs give or take, while supplying the panzer armies. If that doesn't win the war then you need to establish supply over rail, but here lies the problem. There is just one double track railway serving east-west Warsaw-Moscow. 30 trains a day is doable with double track, but there was not enough rolling stock, not enough tenders, signalling and switches were destroyed and German einsbahntroupe was simply not up to par.

In order to continue war OKH gave absolute priority to ammunition and fuel. Hitler did not "neglet to give winter gear", winter gear was available but there was not enough capacity to transport it. Neither was there room for any food, but that could be taken from Russians.

So if the Russians refuse to roll over after the 500 km dash, the Germans are done for
 

Deleted member 1487

What if, instead of dividing up the forces of Barbarossa into Army Groups North, Center, and South, using North to take the Baltics and besiege Petersburg, Center to besiege Moscow, and south to conquer the Ukraine and drive towards the Caucasus, Hitler had opted for a "Moscow First" strategy? This could potentially involve the cancellation of Army Group South as we know it, with Hitler using most of its OTL troops to provide extra men and reserves for Army Groups North and Center (with extra for Center), and relying on the Romanians, Hungarians, and some Germans, if necessary, to hold the line in Ukraine and make some small gains. The plan would be for Army Groups Center and North to quickly capture Moscow and Leningrad respectively. Then, perhaps, Army Group North would occupy the territory between Moscow and Petersburg (with a few divisions splitting off to take Karelia, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk), and then fan out to the Urals. Army Group Center would split in half, with one part continuing south-west towards the Volga, and the other heading straight south, combining with units on the Ukrainian border to finally conquer Ukraine and push towards the Caucasus. The Soviets, weakened in morale, manpower, and leadership by the loss of Leningrad and Petersburg, may very well be unable to repulse this, potentially leading to a German victory on the Eastern Front. Would this change in overall strategy have been successful? Could it have led to the captures of Moscow and Leningrad, or would Army Groups North and Center simply have been hampered by worse logistics issues? Would the captures of those cities have led to German victory against the Soviet Union, if not against the swarms of partisans that would spring up? Would my specific vision of such a plan be close to the one enacted TTL, and how would the actual plan differ? And finally, would the changes to Hitler's mind required for him to make or approve this plan perforce have turned him into Notler?
I addressed something like this here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/no-major-offensive-toward-leningrad-1941.380636/

Basically going after Ukraine was sound, going after Leningrad with the forces at hand and Soviet resistance was not. The problem is that the Nazis didn't realize that the campaign would go on past the initial border fight, so their plan to divide up their forces was sound if the Soviets effectively collapsed after the 1st Strategic echelon was defeated, but they were not. So you'd at very least have Hitler realize that the intelligence about Soviet numbers was correct and that the Soviets would fight hard to the gates of Moscow, but if you do that then he might well not invade, because he based in entire strategic plan on the belief that the Soviets would collapse by August, the rest of 1941 would be the occupation of the collapsed state, and 1942 would be the Germans turning on the Brits with the full weight of Russian raw materials while they started setting up their colonies in the East. If that plan isn't going to work due to the realization that fighting the USSR is going to be a multi-year commitment, he likely changes his plans and leaves the USSR alone.
 

Deleted member 1487

where do they fall off the cliff in terms of logistics? Minsk? Smolensk?
Minsk. That was where they though the war would end. They were able to stumble on to Smolensk and then had to stop to bring up rail logistics, but get hammered by Soviet counteroffensives in the meantime. Those counteroffensives would have been easily slaughtered near the border, but due to being deep in the USSR they were a handful and cost the Germans 100k casualties from July-early September.
 

Deleted member 1487

I know right? Guess I'll have to do 20 years Gulag as penance or something. :p

But yes. More seriously, the Germans did have the physical resources to take Leningrad had they utilized them more competently, and that comes down to how their logistics chain was organized. As a whole, the Germans achieving victory over the Soviets by their own merits (as opposed to the Soviets bungling things even worse) isn't impossible like, say, Japan defeating the Americans is. It's just so difficult and so not worth it that they would be better off not even having bothered trying. The Germans achieving victory over the Soviets in a single campaign season by their own merits, on the other hand, is pretty much not only impossible but also counter-productive. The problem the Germans had was that they were wedded to just that.
What happened to you man??? You've changed. And its freakin' me out!
 

Deleted member 1487

And Soviet partisans (as well as cut-off army units) made attacking the railroad system a priority...
Soviet partisans didn't really exist as a significant force in 1941. There were straggler Soviet troops left behind due to the rapid German advance that attacked any Germans they saw, which were generally logistics troops and occasionally officers.
 
It actually is. Given the logistical difficulties and the fact Soviet defenses were more powerful in late-August then they were in late-September (as the Yel'niya counteroffensive and Kiev encirclement would weaken them considerably), any further attempt to move eastward then would see AGC take massive losses for little progress.

(1) AG Center was involved in very heavy combat during August. In fact, the casualties suffered during that month was the highest incurred by any Army Group in any month in the east until February of 1943 when the losses of 6th Army were registered.
Immediatly preceding this bloody month was the bloodiest 10-day period any Army Group suffered until February of 1943.

(2) The losses in August fell heaviest on the infantry units defending north and south of Smolensk, and not the mechanized troops.

(3) It's quite common for (infantry) units engaged in very heavy combat to expend large amounts of ammunition

With those three statements fresh in memory, it's worth remembering that the ability to stockpile supplies is dependent on two factors: (a) the delivery of supplies (b) the consumption of supplies.

While much is made of the difficulties the Germans had in providing for (a), less is made of the Soviet counteroffensives leading to a high (b). Creveld for instance, does not allow for adjusting (b) (which makes sense in his context).


In my remark earlier in this thread, I advocated for a stronger AG South (at the expense of the Med). Such a change might very well force 16A and 19A to remain in the Ukraine instead of being shipped north.
The absence of those troops would in all probability lead to a more succesful German battle around Smolensk, given that the Germans in OTL got too greedy and - while coming very close - failed to seal the deal in multiple directions.

Using Glantz's estimate of around 630k Soviet troops in the western direction on 1.Aug; (1) adjusting for the absence of 16A+19A and (2) accounting for a more succesful German conduct in the preceding month would leave the Soviets with slightly more than 400k troops (3) before accounting for any Soviet emergency countermeasures.

That's a far cry from OTL. Which again leads to fewer German losses and a reduced ammuntion consumption. Which again would improve the Germans chances against a weakened foe if they decided to go one leap closer to Moscow.
 
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