WI: Hitler dies on October 16, 1941

Let's say the German commander-in-chief dies right before the Germans begin major operations on the Mozhaistk line and after their capture of Rhzev. Let's say he dies from choking to death or something sudden, and not related to an organize coup attempt. What happens?

The reason I choose this POD because Nazi Germany is at its very peak of military power, having just surrounded more than half a million Russian soldiers in Russia and being on ground they were able to successfully defend as per OTL. Further, the Germans avoid a great degree of their major personnel and equipment losses from their over extended lines in OTL.

My questions are these:

1. Who realistically takes over?
2. What are the Russian counter-measures to this?
3. Presuming the war continues, how does it realistically end one way or the other?
4. Lastly, how is Hitler remembered today?

I have an opinion, but I want to dig your minds first.
 
This is gonna extend the war probably. There'll probably be a lot of bitching between Goring, Goebbels, Himmler as to who takes over, but it'll probably be Himmler. Don't know about Soviet response, but when they counter attack, sanity will probably prevail through the retreat, delaying the war's end into 1946/early 1947. Hitler's memory won't be changed- the Final Solution will still go ahead and people will still view him as a monster.
 
No matter who takes over, wouldn't the military be politically be much more powerful, as Hitler has no clear successor and Germany is in the middle of the biggest war in history? In essence, even if the military didn't totally take over, they would essentially play kingmaker.
 
This is gonna extend the war probably. There'll probably be a lot of bitching between Goring, Goebbels, Himmler as to who takes over, but it'll probably be Himmler. Don't know about Soviet response, but when they counter attack, sanity will probably prevail through the retreat, delaying the war's end into 1946/early 1947. Hitler's memory won't be changed- the Final Solution will still go ahead and people will still view him as a monster.

Himmler, in 1941, isn't powerful enough yet. Besides that, he wasn't well liked by the army, and the army is much stronger than his Waffen SS at this point in time. Goering is more likely to take over due to his image as the 'moderate' Nazi.

I actually see the Eastern Front going worse for the Germans. Goering will likely not have a micromanaging approach on the conduct of the war, instead letting his generals run it for him. As an ideological rival, being on the left wing of the party, Goebbels will probably be sidetracked. As plenipotentiary for the four year plans, Goering will also set his sight on Himmler's pool of slave labour: he will therefore try to make him an ally or try to replace him with someone more malleable.

This could mean that the no-retreat order in the face of the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow is never given, resulting in a collapse of the frontlines of Army Group Centre and a much greater Soviet advance than IOTL in December 1941. Perhaps they could be thrown as far back as Minsk by the time the Red Army loses momentum.

I imagine Goering will then try to butt out of the war in the east with a peace treaty that looks like victory. The question is whether Stalin will accept since the Germans are obviously negotiating from a position of weakness.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think the German resistance would act, as this was their peak. What was holding them back was the oath to Hitler that kept a number of officers from participating and Hitler's popularity, yet they still tried to kill him repeatedly:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_attempts_on_Adolf_Hitler
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/20_July_plot#Background
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oster_Conspiracy

The 1942 resistance team wasn't put together yet, but Goering has lost his luster to a point by this point and his role in the Blomberg-Fritsch affair has not been forgotten, nor forgiven.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blomberg-Fritsch_Affair

The Nazis probably fight it out and the army steps in, as Goering has really been on the outs with Hitler due to the BoB failure and increased bombing of Germany by the RAF. In December he was dropped as leader of the war economy in favor of Speer, so this is just before then. Typhoon probably still happens, but stays in permanent remission when the rains start; there is a power struggle in Berlin and probably a Junta being formed. Goering doesn't have the power he once did, nor the political luster; in fact he was pretty much out of the public eye since 1940 IIRC. Himmler was hated by the army, while everyone else but Todt depended on Hitler for their authority, including Goebbels. Todt is probably kept around, despite his conflicts with the army economic staff, while everyone else probably gets purged. The army runs the war from this point on, not sure how 1942 on shakes out or if there is a DoW against the US. In fact the resistance was pretty much hoping for a deal with the West post-Hitler, so if they take power, they probably will try and deal, which might be possible given Canaris's connections with the British, while the Uboat war is called off/calmed down, making US entry non-viable.

This might end up a European Axis vs. Soviet war if there can be a deal with the Brits, while the US stays out.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wilhelm_Canaris#World_War_II
Shocked by these incidents, Canaris began working more actively, at increasing risk, to overthrow Hitler's régime, although he cooperated with the SD to create a decoy. This made it possible for him to pose as a trusted man for some time. He was promoted to full Admiral in January 1940. With his subordinate Erwin Lahousen, he formed a circle of like-minded Wehrmacht officers, many of whom would be executed or forced to commit suicide after the failure of the 20 July Plot. At an officers conference in Berlin, December 1941, Canaris is quoted as saying "Abwehr has nothing to do with persecution of Jews....no concern of ours, we hold ourselves aloof from it" (MI6 Sub-section Vf files NA HW 1/327). It has been speculated that there was contact with British intelligence during this time, despite the war between the two countries. It is thought that during the invasion of Russia, Canaris received a detailed report of all the enemy positions that was known only to the British. The head of MI6, Stewart Menzies, who shared Canaris’s strong anti-communist beliefs, praised Canaris’s courage and bravery at the end of the war. Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Himmler investigated in detail the sources of Canaris's information on Operation Barbarossa, arriving at the conclusion that there had indeed been contact between him and the British.
 
The shock to the command structure from the CnC suddenly dropping dead certainly will cause some problems. Typhoon might get delayed, which is bad for the Germans and very good for the Soviets. The retreat order going out in the winter probably makes things worse for the Germans, but I don't see the Soviets really achieving anything decisive during the winter of '41, although they can inflict more casualties and gain more territory then IOTL which will have knock-on effects for the summer '42 campaign season. The Japanese are still due to bomb Pearl by December which will piss off the Americans and immediately put them on the side of the British... and by extension, against the Germans.

If any of the dissident German officer tries to throw out the Nazis, then they'll likely worsen the command confusion.

TIn fact the resistance was pretty much hoping for a deal with the West post-Hitler

Which was wishful thinking on their part. The British believed the war to be as much the result of the exact kind of German conservatives who would now be in power as it was of the Nazis.

This might end up a European Axis vs. Soviet war if there can be a deal with the Brits, while the US stays out.
The odds of this happening at the point we are at is somewhere just around the same as the odds of Germany acquiring nuclear ordnance in the next four years.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

The shock to the command structure from the CnC suddenly dropping dead certainly will cause some problems. Typhoon might get delayed, which is bad for the Germans and very good for the Soviets. The retreat order going out in the winter probably makes things worse for the Germans, but I don't see the Soviets really achieving anything decisive during the winter of '41, although they can inflict more casualties and gain more territory then IOTL which will have knock-on effects for the summer '42 campaign season. The Japanese are still due to bomb Pearl by December which will piss off the Americans and immediately put them on the side of the British... and by extension, against the Germans.

If any of the dissident German officer tries to throw out the Nazis, then they'll likely worsen the command confusion.



Which was wishful thinking on their part. The British believed the war to be as much the result of the exact kind of German conservatives who would now be in power as it was of the Nazis.

The odds of this happening at the point we are at is somewhere just around the same as the odds of Germany acquiring nuclear ordnance in the next four years.


http://www.shafr.org/passport/2000/sep/asher.htm
Well Hitler's DoW on the US was his personal choice, so its very unlikely that anyone else would do it without him. The British might think twice about a lengthy war without the US.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_declaration_of_war_against_the_United_States_(1941)
The German declaration of war came as a great relief to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who feared the possibility of two parallel disconnected wars (UK and Soviet Union versus Germany in Europe, US versus Japan in the Pacific). With Nazi Germany's declaration against the United States in force, American assistance for Britain in both theaters of war as a full ally was assured.

A non-Hitler led Germany stepping back from the Uboat campaign to avoid provoking the US would make it virtually impossible to find a Casus Belli, which AFAIK the German leadership outside of Hitler wanted to do.

As to Typhoon, it was already underway; the pause in November might be permanent though, as command is figured out and the situation becoming very bad at the front. Its pretty hard to predict how things would change at that point. If the Germans standstill starting October 31st they will have the best of all worlds: the vast casualties inflicted up until then (over 500k according to Glantz) and time to prepare for Winter/defense. The Tikhvin offensive probably won't happen though, which will prevent Demyansk and the issues with that. The Soviet offensive in December then runs into a German line that has had a month to prepare and isn't nearly as worn down, stretched out, and vulnerable as it was IOTL on December 5th.

Now if the resumption of November is launched and there is no stand fast order...well I'm not convinced that the directive was actually that helpful and there is a lot of debate on the issue; it would probably be as bad a situation as IOTL, but hardly decisive, especially if there isn't a Tikhvin attack and AG-North is dug in in better positions rather than exposed as it was in December IOTL.
http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum3/HTML/000032-2.html

1942 and on is vastly different without the US in the war.

Would Goering or whomever is in charge declare war on the US?
http://www.shafr.org/passport/2000/sep/asher.htm
No, that was Hitler's decision alone and not well liked among the general staff, but at that point Hitler was liberally firing people, so they kept their mouths shut. See article above.
 
Well Hitler's DoW on the US was his personal choice, so its very unlikely that anyone else would do it without him.

Which is irrellevant. In American eyes, Japan and Germany are co-joined at the hip. If Germany doesn't declare war on the US, the US will do it within months. And that leaves aside that for all intents and purposes the US is already in the war on the Allied side in economic terms.

A non-Hitler led Germany stepping back from the Uboat campaignp
Has just given Britain and the Soviet Union (the first protocol was signed sixteen days before the PoD) uninterrupted access to American lend-lease supplies. Also gives the British a convenient way to stroll through the Arctic convoy route: just mix in American ships with the convoy and the Germans can't attack without also attacking American vessels. This aids the Soviet Union immensely. At least, until America declares war itself.

The Soviet offensive in December then runs into a German line that has had a month to prepare and isn't nearly as worn down, stretched out, and vulnerable as it was IOTL on December 5th.
Running further down the logic chain: said Soviet offensive is also more powerful though, since the Red Army did expend alot of resources even between October 16th and the start of December halting the German advance. ITTL, it can put those resources into the offensive. Ultimately though, it won't be enough extra power to breakthrough the line. However, the Red Army offensive stalling on the Tishkin line probably see's Stalin cancelling the January-February offensives, which means the troops who died on those offensives are not lost and doubles the amount of time the Soviets will be spending resting and refitting during the first-half of 1942.

The Germans cancelling Typhoon at the October 31st front is very unlikely though. Both German staff officers and field commanders at the time had very little appreciation of their own limitations regarding logistics and grossly underestimated how many reserves the Soviets still had available and would instead be desperate to take Moscow before the winter sets in earnest. They'll probably try one last lunge for Moscow as per IOTL, only slightly later, which fails like IOTL.

it would probably be as bad a situation as IOTL, but hardly decisive
Probably worse then IOTL, but still hardly decisive. But the extra losses and all would seriously degrade German capabilities for the '42 season.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

Which is irrellevant. In American eyes, Japan and Germany are co-joined at the hip. If Germany doesn't declare war on the US, the US will do it within months.
Based on what exactly? There were extreme fears in both the US and Britain that Germany would not declare war, just at worst break relations and make it difficult to provide Casus Belli. Churchill was really worried about having to fight a parallel war in Europe while the US was distracted in Asia. Germany and Japan were not seen as 'joined at the hip' rather were opportunistic powers fighting parallel wars in different areas of world. Perhaps the US intended to create a Casus Belli in the Atlantic when they were ready for war some time in mid/late 1942, but that depends on the German actually attacking a US ship. A non-Hitler leadership is going to be insanely paranoid about not provoking the US to war; it was really Hitler's fantasy to fight the US at some point, which is what got Germany to DoW the US in December; without that there isn't anyone I can think of in the German leadership that is going to want to provide the US with any excuse to fight in Europe.

Has just given Britain and the Soviet Union (the first protocol was signed sixteen days before the PoD) uninterrupted access to American lend-lease supplies. Also gives the British a convenient way to stroll through the Arctic convoy route: just mix in American ships with the convoy and the Germans can't attack without also attacking American vessels. This aids the Soviet Union immensely. At least, until America declares war itself.
US ships couldn't be used in warzones it wasn't participating in, so while the US extended its protection zone to an unreasonable degree the US public wasn't interested going further, nor was it interested in actually fighting in Europe without reason, so they cannot mix in US ships with British convoys in the Arctic without serious politic consequences in the US over the illegality and distraction from the war in Asia (for which the US doesn't have enough transport capacity of its own until 1943). Germany can stick its Uboats outside the US protection zone and mostly be fine until some time in mid-1942 when it will have to focus on the Arctic convoys while providing limited threats in the Atlantic to British convoys due to British defenses in the Atlantic getting too strong. The US cannot up and declare war for no reason and they won't have one in 1942-43 simply due to being unable to afford to send the British any transport shipping due to the need for the Pacific Theater, as they will lack British shipping capacity to supplement their own.

Running further down the logic chain: said Soviet offensive is also more powerful though, since the Red Army did expend alot of resources even between October 16th and the start of December halting the German advance. ITTL, it can put those resources into the offensive. Ultimately though, it won't be enough extra power to breakthrough the line. However, the Red Army offensive stalling on the Tishkin line probably see's Stalin cancelling the January-February offensives, which means the troops who died on those offensives are not lost and doubles the amount of time the Soviets will be spending resting and refitting during the first-half of 1942.
I didn't say the offensive would stop between the 16th and 30th; it was already going by then so it couldn't really be affected by the political situation in Berlin; from November-December it could be, which is when the changes would happen.

Without the Tikhvin offensive by the Germans the Soviets wouldn't attack there, but they would try and break the siege of Leningrad, which will end very badly and probably cost them more than the encirclement of Demyansk, while the Germans avoid the major losses they suffered there. Stalin was trying to break the Germans everywhere, so just sitting still doesn't mean he won't try and break the lines around Leningrad; in fact it will be politically, economically, and militarily necessary for him to try and liberate the city. The Soviet forces saved from November-December ITTL will not be much of a savings compared to what Germany lost relatively in the process, nor worth as much as the time Germany gains in digging in further back and being prepared for a Soviet offensive; the Soviets will bleed far worse going after German lines ITTL if the offensive is permanently cancelled after the October 31st weather halt.


Probably worse then IOTL, but still hardly decisive. But the extra losses and all would seriously degrade German capabilities for the '42 season.
Hard to prove; most of the claims that Hitler was right to give the order to stand fast comes from his toadies at OKW. The guys on the ground that lost their jobs (Guderian, Hoth, etc.) all wanted to retreat in an organized fashion and given the actual retreats that took place IOTL and were successful despite Hitler's order demonstrate that it was possible for the retreats to better lines to be equally as good or better in terms of outcomes. Read the link I posted about the discussion on the merits of retreating vs. standing still.
It likely won't be worse than IOTL.
http://www.amazon.com/The-Drive-Mos...=2025&creative=165953&creativeASIN=1612001203

Edit:
There were a lot of calls to stop the offensive in November, but Hitler didn't ultimately listen.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle...e_gates_.281_November_.E2.80.93_5_December.29
David Glantz in his book When Titans Clashed, compared the state of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in late October to that of two "punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet but rapidly losing the power to hurt each other." The German forces were worn out, with only ⅓ of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantry divisions at ⅓ to ½ strength, and serious logistics issues preventing the delivery of warm clothing and other winter equipment to the front. Even Hitler seemed to surrender to the idea of a long struggle, since the prospect of sending tanks into such a large city without heavy infantry support seemed risky after the costly capture of Warsaw in 1939.[48]
 
Based on what exactly?

Polls taken between Pearl Harbour and the declaration of war by Germany. I've seen them been cited to you on this forum and their a lot more evidence then anything you have provided.

There were extreme fears in both the US and Britain that Germany would not declare war,
There were fears, but no evidence to indicate that they were extreme or even valid.

The US cannot up and declare war for no reason and they won't have one in 1942-43 simply due to being unable to afford to send the British any transport shipping due to the need for the Pacific Theater, as they will lack British shipping capacity to supplement their own.
It seems you are also forgetting that Japan will be at war Britain as well as the US, given that the whole point of attacking Pearl Harbour was to get the US Pacific Fleet out of the way so the Japanese could seize all those American, Dutch, and British colonies in South East Asia. The US being allies with the British in the Pacific will is another factor that will push the US towards war with Germany.

US ships couldn't be used in warzones it wasn't participating in,
Based on what? The US was already helping escort British convoys IOTL well before Pearl Harbour occurred. There is literally nothing in the way stopping them from doing something like that ITTL.

I didn't say the offensive would stop between the 16th and 30th; it was already going by then so it couldn't really be affected by the political situation in Berlin; from November-December it could be, which is when the changes would happen.
Oh, so then the Germans exhaust themselves as per IOTL

Stalin was trying to break the Germans everywhere, so just sitting still doesn't mean he won't try and break the lines around Leningrad;
Incorrect: Stalin tried to break the Germans everywhere after the success of the initial Soviet Moscow counter-offensive convinced him the Germans were on the verge of collapse. If the initial offensives do not succeed, Stalin does not get that impression and has much less reason to press the attack.

The Soviet forces saved from November-December ITTL will not be much of a savings compared to what Germany lost relatively in the process,
Glantz estimates that the Soviets took 680,000 casualties during the defence phase of the Battle for Moscow. Of those, probably somewhere around 200,000 were lost during November.

An additional 200,000 troops with an extra month to refit and train is hardly "not much of a savings".

nor worth as much as the time Germany gains in digging in further back and being prepared for a Soviet offensive;
And the Soviets gain time to reconnoiter the German positions, plan their attacks, and stockpile supplies.

Having additional time goes both ways.

Hard to prove; most of the claims that Hitler was right to give the order to stand fast comes from his toadies at OKW.
And a number of historians looking at the state of the German panzer and motorized forces at the time. Including Glantz, a quote of whom you just cited.

There were a lot of calls to stop the offensive in November, but Hitler didn't ultimately listen.
No, no there really were not. Some people claim after the fact that they called for the offensive to halt, but failed to provide any evidence that they in fact did so.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

Polls taken between Pearl Harbour and the declaration of war by Germany. I've seen them been cited to you on this forum and their a lot more evidence then anything you have provided.
Care to provide them then if they prove your point?


There were fears, but no evidence to indicate that they were extreme or even valid.
Based on?


It seems you are also forgetting that Japan will be at war Britain as well as the US, given that the whole point of attacking Pearl Harbour was to get the US Pacific Fleet out of the way so the Japanese could seize all those American, Dutch, and British colonies in South East Asia. The US being allies with the British in the Pacific will is another factor that will push the US towards war with Germany.
Sure, they fight parallel wars with the US providing LL and staying out of Europe.


Based on what? The US was already helping escort British convoys IOTL well before Pearl Harbour occurred. There is literally nothing in the way stopping them from doing something like that ITTL.
The Neutrality Patrols were in the US declared neutral zone that they patrolled and warned the Germans about. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutrality_Patrol#Neutrality_Zone
Have the Germans stay out and there isn't an issue.

Oh, so then the Germans exhaust themselves as per IOTL
What are you talking about? I said they were attack as per OTL until November and then not resume the offensive on the 15th. How would that exhaust them more?

Incorrect: Stalin tried to break the Germans everywhere after the success of the initial Soviet Moscow counter-offensive convinced him the Germans were on the verge of collapse. If the initial offensives do not succeed, Stalin does not get that impression and has much less reason to press the attack.
Alright the Soviets are initially unsuccessful and the fight stays around Moscow; Stalin cannot afford to stay on the defensive politically though so he has to attack as long as he has the forces; he did so non-stop no matter the cost throughout the war.


Glantz estimates that the Soviets took 680,000 casualties during the defence phase of the Battle for Moscow. Of those, probably somewhere around 200,000 were lost during November.
What are you basing the 200k casualties in 3 weeks on? The majority of the encirclements happened in October and the fighting from November to the Soviet counter offensives were much weaker and didn't encircle that many Soviets and frontal combat in that period does not suggest they suffered that badly.

An additional 200,000 troops with an extra month to refit and train is hardly "not much of a savings".
Sure if that were the case, you need to demonstrate that first. Also remember the Germans aren't losing 10s of thousands of men in November-December, are digging in and getting resupplied, while also getting ready for the winter much closer to their rail heads.

And the Soviets gain time to reconnoiter the German positions, plan their attacks, and stockpile supplies.

Having additional time goes both ways.
Sure, see above; the relative advantage goes to the Germans after October for sitting still.


And a number of historians looking at the state of the German panzer and motorized forces at the time. Including Glantz, a quote of whom you just cited.
Glantz is notoriously bad on German sources; I trust him on the Soviets, but there are far better scholars on the German side, like Zetterling, who's book I posted on this very subject that suggests exactly the opposite. Plus there is the forum discussion I posted with him discussing why the retreat was a better option.


No, no there really were not. Some people claim after the fact that they called for the offensive to halt, but failed to provide any evidence that they in fact did so.
There really isn't documents to support conversations.
 
This is gonna extend the war probably. There'll probably be a lot of bitching between Goring, Goebbels, Himmler as to who takes over, but it'll probably be Himmler. Don't know about Soviet response, but when they counter attack, sanity will probably prevail through the retreat, delaying the war's end into 1946/early 1947. Hitler's memory won't be changed- the Final Solution will still go ahead and people will still view him as a monster.

No way Himmler... he is nothing without Hitler. And inside SS powergames, Heydrich is stil alive.
 
The shock to the command structure from the CnC suddenly dropping dead certainly will cause some problems. Typhoon might get delayed, which is bad for the Germans and very good for the Soviets. The retreat order going out in the winter probably makes things worse for the Germans, but I don't see the Soviets really achieving anything decisive during the winter of '41, although they can inflict more casualties and gain more territory then IOTL which will have knock-on effects for the summer '42 campaign season. The Japanese are still due to bomb Pearl by December which will piss off the Americans and immediately put them on the side of the British... and by extension, against the Germans.

If any of the dissident German officer tries to throw out the Nazis, then they'll likely worsen the command confusion.



Which was wishful thinking on their part. The British believed the war to be as much the result of the exact kind of German conservatives who would now be in power as it was of the Nazis.

The odds of this happening at the point we are at is somewhere just around the same as the odds of Germany acquiring nuclear ordnance in the next four years.

Regarding german CoC: Halder and Brauchitsch are still in position, Hitlers death may be a morale hit, but the Army CoC seems stable - well, except maybe a bitter OKH-OKW clash.
Hm. Maybe if Keitel try to do something stupid...
 
A few comments:

1. US entry IMHO is extremely unlikely. The fact that we already know that OTL the military was not interested in fighting another power and that whomever takes over will likely be conciliatory, changes everything. The US DIDN'T declare war on Germany after all. Further, now that Hitler's dead people are going to wait (other than the Russians) and see what he would do. I think we are ignoring stuff we already know from established history.

2. If the Germans pushed as far as Rhzev the Russians will counter-attack in the winter to try to catch the Germans off balance. Heck, they will probably attack again in the spring, simply because it is too close to Moscow. The war isn't happening in a vacuum. For political reasons, Stalin MUST attack the Germans when it is plausible that their military position is unstable due to political instability. He attacked OTL anyway, and he kept doing so against army group center and kept losing.

I think it more likely that Stalin loses even worse given a relatively stable political situation in Germany.

3. Army Group Center would not collapse in the winter of 1941-42 as long as the political situation is stable. They did not overstretch their logistics, they had time to dig in, and they will actually have some mobile reserves. "Well, it's too cold for the mobile reserves to play a role." Exactly. The Russians did not push back the Germans 100 miles because they rolled over them with tanks. The German situation collapsed because they were way overstretched and their lines were thin. This cannot occur in this timeline.

Given a stable political situation, Germany has a much better 1941, and the question is whether Stalin would realistically seek peace or if the new German leadership would want it, which I presume they would.
 

Deleted member 1487

Exactly. The Russians did not push back the Germans 100 miles because they rolled over them with tanks. The German situation collapsed because they were way overstretched and their lines were thin. This cannot occur in this timeline.
Also Germany was 1-200 miles beyond their anticipated winter lines...
 
The biggest push for launching the final stage of Typhoon came from von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, and it's unlikely that Hitler's death changes that. von Bock was very invested in his Army Group's ability to score a war winning victory, to the point that von Brauchitsch felt that he really couldn't hold him back if he wanted a go at it. OKH and OKW were -at this stage more than ever- incredibly out of touch with the situation on the ground. So even if Hitler dies I'd argue that OKH will still try to achieve a war winning victory, especially since it'll confer immense political advantages.

1. US entry IMHO is extremely unlikely. The fact that we already know that OTL the military was not interested in fighting another power and that whomever takes over will likely be conciliatory, changes everything. The US DIDN'T declare war on Germany after all. Further, now that Hitler's dead people are going to wait (other than the Russians) and see what he would do. I think we are ignoring stuff we already know from established history.

I strongly disagree, even before Pearl Harbor US public opinion was moving decisively towards war with Germany as well as Japan. Isolationism was dead as a political or social force by early 1941, and all that Roosevelt needed was to convince the public that direct US involvement was necessary to defeat Germany. The big question was always how much US involvement was needed, not if the US should be involved at all. Indeed, it's very probable that the Roosevelt administration could and would have declared war on Germany in December 1941 anyways. At minimum you'd see the US stepping up support for Britain and the USSR -support for the extension of Lend Lease to the USSR was above 45% even prior to Pearl- to the point where it'd essentially be a co-belligerent.
 
Last edited:
The biggest push for launching the final stage of Typhoon came from von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, and it's unlikely that Hitler's death changes that. von Bock was very invested in his Army Group's ability to score a war winning victory, to the point that von Brauchitsch felt that he really couldn't hold him back if he wanted a go at it. OKH and OKW were -at this stage more than ever- incredibly out of touch with the situation on the ground. So even if Hitler dies I'd argue that OKH will still try to achieve a war winning victory, especially since it'll confer immense political advantages.

Good info. Do you think that the military would be that offensive minded even when the political situation is unsettled?

I strongly disagree, even before Pearl Harbor US public opinion was moving decisively towards war with Germany as well as Japan.
Yet, they still didn't declare war on Germany. A conciliatory Germany will change public opinion in the US. Further, after losing the Philippines, the US public likely would want to crush Japan and not invent reasons to DoW on a major power that is not at war with them and not sinking their ships.

At minimum you'd see the US stepping up support for Britain and the USSR (Support for the extension of Lend Lease to the USSR was above 45% even prior to Pearl) to the point where it'd essentially be a co-belligerent.

I'd agree. The difference is that Germany would avoid major 1941 losses if Tyfun ends at a certain time.
 
Good info. Do you think that the military would be that offensive minded even when the political situation is unsettled?

Yet, they still didn't declare war on Germany. A conciliatory Germany will change public opinion in the US. Further, after losing the Philippines, the US public likely would want to crush Japan and not invent reasons to DoW on a major power that is not at war with them and not sinking their ships.

Definitely. The consensus among the decision makers in OKH and OKW was that the Red Army didn't have the manpower for a counteroffensive, so one last push would not have significant consequences even if it failed.

Of course the US didn't declare war right away, as Germany declared war just four days after the attack on December 11. But Roosevelt had the motivation and means to do it. Public support was decisively united against Germany; a majority polled after December 7th supported declaring war on it even prior to its own DoW. Germany was at war with several US allies in the war against Japan, Britain in particular, and had sunk US vessels. The bigger question is why Roosevelt wouldn't ask for a declaration of war on Germany in December 1941 when he had public support and a strong case for it.
 
Top