WI Hirohito dies immediately after Nagasaki bombed?

Basically, I'm interested in how the power struggle between the military hardliner faction and the more moderate faction (which eventually received Hirohito's backing) would have played out in the event of Hirohito's death. So the premise holds that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been hit with atomic bombs, and Hirohito dies of natural causes a few minutes after Nagasaki is hit.

Would Japan still pursue a course of unconditional surrender, or would they choose more drastic action without Hirohito being there to call it quits?
 
The devil is in the details...

I realize that you didn't intend this, but 'natural causes' is a fairly vague description of how the Emperor would die, and thus leaves much room for mischief. If, for instance, Hirohito died of a heart attack (stroke, etc. are also good here) and there was not the slightest hint of anything 'enemy-related' in his demise, there is a (somewhat) stronger chance that those opposed to the military hardliners would be willing to stand united as a faction. If, on the other hand, he died as a result of something that could be somehow connected to allied action (hit by a falling beam in his shelter, etc.), then the game is pretty much up.

In fairness, however, I tend to think that this would end up the same way no matter what. Without the Emperor to provide some focal point for the 'doves' (keep in mind that the succession would leave a regent at least nominally in charge, and this regent would certainly be chosen with at least the approval of the military faction), the hardliners would be able to withstand any move to surrender at that time.

Put concisely (something I haven't done so far!), the war would go on, and the killing would continue. The odds are that the USN would blockade the home islands while the USAAF would continue to bomb, while Olympic would loom in the background. Given the overwhelming momentum of the preparations (as well as MacArthur's almost pathological ambition), Olympic would probably happen on schedule, though I do wonder if things would go on beyond that...
 

Cook

Banned
So the premise holds that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been hit with atomic bombs, and Hirohito dies of natural causes a few minutes after Nagasaki is hit.

Make it easier on yourself and have him killed in the bombing of Tokyo on 10 August. (24 hours after Nagasaki)
 
Carry on with strategic bombing for 12 to 18 month and detonate every completed nuke over Japan, deny any supplies reaching the home islands, spray their rice paddies with total herbicides and there will be no need to invade Japan since it would be a radioactive wasteland and Japanese a language spoken only in hell. Faced with such a prospect even the most diehard falcons in the japanese military would sue for peace sooner or later.
 
Carry on with strategic bombing for 12 to 18 month and detonate every completed nuke over Japan, deny any supplies reaching the home islands, spray their rice paddies with total herbicides and there will be no need to invade Japan since it would be a radioactive wasteland and Japanese a language spoken only in hell. Faced with such a prospect even the most diehard falcons in the japanese military would sue for peace sooner or later.

More likely later than sooner, sadly enough. Worse still, famine would not be the end of it....disease would break out and run riot. Some of the navy's estimates for deaths in a long siege ran well over 10 million, a number I consider to be a bit low.

If a diehard military faction took control, however, there is an excellent probability that at least Olympic would have taken place, though I agree that Coronet would have likely been delayed. In some ways, this might be the worst of both worlds (high casualties, and no decisive result ending the war), but eithe way, the outcome will be ugly.
 
I've read somewhere that the most powerful argument that caused Japan's leaders to surrender was they thought the US would just continue to drop nukes nonstop if they didn't surrender, thus denying them a chance for a honorable last stand.

No idea if any of it is true so take it with a grain of salt.
 
Basically, I'm interested in how the power struggle between the military hardliner faction and the more moderate faction (which eventually received Hirohito's backing) would have played out in the event of Hirohito's death. So the premise holds that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been hit with atomic bombs, and Hirohito dies of natural causes a few minutes after Nagasaki is hit.

Would Japan still pursue a course of unconditional surrender, or would they choose more drastic action without Hirohito being there to call it quits?
Tojo kills or imprisons the moderate leaders. After multiple additional atomic bombs, Tojo is assassinated but the government falls apart and there is no one left with authority to surrender the IJA. Operation Olympic proceeds, but military opposition is haphazard at best. Human wave attacks with spears cost hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives. Russia seizes Manchuria, Korea, and Hokkaido. Japan is divided up into occupation zones, like Germany was, and is not reunified until the twenty-first century.
 
More likely later than sooner, sadly enough. Worse still, famine would not be the end of it....disease would break out and run riot. Some of the navy's estimates for deaths in a long siege ran well over 10 million, a number I consider to be a bit low.

If a diehard military faction took control, however, there is an excellent probability that at least Olympic would have taken place, though I agree that Coronet would have likely been delayed. In some ways, this might be the worst of both worlds (high casualties, and no decisive result ending the war), but eithe way, the outcome will be ugly.

If the measures statet in my previous post would have been applied, I would estimate the total casualty figures to be somewhere between 30 and 60 millions, depending to what extent those measures, especially the destruction of japanese agriculture and fishing, escalating the nutrition crisis to previously unimaginale magnitudes, would be implemented. If the agricultural output of the home islands would have been reduced by let's say only 70% to 80% and what little still could have been produced would have been the deliberate target of air raids, famine alone could easily kill off 50% of the population within no more than 12 month.
 
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Starseed

Banned
Take the most rascist dreams by racists who wish to kill muslims, then apply them to the Home Islands.

Disease.
Famine.
Mass Bombing.
A-bombs.

Heck, just real 'A Big One' and replace Germany with Japan, although there is no peace. This will eventually happen if the 'demand' for Abombs remains high enough. (It will if Japan refuses to surrender.)
 

Sumeragi

Banned
Tojo kills or imprisons the moderate leaders. After multiple additional atomic bombs, Tojo is assassinated but the government falls apart and there is no one left with authority to surrender the IJA.
Tojo was not the Prime Minister at the time.
 
I've read somewhere that the most powerful argument that caused Japan's leaders to surrender was they thought the US would just continue to drop nukes nonstop if they didn't surrender, thus denying them a chance for a honorable last stand.

No idea if any of it is true so take it with a grain of salt.

There is substantial evidence that the devastating Soviet invasion of Manchuria on August 9 had as much to do with the surrender as anything else.

Basically, I'm interested in how the power struggle between the military hardliner faction and the more moderate faction (which eventually received Hirohito's backing) would have played out in the event of Hirohito's death. So the premise holds that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been hit with atomic bombs, and Hirohito dies of natural causes a few minutes after Nagasaki is hit.

Would Japan still pursue a course of unconditional surrender, or would they choose more drastic action without Hirohito being there to call it quits?

The most likely outcome is that the military hardliners keep control of the top tiers of government. When the Americans invade, everything starts to fall apart, and casualties for the Americans reach into the seven figures; Japanese deaths go into the eight figures.

This is an interesting idea.

Take the most rascist dreams by racists who wish to kill muslims, then apply them to the Home Islands.

Huh?? What do Muslims have to do with this, and since when have there been plans to nuke Muslim countries?
 
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WTF?

Kyle...

What 'substantial evidence' are you referring to regarding the Soviet invasion of Manchuria being the coup de grace? Certainly it added to the problems that the Japanese were facing, and certainly it was devastating news for the IJA, but Manchuria was NOT the Home Islands, and the Army wasn't sharing much of this information with the inner circle (the folks actually making decisions) in August of 1945. Absolutely the Army didn't see this as a war-ender, and most of the bitter enders came from the Army.

As for the Japanese people revolting, that is pure ASB plain and simple. Given the nature of Japanese society (shame-based) the idea that any significant number of Japanese citizens would revolt after the Emperor's death (which would certainly have been blamed on the Allies if it were at all possible) would in effect represent a repudiation of a societal model that they were programmed to revere from earliest childhood. Would you have able to been able to find a few (far <1%) revolutionaries who didn't like the current regime anyway? Absolute, and most of them were already in prison being busily tortured. The Kempeitai could have taught the Gestapo lessons in ruthless efficiency, and they had an absolute total grip on the population at that point.
 
Kyle...

What 'substantial evidence' are you referring to regarding the Soviet invasion of Manchuria being the coup de grace? Certainly it added to the problems that the Japanese were facing, and certainly it was devastating news for the IJA, but Manchuria was NOT the Home Islands, and the Army wasn't sharing much of this information with the inner circle (the folks actually making decisions) in August of 1945. Absolutely the Army didn't see this as a war-ender, and most of the bitter enders came from the Army.

I'm just going to copy the appropriate text from Wikipedia along with the obligatory references.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's research has led him to conclude that the atomic bombings were not the principal reason for Japan's capitulation. He argues it was the swift and devastating Soviet victories on the mainland in the week following Joseph Stalin's August 8 declaration of war that forced the Japanese message of surrender on August 15, 1945.[18] Others with similar views include The "Battlefield" series documentary,[2] Drea,[14] Hayashi,[15] and numerous others, though all, including Hasegawa, state that the surrender was not due to any single factor or single event.

In my opinion, it was the accumulated devastation of firebombing that moved the Japanese towards surrendering, and the invasion of Manchuria that pushed them over the edge. The nuke attacks certainly helped, but even those were less devastating than some of the massed firebombing raids done by B-29s.

As for the Japanese people revolting, that is pure ASB plain and simple. Given the nature of Japanese society (shame-based) the idea that any significant number of Japanese citizens would revolt after the Emperor's death (which would certainly have been blamed on the Allies if it were at all possible) would in effect represent a repudiation of a societal model that they were programmed to revere from earliest childhood. Would you have able to been able to find a few (far <1%) revolutionaries who didn't like the current regime anyway? Absolute, and most of them were already in prison being busily tortured. The Kempeitai could have taught the Gestapo lessons in ruthless efficiency, and they had an absolute total grip on the population at that point.

Sorry. I could not find a better word for what would happen and I should have been more clear. There would not be a full-scale rebellion against the Japanese government. But once the Americans invade, the Japanese will not offer a full-scale resistance to the last man, woman and child. Basically, things would fall apart, and my opinion is that most Japanese would simply capitulate to the American invaders (though of course the remainder would cause a hell of a lot of trouble). A few Japanese who were against their government would probably take the opportunity to try to assassinate government members.
 

Sumeragi

Banned
Sorry. I could not find a better word for what would happen and I should have been more clear. There would not be a full-scale rebellion against the Japanese government. But once the Americans invade, the Japanese will not offer a full-scale resistance to the last man, woman and child. Basically, things would fall apart, and my opinion is that most Japanese would simply capitulate to the American invaders (though of course the remainder would cause a hell of a lot of trouble). A few Japanese who were against their government would probably take the opportunity to try to assassinate government members.

Okinawa says otherwise, and that was the least "loyal" Japanese region.
 
Yeah, by this point of the war, the Japanese people and their foreign subjects had been so thoroughly brainwashed that the idea of surrender was utterly unthinkable to them. Propaganda painted the Americans as atrocity-committing sadists to the point that those Japanese who actually surrendered were utterly shocked to find that they were to be treated humanely in accordance to the terms of the Geneva Convention. The Japanese state propaganda was so effective that civilians would rather commit suicide than submit themselves to the purported "torture" they would endure at the hands of Americans.

As mentioned above, the key example of this would be Okinawa.

In addition, Japanese propaganda continued to insist that they were winning the war, and there weren't any external sources to deny those claims. As a result, the Japanese would've kept their fighting spirit until it was physically impossible to maintain any longer.

I'm of the personal opinion that it took Hirohito's personal endorsement of the surrender to disengage the Japanese will to fight, as only the emperor of their society could manage such a shocking turnaround. As they say, only Nixon could go to China, and in this case, only Hirohito could convince the Japanese to lay down their arms.
 
Okinawa says otherwise, and that was the least "loyal" Japanese region.

Many Okinawans died but this was mostly caused by (a) Japanese soldiers impressing locals into service and (b) collateral damage. And Okinawa had not been fire-bombed for months on end.
 
I think his point about the Okinawans was their high rate of suicide compared to their rate of surrender (even among civilians).
 
I'm just going to copy the appropriate text from Wikipedia along with the obligatory references.



In my opinion, it was the accumulated devastation of firebombing that moved the Japanese towards surrendering, and the invasion of Manchuria that pushed them over the edge. The nuke attacks certainly helped, but even those were less devastating than some of the massed firebombing raids done by B-29s.



Sorry. I could not find a better word for what would happen and I should have been more clear. There would not be a full-scale rebellion against the Japanese government. But once the Americans invade, the Japanese will not offer a full-scale resistance to the last man, woman and child. Basically, things would fall apart, and my opinion is that most Japanese would simply capitulate to the American invaders (though of course the remainder would cause a hell of a lot of trouble). A few Japanese who were against their government would probably take the opportunity to try to assassinate government members.

Your 'substantial' evidence then, is a wikipedia article which in turn references ONE book by ONE rather fringey Japanese historian. The other references (and Battlefield barely rises to the term) make the argument (more defensible) that surrender was a result of MANY factors, not simply (or even primarily) the Soviet entry into the war. The notion that with the Home Islands isolated, Okinawa lost, and most of their cities burnt and blasted and two nuked, that the Japanese Big Six would regard the loss of some (not all, the Kwangtung Army lost Manchuria, but was still very much in business in other parts of China) their overseas posessions (which I stress again, were completely cut off from the Home Islands in any event) as the central reason for surrender is extraordinarily difficult to believe under any circumstances.

(later) I did take the opportunity to check out Hasegawa's work, and even he only makes the case that the Soviet entry into the war shattered the military's ability to resist, and thus empowered the civilians in the Big Six, not that it was the only relevant factor. More to the point, Hasegawa relies heavily on the post-war writings of the surviving civilians, who obviously have a very strong motivation to tell the story in a way that makes the atomic bombs look unnecessary (and thus paint Japan as a victim), which has been the post-war Japanese excuse to absolve themselves of their barbaric behavior during the war.

Regarding the idea that Okinawa, with a population regarded by the Japanese as roughly akin to 'hillbillies', despised and alienated, would be less likely to surrender than those on the Home Islands is simply unbelievable on its face. Your comment that the Japanese population subjected to weeks/months of heavy bombing would be at the breaking point is straight out of the terror bombing songbook so beloved by the USAAF and RAF during WWI, but once again, there is little reason to see it as anything more than unsupported assertion. The Japanese had no elevated crime problems, no serious unrest or resistance to military requisitions or draft, and there was no recorded violence against the Kempeitai, all things that would have been easily observed if their system was breaking down.

The death of the Emperor would have strengthened the hand of the military hardliners, not weakened it, as it was the civilians on the Big Six who were sustained by his 'behind the scenes' support, such as it was. Keep in mind that military hardliners (particularly junior and mid-level officers) were regularly assasinating insufficiently fanatical leaders (civilian and military) on a regular basis since the 1920s, so it is unlikely that without the Emperor's personal connection, some of the members of the Big Six wouldn't have met with untimely ends.

Finally, the death of the Emperor would have been a galvanizing force for the military, an event that they could rally around, and urge the people to rally around as well. This was precisely why the US went to such great lengths to avoid any action which would have a significant chance of killing the Emperor...
 
Your 'substantial' evidence then, is a wikipedia article which in turn references ONE book by ONE rather fringey Japanese historian. The other references (and Battlefield barely rises to the term) make the argument (more defensible) that surrender was a result of MANY factors, not simply (or even primarily) the Soviet entry into the war. The notion that with the Home Islands isolated, Okinawa lost, and most of their cities burnt and blasted and two nuked, that the Japanese Big Six would regard the loss of some (not all, the Kwangtung Army lost Manchuria, but was still very much in business in other parts of China) their overseas posessions (which I stress again, were completely cut off from the Home Islands in any event) as the central reason for surrender is extraordinarily difficult to believe under any circumstances.

(later) I did take the opportunity to check out Hasegawa's work, and even he only makes the case that the Soviet entry into the war shattered the military's ability to resist, and thus empowered the civilians in the Big Six, not that it was the only relevant factor. More to the point, Hasegawa relies heavily on the post-war writings of the surviving civilians, who obviously have a very strong motivation to tell the story in a way that makes the atomic bombs look unnecessary (and thus paint Japan as a victim), which has been the post-war Japanese excuse to absolve themselves of their barbaric behavior during the war.

The death of the Emperor would have strengthened the hand of the military hardliners, not weakened it, as it was the civilians on the Big Six who were sustained by his 'behind the scenes' support, such as it was. Keep in mind that military hardliners (particularly junior and mid-level officers) were regularly assasinating insufficiently fanatical leaders (civilian and military) on a regular basis since the 1920s, so it is unlikely that without the Emperor's personal connection, some of the members of the Big Six wouldn't have met with untimely ends.

Have you read the Great Soviet Encyclopedia? I did in college back in the early 80's, at the height of the Soviet Gerontocracy. The entries on WWII outside of the Eastern Front in Europe made for good satire, but little else. In just a few lines, the entries on the war against Japan pretty much ignored everything except Russia's role. I can't imagine what even the most dedicated Communist at the time thought of the entry declaring that Russia had defeated Japan by itself in 24 days (they ignored the ceasefire on the 14th of August, and the fact that no fighting took place after the 20th). A war that in one form or another had been going on for years).

I've always felt it was the big shock of the Japanese Home Minister telling the Supreme War Council that Japan's economy would collapse (blockade, bombing) no later than October 1st, 1945 that really brought things home to the militarists. The idea that the railroads would stop running a month before Olympic started meant that essentially they would have their first wave of kamikazes against the invaders, and then that was it. Forces on the ground would have to fight where ever they were, with no chances of maneuver.

This was only days before the rapid falling dominoes of Hiroshima, the Soviet DoW, and Nagasaki. The FACT of the Soviet DoW meant any possible use of a powerful diplomatic go-between was now gone. The tactical results were irrelevant. Marshal Zhukov's tanks could have been caught in a typhoon and it wouldn't have changed anything. The horror of Hiroshima was bad enough, but the militarists had deluded themselves into thinking that the US had shot its bolt. That was not unreasonable for them. Any Japanese physicist could have told them the process for making an atomic bomb was extremely costly, and not possible to be mass produced.

But that was because they didn't know about the implosion device (U-239) developed for Nagasaki. That COULD be mass produced. It just took a lot longer to perfect.

Once all these factors fell together, the militarists really didn't have a leg to stand on. Ironically, the officer who put down the uprising was the very same Home Minister.:)
 

Sumeragi

Banned
Once all these factors fell together, the militarists really didn't have a leg to stand on. Ironically, the officer who put down the uprising was the very same Home Minister.:)
Which Home Minister?

PS: I hate being referred to "he".
 
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