WI: Hannibal pulled a Cannae at Zama

Also, Hannibal fought on his home turf, and presumably, the Romans didn't have good maps. Shouldn't that count as an advantage for him?

Well, Scipio spent some time in the area prior to the battle of Zama and he had the Numidians. OTOH, Hannibal was not on his home turf since when? his childhood?

BTW, using the same logic, shouldn't the Romans have an advantage of knowing their own territory better than Hannibal? ;)
 

Artaxerxes

Banned
Well, Scipio spent some time in the area prior to the battle of Zama and he had the Numidians. OTOH, Hannibal was not on his home turf since when? his childhood?

BTW, using the same logic, shouldn't the Romans have an advantage of knowing their own territory better than Hannibal? ;)

They did, Hannibal was that fucking good though.

By Zama Carthage was done, it's not getting any better for them in terms of men or money and they only have one Hannibal. Rome meanwhile has not just recovered but got a solid core of experience in training and using armies.

This isn't like the first war where both sides are running on fumes.
 
They did, Hannibal was that fucking good though.

Well, so was Scipio so we have your question answered. :)

By Zama Carthage was done, it's not getting any better for them in terms of men or money and they only have one Hannibal. Rome meanwhile has not just recovered but got a solid core of experience in training and using armies.

Quite agree on that except for the fact that in the Rome there was a strong opposition to the African adventure which could gain an upper hand if Hannibal won at Zama. What was their idea of winning the war I simply don't know.
 

Artaxerxes

Banned
Well, so was Scipio so we have your question answered. :)



Quite agree on that except for the fact that in the Rome there was a strong opposition to the African adventure which could gain an upper hand if Hannibal won at Zama. What was their idea of winning the war I simply don't know.

I presume as with most Roman politics a lot of it was a reluctance to let scipio have his head and acquire to much prestige, alongside the caution of supporting an overseas army. As for ending the war without marching on Carthage, possibly a series of fleet raids or bungs to Libyans?
 
Well, Scipio spent some time in the area prior to the battle of Zama and he had the Numidians. OTOH, Hannibal was not on his home turf since when? his childhood?

BTW, using the same logic, shouldn't the Romans have an advantage of knowing their own territory better than Hannibal? ;)

To add to what @Artaxerxes said, Massinissa in 204 BCE was just a pretender leading a small contingent of trusted warriors, Syphax, and the Numidians as a whole, were backing Carthage.
 
let's look at Dresden for comparison.
The comparison doesn't really holds entierelt there I think : in 1813 and while having suffered an important defeat in 1812, Napoleon still had more ground and ressources at disposal than he did in 1815. Veteran troops, still fighting outside napoleonic "inner sphere" (altough the battle was about logistical control) all things that allowed Napoleon to quickly raise more troops without scrapping what it could get.

More to the point, Hannibal has a numerical advantage here.
Which is not as a clear obvious advantage you seems to make it. Most ancient battles does point that and even with a skilled general leading them, numerical advantage only generally have to tempered with supply, quality and maneuverability of troops. Namely, 1/3 of Carthaginian army was taken from urban citizens which had little occasion to sharpen their fighting skills so far : there's no comparison with the Roman army citizen infantry at this point of the war.
Moreover, Hannibal did not derive his advantage from any revolutionary changes in the art of war that his enemies can simply adopt like Napoleon did, but rather from the timeless art of command.
While his command skills were real, especially among armies he led since a decade and a half then, I think you're wrong to consider his tactical skills played no major role : there's a consensus this is exactly what made him a great general (and compensated for not that great strategical perspective)

So you're essentially arguing that one of the greatest generals in history can't use his numerical superiority to take advantage of his enemy's monumental blunder and win a decisive victory.
I'm essentially arguing that one of the greatest genera in history, fighting a battle in a war his side was loosing hard at this point, can't reverse the result a battle from a crushing defeat from an epic-scale victory just because he's leading an hastly gathered patworkesque army. Feel free to disagree, but I'd prefer if you were able to recognize the point you're disagree on.

It probably safe to assume that there was a non-zero chance of Hannibal's battlefield victory
I don't disagree with this, of course : for a given definition of "victory" (I know you understand this, giving we already discussed about this situational definition of victory). Frankly, I don't think we're in disagreement there : Hannibal could have pulled a tactical stalemate forcing Romans to regroup in an infetiority position with still political and strategical upper hand in Africa.

What's next is anybody's guess because a lot would depend upon Senate's willingness to send reinforcements to Africa
I think it would go down to two things : how much and how long Rome can afford a relatively long conflict in Africa (or even in Spain or Sicily if they thought Carthage could pull it back there, which would arguably be concieved IMO in the first case), and how much political support in Italy would be the idea to just double down on the operation (while doable IMO). I don't know enough about senatorial politics at this time to remotely guess which would have been considered and how it could have made to happen.
position of the vassals of Carthage, etc.
A lot of second-guessing and status-quo I think, even if the "devil you know..." would probably play a lot in favor of Carthage when it comes to Punic cities it dominated IMO.

Seems that at best Carthage may expect to get a somewhat better terms.
I think that's what Carthage mostly expected from Hannibal there : the city already asked for terms to Rome and these were really harsh. Trying to pressure negotiations thanks to pointing Rome they could be as bogged down in Africa than Hannibal was in Italy was quite sound strategically.

Also, Hannibal fought on his home turf, and presumably, the Romans didn't have good maps. Shouldn't that count as an advantage for him?
It did played a role, you're right, but I'm under the impression it was more political-strategical : Romans were clearly invaders there and received limited support (I'd be tempted to say that their alliance with Numidians, a more "traditional" other of Punic in the regions whom relationship was supposed to be subservient played a role there), so as raising a lot of men from urban reserves into Carthaginian's army in Zama does point, Carthage's political network was largely holding up against Romans.
On the other hand, if the battle had the goal to search for better terms, while the negotiation manoeuvre would likely be better ITTL, I'm not sure Carthaginians allies would allow too much risk-taking there.
 
The comparison doesn't really holds entierelt there I think : in 1813 and while having suffered an important defeat in 1812, Napoleon still had more ground and ressources at disposal than he did in 1815. Veteran troops, still fighting outside napoleonic "inner sphere" (altough the battle was about logistical control) all things that allowed Napoleon to quickly raise more troops without scrapping what it could get.


Which is not as a clear obvious advantage you seems to make it. Most ancient battles does point that and even with a skilled general leading them, numerical advantage only generally have to tempered with supply, quality and maneuverability of troops. Namely, 1/3 of Carthaginian army was taken from urban citizens which had little occasion to sharpen their fighting skills so far : there's no comparison with the Roman army citizen infantry at this point of the war.

While his command skills were real, especially among armies he led since a decade and a half then, I think you're wrong to consider his tactical skills played no major role : there's a consensus this is exactly what made him a great general (and compensated for not that great strategical perspective)


I'm essentially arguing that one of the greatest genera in history, fighting a battle in a war his side was loosing hard at this point, can't reverse the result a battle from a crushing defeat from an epic-scale victory just because he's leading an hastly gathered patworkesque army. Feel free to disagree, but I'd prefer if you were able to recognize the point you're disagree on.
The Battle of Dresden was fought with raw levies outnumbered almost 2-1 in weather that favored the enemy. Contending Napoleon didn't win a crushing victory at a major disadvantage is probably the most ridiculous conclusion you can draw. You absolutely cannot deny the role of tactics in deciding the battle.

Numbers are almost always the most important factor in deciding a battle, alongside tactics; troop quality is probably in third place. No matter how good the men are, even slight numerical advantages can change the tide of the battle. Even if the Carthaginian citizens were not adept at maneuvering, they can be used in such a way as to minimize this deficiency, for example by holding the center of the line while the more experienced troops on the wings envelop and roll up the enemy.

I'm doing the exact opposite of denying the role of Hannibal's tactics in battle; what I'm pointing out is that they're not innovations that the enemy can simply adopt and nullify. Napoleon's success hinged in large part on his army being fundamentally different than those of his enemies', whereas Hannibal was essentially practicing the same art of war as his enemies but better. Ruse, stratagem, envelopment, ambush -these had all been part of the tactical playbook for centuries, probably millennia. It's not as simple as 'the Romans figured out his tricks'. Especially considering they fell for them at Zama.

By focusing purely on the negative factors, you're ignoring the more relevant fact that Hannibal had advantages of his own and options open to him that he didn't take. These more than anything determine victory or defeat once battle is joined.

For example, if Hannibal deployed his citizens in the center and mercenaries/veterans on the wings, and once Scipio's cavalry left the field, attacked rather than awaited Scipio's attack, he could have enveloped the Romans with his superior numbers and driven them from the field. By holding his elephants in reserve, he even could have hedged against the return of the Roman cavalry to the field, protecting the rear of his army like the allies did at Ipsus. If you didn't know the outcome of the OTL battle, and you read that in a timeline, it would be completely plausible. Contending such a victory was impossible because of the OTL result is just determinism.
 
The Battle of Dresden was fought with raw levies outnumbered almost 2-1 in weather that favored the enemy. Contending Napoleon didn't win a crushing victory at a major disadvantage is probably the most ridiculous conclusion you can draw. You absolutely cannot deny the role of tactics in deciding the battle.

Numbers are almost always the most important factor in deciding a battle, alongside tactics; troop quality is probably in third place. No matter how good the men are, even slight numerical advantages can change the tide of the battle. Even if the Carthaginian citizens were not adept at maneuvering, they can be used in such a way as to minimize this deficiency, for example by holding the center of the line while the more experienced troops on the wings envelop and roll up the enemy.

I'm doing the exact opposite of denying the role of Hannibal's tactics in battle; what I'm pointing out is that they're not innovations that the enemy can simply adopt and nullify. Napoleon's success hinged in large part on his army being fundamentally different than those of his enemies', whereas Hannibal was essentially practicing the same art of war as his enemies but better. Ruse, stratagem, envelopment, ambush -these had all been part of the tactical playbook for centuries, probably millennia. It's not as simple as 'the Romans figured out his tricks'. Especially considering they fell for them at Zama.

By focusing purely on the negative factors, you're ignoring the more relevant fact that Hannibal had advantages of his own and options open to him that he didn't take. These more than anything determine victory or defeat once battle is joined.

For example, if Hannibal deployed his citizens in the center and mercenaries/veterans on the wings, and once Scipio's cavalry left the field, attacked rather than awaited Scipio's attack, he could have enveloped the Romans with his superior numbers and driven them from the field. By holding his elephants in reserve, he even could have hedged against the return of the Roman cavalry to the field, protecting the rear of his army like the allies did at Ipsus. If you didn't know the outcome of the OTL battle, and you read that in a timeline, it would be completely plausible. Contending such a victory was impossible because of the OTL result is just determinism.

Hannibal only had a few thousands of his veterans left, not enough to envelop the roman army, if he had deployed the citizens in the center and the veterans on the wings on a single line, the Romans would have smashed through them, and the battle would have ended there and then. Elephants aren’t meant to stop cavalry, they’re meant to bring infantry in disarray at the first stages of battle, keeping them on the rear would have been pointless. At Ipsus Demetrius easily rode around them, he didn’t come back simply because he got caught up in his own pursuit of the enemy.

Hannibal employed the best possible tactic he was allowed to employ, exploiting his numerical superiority the same way Romans do, by keeping lines fresh lines in reserve so to never allow his formation to be broken. Scipio’s Romans however, the formation they adopted, which made elephants useless by making them pass through them, and superiority in cavalry really determined the outcome, not a blunder by Hannibal.
 
Hannibal only had a few thousands of his veterans left, not enough to envelop the roman army, if he had deployed the citizens in the center and the veterans on the wings on a single line, the Romans would have smashed through them, and the battle would have ended there and then. Elephants aren’t meant to stop cavalry, they’re meant to bring infantry in disarray at the first stages of battle, keeping them on the rear would have been pointless. At Ipsus Demetrius easily rode around them, he didn’t come back simply because he got caught up in his own pursuit of the enemy.

Hannibal employed the best possible tactic he was allowed to employ, exploiting his numerical superiority the same way Romans do, by keeping lines fresh lines in reserve so to never allow his formation to be broken. Scipio’s Romans however, the formation they adopted, which made elephants useless by making them pass through them, and superiority in cavalry really determined the outcome, not a blunder by Hannibal.
The Romans broke through the Carthaginian center at the Trebia and Cannae, where the solid African infantry were a very small minority in the army. See also Marathon. Clearly, a breakthrough in the center is not enough to win the battle at a stroke when the enemy is enveloping your wings. Moreover, Hannibal achieved this with a vastly outnumbered army, whereas here he has the advantage. Simply sitting in place, letting the Romans beat down each successive line, forfeited the initiative and prolonged the battle enough for Scipio's cavalry to return and decide the issue. He also failed to exploit the elephants the way Xanthippus did at Tunis by taking advantage of the resultant gaps in the Roman lines.

I'd really appreciate some chapter and verse regarding Ispus; the way Plutarch describes it, the elephants in Demetrius's way prevented him from rejoining the battle, leading to the allies' victory.
 
The Romans broke through the Carthaginian center at the Trebia and Cannae, where the solid African infantry were a very small minority in the army. See also Marathon. Clearly, a breakthrough in the center is not enough to win the battle at a stroke when the enemy is enveloping your wings. Moreover, Hannibal achieved this with a vastly outnumbered army, whereas here he has the advantage. Simply sitting in place, letting the Romans beat down each successive line, forfeited the initiative and prolonged the battle enough for Scipio's cavalry to return and decide the issue. He also failed to exploit the elephants the way Xanthippus did at Tunis by taking advantage of the resultant gaps in the Roman lines.

I'd really appreciate some chapter and verse regarding Ispus; the way Plutarch describes it, the elephants in Demetrius's way prevented him from rejoining the battle, leading to the allies' victory.

At Trebia and Cannae Romans broke through, but their cavalry had been routed, that’s what brought victory to Hannibal. In Italy Hannibal knew his cavalry was superior in both numbers and quality to the Romans’, and he properly exploited that. At Zama, not only Roman cavalry outnumbered his, but Massinissa’s Numidians were way better than what he had, Hannibal knew all of this, and that’s why once the Romans broke through at Zama, the battle was effectively over.

Scipio’s gaps in his army weren’t the same adopted by Regulus. Scipio aligned the maniples, forming perfect columns where the elephants would pass through. Regulus employed the same old formation and tried to scare the elephants off, but it didn’t work. Also, his cavalry was heavily outnumbered, which, and this can’t be stressed enough, was not the case in Zama, where Scipio outnumbered Hannibal’s cavalry.

Concerning Ipsus, elephants did prevent Demetrius from rejoining battle, but that happened because he had already gone too far away by the time he decided to go back, so that once Seleucus threw at him one hundred elephants, he had no infantry support to fight them.

It’s actually unclear why the coalition against Antigonus placed elephants in the rear, some even speculate that their role against Demetrius’ cavalry was improvised.
 
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At Trebia and Cannae Romans broke through, but their cavalry had been routed, that’s what brought victory to Hannibal. In Italy Hannibal knew his cavalry was superior in both numbers and quality to the Romans’, and he properly exploited that. At Zama, not only Roman cavalry outnumbered his, but Massinissa’s Numidians were way better than what he had, Hannibal knew all of this, and that’s why once the Romans broke through at Zama, the battle was effectively over.

Scipio’s gaps in his army weren’t the same adopted by Regulus. Scipio aligned the maniples, forming perfect columns where the elephants would pass through. Regulus employed the same old formation and tried to scare the elephants off, but it didn’t work. Also, his cavalry was heavily outnumbered, which, and this can’t be stressed enough, was not the case in Zama, where Scipio outnumbered Hannibal’s cavalry.

Concerning Ipsus, elephants did prevent Demetrius from rejoining battle, but that happened because he had already gone too far away by the time he decided to go back, so that once Seleucus threw at him one hundred elephants, he had no infantry support to fight them.

It’s actually unclear why the coalition against Antigonus placed elephants in the rear, some even speculate that their role against Demetrius’ cavalry was improvised.
The Roman cavalry played no role at Zama until the very end, as Hannibal had deliberately lured them away, and Massinissa completely fell for it. The situation this precisely paralleled Ipsus.

The role of Hannibal's cavalry at Cannae was to shear the Roman flanks of their protection; the real efficacious force of the double envelopment was his African infantry.

Even though the formation adopted by Scipio was certainly orderly and well planned to counter the elephants, it would still be wholly unsuited to fighting Hannibal's infantry; in modern times, the infantry square was excellent against cavalry, but very weak against infantry or artillery.
 
Hannibal only had a few thousands of his veterans left, not enough to envelop the roman army, if he had deployed the citizens in the center and the veterans on the wings on a single line, the Romans would have smashed through them, and the battle would have ended there and then.

Or they'd smash the wings while the low-quality Carthaginian center would be contained by the relatively small Roman force. After which the center would be dealt with as happened at Metaurus. An idea that Scipio would be imitating Varro by arranging his troops into a deep narrow column seems highly unlikely to me: he did nothing of the kind at Zama. Actually, at the later stage of the battle he extended his front by putting the triarii on the outer wings. In a different scenario this could happen earlier.

Of course, an opinion that at Cannae the encirclement was accomplished exclusively by an infantry is not universally shared. Schliffen wrote about the Carthaginian cavalry attack on the Roman rear and so did Montgomery, Razin and Delbruck. I assume that opinions of 2 fieldmarshals, one colonel and one military historian with world-wide name recognition should amount to something. :winkytongue:
 
Or they'd smash the wings while the low-quality Carthaginian center would be contained by the relatively small Roman force. After which the center would be dealt with as happened at Metaurus. An idea that Scipio would be imitating Varro by arranging his troops into a deep narrow column seems highly unlikely to me: he did nothing of the kind at Zama. Actually, at the later stage of the battle he extended his front by putting the triarii on the outer wings. In a different scenario this could happen earlier.

Of course, an opinion that at Cannae the encirclement was accomplished exclusively by an infantry is not universally shared. Schliffen wrote about the Carthaginian cavalry attack on the Roman rear and so did Montgomery, Razin and Delbruck. I assume that opinions of 2 fieldmarshals, one colonel and one military historian with world-wide name recognition should amount to something. :winkytongue:

Yeah, that too. I agree about the role of the cavalry in the encirclement at Cannae, that’s why I think it would have been impossible for Hannibal to repeat that at Zama.
 
The Roman cavalry played no role at Zama until the very end, as Hannibal had deliberately lured them away, and Massinissa completely fell for it. The situation this precisely paralleled Ipsus.

The role of Hannibal's cavalry at Cannae was to shear the Roman flanks of their protection; the real efficacious force of the double envelopment was his African infantry.

Even though the formation adopted by Scipio was certainly orderly and well planned to counter the elephants, it would still be wholly unsuited to fighting Hannibal's infantry; in modern times, the infantry square was excellent against cavalry, but very weak against infantry or artillery.

At the very end? The whole battle began with Massinissa routing Hannibal’s cavalry, which greatly helped in determining the battle’s final outcome.

As @alexmilman pointed out, no envelopment could have worked without cavalry, that’s why Hannibal never planned that at Zama.

It wasn’t really a square, more like a rectangle, but that’s not the point. You can’t apply the rules of modern warfare to ancient warfare, they’re on two wholly different levels tactically and strategically.
 
At the very end? The whole battle began with Massinissa routing Hannibal’s cavalry, which greatly helped in determining the battle’s final outcome.

As @alexmilman pointed out, no envelopment could have worked without cavalry, that’s why Hannibal never planned that at Zama.

It wasn’t really a square, more like a rectangle, but that’s not the point. You can’t apply the rules of modern warfare to ancient warfare, they’re on two wholly different levels tactically and strategically.
The battle began with a planned withdrawal by Hannibal's cavalry, keeping Massinissa's cavalry from engaging the main force of his army until the very end.

Believing you can't envelop an army with infantry is so ridiculous it barely warrants discussion; just imagine me providing a gigantic list of battles won by infantry envelopments.

The point is that a formation useful for nullifying elephants would be vulnerable against infantry if they struck while the iron is hot. If it was, there would be no reason to shift back; hitting the enemy with multiple types of forces -elephants and infantry, skirmishers and cavalry- so that the enemy is forced to adopt a posture that can't defend against both is tactics 101.
 
It wasn’t really a square, more like a rectangle, but that’s not the point. You can’t apply the rules of modern warfare to ancient warfare, they’re on two wholly different levels tactically and strategically.

Not to put too much stress on it (analogies of that type are not always applicable) but the square/column-based infantry formations had been working just fine not just against the cavalry. Starting from the Swiss columns and all the way to the 30YW the square-like infantry formations had been fighting each other on the battlefields of Europe. And as late as in the 1780's they were routinely and quite successfully used by the Russians against the Ottoman infantry as the main attacking formation.
 
Believing you can't envelop an army with infantry is so ridiculous it barely warrants discussion; just imagine me providing a gigantic list of battles won by infantry envelopments.

Nice attempt to change the subject by switching from the specific example (Cannae) to the sweeping generalities. Did anybody said that envelopment by the infantry alone was not possible at all? I don't think so.
 
The battle began with a planned withdrawal by Hannibal's cavalry, keeping Massinissa's cavalry from engaging the main force of his army until the very end.

Believing you can't envelop an army with infantry is so ridiculous it barely warrants discussion; just imagine me providing a gigantic list of battles won by infantry envelopments.

The point is that a formation useful for nullifying elephants would be vulnerable against infantry if they struck while the iron is hot. If it was, there would be no reason to shift back; hitting the enemy with multiple types of forces -elephants and infantry, skirmishers and cavalry- so that the enemy is forced to adopt a posture that can't defend against both is tactics 101.


According to Goldsworthy “On the left a number of the animals (elephants) panicked and stampeded back through the ranks of their own cavalry. Massinissa spotted an opportunity and led his men forward in an immediate attack on Hannibal’s Numidian allies, routing them almost immediately”
The fall of Carthage p. 304

I honestly don’t see how some Numidians could lead away other Numidians without either being routed or routing their enemies themselves. There was no tactical withdrawal. The elephants, being poorly trained, panicked right away, and this brought about the collapse of the cavalry.

I don’t believe infantry can’t envelope without cavalry, there’s several cases where that happened, like at the battle of Sabis, where Caesar fought the Nervii. Nonetheless, I believe that Hannibal, in the circumstances he found himself in, couldn’t do it either in Italy or in Africa without superiority in cavalry.

Hannibal couldn’t hit the enemy when the iron was hot. The elephants panicked, the cavalry was routed and 4/5 of his army was made of untrained soldiers. Attempting any sort of complex maneuver with those men would have just broken their formation sooner for the Romans’ benefit.
 
According to Goldsworthy “On the left a number of the animals (elephants) panicked and stampeded back through the ranks of their own cavalry. Massinissa spotted an opportunity and led his men forward in an immediate attack on Hannibal’s Numidian allies, routing them almost immediately”
The fall of Carthage p. 304

I honestly don’t see how some Numidians could lead away other Numidians without either being routed or routing their enemies themselves. There was no tactical withdrawal. The elephants, being poorly trained, panicked right away, and this brought about the collapse of the cavalry.

I don’t believe infantry can’t envelope without cavalry, there’s several cases where that happened, like at the battle of Sabis, where Caesar fought the Nervii. Nonetheless, I believe that Hannibal, in the circumstances he found himself in, couldn’t do it either in Italy or in Africa without superiority in cavalry.

Hannibal couldn’t hit the enemy when the iron was hot. The elephants panicked, the cavalry was routed and 4/5 of his army was made of untrained soldiers. Attempting any sort of complex maneuver with those men would have just broken their formation sooner for the Romans’ benefit.


Schliffen (IIRC) put it rather nicely: to have Cannae you need Hannibal on one side and Varro on another. ;)

An assumption that Scipio would be ineptly leaving all tactical initiative to the opponent is not supported by any known facts of his military career and, anyway, at Zama he ended up extending his front line by putting troops from his 3rd line to the flanks so an idea of having Hannibal's veterans on the flanks would not produce any miracles. As for an idea of leaving the untrained levies in the center, analogy with Cannae is not working because at that battle all Hannibal's troops had been experienced soldiers (who already won a number of battles) and even the lightly armed troops in the center were of a better quality than untrained city militia.

As for the fancy ideas about using the elephants, I'm just curious how often had they been used as a reserve or for some complicated tactical schema? To my very superficial recollection they were usually placed at the front of the troops or formed a part of a front line.
 
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