WI: Guerilla warfare in the Republic of Korea

It's known that there were quite a few massacres in South Korea during and around the time of the Korean War. The claim by the Republic of Korea government was that these were Communist infiltrators, though I don't believe that explanation at all. However, was a Communist uprising in South Korea ever possible? I'm not just talking about after the Korean War. For example, if North Korea hadn't started the Korean War by invading first in 1950, could a Vietcong style uprising in South Korea start in any way, growing off of the smaller revolts that did pop up historically? What about after or during the Korean War? Again, I'm talking about a large-scale, prolonged conflict, so those bloody but short events in Jeju or Gwangju aren't large enough or drawn-out enough.

And if these events did occur, what would be their larger effects down the line?
 
I believe there were a few in the late 40s and 50s, but they were wiped out, and then after the Korean War the DMZ was too well defended to penetrate.

Pak Honyong told Kim Il Sung that there was going to be a massive uprising in support of the North in it invaded the South, which was one of the reasons he went through with the invasion when he did. Needless to say, there wasn't, and this was used against Pak when he was purged in 1953.

If Stalin and Mao didn't give the go-ahead for an invasion for whatever reason, then it is likely that efforts along these lines would have been expanded somewhat. They might have even been relatively successful, particularly as in this period the North was more economically developed than the South and roughly equivalent in terms of repression. This could actually work, I think. After the Soviets pull out of the North and the Americans are still occupying the South, then the Northern regime might attract more support from the South. Cue some excessive overreaction from Seoul and you could get some nastiness brewing.
 
I believe there were a few in the late 40s and 50s, but they were wiped out, and then after the Korean War the DMZ was too well defended to penetrate.

Pak Honyong told Kim Il Sung that there was going to be a massive uprising in support of the North in it invaded the South, which was one of the reasons he went through with the invasion when he did. Needless to say, there wasn't, and this was used against Pak when he was purged in 1953.

If Stalin and Mao didn't give the go-ahead for an invasion for whatever reason, then it is likely that efforts along these lines would have been expanded somewhat. They might have even been relatively successful, particularly as in this period the North was more economically developed than the South and roughly equivalent in terms of repression. This could actually work, I think. After the Soviets pull out of the North and the Americans are still occupying the South, then the Northern regime might attract more support from the South. Cue some excessive overreaction from Seoul and you could get some nastiness brewing.

So, Kim Il-Sung invaded South Korea with the idea that the locals would rise in favor of him, but didn't actually do any coordinating for that idea first? So, if there was a Vietcong style uprising in South Korea instead of the Korean War, would that create another version of the Korean War instead?
 
So, Kim Il-Sung invaded South Korea with the idea that the locals would rise in favor of him, but didn't actually do any coordinating for that idea first? So, if there was a Vietcong style uprising in South Korea instead of the Korean War, would that create another version of the Korean War instead?

I suggest the KIMH's first volume on the Korean War here.

Kim Il-Sung wasn't predominate in the central committee at the time of the war.

For years the southern elements of Korean communism had been attempting to cause a revolutionary situation, including small scale use of armed combat. These attempts were ineffective. South Korea didn't have a number of features of the Republic of Vietnam that made a village centred revolution possible, and therefore made it possible for a Leninist party to ride that tiger.

Prior to the war the party attempted repeatedly to coordinate these activities, they were not particularly effective except at drawing South Korean units away from border protection or training and into anti-partisan operations.

yours,
Sam R.
 
Kim Il-Sung wasn't predominate in the central committee at the time of the war.

He was predominant, just not as overwhelmingly so as he became by the end of the 1950's. He was the single most powerful figure in North Korean politics, though the power of the Kim Il Song guerilla faction wasn't yet dominant.

For years the southern elements of Korean communism had been attempting to cause a revolutionary situation, including small scale use of armed combat. These attempts were ineffective. South Korea didn't have a number of features of the Republic of Vietnam that made a village centred revolution possible, and therefore made it possible for a Leninist party to ride that tiger.

What were these features?
 
were these features?

The comprador bourgeoisie being Catholic, the deep impact of the fish sauce tax and its attendant proletarianisation of the countryside, the (relatively) effective maintenance of multi-tendential Stalinist Leninism in the party and the effective structuring of multiple coaligned front parties around the VWP. Also, the VWP did not come to be dominated by a batshit insane faction. And of course the size and scope of the hinterland.

In South Korea the southern comrades had no hinterland, lacked a unifying "outside" force, suffered from internal party shitfighting, lacked the support of coaligned front parties, and were dominated significantly by either multiple or a single batshit insane faction.

Additionally, of course, when the VWP fucked up, it rethought what it was doing. Consider the dropping of the General Uprising line in 1968 and the shift of PRG economics towards sustaining long term liberated areas. When the Korean Party began failing in the late 1940s in the South, the answer was to continue along the same pathway, while misrepresenting their levels of success to their Northern comrades.

Different parties, different outcomes.

yours,
Sam R.
 
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