WI: Great War of '63

The start date of the war is irrelevant to the facts outlined. If you have 1.5 million pounds on powder on hand, will use 7.5 million just for the Army over the next year and have been cut off from your import source of 11.9 Million pounds, the inescapable fact is you're going to run out of gunpowder.

Unless it was just cheaper or simpler to buy than produce and you can increase your own production with a relative ease. I don't know whichever it was.
 
Is there any way to get, instead of an 1863 POD, some alternate result of the St. Albans Raid resulting in Federal troops crossing into Canada and skirmishing with British Army units stationed there? Seems a bit...out there, but it could result in a war in 1864 particularly as the USA will likely refuse mediation at this point. Britain gets France on board to send an ultimatum for mediation as well as humiliating terms for the treatment of the US soldiers who made their way across the border, which Lincoln refuses, leading to war...

The question then becomes if Prussia will be able to, right off of the success of the Danish war, turn this into a CB against France and, boom, 1860s Great War isn't hard to see emerging. Possibly Prussia, Austria, Russia, USA versus UK, France, Italy, Ottomans, CSA...
 
Unless it was just cheaper or simpler to buy than produce and you can increase your own production with a relative ease. I don't know whichever it was.

It could not be produced cheaply or timely in the Federal States. This is why Britain dominated the nitrates market up until 1912 with only Chile being notable besides them.
 
As far as I can tell, the doom and gloom conclusions were for the case when the exports/imports are stopped and mostly linked to Britain, not the whole world, so it is not a big surprise that they did not come true. But I don't see the reason of questioning the numbers related to the existing (by that time) imports and exports. Neither do I see the reason to doubt a conclusion that cessation of imports and exports hits both sides and probably more the side with a negative trade balance.

Well, the British would likely blockade the Union, resulting in a decrease of all foreign trade for the US, whereas the Union wouldn't be able to do much against Britain's non-US-bound trade. I don't know the exact amount of trade each country carried out at the time, so maybe the UK would end up losing more in absolute terms, but in relative terms I'd expect the US to end up significantly worse off.

Given time, though, they can pull the blockade back in (Since its a rational conclusion, according to you and I agree, that trying to hold it against a British expeditionary fleet is hopeless) and concentrate its sea power along the eastern coast to create a threatening fleet-in-being that will prevent the British from spreading out in a counter-blockade.

AFAIK most of the Union navy was made up of small ships which were good for enforcing blockades but not very much use at all in big naval battles. So I suspect that the British would be able to blockade the US fleet and still have enough ships left to seriously disrupt US trade.
 
AFAIK most of the Union navy was made up of small ships which were good for enforcing blockades but not very much use at all in big naval battles. So I suspect that the British would be able to blockade the US fleet and still have enough ships left to seriously disrupt US trade.

Sure, but a longer war means more opportunities for innovation in warships. As ironclad ships become the norm, it'll put the USA on a much more even playing field especially since they only have to disrupt a blockade of their own coasts.

Not to mention the possibility of more development in submarines...
 
Well, the British would likely blockade the Union, resulting in a decrease of all foreign trade for the US, whereas the Union wouldn't be able to do much against Britain's non-US-bound trade. I don't know the exact amount of trade each country carried out at the time, so maybe the UK would end up losing more in absolute terms, but in relative terms I'd expect the US to end up significantly worse off.

Well, this depends upon the specifics. If, as was pointed out, the Union is heavily depended upon the British-supplied nitrites and ready gunpowder and simply can not get needed volume of the ingredients domestically, then this is a very serious blow to its capacity to continue a war (actually, if GB had a near-monopoly, how other European powers were producing their explosives? They could not be fully dependent upon the British goodwill so I'd assume that there were ways around this problem). Similarly, if Britain was importing big amounts of food from the US this could cause serious domestic problems on other side of the equation because it may or may not be easy to get adequate amounts elsewhere at the same price. Shortages of food and increasing prices could easily make war unpopular toppling the government and ending the whole affair.

Then goes further potential complications. Of course, a new Trafalgar was not going to happen and unilateral British blockade of the US ports sounds impressive but there are at few potential problems:

1st, even at the time in question there were numerous ports on the Atlantic side and some on the Pacific side as well. Blocking all of them could stretch British naval forces, big as they were, very thin making them vulnerable in many points.

2nd, both on the Atlantic and especially on the Pacific side there would be an issue of re-coaling and a need of the coaling stations. As it was pointed out Halifax may not be adequate for the task and I have no idea what could be done on the Pacific side.

3rd, shoals and other similar issues could make a close blockade of at least some of the major ports (for example Boston) by the big ships either impossible or close to impossible leaving the task to the smaller, mostly wooden, ships which could be attacked by their American equivalents stationed in the ports (and not suffering from the bad weather, etc.) .

4th, there could be diplomatic implications if the British ships are intercepting the merchant ships of a neutral country. How many European countries could GB piss of at the same time without risk of the repercussions?

The Hell is in the details of which I simply don't know enough.
 
The Union can produce gunpowder locally - but building up the nitrates production (mostly in niter beds from animal and human dung and pee) takes a year or more - the CSA managed to construct such an industry, but in 1862, it produced only 1000 tons of salpeter, while it had reached roughly 2000 tons yearly by late 1864, it was still not enough to supply the Confederacy. As you can see, it takes time to build up a local nitrates industry, and I am not sure the USA has such time before they run out of gunpowder.

As for a blockade, the British and the French both have sea-going ironclads that are strong enough to take on the entire US and CS navies combined - wood and ironclad, steam and sail - and win, due to being bigger, faster, more heavily armoured and equipped with heavy rifled guns, something that was in the absolute forefront of industrial know-how at the time, and which the US lacked the ability to do until 1868 or so - both the smoothbore heavy Dahlgren guns and the heavie rifled Parrots were prone to cracking or bursting and while the smoothbores eventually worked out, only a handful of the rifled guns were used in the field (or on ships), such as the Swamp Angel, which burst on its 36th shot.

In fact, the two squadrons sent to the US by Russia in 1863 consisted of 3 wooden steam screw frigates, 6 wooden steam screw corvettes and 3 wooden steam clippers would be almost equal to the entire US blue water navy at the time, as the ironclads except for USS New Ironsides all were coastal ones.

Neither USA nor the Confederacy has any real power projection ability, and neither would be of any use as an ally against a European power - the US ability to actually bring any kind of fight to Europe starts with Roosevelt's great white fleet - before that no European power would consider an alliance with the US, except possibly as a distraction for Britain's land forces. Any European power going to war with the US as an ally is pretty unlikely at this time, as they all know the US will not be able to aid them in any other way than being a distraction for the British. Thinking otherwise is really pushing the US military hegemony backwards in time.

The US COULD build up a military projection, if it dedicated the resources to it, but history shows that it was unwilling to do so before ww1, prefering to not keep a large standing army not widespread conscription or the naval bases and recoaling stations to move troops over the world,m as these things cost a lot of money.
 
Is there any way to get, instead of an 1863 POD, some alternate result of the St. Albans Raid resulting in Federal troops crossing into Canada and skirmishing with British Army units stationed there? Seems a bit...out there, but it could result in a war in 1864 particularly as the USA will likely refuse mediation at this point. Britain gets France on board to send an ultimatum for mediation as well as humiliating terms for the treatment of the US soldiers who made their way across the border, which Lincoln refuses, leading to war...

The question then becomes if Prussia will be able to, right off of the success of the Danish war, turn this into a CB against France and, boom, 1860s Great War isn't hard to see emerging. Possibly Prussia, Austria, Russia, USA versus UK, France, Italy, Ottomans, CSA...

Not really. If the US crossed into Canada by accident Lincoln et all have a huge incentive to eat crow and not do anything about any British ultimatum. For one thing it is an election year, and for another they will be entering some of the hardest fighting in the war pushing on Richmond and Atlanta. Anything distracting from that is a net negative to the Union war effort, imagine if troops from the Army of the Potomac or the Army of the Tennessee had to suddenly turn north en masse to protect the border with Canada, it would be a nightmare since the Confederacy suddenly has breathing room. Even if this didn't win it for them, they'd have space to breathe in the campaigns of 1864 which could delay the end of the war to late 1865 early 1866, especially if the British broke the blockade and gave the South vital breathing room.

No foreign power has an interest in getting involved at this point, and the Union has no interest in ticking off the European powers. The Russians were unwilling to go to war with the European powers a mere decade after the Crimean War (they did not abrogate the demilitarization of the Black Sea till 1870 for a reason) and Prussia has no interest (or business) attacking France in 1864, since Russia would not march to the Rhine for them, and Austria might be too willing to settle the German question right there and then if it is seen as in their interests.

Well, this depends upon the specifics. If, as was pointed out, the Union is heavily depended upon the British-supplied nitrites and ready gunpowder and simply can not get needed volume of the ingredients domestically, then this is a very serious blow to its capacity to continue a war (actually, if GB had a near-monopoly, how other European powers were producing their explosives? They could not be fully dependent upon the British goodwill so I'd assume that there were ways around this problem). Similarly, if Britain was importing big amounts of food from the US this could cause serious domestic problems on other side of the equation because it may or may not be easy to get adequate amounts elsewhere at the same price. Shortages of food and increasing prices could easily make war unpopular toppling the government and ending the whole affair.

Firstly, the Union could build a domestic powder industry, but this is neither quick nor cheap to do. It is far more economic to ship in cheap nitre or powder from Britain, as building a domestic industry takes years of effort and expense, something not really done in the middle of a major war.

Secondly, I have yet to find any hard evidence Britain was dependent on Union grain. I have seen evidence that prices might rise, but none suggesting it would rise to unacceptable levels in this period. It's one of those 'facts' that seems to be thrown around with little corresponding evidence.

1st, even at the time in question there were numerous ports on the Atlantic side and some on the Pacific side as well. Blocking all of them could stretch British naval forces, big as they were, very thin making them vulnerable in many points.

The British did draw up plans for blockade in 1862, and it would not have stretched the Royal Navy unduly from their existing commitments, and this isn't counting any new builds or mobilization. It would be their largest mobilization since the Crimea, but nothing which would make it impossible to continue policing the global sea lanes.

2nd, both on the Atlantic and especially on the Pacific side there would be an issue of re-coaling and a need of the coaling stations. As it was pointed out Halifax may not be adequate for the task and I have no idea what could be done on the Pacific side.

Admiral Milne himself suggesting seizing Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard as coaling stations, and with British plans to seize Portland this may alleviate that problem. My own TL explores some of these issues in depth.

3rd, shoals and other similar issues could make a close blockade of at least some of the major ports (for example Boston) by the big ships either impossible or close to impossible leaving the task to the smaller, mostly wooden, ships which could be attacked by their American equivalents stationed in the ports (and not suffering from the bad weather, etc.)

A problem, but not an insurmountable one, since it still applies to ships operating on peace time duties as well.

4th, there could be diplomatic implications if the British ships are intercepting the merchant ships of a neutral country. How many European countries could GB piss of at the same time without risk of the repercussions?

If Britain declares a blockade as an act of war, that's something that maritime nations will respect. It would be a legal part of the war itself and while individuals might have an interest in defying it, no maritime nation would.
 
Secondly, I have yet to find any hard evidence Britain was dependent on Union grain. I have seen evidence that prices might rise, but none suggesting it would rise to unacceptable levels in this period. It's one of those 'facts' that seems to be thrown around with little corresponding evidence.

It reminds me a bit of the whole "King Cotton" argument. Of course, it might be that King Grain (to coin a phrase) is correct whereas King Cotton wasn't, but the fact that we already have one example of a cessation of exports not leading to the expected chaos should give us pause, IMHO.

Plus, are there any contemporary examples of people predicting that a lack of American grain imports would be ruinous for Britain? The US and UK came close to war on at least one occasion (the Trent affair), so if Britain really was dependent on US grain (as opposed to buying US grain because it was cheaper, but able to find alternative sources if necessary), we'd expect the issue to come up, either in editorials or in governmental discussions.
 
Firstly, the Union could build a domestic powder industry, but this is neither quick nor cheap to do. It is far more economic to ship in cheap nitre or powder from Britain, as building a domestic industry takes years of effort and expense, something not really done in the middle of a major war.

Well, this was exactly an argument I made to get a reply that it could not because Britain was the largest supplier of the nitrites. Don't know how long it would really take for the Union to build up its own supply base and not sure that I have to take your word for it unless you are a specialist in this area.

Secondly, I have yet to find any hard evidence Britain was dependent on Union grain. I have seen evidence that prices might rise, but none suggesting it would rise to unacceptable levels in this period. It's one of those 'facts' that seems to be thrown around with little corresponding evidence.

Did you notice "if" in my post?

As for the evidence I quoted earlier an article from NYT circa 1871 dedicated to the subject. While this article seems to be excessively "patriotic", it contained some numbers related to the imports/exports which are probably correct. Conclusions, especially sweeping ones, are a different issue.


The British did draw up plans for blockade in 1862, and it would not have stretched the Royal Navy unduly from their existing commitments, and this isn't counting any new builds or mobilization. It would be their largest mobilization since the Crimea, but nothing which would make it impossible to continue policing the global sea lanes.

"Policing" the sea lines is a far cry from a close blockade of the US sea ports.

Admiral Milne himself suggesting seizing Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard as coaling stations, and with British plans to seize Portland this may alleviate that problem. My own TL explores some of these issues in depth.

The part that I like about this idea is a possible fundamental ecological screw up of Martha's Vineyard preventing it from becoming a place for the mansions of the "beautiful people". :)

OTOH, Nantucket Sound is generally shallow and these islands, AFAIK, are lacking anchorage suitable for the big ships.


A problem, but not an insurmountable one, since it still applies to ships operating on peace time duties as well.

Well, the ships operating in a peace time are not trying to maintain a blockade so their "operations" are quite different.
 
Regarding coal, ocean-going ships of this period still carried sails. Outside of actual combat, then, the British ships wouldn't need to use much, if any, coal.
 
It reminds me a bit of the whole "King Cotton" argument. Of course, it might be that King Grain (to coin a phrase) is correct whereas King Cotton wasn't, but the fact that we already have one example of a cessation of exports not leading to the expected chaos should give us pause, IMHO.

Plus, are there any contemporary examples of people predicting that a lack of American grain imports would be ruinous for Britain? The US and UK came close to war on at least one occasion (the Trent affair), so if Britain really was dependent on US grain (as opposed to buying US grain because it was cheaper, but able to find alternative sources if necessary), we'd expect the issue to come up, either in editorials or in governmental discussions.

King Wheat does seem to be a specter similar to King Cotton. I have personally yet to find any hard evidence that King Wheat played a role in British deliberations, and it seems like one of those 'facts' stated without any real research into it.

I would assume that the cessation of wheat exports would cause prices in Britain to rise, but without any way of testing that we can't say whether this would be ruinous or not. I lean towards the not camp personally, since we have Britain going to war with one of her main providers (Russia) in the 1850s and no evidence of Britain being brought low by famine from that war.

Well, this was exactly an argument I made to get a reply that it could not because Britain was the largest supplier of the nitrites. Don't know how long it would really take for the Union to build up its own supply base and not sure that I have to take your word for it unless you are a specialist in this area.

The closest I can give as an answer to this is from my own TL in Chapter 11 where I quote from Dupont Dalghren and the Saltpetre Shortage (Google that and you get the PDF that the web forces you to download to read unfortunately) which I discovered in McPherson's Battlecry of Freedom, and there is also The Devil To Pay! Saltpeter and the Trent Affair which offers another examination of the problem of what the Union could do without British powder. However, Joseph LeConte provided some interesting calculations using other methods of producing nitre for gunpowder. They are the Prussian and the Swiss methods. Neither is quick nor particularly efficient in the short term, but would provide a suitable domestic base for the stuff.

By my own calculations it would optimally take a year for the Union to begin powder production, realistically it would be two before large amounts powder could be churned out reliably.

As for the evidence I quoted earlier an article from NYT circa 1871 dedicated to the subject. While this article seems to be excessively "patriotic", it contained some numbers related to the imports/exports which are probably correct. Conclusions, especially sweeping ones, are a different issue.

I've got some numbers on grain totals exported/imported during certain years in the 1800s from here (table 2.2). So we can see that during a similar period (1853-57) three of those years Britain was at war with one of its major grain suppliers and was actively blockading them. It seems then than King Grain is not really a factor. Prices might rise, but would this derail the war effort? That is the question.

"Policing" the sea lines is a far cry from a close blockade of the US sea ports.

This was still done in the Crimean War where Britain held a close blockade and mounted numerous and extensive operations against defended Russian ports in the Baltic and the Black Sea. The difference here is that the operational tempo (and the surity that the USN will fight) means more losses than the handful suffered in the Crimean War.

The part that I like about this idea is a possible fundamental ecological screw up of Martha's Vineyard preventing it from becoming a place for the mansions of the "beautiful people". :)

OTOH, Nantucket Sound is generally shallow and these islands, AFAIK, are lacking anchorage suitable for the big ships.

So far as I understand it, this would be a messy ship to ship coaling where colliers base in those waters and the blockaders come and refill their bunkers while not needing to be too far away from their stations.

Well, the ships operating in a peace time are not trying to maintain a blockade so their "operations" are quite different.

Ish. Shoals and bad weather are a part of even peace time operations, and we know from Milne's papers that the RN had access to the American hydrographers reports and coastal survey charts from 1859, and with ships operating on station they would have the resources to watch these shifting sandbars and be aware of the most hazardous obstacles. Their biggest worry might be the USN interfering with previously established buoys and navigational guides to confound the British at sea or in the littorals.
 
Regarding coal, ocean-going ships of this period still carried sails. Outside of actual combat, then, the British ships wouldn't need to use much, if any, coal.

Well the thing is if you want to have your engines available for the sudden pursuit of a steam vessel you do need to keep your boilers hot and steam pressure up so coal usage even on station would not be negligible. That said the British by this period did have experience of blockading a naval power with a steam navy.
 
I've got some numbers on grain totals exported/imported during certain years in the 1800s from here (table 2.2). So we can see that during a similar period (1853-57) three of those years Britain was at war with one of its major grain suppliers and was actively blockading them. It seems then than King Grain is not really a factor. Prices might rise, but would this derail the war effort? That is the question.

I'm not sure that by 1850's Russia remained grain supplier up to the same degree it was in the early XIX: almost immediately after the Napoleonic Wars ended Britain introduced the corn laws (or was it grain laws?) which limited foreign imports and remained in power until 1840's. Which, IMO, indicates that dependency was already down (but eventually there were some domestic troubles over the higher bread prices). Personally, I never used "King Grain" argument which would imply that grain from the US could be a decisive factor. But it could be a noticeable factor.


This was still done in the Crimean War where Britain held a close blockade and mounted numerous and extensive operations against defended Russian ports in the Baltic and the Black Sea. The difference here is that the operational tempo (and the surity that the USN will fight) means more losses than the handful suffered in the Crimean War.

The difference goes well beyond of what you wrote. Number of the Russian ports was quite limited comparing to those of the Atlantic coast and, what's even more important, it would be quite easy to maintain such a blockade (but never really happened) because all the way to the late XIX more than 90% of the Russian naval trade had been conducted by the foreign ships of which the British and French represented a majority. As a result, the allied squadrons could go at will to a specific port, do some bombardment (this mostly applies to the Black Sea and Sea of Azov) and sail away or to take hold of an isolated fortification (like Kinburn or Bomarsund). With the multiple American ports and a big merchant fleet the Brits would have to take blockade much more seriously.


However, the results on the Baltic Sea were anything but impressive. The defended ports on the Baltic Sea had been protected by the combination of land fortifications, mine fields and screw-propelled cannon boats (it took 90 days to have 32 of them built and ready for the operations on Baltic - each having from 1 to 3 68-pounders capable of firing the bombs within a maximum range of 2.6km (and precision shot of 700m). With the main artillery of the forts being 48-pounders (bombing) with the range of 2,13–2,8km which forced the British squadron to fire from the distance of over 3km with practically zero results. Sveaborg was bombarded for a while but not destroyed and attack on Kronstadt never even tried with any degree of a seriousness.


So far as I understand it, this would be a messy ship to ship coaling where colliers base in those waters and the blockaders come and refill their bunkers while not needing to be too far away from their stations.

This makes sense but as you said the process would be messy and requiring a good calm weather. The coaling ships would be staying in the open ocean which makes them vulnerable both to the weather (like a half-decent Nor'Easter) and to the sudden attacks by the small ships going across the shallow waters. Not impossible to maintain but far from being ideal.

Ish. Shoals and bad weather are a part of even peace time operations, and we know from Milne's papers that the RN had access to the American hydrographers reports and coastal survey charts from 1859, and with ships operating on station they would have the resources to watch these shifting sandbars and be aware of the most hazardous obstacles. Their biggest worry might be the USN interfering with previously established buoys and navigational guides to confound the British at sea or in the littorals.

I'm afraid that you somewhat misunderstood what I was trying to say. Of course, it was possible to obtain the maps but these maps do not make it possible to led the big ships through the shallow waters and the deep water passages quite often had been protected by the coastal fortifications. For example, during the ACW the forts protecting Boston Harbor had been rearmed with new Rodman guns, primarily 15-inch and 10-inch caliber (range up to 5,000 yards for 15-inch and 4,800 for 10-inch) and some 100-, 200-, and 300-pounder Parrott rifles (as I understand the range of up to 3,500 yards). So your big ships with a powerful artillery should be kept well away in the sea (which may allow the fast merchant ships to sneak through) and, while you still can go through the shallow zones with the smaller ships, they'd be fighting on equal (or worse) terms with the smaller ships defending the harbor.
 
I'm not sure that by 1850's Russia remained grain supplier up to the same degree it was in the early XIX: almost immediately after the Napoleonic Wars ended Britain introduced the corn laws (or was it grain laws?) which limited foreign imports and remained in power until 1840's. Which, IMO, indicates that dependency was already down (but eventually there were some domestic troubles over the higher bread prices). Personally, I never used "King Grain" argument which would imply that grain from the US could be a decisive factor. But it could be a noticeable factor.

By pure tonnage in the 1850s Russia was the larger supplier than the US, but this didn't see the British fall over when they didn't import Russian grain. It seems that it would be unlikely for grain to be a major factor in any hypothetical war in the 1860s.

The difference goes well beyond of what you wrote. Number of the Russian ports was quite limited comparing to those of the Atlantic coast and, what's even more important, it would be quite easy to maintain such a blockade (but never really happened) because all the way to the late XIX more than 90% of the Russian naval trade had been conducted by the foreign ships of which the British and French represented a majority. As a result, the allied squadrons could go at will to a specific port, do some bombardment (this mostly applies to the Black Sea and Sea of Azov) and sail away or to take hold of an isolated fortification (like Kinburn or Bomarsund). With the multiple American ports and a big merchant fleet the Brits would have to take blockade much more seriously.

However, the results on the Baltic Sea were anything but impressive. The defended ports on the Baltic Sea had been protected by the combination of land fortifications, mine fields and screw-propelled cannon boats (it took 90 days to have 32 of them built and ready for the operations on Baltic - each having from 1 to 3 68-pounders capable of firing the bombs within a maximum range of 2.6km (and precision shot of 700m). With the main artillery of the forts being 48-pounders (bombing) with the range of 2,13–2,8km which forced the British squadron to fire from the distance of over 3km with practically zero results. Sveaborg was bombarded for a while but not destroyed and attack on Kronstadt never even tried with any degree of a seriousness.

In any hypothetical war with the Union in this period the Admiralty had plans laid to blockade all the major ports and inlets and the 1,200 miles of coastline that supplied the Union war effort. Either by winnowing the number of ports (seizing Portland) or by close blockade against the major ports. About the only one which might be daunting is New York due to the naval facilities there and the two entrances which need to be watched. The Union trade would, virtually over night, cease to exist. A small number of Confederate naval raiders caused a loss of IIRC something like 50% of the Union merchant marine either to direct loss or reflagging to escape raiders. The sudden declaration of open season by the largest navy in the world will be catastrophic.

I haven't read anything about screw gunboats for the Russian fleet (evidently they provided enough reason to stand off from Kronstadt, though that was also a portion of the British and French disagreeing on strategy) but you are correct that the British generally only attacked fortified places when they felt compelled to, and with middling success. However, the destruction of Kinburn ought to be seen as instructive, since the introduction of ironclads fundamentally changed the game, making landward defences (especially purely masonry ones) nowhere near as effective as they had been. True the Americans have their own ironclads, but they can't protect everywhere and there's no guarantee they will be as powerful against British inshore ironclads.

This makes sense but as you said the process would be messy and requiring a good calm weather. The coaling ships would be staying in the open ocean which makes them vulnerable both to the weather (like a half-decent Nor'Easter) and to the sudden attacks by the small ships going across the shallow waters. Not impossible to maintain but far from being ideal.

Not necessarily requiring calm weather. Coaling depots could be established on the islands, and coal ferried back and forth or performed closer to shore. Not as efficient as doing it in a proper port, but definitely doable. Coal isn't going to be the bottleneck in these operations.

I'm afraid that you somewhat misunderstood what I was trying to say. Of course, it was possible to obtain the maps but these maps do not make it possible to led the big ships through the shallow waters and the deep water passages quite often had been protected by the coastal fortifications. For example, during the ACW the forts protecting Boston Harbor had been rearmed with new Rodman guns, primarily 15-inch and 10-inch caliber (range up to 5,000 yards for 15-inch and 4,800 for 10-inch) and some 100-, 200-, and 300-pounder Parrott rifles (as I understand the range of up to 3,500 yards). So your big ships with a powerful artillery should be kept well away in the sea (which may allow the fast merchant ships to sneak through) and, while you still can go through the shallow zones with the smaller ships, they'd be fighting on equal (or worse) terms with the smaller ships defending the harbor.

The British had the maps is what I meant to point out, and the navigational and charting expertise to be able to mark the waters they'd be using. Some ships could be lost by becoming grounded off the coast, but that's a hazard in peace time as well.

As for big guns, well those can be a deterrent, but aren't a deterrent when the attack must be mounted and the big ships go in anyways. They might sink a few ships, but that's the cost of doing business in war. The heaviest guns aren't even available in larger quantities compared to their lighter cousins, so you're far more likely to see 10 and 8-inch Columbiads (pure Rodman guns were not built in large quantities) going up against 68-pound and 110-pound Armstrong guns of the fleet. An interesting competition to be sure.

I don't know who would win in any particular match up, but with the record of the ACW the attackers can give as good as the defenders, even with mines and ironclads in play.

In really depends on when in 1863 things go down, many of the harbor defences were still not quite up to snuff. Though again, this won't impact the blockade much, the forts are too far inland from the main channels to prevent the British from blocking them in most cases.
 
In any hypothetical war with the Union in this period the Admiralty had plans laid to blockade all the major ports and inlets and the 1,200 miles of coastline that supplied the Union war effort.

Shall I comment that the Admiralty's plans did not prove to be completely implementable even for the Crimean War? :winkytongue:

Either by winnowing the number of ports (seizing Portland) or by close blockade against the major ports. About the only one which might be daunting is New York due to the naval facilities there and the two entrances which need to be watched. The Union trade would, virtually over night, cease to exist. A small number of Confederate naval raiders caused a loss of IIRC something like 50% of the Union merchant marine either to direct loss or reflagging to escape raiders. The sudden declaration of open season by the largest navy in the world will be catastrophic.

In general, I agree but you are ignoring the fact that more than one side can play raiders game and this time the British merchant fleet could end up on a receiving side?


I haven't read anything about screw gunboats for the Russian fleet (evidently they provided enough reason to stand off from Kronstadt, though that was also a portion of the British and French disagreeing on strategy) but you are correct that the British generally only attacked fortified places when they felt compelled to, and with middling success. However, the destruction of Kinburn ought to be seen as instructive, since the introduction of ironclads fundamentally changed the game, making landward defences (especially purely masonry ones) nowhere near as effective as they had been. True the Americans have their own ironclads, but they can't protect everywhere and there's no guarantee they will be as powerful against British inshore ironclads.

Destruction of Kinburn proved all that you said but you missed an additional factor: the attacked fortification should not have any big guns (the top caliber in Kinburn was 24 pounders) and these guns should not be firing the bombs. Well, you also have to have this fortification isolated (also case with Bomarsund) and rather small (maps of both are available on the web). :winkytongue:


In really depends on when in 1863 things go down, many of the harbor defences were still not quite up to snuff. Though again, this won't impact the blockade much, the forts are too far inland from the main channels to prevent the British from blocking them in most cases.

Well, I was talking exclusively about the Boston Harbor forts which are on the islands protecting the harbor and on the coast itself.
 
By 1864, Britain has 22 sea-going ironclads and (IIRC) 13 coastal ironclads.

The number of ports that need to be blockaded is actually quite low, due to the dispersed US railroads - basically all you need to cover is the northern east coast.

MapRR1860.png
 
Shall I comment that the Admiralty's plans did not prove to be completely implementable even for the Crimean War? :winkytongue:

The Union blockade wasn't perfect either, but it bit nontheless. A British blockade would be similar, and British economic pressure is significant.

In general, I agree but you are ignoring the fact that more than one side can play raiders game and this time the British merchant fleet could end up on a receiving side?

Yes, but raiding isn't a war winning strategy. For American raiders trying to raid British commerce they have to deal with the fact that the British have squadrons stationed all over the world (which means raiders have an exponentially higher chance of being caught and sunk) the British have the tonnage to implement the convoy system as they did in previous wars and the Union raiders will have to seek easier but slimmer pickings elsewhere, the British have a global network of bases and ports to support their navy hunting the Union raiders, the raiders must rely on neutrality, and there's not a whole lot of large neutral ports they can depend on where British warships can't lie in wait for them.

The British are far better prepared to deal with Union raiders than the Union was to deal with Confederate raiders. Indeed, one of the reasons why the famed Alabama was so successful was because the Alabama would burn ships, then the Union would send ships chasing after her, by the time they arrived the Alabama would already be off. She was finally sunk when the USN caught her in port by waiting for her. A navy with a world wide presence and squadrons stationed at key points around the world stands a much better chance of intercepting raiders than one which lacks that infrastructure.

Destruction of Kinburn proved all that you said but you missed an additional factor: the attacked fortification should not have any big guns (the top caliber in Kinburn was 24 pounders) and these guns should not be firing the bombs. Well, you also have to have this fortification isolated (also case with Bomarsund) and rather small (maps of both are available on the web). :winkytongue:

ACW ironclads regularly took worse poundings, and the British ironclads some have argued have better armor than the American ones.

However, this is drifting a bit from the main topic of the thread.
 
With regards to the King Wheat/Corn myth, the research on that has debunked it pretty well; there's an article on JSTOR I have saved somewhere I'll try to post here in a day or so. Outside of that, removal of North American wheat would reduce British stocks to about 1858 levels, necessitating a small price rise possibly....but by 1866 British imports were basically at 1858 levels anyway so even that price rise might not occur. Regardless of that, wheat certainly won't be an issue for the British though.
 
It reminds me a bit of the whole "King Cotton" argument. Of course, it might be that King Grain (to coin a phrase) is correct whereas King Cotton wasn't, but the fact that we already have one example of a cessation of exports not leading to the expected chaos should give us pause, IMHO.

Plus, are there any contemporary examples of people predicting that a lack of American grain imports would be ruinous for Britain? The US and UK came close to war on at least one occasion (the Trent affair), so if Britain really was dependent on US grain (as opposed to buying US grain because it was cheaper, but able to find alternative sources if necessary), we'd expect the issue to come up, either in editorials or in governmental discussions.

There's a fairly detailed (albeit old) paper on the respective importance of wheat and cotton here (cotton in the first half, wheat in the second). He does cite some sources (both government discussions and editorials) discussing the potential shortfall of wheat (frustratingly, he generally references them rather than quotes them, but there are a few direct quotes).

I've got some numbers on grain totals exported/imported during certain years in the 1800s from here (table 2.2). So we can see that during a similar period (1853-57) three of those years Britain was at war with one of its major grain suppliers and was actively blockading them. It seems then than King Grain is not really a factor. Prices might rise, but would this derail the war effort? That is the question..

I note that the numbers on that table are very different from the numbers in the source I've cited above (see Table II), which seem to come from a reasonable source - he cites the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England for his numbers. For example, the table in my source has France as the number one source of grain to the UK in 1858, whereas France isn't mentioned at all in yours.

(Please don't take me as trying to push one source over the other so much as bringing up another one and pointing out a discrepancy between them).
 
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