Before Ike’s Threats: MacArthur’s Lunacy?
On December 9, 1950, after China entered the war, MacArthur requested commander’s discretion to use atomic weapons in Korea. Two weeks later he submitted “a list of retardation targets” for which he needed twenty-six atomic bombs. In interviews published posthumously, he said he had a plan that would have won the war in ten days: “I would have dropped between 30 and 50 atomic bombs... strung across the neck of Manchuria;” then he would have introduced half a million Nationalist troops at the Yalu, and “spread behind us—from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea—a belt of radioactive cobalt... it has an active life of between 60 and 120 years. For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North.” He expressed certainty that the Russians would have done nothing: “my plan was a cinch.”
If this was lunacy, MacArthur was hardly alone. Before China came into the war, a committee of the JCS had said that atomic bombs might be the “decisive factor” in cutting off a Chinese advance into Korea; initially they could be useful in “a ‘cordon sanitaire’ [that] might be established by the UN in a strip in Manchuria immediately north of the Manchurian border.” A few months later Congressman Albert Gore complained “Korea has become a meat grinder of American manhood,” and suggested “something cataclysmic” to end the war: a radiation belt dividing the Korean peninsula. Although Gen. Ridgway said nothing about cobalt bombs, in May 1951 he renewed MacArthur’s request of December 24, this time for thirty-eight atomic bombs. (The request was denied.)