WI: Germany wins Battle of Britain

[Deleted member 1487]

For the Luftwaffe to win the Battle, you require Göring not to be a nitwit & Luftwaffe intelligence not to be populated with boobs who don't know where the Spitfire factory is nor where Merlins are manufactured, & who know the difference between knocking out a target (like an airbase) & simply crossing it off an "attacked targets" list.

In short, you need them all to behave less like evil Marx brothers.

The Battle of Britain was unwinnable in its objective of gaining air superiority over Southern England and being able to maintain it enough to launch Sea Lion, which was the stated purpose of the BoB. Luftwaffe fighters were outnumbered from day one and the lopsidedness of the battle only grew as it went on, because the British were focused on fighter production, while the Germans very badly managed their production and focused it on bombers.

Goering was only part of the problem in that he followed Hitler's constant order changes blindly and threw in some of his own terrible ideas. His CoS Jeschonnek was equally as bad. Luftwaffe intelligence for all of its many faults, many of which actually go back to Goering staffing it with his sycophants without intelligence experience and the rejects from other departments, was really not to blame for the intelligence failures during the BoB. They were told to focus their intelligence gathering efforts on Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France, with Britain as an afterthought STARTING in 1938. Even then they said the BoB was the wrong strategy and strongly suggested focusing on bombing and mining British ports like General Felmy suggested after his staff study on fighting Britain in 1938, which Goering rejected as 'too pessimistic'.

While it is true that Luftwaffe intelligence would have performed far better with an experienced/trained leader and decent staff, they were not the decisive issue in losing that battle. Yes, the Luftwaffe could have fought it more effectively without Goering and with General Wever still running things properly (for that check out Michele's 'A better show in 1940'), I still don't think that it was winnable in any sense. Basically the best that could be hoped for was inflicting more losses with fewer Luftwaffe losses and potentially a failed Sea Lion. In fact it was actually strategically better for Germany to lose the Battle of Britain, as it saved them from the far higher losses that a failed Sea Lion would bring, not to mention the political consequences of the failed invasion. Overall it would have been the best not to fight the BoB at all, but rather focus on the targets that Luftwaffe intelligence suggested in the first place: British ports.

 

[deathscompanion1]

Amen to that. Hitler must have thought the British were going to quickly throw in the towel like the French did.

Half your country is occupied and your armies are smashed.

The absolute most you can do is make the enemy bleed more and kill off more of your countrymen.

France's situation at it's darkest hour was a hundred times worse than Britians.

The most devastating battles of WWI was fought on French soil the idea of halting the Germans and digging in for another round was probably more horrifying to the French than surrendering.

 

[Garrison]

Half your country is occupied and your armies are smashed.

The absolute most you can do is make the enemy bleed more and kill off more of your countrymen.

France's situation at it's darkest hour was a hundred times worse than Britians.

The most devastating battles of WWI was fought on French soil the idea of halting the Germans and digging in for another round was probably more horrifying to the French than surrendering.

All true but the Germans also thought the British would see their position as hopeless, one more mistake added to the pile.

 

[phx1138]

targets that Luftwaffe intelligence suggested in the first place: British ports.

And not the airbases, to attain air superiority?

 

[Michele]

The Battle of Britain was unwinnable in its objective of gaining air superiority over Southern England and being able to maintain it enough to launch Sea Lion, which was the stated purpose of the BoB.

...


While it is true that Luftwaffe intelligence would have performed far better with an experienced/trained leader and decent staff, they were not the decisive issue in losing that battle. Yes, the Luftwaffe could have fought it more effectively without Goering and with General Wever still running things properly (for that check out Michele's 'A better show in 1940'), I still don't think that it was winnable in any sense. Basically the best that could be hoped for was inflicting more losses with fewer Luftwaffe losses and potentially a failed Sea Lion. In fact it was actually strategically better for Germany to lose the Battle of Britain, as it saved them from the far higher losses that a failed Sea Lion would bring, not to mention the political consequences of the failed invasion.

Hey, thanks for the accolade! I knew you liked that timeline, but it's always a pleasure to find it mentioned as a good thing.

Overall it would have been the best not to fight the BoB at all, but rather focus on the targets that Luftwaffe intelligence suggested in the first place: British ports.

That would, of course, have meant settling for a long-term blockade/siege strategy, going hand in hand with the naval submarine/surface raider blockade. Dim prospects for Britain in the medium term - but it conflicts with Hitler's ideas for the following year.

 

[Michele]

And not the airbases, to attain air superiority?

By this token, in 1941 the German battleships should have sought a major naval battle, in order to wrestle naval superiority from the Royal Navy, instead of trying to sneak out and hunt the British shipping. Once the Bismarck, the Prinz Eugen and the Hipper have sunk all the British battleships, battle cruisers and aircraft carriers, they have naval superiority and they can starve the British Isles.

Naturally, the Germans stood no chance in such a strategy, so they didn't try that.

Objective A may well be, in theory, better than objective B. But if you have no chance, or only very puny chances, of achieving A, it's better if you settle for B.

 

[phx1138]

Naturally, the Germans stood no chance in such a strategy, so they didn't try that.

Objective A may well be, in theory, better than objective B. But if you have no chance, or only very puny chances, of achieving A, it's better if you settle for B.

I'm far less convinced than you Luftwaffe was incapable of achieving it over the landing zones, which was, in the end, all that was really needed. I'm also not entirely convinced it was impossible to achieve at least temporary superiority over southern England.

Given the landings were proposed to be by barges, ISTM intensive intruder operations against Bomber Command bases made the most strategic sense. (This also requires no evil Marx Brothers, again.)

 

[Michele]

I'm far less convinced than you Luftwaffe was incapable of achieving it over the landing zones, which was, in the end, all that was really needed. I'm also not entirely convinced it was impossible to achieve at least temporary superiority over southern England.

Sorry, this has been discussed to utter boredom. I'm not going to rehash it again here. I think you know where you can find the information.

Given the landings were proposed to be by barges, ISTM intensive intruder operations against Bomber Command bases made the most strategic sense. (This also requires no evil Marx Brothers, again.)

This hits the usual limitations. "Intensive", you say. This has to be daylight operations, and preferably using accurate bombing i.e. either twin engined bombers at very low level, or Stukas.
It means that bomber bases outside of Stuka range, and/or bomber bases outside of Bf 109 range, are safe and untouchable.

Alternatively, level bombers can be sent out at night hunting those far bomber bases. They mostly won't find them, and if they do, they will be very ineffective anyway.

Or finally, German bombers can be sent out without Bf 109s to try and reach those far Bomber Command bases in daylight. Slaughter of German bombers ensues.

From those safe bases, the British bombers can thus take off every night and head for their own targets. Unlike air bases, their targets are easy to find even at night, and close-packed (they are the ports of departure and the beachheads). Remember that without even dedicating an all-out effort to that, Bomber and Coastal Command sank or damaged around 12% of the German flotilla in its own ports.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I'm far less convinced than you Luftwaffe was incapable of achieving it over the landing zones, which was, in the end, all that was really needed. I'm also not entirely convinced it was impossible to achieve at least temporary superiority over southern England.

I'm with you on this one

 

[King Augeas]

I'm far less convinced than you Luftwaffe was incapable of achieving it over the landing zones, which was, in the end, all that was really needed.

Needed to do what? Convince Hitler to implement Sealion? That's arguably true.

Just keep an eye on the difference between a successful invasion and a failed one...

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I'm far less convinced than you Luftwaffe was incapable of achieving it over the landing zones, which was, in the end, all that was really needed. I'm also not entirely convinced it was impossible to achieve at least temporary superiority over southern England.

Given the landings were proposed to be by barges, ISTM intensive intruder operations against Bomber Command bases made the most strategic sense. (This also requires no evil Marx Brothers, again.)

The problem with trying to achieve such air superiority is that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered in terms of fighters and fighter pilots in July 1940. It only got worse from there. German bombers didn't have sufficient protection to survive on their own, so fighters are really the only real means of protection unless they are bombing at night, which has accuracy issues.
Remember too that it took the USAAF and RAF 3 years with their massive production, training, numerical, supply, and later technological superiority to achieve daylight superiority over Germany and even this only with German distracted by a multifront ground and air war.

As it was Germany as the attacker was outnumbered in terms of fighters AND production. Plus the Luftwaffe fighters couldn't reach very far into Britain, which meant that no matter what was achieved shallowly along the coast in terms of British airfield bombing, the RAF had plenty of airfields out of fighter cover, so the LW is not hitting anywhere near a critical number of fields. Not only that, but the attrition war heavily favors the British, not least because of Radar.

In short a daylight air superiority battle is just not winnable for the Luftwaffe, nor is Sea Lion remotely potentially successful.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

The problem with trying to achieve such air superiority is that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered in terms of fighters and fighter pilots in July 1940. It only got worse from there. German bombers didn't have sufficient protection to survive on their own, so fighters are really the only real means of protection unless they are bombing at night, which has accuracy issues.
Remember too that it took the USAAF and RAF 3 years with their massive production, training, numerical, supply, and later technological superiority to achieve daylight superiority over Germany and even this only with German distracted by a multifront ground and air war.

As it was Germany as the attacker was outnumbered in terms of fighters AND production. Plus the Luftwaffe fighters couldn't reach very far into Britain, which meant that no matter what was achieved shallowly along the coast in terms of British airfield bombing, the RAF had plenty of airfields out of fighter cover, so the LW is not hitting anywhere near a critical number of fields. Not only that, but the attrition war heavily favors the British, not least because of Radar.

In short a daylight air superiority battle is just not winnable for the Luftwaffe, nor is Sea Lion remotely potentially successful.

My understanding is that the RAF had 644 fighters available in early July with 1249 pilots. Facing them were 1464 fighters of the Luftwaffe plus 1380 bombers and 428 dive bombers. I have never been able to tie down exactly how many pilots were available for the LW but I'm assuming they had at least enough to pilot the planes plus reserves. This means that it was RAF Fighter Command that was outnumbered.

Production figures of fighters on both sides amount to an average of 225 per month for the Germans and at their peak the British could manage 295 (plus a good rate of repaired aircraft). As far as the pilots were concerned it has been widely recognised that the Germans had the advantage of experience at the start of the campaign and that their training programme was far in advance of the British and in full swing, churning out 800 new pilots a month as opposed to the 200 a month of the British. The RAF was lucky in the fact that it managed to introduce 5 new squadrons of foreign pilots between July and October plus receiving pilots from bomber command and the Royal Observer Corp.

In a war of attrition logic would say that the RAF was doomed, we know that wasn't the case but at the beginning I'm sure there were a lot of worried RAF commanders.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

My understanding is that the RAF had 644 fighters available in early July with 1249 pilots. Facing them were 1464 fighters of the Luftwaffe plus 1380 bombers and 428 dive bombers. I have never been able to tie down exactly how many pilots were available for the LW but I'm assuming they had at least enough to pilot the planes plus reserves. This means that it was RAF Fighter Command that was outnumbered.

http://www.amazon.com/The-Battle-Britain-Myth-Reality/dp/0393322971
This book has very different numbers than that. August might be his start point though. I don't have my copy in front of me, I won't has access for another week or so. I can look things up then, but from what I remember the LW had about 850 fighters and fewer fighter pilots (they had the lowest priority for assignment of personnel because fighters were viewed as a defensive weapon), while the RAF had excess pilots and rapidly climbing fighter production thanks to major investments in the industry and much more efficiency in production than the LW.

Production figures of fighters on both sides amount to an average of 225 per month for the Germans and at their peak the British could manage 295 (plus a good rate of repaired aircraft). As far as the pilots were concerned it has been widely recognised that the Germans had the advantage of experience at the start of the campaign and that their training programme was far in advance of the British and in full swing, churning out 800 new pilots a month as opposed to the 200 a month of the British. The RAF was lucky in the fact that it managed to introduce 5 new squadrons of foreign pilots between July and October plus receiving pilots from bomber command and the Royal Observer Corp.

LW losses were write offs both for the pilot and aircraft when they were lost over Britain. Not so for Britain, which could often repair damaged aircraft and save their own pilots for another day. The experience advantage quickly eroded, because the LW had to expend so much of their fuel coming over the Channel that they had only 30 minutes of fuel to fight with. The Spitfire out turned the ME109, as did the Hurricane. Plus radar meant that the RAF could mass to turn back major bombing raids, while not engaging fighter sweeps. Radar was the massive advantage that allowed the RAF to stay fresh, while German pilots were worn down and became fatigued, which made them vulnerable to mistakes.

An excellent explanation of all the factors of the BoB:
http://www.amazon.com/Most-Dangerou...8047&sr=1-1&keywords=the+most+dangerous+enemy

The RAF had the advantage even if numbers were equal, which they quickly weren't.
Plus there was purchasing from the US, which added its aircraft production to Britain's.

In a war of attrition logic would say that the RAF was doomed, we know that wasn't the case but at the beginning I'm sure there were a lot of worried RAF commanders.

In a war of attrition the LW was doomed, as it was the attacker and had higher attrition rates than the RAF. Plus the RAF produced more aircraft from 1940-3 than the LW:
http://www.scottmanning.com/archives/1940aircraftproduction.php
15,000 RAF
10,000 Luftwaffe

On the back of adequate planning and decentralization, the UK aircraft production figures compensated for losses and failures of certain aircraft types. Fighter production was very impressive with the RAF stronger at the end of the Battle of Britain than at the beginning. By early 1941, over 1,000 Spitfires would be based on the Channel Front. The Luftwaffe's bombing campaign barely interrupted British production.

Not only that, but Britain was purchasing from the US, so that needs to be factored into your assessment. Britain had an outside advantage that Germany did not.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

This book has very different numbers than that. August might be his start point though. I don't have my copy in front of me, I won't has access for another week or so. I can look things up then, but from what I remember the LW had about 850 fighters and fewer fighter pilots (they had the lowest priority for assignment of personnel because fighters were viewed as a defensive weapon), while the RAF had excess pilots and rapidly climbing fighter production thanks to major investments in the industry and much more efficiency in production than the LW.


LW losses were write offs both for the pilot and aircraft when they were lost over Britain. Not so for Britain, which could often repair damaged aircraft and save their own pilots for another day. The experience advantage quickly eroded, because the LW had to expend so much of their fuel coming over the Channel that they had only 30 minutes of fuel to fight with. The Spitfire out turned the ME109, as did the Hurricane. Plus radar meant that the RAF could mass to turn back major bombing raids, while not engaging fighter sweeps. Radar was the massive advantage that allowed the RAF to stay fresh, while German pilots were worn down and became fatigued, which made them vulnerable to mistakes.

In a war of attrition the LW was doomed, as it was the attacker and had higher attrition rates than the RAF. Plus the RAF produced more aircraft from 1940-3 than the LW:
http://www.scottmanning.com/archives/1940aircraftproduction.php
15,000 RAF
10,000 Luftwaffe

We could go round in circles on this one all day.

I never said the RAF wasn't producing more planes in fact the figures I have are 4283 for the British and 2735 for the Germans plus a further 2852 bombers and 603 dive bombers. Those figures relate to the whole of 1940 and I know that a number of those produced by both sides were to replace losses prior to the BoB. Not only that the planes on both sides were not just destined to go to the BoB battlegrounds. But the starting figures don't lie and I also know that the kill rates were almost 2:1 in the RAF's favour but that includes the "vulnerable" bombers which were easier to shoot down.

If we are talking about accidents and mishaps and fatigue you only need to look at the first month of the BoB, 10th July to 11th August and there were 47 fighters of the RAF written off and 68 badly damaged due to accidents as compared to 85 brought down by the enemy to realise that both sides were feeling the strain.

The number of available RAF fighters never rose above 740 throughout the BoB (10th July - 31st October) and couldn't have risen much higher if they had tried as there were only 12 fighters assigned to each of the 66 squadrons that eventually took part. The pilots were not coming through as quickly as it was hoped which led to the decision to cut the number of pilots in a squadron from 26 to 16 on or around 8th September, barely a reserve at all.

 

[Michele]

My understanding is that the RAF had 644 fighters available in early July with 1249 pilots. Facing them were 1464 fighters of the Luftwaffe

You are comparing figures for serviceable, operational fighters with the combat units - for the RAF - with figures for the total number of machines on strength, including the non-serviceable ones, plus the NJG1 back in Germany training for night fighting, and JG 77 in Norway - for the Luftwaffe.

Data from Bungay, Mason, Murray; the latter are based on Abteilung 6's (der OKL) strength returns of June 29.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You are comparing figures for serviceable, operational fighters with the combat units - for the RAF - with figures for the total number of machines on strength, including the non-serviceable ones, plus the NJG1 back in Germany training for night fighting, and JG 77 in Norway - for the Luftwaffe.

Data from Bungay, Mason, Murray; the latter are based on Abteilung 6's (der OKL) strength returns of June 29.

Ah, thanks for bringing that up. The LW figures also included non-serviceable fighters as well in all theaters, without noting that the LW had a serviceability rate of barely more than 50% throughout the BoB, while the RAF had more than 60% IIRC. And the RAF had a larger reserve of fighter pilots, which allowed them to rotate out. Plus the Germans found that as much as 25% of their new fighter deliveries had to be rejected do to poor workmanship and sabotage, as Polish forced labor was starting to be used in 1940.

 

[Michele]

I can look things up then, but from what I remember the LW had about 850 fighters

You are probably remembering the figure for operational Bf 109s. The total Bf 109s at hand, including the non-operational ones, and those with NJG 1 and JG 77, is 1,107. 850 would be over 75% serviceability, not bad, but bound to get worse, of course.

Indeed, if one wants to compare apples with apples, it's a good idea to compare serviceable aircraft with serviceable aircraft.

Interestingly enough, at this time the Luftwaffe fighter arm had 906 combat-ready Bf 109 pilots. They were 869 one month later, and 735 on September 1. Meanwhile, Fighter Command went from 936 Hurricane and Spitfire pilots on July 1, to 946 on September 1. In short, every British fighter had 1.5 to 2 pilots for it, thus adding to the laughability of the notion that it's the British fighter pilots who get tired.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Interestingly enough, at this time the Luftwaffe fighter arm had 906 combat-ready Bf 109 pilots. They were 869 one month later, and 735 on September 1.

While we're on the subject of Luftwaffe Pilots do you have a good reliable source for the totals of trained pilots as its the last bit of research I need to fit in my jigsaw that is the BoB?

 

[Ian Hathaway]

While we're on the subject of Luftwaffe Pilots do you have a good reliable source for the totals of trained pilots as its the last bit of research I need to fit in my jigsaw that is the BoB?

The problem is the only stats I can find for pilot losses is one that states that in August 1940 the RAF lost 256 pilots killed, missing or wounded and that the LW lost 76 Bf109 and Bf110 pilots killed, missing or wounded so I might have to use those figures as the reference for all my future research unless I can find a more reliable source.

 

[Michele]

Ah, thanks for bringing that up. The LW figures also included non-serviceable fighters as well in all theaters, without noting that the LW had a serviceability rate of barely more than 50% throughout the BoB, while the RAF had more than 60% IIRC. And the RAF had a larger reserve of fighter pilots, which allowed them to rotate out.

Sorry, my last message was posted without having seen this one of yours. Certainly 50-60% serviceability seems very low, for both sides. You'd better check your books when you have again access to them.

Plus the Germans found that as much as 25% of their new fighter deliveries had to be rejected do to poor workmanship and sabotage, as Polish forced labor was starting to be used in 1940.

I didn't know this bit, thanks, interesting.