WI: Germany wins Battle of Britain
- Thread starter Kaiser K
- Start date
No, it doesn't it says "Humane commander who know more Frenchmen dead won't change anything."
Sternberg
Banned
For a successful Battle of Britain, I believe that one would need to go back to shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, with Danzig being peacefully annexed and the United States completely staying out of the war, but battlegrounds opening up in the Low Countries and France between Germany and the Western Allies. Assuming that we have Germany marching through Amsterdam, Brussels, Luxembourg, and Paris by mid-1940 at the very latest, Germany would need to prove that they can attain both aerial, naval, and land superiority over the British. And even though I'm Canadian, I still believe that a German amphibious invasion of Great Britain was completely feasible had Hitler made better decisions and was able to demonstrate the combined power of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine.
Once the Third Reich gains aerial superiority over the British (let's say September 1940, per my Alternate Fallout timeline), they'll then need to get the Kriegsmarine to dominate the Royal Navy as well. Perhaps we can see dive bombers being used much earlier, as well as aircraft carriers being prominently used by the Kriegsmarine. By April 1941, also bringing reference from my own Alternate Fallout timeline, The Royal Navy has been dealt a killing blow in the seas of Europe, and then the Third Reich would be ready for a combined amphibious and aerial invasion of Britain. Think the Battle of France, but a couple times more bloodshed and destruction. Massive urban battles in London, the Windsors being evacuated to Canada, and by as early as January 1942, we could see Oswald Mosley as the figurehead leader of fascist puppet state Britain.
Only thing that's in the way now are the Free Western Allies in Africa, the Eastern Allies, and then of course, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. Would have required Germany to get the atomic bomb, and for Hitler to have read a couple books that made him a more competent leader, but hey, it could have happened! Believe it or not, Nazi Germany was actually quite close to occupying the same niche the Soviet Union held during the Cold War. They were polar opposites, yes, but they were both totalitarian states with a vast array of power. I'm a firm believer that WWII could have either turned out with a Cold War with America versus the Soviet Union per OTL, or Nazi Germany per many ATLs. It's just that with a Nazi victory, I don't really expect civilization as it was after the war to come out in one piece, because we all know how aggressive the Third Reich was!
I don't want to set the world on fire...
Once the Third Reich gains aerial superiority over the British (let's say September 1940, per my Alternate Fallout timeline), they'll then need to get the Kriegsmarine to dominate the Royal Navy as well. Perhaps we can see dive bombers being used much earlier, as well as aircraft carriers being prominently used by the Kriegsmarine. By April 1941, also bringing reference from my own Alternate Fallout timeline, The Royal Navy has been dealt a killing blow in the seas of Europe, and then the Third Reich would be ready for a combined amphibious and aerial invasion of Britain. Think the Battle of France, but a couple times more bloodshed and destruction. Massive urban battles in London, the Windsors being evacuated to Canada, and by as early as January 1942, we could see Oswald Mosley as the figurehead leader of fascist puppet state Britain.
Only thing that's in the way now are the Free Western Allies in Africa, the Eastern Allies, and then of course, the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. Would have required Germany to get the atomic bomb, and for Hitler to have read a couple books that made him a more competent leader, but hey, it could have happened! Believe it or not, Nazi Germany was actually quite close to occupying the same niche the Soviet Union held during the Cold War. They were polar opposites, yes, but they were both totalitarian states with a vast array of power. I'm a firm believer that WWII could have either turned out with a Cold War with America versus the Soviet Union per OTL, or Nazi Germany per many ATLs. It's just that with a Nazi victory, I don't really expect civilization as it was after the war to come out in one piece, because we all know how aggressive the Third Reich was!
I don't want to set the world on fire...
Snake Featherston
Banned
This scenario is impossible because Germany 1) first and most crucially under Adolf Hitler will never want to destroy the Empire, let alone defeat the UK on the Home Islands. Without overcoming this factor all the rest are irrelevant. Hitler's goal is blazing a new Europe on the skeletons of murdered Slavs and Jews, not defeating the UK. 2) Germany doesn't have Navy enough after Norway. 3) Germany does not have an air force capable of defeating an enemy all by itself. Neither did anyone else at the time, but the Germans were the first ones dumb enough to try.
My first question is How?
The Kriegsmarine trashing the Royal Navy? I believe we need to start a little earlier then just before the onset of WWII in Europe to make that occur in any plausible manner.
But, assuming this happens in such a manner, I wonder what will happen in India.
I think if Hitler would have died, the Nazi leadership reshuffled and Nazi Germany slowly recovering from a period of internal political turmoil things would calm down a bit after a while.
I once read a really nice time line about New Europe what looked like a lot more plausible Nazi dominated Europe instead of the usual Generalplan Ost wanks.
(This is the map they used)
If anyone can tell me the link again that would be great.
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C'on people...
So, how they will make it happen? And don't say it couldn't be done, because any good decision, strategy etc. can bring down British Empire if they carried out properly. Say it that I am no military thinker, but I say that it was possible. (Rule Britannia? They can't even stop a 'semi-naked fakir' from gaining independence for his country...
)
So, how they will make it happen? And don't say it couldn't be done, because any good decision, strategy etc. can bring down British Empire if they carried out properly. Say it that I am no military thinker, but I say that it was possible. (Rule Britannia? They can't even stop a 'semi-naked fakir' from gaining independence for his country...
)My first question is How?
The Kriegsmarine trashing the Royal Navy? I believe we need to start a little earlier then just before the onset of WWII in Europe to make that occur in any plausible manner.
But, assuming this happens in such a manner, I wonder what will happen in India.
I think if Hitler would have died, the Nazi leadership reshuffled and Nazi Germany slowly recovering from a period of internal political turmoil things would calm down a bit after a while.
I once read a really nice time line about New Europe what looked like a lot more plausible Nazi dominated Europe instead of the usual Generalplan Ost wanks.
(This is the map they used)
If anyone can tell me the link again that would be great.
Which?
Has anybody ever considered doing a statistical study of the relative strength and capability of Fighter command during the early stages of the BoB to see what the outcome might be?
There are trends that become obvious once you begin this kind of thing and there are plenty of official sources for the number of aircraft, pilots killed etc. out there.
It's a bit of a leading question actually as I have already done it and a few of you might be surprised at the results.
There are trends that become obvious once you begin this kind of thing and there are plenty of official sources for the number of aircraft, pilots killed etc. out there.
It's a bit of a leading question actually as I have already done it and a few of you might be surprised at the results.
Well, it depends on what you mean by "the early stages". There are some snippets on Wikipedia, saying that Air Marshall Peter Dye stated that the number of pilots in RAF Fighter Command increased during July, August and September, presumably on a monthly basis, and that the RAF had more fighter pilots available than the Luftwaffe throughout the battle (although I wouldn't like to comment on the quality or experience of many of them!), while Richard Overy states that the number of serviceable and total RAF fighters both increased during the peak of the battle, from 3 August to 7 September.
OTOH, the 1950s-1960s view was more critical, but even the figures quoted there suggest that the rate of attrition of Fighter Command was quite slow, and certainly too slow for air superiority to be won before autumn storms made a barge invasion insane.
I absolutely agree with everything you just said. However what is interesting is the date that the attacks were switched to London ... it was right at the pivot point ... and I mean one day more and the difference would have been seen. The switch of targets meant that fighter command got a breather for a week or so. The figures speak for themselves when you look at them on a daily basis. On 8th September the RAF is able to fly less than 50% of the sorties it was flying in the previous two weeks and that continued for six days. Also during this period the number of serviceable fighters drops by almost 10%, quickly to recover again after the six day period. If the attacks had continued on the military targets there wouldn't have been the respite and battle fatigue would have kicked in and a rapid decline in the effectiveness of fighter command would have ensued. To the point where (I believe) fighter command would not have been able to stop the constant attacks for anything more than two more weeks. I've tried all kinds of variables to try to boost the effectiveness of fighter command after 7th September and the results are almost always the same.
Stephen Bungay ‘Most Dangerous Enemy’
Fighter Command’s victory was decisive. Not only had it survived it ended the battle stronger that it had ever been. On 6 July its operational strength stood at 1,259 pilots. On 2 November, the figure was 1,796, an increase of over 40%. It had also seriously mauled its assailant. In a lecture held in Berlin on 2 February 1944, the Intelligence officer of KG2, Hauptmann Otto Bechtle, showed that from August to December 1940 German fighter strength declined by 30% and bomber strength by 25%.
Many believe that Luftwaffe came close in the last week of August and the first week of September. In fact, all the fury achieved little. The only Sector Station to go down at all was Biggen Hill, and it was non-operational for just a few hours. 11 Group’s efficiency was impaired, and Park was vociferous about that, in part because he wanted to make the point that it did indeed matter whether interceptions took place before or after bombing, and in part because of his rage with 12 Group for not protecting his airfields when he asked them to.
Dowding was more objective, commenting in his letter accompanying Park’s report on the period of 8 August to 10 September.
‘I agree with Air Officer Commanding 11 Group that the damage done by air attack to aerodromes has been serious, and that it was beginning at one time to affect materially the efficiency of our fighter operations. Nevertheless, I must point out…
That 13 aerodromes in the Group underwent a total of forty attacks in three weeks, but Manston and Lympne were the only two that were unfit for flying for more than a few hours.
That although the scale of attack certainly exceeded the capacity of the works organisation existing at the outset, this was rapidly strengthened, and I do not wish to express any dissatisfaction with the measures taken to effect this improvement.
Park could not afford to be complacent, but Dowding states the facts.
The Luftwaffe’s turn on London was a relief, but it was not critical. Even if the Luftwaffe had continued to pound the airfields, the counter-measures put in place and the robustness of the system would still have ensured its survival. Whether they attacked London or Biggen Hill or any other target made no difference whatever to the loss-rate in the air. Some of the Luftwaffe’s most successful days of air fighting, 11, 14 and 28 September, came after they had turned on the capitol.
Fighter Command’s victory was decisive. Not only had it survived it ended the battle stronger that it had ever been. On 6 July its operational strength stood at 1,259 pilots. On 2 November, the figure was 1,796, an increase of over 40%. It had also seriously mauled its assailant. In a lecture held in Berlin on 2 February 1944, the Intelligence officer of KG2, Hauptmann Otto Bechtle, showed that from August to December 1940 German fighter strength declined by 30% and bomber strength by 25%.
Many believe that Luftwaffe came close in the last week of August and the first week of September. In fact, all the fury achieved little. The only Sector Station to go down at all was Biggen Hill, and it was non-operational for just a few hours. 11 Group’s efficiency was impaired, and Park was vociferous about that, in part because he wanted to make the point that it did indeed matter whether interceptions took place before or after bombing, and in part because of his rage with 12 Group for not protecting his airfields when he asked them to.
Dowding was more objective, commenting in his letter accompanying Park’s report on the period of 8 August to 10 September.
‘I agree with Air Officer Commanding 11 Group that the damage done by air attack to aerodromes has been serious, and that it was beginning at one time to affect materially the efficiency of our fighter operations. Nevertheless, I must point out…
That 13 aerodromes in the Group underwent a total of forty attacks in three weeks, but Manston and Lympne were the only two that were unfit for flying for more than a few hours.
That although the scale of attack certainly exceeded the capacity of the works organisation existing at the outset, this was rapidly strengthened, and I do not wish to express any dissatisfaction with the measures taken to effect this improvement.
Park could not afford to be complacent, but Dowding states the facts.
The Luftwaffe’s turn on London was a relief, but it was not critical. Even if the Luftwaffe had continued to pound the airfields, the counter-measures put in place and the robustness of the system would still have ensured its survival. Whether they attacked London or Biggen Hill or any other target made no difference whatever to the loss-rate in the air. Some of the Luftwaffe’s most successful days of air fighting, 11, 14 and 28 September, came after they had turned on the capitol.
Dude.
On 8th September Fighter Command carried out few sorties because a) it was largely a cloudy day and b) because the Germans were the ones who did not want, or could not, continue with major daylight operations.
Note by the way that on 8th September, in daylight, the Luftwaffe sent out some 130 combat sorties (plus recon flights); of these, about 50 were against London.
Also note that on that morning, Fighter Command had 197 Spitfires and 381 Hurricanes operational.
As to the "lull" you make it sound as if that was due to some bad decision by the Luftwaffe.
Actually it was due to the weather, mostly. Additionally, it's not as if the Luftwaffe didn't need the rest. But mostly the weather.
In the following week, indeed, there was one day with reasonably good weather. For the rest, the Germans had to carry out medium-to-smaller-scale operations simply because they had to push them through the clouds and/or in the occasional few hours of reasonable weather.
On the 9th there were "scattered showers, thundery in the East". The Germans carried out a mid-sized attack against London.
On the 10th, "generally cloudy, some rain". The Germans carried out nuisance raids (I mean, 1-aircraft raids).
On the 11th, the weather was "mainly fine, but with some showers. Cloud in the Channel"; the Germans launched one mid-sized attack.
On the 12th the weather was "unsettled, rain in most districts". The Germans carried out recon flights only.
On the 13th the weather was "unsettled"; the Germans carried out many small raids - some by 1 aircraft.
On the 14th, "showers and local thunder, cloudy in the Straits and Channel". The Germans carried out two mid-to-small attacks, mostly against London.
On none of these days Fighter Command had less Spitfires and Hurricanes operational than on the 8th; actually they never had less than 600, taken together.
So are you seriously going to claim that if the Germans had attacked the airfields in this bad-weather week, with the kind of meager efforts they managed to put through in actual history, they could have seriously damaged the airfields? And are you seriously arguing that the lower-level of Fighter Command activity in this week is due to some weakness, as opposed to the fact that Germans simply weren't coming in large numbers?
If this is the level of your "analysis", just go back to reading.
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I will now use a few metaphors to explain your situation to you. You are trying to reinvent the wheel. Not only that. You are also trying to convince everybody that your design of the wheel, a cubic-shaped device, will work better than the cylinder-shaped ones everyone else already uses.
Additionally, as to your question of whether somebody had already looked up the data, any data. Look around you. You are standing in the middle of a sea mammal cemetery. You evidently have not looked at the tombs, i.e. the threads, as already recommended to you. Get used to the fact that all of these poor beasts died in the same way: they were driven to the start line and they were flogged to death. Once they were buried, however, young, enthusiastic, eager, ignorant I'm-smarter-than-Raeder guys showed up with a shovel, disturbed the burials, and tried a Frankenstein on those corpses, flogging them again. Needless to say they failed.
The interesting thing about the loss ratios on those two days, 11 and 14 September, and a point made by the same source (Bungay) is exactly that the Luftwaffe had some measure of success in the air combat on days of limited activity. Such as, indeed, those two days.
When there were limited operations, and, if at all possible, limited visibility (and those two days did not have fair weather), which would level the playing field of vectored interceptions, the Germans might hope to succeed.
Unfortunately, while the kill ratio was in favor of the Luftwaffe, exactly because the scale of the operations was limited, the actual totals of enemy aircraft downed weren't exciting. Taken together, 11 and 14 September account for 38 losses for Fighter Command (paid for with 29 German aircraft). That's a 1.3:1 loss ratio in favor of the Luftwaffe.
In order to defeat the British air defense, the Germans had, however, to carry out large aerial battles. And when they had good weather and enough aircraft for those - they lost them.
Indeed, on the day after, a fair day on which there was a large German effort, the Germans took a 2:1 loss ratio (in favor of the RAF), but the actual figures were 56 to 28.
In short, had the Germans had more good-weather, maximum-effort days, chances are they would have been soundly beaten in most or all of them, not only incurring in an adverse loss ratio but also having that in large numbers. If the Germans had had more good kill ratio days, chances are these would have been like the two days mentioned above, in which the actual figures of British aircraft downed would be low.
On their three best days, the Germans had 4:1, 2.5:1 and 1.4:1 ratios. The first figure looks terrific, and the second is good. Unfortunately, these amount to a puny 37 British aircraft downed.
On their three best days, the British had 3.6:1, 2.3:1 and roughly 2:1 ratios. These three days amount to 191 German aircraft downed.
I saw an interesting study about a year ago which suggested Germany might have been able to pull off Operation Walrus if it were done as a follow-up to an Axis victory in the Mediterranean. The study assumes that with the Mediterranean an Axis lake that Vichy, Spanish, and Italian ships would be able to help Germany defeat the Royal Navy. And with Britain out of the way Barbarossa wouldn't be part of a two-front war.
The wild card would be whether the British make good on plans to use mustard gas against the invaders, and this could have led to a pyrrhic British victory. It would have made it much harder for FDR to sell Lend-Lease to the American public, and when the Germans had an industrial plant for Tabun production in 1942 they would have remembered that the British used poison gas first.
The wild card would be whether the British make good on plans to use mustard gas against the invaders, and this could have led to a pyrrhic British victory. It would have made it much harder for FDR to sell Lend-Lease to the American public, and when the Germans had an industrial plant for Tabun production in 1942 they would have remembered that the British used poison gas first.
That's an extraordinary statistic.
A couple of other things to note - first, the best plane for attacking airfields was probably the Stuka, but it had been withdrawn from the battle after crippling losses on the 18th August. AFAIK attacking airfields was rather costly anyway, the planes had to fly low and slowish and were vulnerable to AA fire and being jumped. Also, it's no use attacking airfields if you attack the wrong ones - Coastal Command's Eastchurch was attacked seven times.
Reading this thread makes me think of a famous song of the time:
We'll meet again,
Don't know where, don't know when,
But I know we'll meet again, some sunny day
Keep typing through,
Just like you, always do,
Till old posters chase the arguments, faaar away
We'll meet again,
Don't know where, don't know when,
But I know we'll meet again, some sunny day
Keep typing through,
Just like you, always do,
Till old posters chase the arguments, faaar away
Firstly I'd just like to say that I would not and have not questioned your motives or even tried to second guess what they are for posting what you do here, so would you please refrain from doing the same with me.
I come from the standpoint that anything is possible until proven otherwise, its just the way I am. I like to gather as much information as possible whether it does or doesn't support the popular views of others. If you spot an error or disagree with anything I write then please tell me so and then point me in the direction of your source so that I can add it to my research rather than mock me. I am not here to challenge others beliefs or try to overturn their views I am simply here to share knowledge, to soak up what others have discovered and to pass on anything I think people might find interesting. Now that you know this please do not assume that you know who I am or why I am here.
I have looked at many threads both here and on other sites that deal with this subject, and by this subject I mean the Battle of Britain as it has become known, and not Operation Sea Lion which I have not mentioned here in this thread. I must admit that I am slightly flattered that you think I am young, enthusiastic and eager whereas in fact I am less than young and my enthusiasm and eagerness have waned over time (unless you were just talking in general terms). I will admit that despite reading and researching the events of WW2 for over 30 years there are a lot of gaps in my knowledge which, as I mentioned before, was my main reason for joining this site.
So I stand corrected regarding the number of planes available, the low point of fighter availability came 12 days after the switch of targets not 6 as I posted, I wrote that originally from memory rather than from my notes, my mistake ... sorry. Fighter commands level of Spitfire + Hurricane did not drop below the 600 mark until 15th to 19th after which there was a rapid influx of operational fighters again.
For those that are interested I will be posting a thread soon that talks about the effects of fatigue and combat stress on fighter command and would be more than welcome to accept additional information that may have an affect on the results.
Michele, it looks like we have already used the main source (or similar) to gather our figures on available resources although I will accept that we have both interpreted what is there differently. For instance, on 11th September:
Weather: Mainly fine with some local showers. Cloud in the Channel and Thames Estuary.
Day: Three large raids in the south-east, including London. Portsmouth and Southampton attacked.
However my analysis of the subject uses this information, plus other statistics from other sources to try to predict what might have been and the more data that is fed into the analysis the better. I'm hoping it can also be used to feed in a lot of "what if's" to see if it changes things. Remember the MORE data that is fed in the more accurate the results.
For the Luftwaffe to win the Battle, you require Göring not to be a nitwit & Luftwaffe intelligence not to be populated with boobs who don't know where the Spitfire factory is nor where Merlins are manufactured, & who know the difference between knocking out a target (like an airbase) & simply crossing it off an "attacked targets" list.
In short, you need them all to behave less like evil Marx brothers.
& who know the difference between knocking out a target (like an airbase) & simply crossing it off an "attacked targets" list.In short, you need them all to behave less like evil Marx brothers.